The resolu

tions of this

upon.

CHAP. VII. ruled by a great majority, and the whole was 1778. communicated to the public at the same time. The succeeding day, other resolutions were body there passed, recommending it to the different states to pardon, under such limitations as they might respectively think proper to make, such of their misguided citizens as had levied war against the United States.

This resolution was accompanied with an order, directing it to be printed in English and in German, and requesting general Washing. ton to take such measures as he should deem most effectual for circulating the copies among the American levies in the enemy's army.

This measure had been originally recom. mended by the commander in chief, and the resolution, requiring him to cause its circulation in the camp of the enemy, afforded a fair retort on major general Tryon. In a letter to that officer, acknowledging the receipt from him of that which enclosed the bills brought into parliament, he transmitted to him copies of the resolve just mentioned, with a request that he would be instrumental in making them known to the persons on whom they were to operate.

During these transactions, the frigate la Sensible arrived with the important and interesting intelligence, that treaties of alliance, and of commerce, had been formed between the United States of America and France. This intelligence was brought over by mr. Simeon

Deare, the brother of the American minister in CHAP. VII. Paris, who, while on his way to congress, 1778. communicated it to general Washington.

The joy which this event diffused throughout the United States may readily be conceived. It had long been anxiously expected, and the delays attending it had been such, as, at length, to excite serious apprehensions that it would never take place.

France, naturally the rival of Britain, was yet extremely sore under the wounds inflicted during the war, which terminated in 1763. It was impossible to reflect on a treaty which had wrested from her so fair a part of North America, without feeling resentments which would seek the first occasion of gratification.

The growing discontents between Great Britain and her colonies were consequently viewed at a distance with secret satisfaction; but rather as a circumstance which might have some tendency to weaken and embarrass a rival power, and which from motives of general policy was to be encouraged, than as one from which any definite and ascertained good was to be derived.

Indeed, the advantage most particularly contemplated from this quarrel, seems to have been security, during its continuance, from any views which the restless temper and ambition attributed to the court of London might form for the disturbance of France.

CHAP. VII. That nation appears, at that time, to have 1778. required and wished for repose. The great exertions of the preceding disastrous war had so deranged its finances, that the wish to cultivate peace seems to have predominated in the cabinet. The young monarch, who had just ascended the throne, possessed a pacific, unambitious temper, by no means inclined to hazard his own dominions for the sake of harassing his neighbours; and the councils of France were guided by men alike indisposed to disturb the general tranquillity.

The jealousy, then, and the resentment towards England, which prevailed in the cabinet and the nation, were restrained from displaying themselves by a disinclination to encounter the financial embarrassments which had been produced by war, and which must be greatly increased by once more entering the lists, and measuring strength with that rival power.

In a memorial presented in 1774 by the count De Vergennes to Louis XVI. soon after the commencement of his reign, in which that minister lays before his sovereign the probabilities of being able to maintain peace with the continental powers of Europe, he proceeds to say, "if after having taken a view of the continent, we turn our eyes to the ocean, do we perceive there greater motives for security? we see by our side an unquiet nation, more jealous of the prosperity of her neighbours than anxious for her own happiness; powerfully armed, and

1778.

ready to strike the instant it may suit her to CHAP. VII, threaten. Let us not deceive ourselves with respect to her. Whatever parade the British ministers may make of their pacific dispositions, we cannot count on those dispositions longer than their domestic embarrassments may continue. These may cease. They may even increase to such a point as to determine the government to give this restlessness of spirit a direction against external objects. It is not without example for the cry of war with France, to be the signal of union to the parties which divide England.”

In April 1776, a memorial was presented by the count De Vergennes upon the manner in which France and Spain ought to contemplate the consequences of the quarrel between Great Britain and her colonies. Several extracts from the reflections of mr. Turgot on this memorial have been published, and serve to show the ideas then entertained by the cabinet of Versailles on this subject.

These reflections close with a recapitulation of the ideas contained in the body of the work, in which mr. Turgot says; "in going over with monsieur De Vergennes the various practicable modes in which the quarrel between England and her colonies may terminate, it has appeared to me, that the event, the most desirable for the interest of the two crowns (France and Spain) would be, that England

CHAP. VII. should conquer the resistance of her colonies, 1778. and force them to submit to her yoke. The

reasons for this opinion are, if the colonies should only be subjugated by the ruin of all their resources, England would lose the advantages she has hitherto drawn from them, during peace, by the increase of her commerce; and during war, by the use she has been able to make of their strength. If on the contrary, the vanquished colonies preserve their riches and their population, they will preserve their courage, and their desire of independence; and will force England to employ a part of her forces to prevent another insurrection.

"The supposition of an absolute separation of the colonies from the mother country appears to me infinitely probable. Whenever the independence of the colonies shall be complete, and shall be acknowledged by the English themselves, there will result from thence a total revolution in the political and commercial connexion between Europe and America; and I believe firmly that all the European powers will be compelled to abandon all empire over their colonies, to leave them an entire liberty of commerce with all nations, and to be content with partaking of that liberty in common with others, and preserving with their colonies the bonds of friendship and relationship.

"A reconciliation above all, and a speedy reconciliation between England and America,