...the emotion which we feel for the mifery of others, B when 2 Of PRoPRIETY. Part I. when we either fee it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive forrow from the forrow of others is a matter of fact too obvious to require any inftances to prove...

...this kind is pity or companion, the emotion which we feel for the mifery of others, when we either fee it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner.' That we often derive forrow from fame t;me a perfeftly natural road of the forrow of others, is too obvious fpeculation...

...is pity or compaffion, the emotion which we feel for the mifery of others, B when \vhenwe either fee it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive forrow from the forrow of others is a matter of fact too obvious to require any inftances to prove...

...is. pity or compafllon, the emotion which we feeI for the mifery of others, B when when we either fee it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive forrow from the forrow of others is a matter of fact too obvious to require any inftances to prove...

...which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing...a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it ; for...

...which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing...a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for...

...which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing...a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from'the sonow of tttheis, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for...

...interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him. though he deiives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it....a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it ; for...

...nature which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, tho' he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing...for the misery of others, when we either see it, or conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter...

...which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, an emotion of the moral sentiments, by which we feel for the misery of others, or joy and pleasure...