The next day's proceedings at the Conservative Conference provided an ironical comment on the Premier's view of the trade situation. Mr. Baldwin had mentioned specifically the woollen manufacture and the steel industry as two trades which were not nearly so badly off as they were painted by the critics of the Government. In the following day's debate on safeguarding duties, the speakers, in estimating the state of trade, completely ignored their leader's comforting assurances, and singled out the woollen and steel manufactures in particular as two industries which were doomed to speedy ruin if they were not saved in time by the process of safeguarding-a view which the Conference endorsed with acclamation.

The advocates of disarmament at this time, not content with criticising the Government, began to exert themselves more actively than ever before to rouse public opinion in the matter. On October 17 the Executives of the National Liberal Party, the Women's National Liberal Federation, and the National League of Young Liberals issued a manifesto in which they sought to pledge the Liberal Party to a policy of complete suppression of war to be prosecuted by means of a whole-hearted support of the League of Nations along with the acceptance of arbitration wherever possible and the reduction of armaments. The manifesto was not immediately endorsed by the Party leaders, but its signatures lent it a weight which they could not disregard.

At the same time the League of Nations Union organised a great campaign for educating public opinion. The first speaker to whom it turned for an address was naturally Lord Robert Cecil, and a great meeting of delegates from all parts of the country assembled at the Caxton Hall to hear him on October 21. Prof. Gilbert Murray, the President of the Union, in introducing Lord Robert said that the stir caused by his resignation from the Government had sent a thrill through League circles in every country. He warned him, however, that he could only justify that step if he utilised his freedom to influence the country and the Government more as a private member of Parliament than he could have done as a member of the Cabinet. With such a leader he thought that members of the Union had a splendid prospect as workers for the League. Prof. Murray concluded with a motion welcoming the resolutions passed by the Eighth Assembly of the League on behalf of arbitration, disarmament, and security, and noting with satisfaction the share taken by the British Government in bringing about the unanimous adoption of the resolutions.

Lord Cecil stated the case for disarmament temperately, and with a cogency born of conviction and knowledge of his subject. He first endeavoured to controvert the opinion somewhat widely held in the country that disarmament was of importance chiefly to Continental Europe, that the British Empire could afford to regard the troubles and dangers of Continental States with an

Olympian detachment, nay, that there might even be an antithesis between the interests of the British Empire and those of the League of Nations. Such a view he regarded as utterly contrary to the truth; it was difficult to imagine any considerable disturbance of the peace of Europe which would not affect more or less the whole Continent with England as well. England too was far more vulnerable owing to the development of aerial warfare than she used to be. When to these factors was added the pressing necessity for national economy, he thought that the case for disarmament by international agreement was complete, and he expressed inpatience at the raising of difficulties based on the remote possi bility of some future risk when the present dangers that actually threatened them were so overwhelming.

Coming to the practical steps to be taken, Lord Cecil recommended first that they should urge the Government to support the efforts of the Preparatory Commission of the League of Nations unequivocally—that is, without allowing technical prejudices or traditional feelings to interfere with the success of those efforts. The next thing was that they should encourage by every means in their power the practice of resorting to arbitration for the settlement of disputes. England, it was true, had been ready enough in the past to resort to arbitration in disputes in which she was concerned, but more was required of her if she was going to strike a blow at international suspicion. She should sign the optional clause pledging her to accept the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice in all justiciable disputes, nay, she should go further, and consider the possibility of entering into arbitration treaties with various States for settling all disputes whatsoever without recourse to war. On the question how far Britain should pledge her resources to guarantee security to any other State, Lord Cecil spoke with reserve, but he urged the Government not to be afraid of taking risks if by doing so they could make war a much more improbable contingency. Finally, it was necessary for the carrying out of this policy that the League's authority should be maintained. The Union recognised that the present Foreign Minister had done much to increase the prestige of the League, especially by setting up the precedent for Foreign Ministers to attend the meetings of the Council and the Assembly. They therefore begged him and the Government not to weary in well-doing, and, above all, not to allow bureaucrats at home or abroad to undermine the organs of procedure of the League by substituting agencies based on the less desirable practices of the old diplomacy. They desired to see the disarmament policy of the last Assembly carried out in the spirit as well as the letter, and they had every ground for hoping that it would be so.

Lord Robert was followed at no long interval by Mr. Lloyd George (October 24), who attacked the problem from a somewhat different angle. After recalling the part taken by Britain in the

creation of the League of Nations while the war was still in process, he said that although the argument for the League no longer reverberated from the cannon's mouth, yet the world was still under the shadow of a dark apprehension, and unless some rational steps were taken in time the sanguinary struggle of 1914 might be renewed on an even more terrible scale. There were many and graye dangers threatening the peace of Europe, about which there was too great a reticence and complacency in this country. The Treaty of Versailles had left some "ragged ends" on the boundaries of States, which would be a serious source of irritation if they were not smoothed out. A still graver peril arose from the too harsh interpretation of the treaties, from failure to give honest effect to clauses in the treaties which imposed obligations on victorious nations. He referred particularly to the treatment of minorities in certain countries and to the continued occupation of the Rhineland. But the worst cause of disturbance was the flagrant disregard of the promises given in reference to disarmament. There could be no peace in Europe until there was disarmament all round. Another and more terrible war was inevitable unless the nations of the world made up their minds to seek justice and protection from established right and not from force. It was necessary that they should refer all their disputes to arbitration under the auspices of the League of Nations with as few reservations as possible, and that they should reduce their swollen armaments to the dimensions of police forces. Mr. George cited the Geneva Naval Conference as an example of the course to avoid, and pointedly asked why Lord Balfour had not been sent as head of the British deputation, as he could have been trusted to state the British case in the right manner.

A few days later (October 27) Sir A. Chamberlain, speaking at a luncheon given in his honour at the Aldwych Club, took occasion to reply to the criticisms which had been evoked, directly or indirectly, both at home and abroad by his speech on disarmament at the Assembly of the League of Nations. Dealing first with his foreign critics, he acknowledged that the exposition which he gave of British policy was not popular with the League, but he maintained that there were many there who felt that for their own nations the same conditions applied, and who were glad in their hearts to find some country which could be the spokesman of their innermost thoughts, without being subject to the suspicion which their own declaration might have given rise to in other quarters. If he had not won popularity for Great Britain, he had at least sought to maintain the respect which British policy and the British Government had earned and enjoyed in the past. Turning to critics at home, he asserted that he had tried to pursue a genuinely national policy, so that even if there was a change of Government there might still be continuity in foreign policy. Referring to the speeches recently delivered by Lord Robert Cecil

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and Mr. Lloyd George before the League of Nations Union, he said that he could see no difference between himself and the former, or if there was a difference, it was not in aim or purpose or spirit, but only in the method by which the purpose was to be achieved. On the other hand, he could not regard Mr. Lloyd George as a true friend of peace. While it was true that the world was still troubled, it was that day a world of goodwill trying to resolve its problems peaceably, and it was not helped by the language of exaggeration and thoughtless distribution of praise and blame such as Mr. George had used. Coming next to the advocates of the Protocol-which, he remarked, had had hardly any friends in this country until the Government refused to ratify it he called upon them to decide in their own minds and publicly declare exactly what commitments they were ready to undertake, and what means they required in order to fulfil them; for it was useless to undertake obligations which they could not fulfil in the hope that they would never be called upon to fulfil them. In his opinion England had done her part in the guarantee which she gave at Locarno, in the share she took in the framing of the Eastern treaties, and in lending the weight of her counsel and influence to spread the same spirit of reconciliation elsewhere. He believed that it was in following that policy that they best served not only the interests of their country and Empire, but also the peace and welfare of the world.

Mr. Lloyd George replied to Sir A. Chamberlain's charges in a speech likewise delivered at the Aldwych Club on November 7. Reiterating his assertion that the Powers victorious in the war were gravely to blame for not reducing their armaments and that since the war there had been cases of forcible annexations of territory in Europe, he said that Sir A. Chamberlain took the view that these were delicate matters which were not to be discussed too openly. He himself, however, was of opinion that complete frankness in discussing them was essential to peace; the "hushhush" policy which prevailed before the war whenever they came to discuss foreign policy was responsible for the death of millions. He further criticised the Foreign Secretary for habitually speaking as if Locarno were both a first step and a final step. He pointed out that in fact the conquerors and conquered had already met on an equal footing at Geneva; and in regard to the future, it was important that Locarno should be regarded merely as one of a series of steps to be taken in the same direction; if Europe did not advance beyond it, war was inevitable.

In a speech which he delivered to the Scottish Unionist Association at Edinburgh on November 2, the Prime Minister made some references to the League of Nations which showed the "reaction" of the head of the Government to the campaign for disarmament. He said that the great virtue of the League, in his opinion, was that it promoted the habit of conference and

discussion among the representatives of European States, and was thus instrumental in enabling them to compose their differences. It was for this reason that during the past three years the Government had sent the Secretary for Foreign Affairs himself to represent Britain at the meetings of the League Assembly. He thought that the British people hardly realised yet what Sir Austen Chamberlain had done for the League of Nations in Europe. He had had, it was true, to utter words of warning and restraint. But he had done so in the best interests of the League itself; it was the part of a true friend to call attention to facts and to reconcile the ideal and the practical. The recent meeting of the Assembly, though it had done nothing spectacular, had made a contribution towards the building up of a greater sense of security in Europe. He hoped that the frank exchange of views which had taken place there had brought to everyone a realisation that, while maintaining ideals, the League must keep its immediate activities within the limits of what was possible at the present moment. Locarno had done much to allay the fears and suspicions which were an obstacle to disarmament and European peace, but much remained to be done. He himself thought that before they could get disarmament they would have to agree on a limitation of armaments. The ground was being explored by the Preparatory Committee on Disarmament, and though there was a certain amount of dispute on important points-points of principle-there was no need to despair of agreement; at any rate, it was far better that these points should be brought out at an early stage than that, in a moment of enthusiasm, they should try to do something which was bound to be wrecked for want of proper exploration and agreement beforehand.

Up to this point pronouncements in favour of disarmament had come mainly from Labour and Liberal speakers, and there was a danger of an impression being created that the movement was the special preserve of these parties. A number of Conservatives were rendered uneasy by the fact that the League of Nations Union, in organising its campaign, had selected its speakers almost exclusively from the Labour and Liberal Parties, and they made representations to it to allow them to share in the work, and so prove that their party was not behind the others in the matter. Undoubtedly the Conservative Party contained many who sympathised with the disarmament movement; but it also contained the bulk of those who were opposed to any reduction of the British forces.

Speaking at Nottingham on October 25, Mr. Snowden found a new indictment to bring against the Government-that it had damaged the national credit. He based his charge on the fact that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had been unable to convert a short-term loan at less than 5 per cent. and in some recent cases had had to increase the interest on the converted debt by no less