8-in. guns. America would not give way on this point, and consequently a deadlock ensued.

After three weeks of discussion between the experts, Mr. Bridgeman came to the conclusion that a plenary session would be of advantage for surveying the position and clearing the air. The delegates accordingly met on July 14, and Mr. Bridgeman laid before them a full statement of the British point of view in regard to cruisers.

He drew particular attention to the fact that one of the main features of the proposals put by Great Britain before the Conference was the prevention of competition in offensive armament by laying down definite maximums for individual ships in each separate category both in tonnage and armament. He reminded the chief American delegate, Mr. Gibson, that at the meeting of the Preparatory Commission on April 5, he also had laid stress on the necessity of dealing with tangible and visible characteristics rather than with those that were not openly visible. This, according to Mr. Bridgeman, was an argument against dealing in terms of total tonnage. Mere fixation of total tonnage or ratio was useless unless it was accompanied by individual limits in each class. If the British proposals were accepted, a definite reduction in the offensive power of every type of vessel would be established for the future. The initial cost of each capital ship would be reduced by a million pounds and of each cruiser by half a million. If on the other hand they could not agree on the lowest maximum sizes in their scheme, the only agreement they could reach was one which would not decrease but might actually increase the offensive strength now prevailing. The American proposal for fixing a maximum of tonnage for cruisers without specifying the maximum numbers of any particular size of cruiser would allow America to build, say, twenty-five cruisers of 10,000 tons with 8-in. guns— a prospect which Great Britain could not view without alarm. He suggested, therefore, that there should be a ratio for large cruisers as for capital ships.

The chief American delegate in reply denied that America had any intention of building twenty-five 10,000 ton cruisers. He continued, however, to insist on the demand for a global tonnage of from 450,000 to 550,000, without restrictions as to types of cruisers, and from this position he would not budge. The Japanese delegate, on the other hand, expressed cordial approval of the British proposals; and the British delegates took advantage of this fact to draft with the Japanese an agreement for fixing the naval armaments of their respective countries as between themselves. The draft was shown to the Americans, but they declined to come into it, on the ground that it restricted unduly the building of cruisers with 8-in. guns, and that it permitted England to keep a certain number of large cruisers which she regarded as obsolete but useful for coast defence.

The British delegates now found themselves at the end of their resources, and on July 19 they returned to London to consult with the Government as to their next step.

The Cabinet found the situation created by the American demands highly perplexing, and held several meetings before it could finally decide what attitude to adopt. It was not till July 27 -more than a week after their arrival in London-that the British delegates were able to return to Geneva with fresh instructions. On the same day Sir A. Chamberlain made in the House of Commons a statement which gave some indication how far England was prepared to go in an endeavour to reach an agreement. The Government, he said, had accepted President Coolidge's invitation to take part in a disarmament conference on the understanding that his desire was to develop the policy of the Washington Conference by diminishing yet further naval expenditure while maintaining national security. It was on this principle that they had proposed to limit the size and armament of battleships while leaving unaltered the numbers fixed at Washington. It was for that reason also that they suggested limitation in the number and armament of large fighting cruisers on principles similar to those adopted at Washington for battleships. In regard to cruisers it was a matter of supreme importance how the tonnage was distributed among vessels of various sizes. The country which for any reason was obliged to distribute its available tonnage among smaller vessels would be at a permanent disadvantage compared with one which was able to adopt a different scheme. There would be nominal parity but real inequality. Consequently, in the opinion of the Government, no provisions open to this kind of criticism should be given the international authority already possessed by those parts of the Treaty of Washington which dealt with strength and numbers. At the same time the Government thought that there need be no difficulty in arriving at a temporary arrangement about the immediate future of cruiser building. But the British Empire could not be asked to give to any such temporary arrangement the appearance of an immutable principle which might be treated as a precedent, as this might be interpreted in the future as involving the formal surrender by the British Empire of maritime equality, a consummation which the Government was well assured was no part of the President's policy.

Although the somewhat cryptic character of the Minister's concluding remarks was calculated rather to whet than to allay curiosity, the House recognised the impropriety of pressing for further details while the Conference was still proceeding, and contented itself with the Minister's assurance that a full opportunity for discussion would be provided after the summer vacation. Sir A. Chamberlain's speech was published by the Foreign Office; and in order to reinforce his argument on the vital need of the British Empire for small cruisers to protect her trade routes, an

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extract was added from a speech delivered by Lord Balfour at the Washington Conference of 1921-22 in which he had explained to the American public the difference between American and British requirements for the protection of sea communications.

Before leaving London Mr. Bridgeman had stated to a press representative that the British proposals were "fundamentally unchanged." This description proved to be correct in respect of the small cruisers and the determination of Great Britain not to be exceeded by the United States in other types, but it left room for an important modification in the earlier proposals. Britain now suggested that the number of large cruisers of 10,000 tons for herself and America should be fixed at twelve, the number which she herself possessed, and that she should hold her hand from further construction while the United States-which at present possessed only two-should build up to this number.

The new British proposals were immediately declared by the American delegation and by Mr. Coolidge himself to be wholly unacceptable. The British Government was gravely perturbed at this announcement, and made desperate efforts to find a way out of the impasse. Ministers were detained in London when on the very point of leaving for their holidays in order to attend a special Cabinet meeting on July 30. The meeting came to no decision, but it persuaded the Conference to postpone the plenary session which had been fixed for Monday, August 1, till the following Thursday, August 4, in order to allow further time for discussion and consultation. On August 3 the Cabinet held two meetings, but again it was unable to arrive at any decision. The delegates at the Conference also in their informal discussions in the interval had been unable to find any new basis of agreement on the cruiser question. The American delegates would not even assent to a British proposal to embody in a formal document those points on which agreement had actually been reached, such as the limitation of the number of destroyers and submarines; and at the plenary session on August 4 the Conference was duly wound up without having made the slightest progress towards achieving the objects for which it had been called.

In their speeches at the final meeting on August 4, Mr. Bridgeman and Mr. Gibson each endeavoured to shift the blame for the failure of the Conference from the shoulders of his own country on to that of the other. According to the British representative, the cause of the breakdown was that America wanted too many large cruisers; according to the American representative, it was that Britain wanted too many small ones. Mr. Bridgeman again justified on grounds of national security Britain's demand for 70 small cruisers, and declared himself unable to understand America's reasons for demanding so many large cruisers, or so many cruisers with such high offensive weapons as the 8-in. gun. Mr. Gibson retorted by asking why Britain, after having at the

Washington Conference declared a total tonnage of 450,000 for vessels of the auxiliary class to be acceptable and reasonable, now asked for a tonnage of 647,000; and he justified the United States' demand for large cruisers on the ground that these were more economical to build and maintain than the same tonnage in small ones. He further asked why it was that if, as Sir A. Chamberlain had recently said in Parliament, war between Britain and America was already outlawed in the hearts of both nations, Britain should refuse to recognise America's right to build a limited number of the type of ship she should desire. However, both Mr. Bridgeman and Mr. Gibson concurred in the opinion that the failure of the Conference would not affect the friendly relations between the two countries, and would not necessarily lead to a competition in armaments between them.

Mr. Gibson's statement that at Washington Britain had only asked for 450,000 tons in auxiliary vessels was promptly controverted by the highest authority. Addressing a public meeting on August 6, Lord Balfour pointed out that the figure of 450,000 tons which he had mentioned at Washington referred only-as he had made perfectly clear to the American delegates at the time— to cruisers auxiliary to the battle fleet, and did not include those which might in addition be required to protect British sea-borne commerce and trade routes. He found cause for serious misgiving in the fact that Mr. Gibson, in quoting his statement on this subject, should have omitted words which modified the whole sense of the passage. Lord Balfour went on to complain gravely of the high-handed way in which the American delegates had conducted their case at the Conference. Great Britain, he said, had made proposals for limiting armament and size of battleships which, if accepted by all nations, would have rendered possible a marked economy in naval expenditure. In both cases the United States representatives had replied curtly that the proposals were unacceptable, without giving any reason on which their objection was based.

On the same day (August 6), Mr. Churchill, speaking at Haslemere, endeavoured on behalf of the Government to reassure public opinion as to the effect of the failure of the Conference on Anglo-American relations. He first made it clear that there could be no question of Britain's accepting the American definition of parity, or receding from her own view of what constituted real naval equality. But he did not see in this any cause for alarm ; because people could not agree about some theory or doctrine, and could not be got to subscribe to any paper formula about it, that was no reason why the practical steps which they might take from year to year should not be perfectly harmonious, and be recognised by both as reasonable and fair. Britain had said again and again that she would take no offence because the United States built the cruisers which she considered herself to require.

The building of such ships would not cause them any alarm or anger, and they could not conceive that any circumstances would arise in any period of time which would lead to a deplorable race in armaments between the two countries. Indeed, it might well be that some of the purposes which President Coolidge had in view would be achieved in the next few years in practice, though not on paper.

In spite of the assurances of Government spokesmen, the friends of peace and disarmament in England were far from satisfied with the way in which the British case had been conducted at the Conference. They asked, as Mr. Gibson had asked, why it was that, if war between Britain and America was "unthinkable," Britain should concern herself with the United States naval programme. The most damaging criticism of the Government came from one of its own representatives at the Conference, Lord Robert Cecil. Lord Robert had co-operated loyally with Mr. Bridgeman in all the proceedings of the Conference. But he did not at all share his colleague's opinion of the righteousness of Britain's cause, and as soon as the Conference was over he showed in an emphatic manner his disapproval of the Government's policy. Early in August he sent in a letter of resignation from his post in the Government as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Britain's representative on the League of Nations. Mr. Baldwin was then in Canada, whither he had gone at the end of July with the Prince of Wales and the Duke of York to take part in the celebrations in honour of the sixtieth anniversary of Canada's acquisition of Dominion status. Lord Robert, in consequence, received no answer to his letter, but immediately on the Premier's return he again (August 26) placed his resignation in his hands, and insisted on its acceptance.

Lord Robert accompanied his resignation with an explanatory minute which contained a scathing indictment of the Government's foreign policy, and which the Cabinet only with a good deal of hesitation allowed to be made public (August 29). The fundamental reason for his resignation was, he said, the fact that on the broad policy of disarmament the majority of the Cabinet and he were not really agreed. Much that had happened during the session in the spring of the Preparatory Commission for the reduction and limitation of armaments had for him been of a disquieting nature. Over and over again he had been compelled by his instructions to maintain propositions which he found difficult to reconcile with any serious desire for the success of its labours. Though these instructions turned for the most part on smaller points, their cumulative effect on the minds of the Commission was unfortunate, and was largely responsible for its comparative ill-success. In the recent Naval Conference also he found himself out of sympathy with the instructions he received; it was, in his opinion, possible to reach an agree