the Conservative Party became rife among the agricultural community.

Equally with agriculture, the coal industry seemed unable to raise itself by its own efforts from the slough into which it had fallen. In spite of the longer working day and the consequent lessened cost of production, the industry as a whole ceased to pay its way after March. Nearly all the large coal-fields in April registered a loss averaging from 34d. a ton in Yorkshire to 18. 6d. in Scotland. Before the summer was far advanced both miners and owners seemed to be making preparations for renewing the duel of the preceding year. The Miners' Federation on June 24 issued a statement containing reports on the trading results of the most important coal-fields, and drawing the conclusion that their unsatisfactory character was due to "unregulated production, unmitigated competition, and unrestrained price-cutting," and that the need for reorganisation was imperative. As a counterblast to this and to warnings that had been uttered from public platforms by Sir Herbert Samuel and Mr. Lloyd George, the coal-owners at the same time issued a statement denying that any coal "crisis " was at hand, and asserting that the period of depression through which the industry was passing had been foreseen and was inevitable, and would have been worse but for the Eight-Hours Act. They deprecated, as usual, the making of the coal industry a party political issue, and denied that any changes in its organisation were needed other than those which they could make, or actually were making, themselves.

The annual Conference of the Miners' Federation, which opened at Southport on July 25, afforded a good opportunity of judging how the political views of the miners had been affected by the events of the previous year. A considerable group of miners was unrepresented at the Conference, having joined the "nonpolitical unions formed by Mr. Spencer and others in various coal-fields. Many also had dropped out of the Federation owing to inability to keep up their subscriptions. Nevertheless, the Federation still represented the great mass of the miners, and was still the most important single trade union in the country. It had been battered, but not yet broken by the events of the previous twelvemonths. The report of the Executive Committee was a sober document which treated the condition of the industry in a very objective fashion. It pointed out that the root of the trouble in the coal industry both in England and in other countries was an excess of supply over demand due to natural causes, which tended to operate with increasing force. In England the trouble had been aggravated by the stupid policy of the coalowners, who had tried to overcome natural causes by unnatural means. The report reiterated the main lines of the policy laid by the miners' representatives before the Coal Commission of 1925, and added two more recommendations-the restriction of

the recruitment of adult labour from outside sources, and the provision of a superannuation fund for aged mine-workers. It concluded with an appeal to miners to remain loyal to the old Federation, and to preserve their unity till the advent of a Labour Government which would realise their hopes.

The presidential address of Mr. Herbert Smith was also marked by great restraint, and gave no countenance to the idea that the miners were contemplating an early resort to drastic action of any kind. He complained bitterly of the condition to which the miners had been reduced, laying the blame largely on the "mad competition" of the coal-owners. He also maintained that accidents in mines had increased as a result of the Eight-Hours Act. He appealed to the British public to assist the mine-workers to reduce their hours of labour at least to the scale which prevailed before 1926, and also to raise the standard of living without having to resort to the weapon of a strike. He thought the time had come when they should use to the full extent their political machine, and he also looked for greater help in the future from the Miners' International. In spite of the Government's repressive legislation, which had culminated in the Trade Union Bill, he was confident that the miners would eventually secure their aims. He advocated the use of purely constitutional methods and deprecated any resort to force. But he warned the Government that if they tried to stifle the expression of the popular will by making the House of Lords paramount, the miners would accept boldly and at all hazards even unconstitutional methods of preserving their liberties.

A debate on the second day of the Conference on the Trade Union Bill revealed the existence among the delegates of a strongly militant "Left Wing" section. This section was in a decided minority at the Conference, and was severely lectured by speakers of the other side. One delegate asked them if they spoke for the Welsh miners or for Russia. Mr. Hartshorn said he hoped the Miners' Federation would never accept their theory that the miners' problems could be solved by world-wide revolution. Mr. Smith charged them with having only one object-to cause disorganisation and disunity-and said that they were doing as much harm to the movement as Mr. Spencer. A number of speakers laid stress on the necessity of loyalty to the Labour Party, and spoke in the highest terms of Mr. MacDonald's leadership. In the voting on various resolutions on the next day the "Left Wing" was somewhat heavily defeated. A proposal that the Federation should "work and vote in favour of the Communist Party being allowed to affiliate to the Labour Party" was rejected by 420,000 to 220,000, and a proposal for the formation of an Anglo-Russian Miners' Committee was not allowed to go to the vote. Nevertheless, the "Left Wing," though held in check, was far from being suppressed; it obtained three new members on the National

1927.]

Relations of Liberals and Labour.

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Executive, and Mr. Cook, who was still secretary of the Federation, was nominated for election to the General Council of the Trade Union Congress.

In the course of a debate on disarmament and foreign policy on July 28, Labour members had inquired whether there was any change in the Government's policy towards China and Russia. Sir A. Chamberlain informed them that Britain's policy towards the former country was still what it had been defined to be in December and February, while to Russia the door was still open for a resumption of relations, provided she would undertake not to abuse the privileges granted to her. In the course of his remarks the Foreign Secretary characterised as utterly false and absurd a report which had appeared in a French newspaper, and to which attention was drawn in the debate, that the British Ambassador in Paris had secretly conferred with the heads of a non-existent Ukrainian State. He suggested that the rumour had been set on foot by the Soviet Government to bolster up its own position.

In July some voices were raised within the Labour ranks advocating a working agreement between the Labour and Liberal parties for the purpose of ensuring the defeat of the Conservatives at the next General Election. Prominent among those who recommended this course was Mr. A. M. Thompson, who, as a founder of the Clarion newspaper in 1891, might be regarded as one of the "fathers" of the Parliamentary Labour Party. Mr. Thompson pointed out that the Labour Party had now fully established its independence, and that a policy of isolation was no longer beneficial to it. His proposals for a Liberal-Labour alliance were strongly endorsed by the influential Liberal daily, the Manchester Guardian. They were, however, ignored by the Labour leaders, and rejected by the Liberals.

At the Liberal Summer School, which opened on July 28, Sir Herbert Samuel indicated that the Liberal Party, so far from co-operating with the Labour Party, would itself make a bold bid for the working-class vote. Sir Herbert selected for the subject of his opening address to the School, "Liberalism and the Labour Movement," and he impressed on his hearers the necessity of framing an alternative policy to Socialism for dealing with social evils. He pointed out that the Liberal Party had during a great part of the nineteenth century been regarded by the working classes as the guardian of their interests, but had forfeited that position to the Labour Party at the beginning of the twentieth century. One reason for this loss of working-class confidence was its adherence to the policy of laissez-faire after that policy had become discredited among the workers. Nevertheless, the essential purposes of the Labour movement had always been included in the aims of Liberalism, and the Liberal Party was equally with the Labour Party an agency for attaining them.

Liberalism had now given up laissez-faire. Why, then, it might be asked, should not Liberals throw in their lot with the Labour Party? The chief reason was that the Labour Party had adopted as the instrument for achieving its aims, Socialism, that is, the socialisation or nationalisation of most branches of industry. This, in Sir Herbert's opinion, was a fundamentally wrong method which, if put into execution, was likely to prove detrimental to all sections of the community. Liberals, therefore, had the duty not to surrender the guardianship of the cause of progress into the hands of politicians whose basic theory was wrong, and who in consequence could only bring that cause to disaster. The right policy for Liberalism to adopt in relation to the Labour movement was to continue the policy that it would have adopted if a separate Labour Party had never come into existence. Laissezfaire and Socialism being both recognised as false guides, the obligation rested upon them to develop a policy of Social Liberalism which would divide into its several parts the problem with which they were confronted, and devise the particular means by which the solution of each could be approached. They should take up the work of Liberalism at the point at which it was laid down in 1914; and the first step in this endeavour was to frame a series of measures for dealing with the questions that were now ripe for solution.

A few days later (August 1), Mr. Lloyd George, approaching the question of Liberal policy from the purely practical standpoint of party tactics, arrived at a conclusion analogous to that of his colleague. Affirming the necessity of coming before the public with a definite programme and not merely with vague principles, he staked the success or failure of the Liberal Party at the next election on its ability to evolve an industrial policy suited to the needs of the time in the same way as it had evolved a land policy and a coal policy; and he announced that a committee of inquiry had been appointed to deal with the question and draw up a report.

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CHAPTER III.

THE GENEVA NAVAL CONFERENCE.

In the debate on foreign affairs initiated by the Labour Party on July 28, Mr. Trevelyan had emphasised the need for international disarmament, and had urged that Britain should come forward with some 'great, dramatic, and challenging proposal" for furthering this object. Sir A. Chamberlain had received the suggestion coldly, expressing his belief that the end could not be attained by a single sudden stroke, and that progress was much more likely to be effected by a succession of conferences each making some small step forward.

Acting on this principle, the Government had early in the year accepted an invitation from the President of the United States to take part in a conversation at Washingtom on the limitation of naval armaments, not without entering a caveat that the special requirements of the British Empire in the way of communications and food supply must be taken into account. The proposed conversation finally took place not at Washington but at Geneva, where on June 20 a Conference on Naval Disarmament was opened between representatives of Britain, the United States, and Japan, with representatives of France and Italy as interested onlookers.

The British delegates were Mr. Bridgeman, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and Lord Cecil. The main proposals of Great Britain as presented by Mr. Bridgeman were the extension of the life of existing capital ships from 20 to 26 years, and corresponding fixing of the life of other vessels; the reduction in the size of any battleships to be built in the future from the present limit of 35,000 tons to something under 30,000 tons; reduction in the size of guns on battleships from the present limit of 16 in. to 13.5 in.; maintenance of the existing ratio between England, America, and Japan of 5-5-3 for cruisers of 10,000 tons displacement, carrying 8-in. guns, and a limitation of 7,000 tons and 6-in. guns to be placed on all future light cruisers after the number of 10,000 ton cruisers had been decided on. In regard to submarines, Great Britain, it was stated, would still, as at the Washington Conference, prefer to see them discontinued, but failing that she suggested that the tonnage of the larger type of submarine should be limited to 1,600 and of the smaller to 600, and the armament of each to 5-in. guns.

In the matter of destroyers and submarines it was soon found that there were no great differences between the three parties to the Conference, and an agreement imposing certain limitations on construction was reached without much difficulty. In regard to capital ships also a spirit of accommodation was manifested, and after long parleying some definite, if slight, progress was made towards reduction.

But on the question of cruisers Britain and America soon found themselves to be hopelessly divided. Britain insisted that she must have "security," and America was equally insistent in demanding "parity"; and though each side in theory conceded the claim of the other, in practice it long proved impossible to evolve a scheme which should satisfy both. By "security" Britain meant a force sufficient to protect her maritime trade routes, which she calculated at 70 cruisers of 7,500 tons. By parity America meant liberty to build up to the same total tonnage as Britain distributed in cruisers of what size and armament she pleased. Britain demurred to this, as she considered that her security would be threatened if America built more than a very limited number of cruisers of 10,000 tons or armed with

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