ment the inconsistences of the views that were advocated by the opponents of ministers). Mr. Canning, being loudly called for from every part of the House, rose at a quarter before 11 o'clock, and commenced the long-expected justification of himself and his colleagues. "We could not" said the right hon. Secretary, "take a single step in the late negotiations, till we had determined what direction ought to be given to those negotiations, so far as the question of peace or war was concerned. We determined that it was our duty, in the first instance, to endeavour to preserve peace, if possible, for all the world: next, to endeavour to preserve peace between the nations whose pacific relations appeared most particularly exposed to hazard; and, failing in this, to preserve at all events peace for this country; but a peace consistent with the good faith, the interests, and the honour of the nation."

This decision, he admitted, was a fit subject of examination: for undoubtedly the conduct of the government was liable to a twofold trial. But, in entering on an inquiry as to the merits or demerits of the negotiations, it was necessary to set out with assuming, for the time, that peace was the object which we ought to have pursued.

"In reviewing, then," said Mr. Canning" the course of these negotiations, as directed to maintain, first, the peace of Europe; secondly, the peace between France and Spain; and lastly, peace for this country,-they divide themselves naturally into three heads:-first, the negotiations at Verona; secondly, those with France; and thirdly, those with Spain."

At Verona, he contended we were completely successful." In

proof of this," said he," my first witness is the duke Mathieu de Montmorency; who states, in his official note* of the 26th of December, that the measures conceived and proposed at Verona, would have been completely successful, if England had thought herself at liberty to concur in them.' Such was the opinion entertained by the plenipotentiary of France of his failure at Verona, and of the cause of that failure. What was the opinion of Spain? The voucher for that opinion is the despatch from sir William A'Court, of the 7th of January,t in which he describes the comfort and relief that were felt by the Spanish government, when they learnt that the congress at Verona had broken up, with no other result than the bruta fulmina of the three despatches from the courts in alliance with France.

"Whatever might grow out of a separate conflict between Spain and France (though matter for grave consideration) was less to be dreaded, than that all the great powers of the continent should have been arrayed together against Spain ;-and although the first object, in point of importance, indeed, was to keep the peace altogether, to prevent any war against Spain-the first, in point of time, was, to prevent a general war;-to change the question from a question between the allies on one side, and Spain on the other, to a question between nation and nation. This, whatever the result might be, would reduce the quarrel to the size of ordinary events, and bring it within the scope of ordinary diplomacy. The immediate object of England, therefore,

• See Papers, Class A, No. 11. + See Papers, Class B, No. 14.

was, to hinder the impress of a joint character, from being affixed to the war-if war there must be, with Spain;-to take care that the war should not grow out of an assumed jurisdiction of the congress;-to keep within reasonable bounds that predominating areopagitical spirit, which the memorandum of the British cabinet, of May 1820, describes as beyond the sphere of the original conception, and understood principles of the alliance,' -an alliance never intended as a union for the government of the world, or for the superintendence of the internal affairs of other states. And this, I say, was accomplished.

"With respect to Verona, then, what remains of accusation against the government? It has been charged, not so much that the object of the government was amiss, as that the negotiations were conducted in too low a tone. But the case was obviously one in which a high tone might have frustrated the object; and, besides, as a tone of reproach and invective was unnecessary, it would have been misplaced. There are others, who think, that with a view of conciliating the great powers, we should have addressed them as tyrants and despots, who were trampling on the rights and liberties of mankind. I doubt whether it is wise even in this House, to indulge in such a strain of rhetoric;-to call wretches' and barbarians,' and a hundred other hard names, powers, with whom, after all, if the map of Europe cannot be altogether cancelled, we must, even according to the admission of the most anti-continental politicians, maintain some international intercourse. But be the language of good sense or good taste in this House

what it may, clear I am, that, in diplomatic correspondence, no minister would be justified in risking the friendship of foreign countries, and the peace of his own, by coarse reproach and galling invective; and that even while we are pleading for the independence of nations, it is expedient to respect the independence of those with whom we plead. We differ widely from our continental allies on one great principle, it is true; nor do we, nor ought we to disguise that difference; nor to omit any occasion of practically upholding our own opinion: but every consideration, whether of policy or of justice, combines with the recollection of the counsels which we have shared, and of the deeds which we have achieved in concert and companionship, to induce us to argue our differences of opinion, however freely, with temper; and to enforce them, however firmly, without insult.

"It had been asked why we sent plenipotentiary to the congress at all?-Originally it was not intended to send a British plenipotentiary to Verona. The congress at Verona was originally convened solely for the consideration of the affairs of Italy, with which England had declined to interfere two years before. England was therefore not to participate in those proceedings; and all that required her participation was to be arranged in a previous congress at Vienna. But circumstances had delayed the duke of Wellington's departure from England, so that he did not reach Vienna till many weeks after the time appointed. The sove

reigns had waited to the last hour consistent with their Italian arrangements. The option was given to our plenipotentiary to meet them

on their return to Vienna; but it was thought, upon the whole, more convenient to avoid further delay; and the Duke of Wellington there fore proceeded to Verona."

Another question had been asked, why Spain was not invited to send her ambassador to the congress, Mr. Canning contended, that England was not the power, that should have taken any preliminary steps to that end, as we did not wish the affairs of Spain to be brought into discussion at all; and, secondly, if Spain had been so called upon, the ambassador would have been sent either as from the king of Spain, or as from the cortes. On the first supposition, the effect could not have been favourable; and, on the latter, it was equally certain it would have led to such a declaration from the alliance, as we wished to prevent.

The result of the congress as to Spain, was simply the discontinuance of diplomatic intercourse with that power, on the part of Austria, Russia, and Prussia ;-a. step neither necessarily nor probably leading to war; perhaps (in some views) rather diminishing the risk of it; a step which had been taken by the same monarchies towards Portugal two years before, without leading to any ulterior consequences. Its result, as to France, was a promise of countenance and support from the allies in three specified hypothetical cases;-1st, of an attack made by Spain on France; 2nd, of any outrage on the person of the king or royal family of Spain; 3rdly, of any attempt to change the dynasty of that kingdom.

Mr. Canning then proceeded to justify our conduct in the negotiations at Paris. He observed, that, having succeeded in preventing a

joint operation against Spain, we might have rested satisfied with that success, and trusted, for the rest, to the reflexions of France herself on the hazards of the project in her contemplation; and he owned that we did hesitate, whether we should not adopt that more selfish and cautious policy. But there were circumstances attending the return of the duke of Wellington to Paris, which directed the decision another way. His grace found, on his arrival in that capital, that M. de Villèle had sent back to Verona the drafts of the despatches of the three continental allies to their ministers at Madrid, which M. de Montmorency had brought with him from the congress ;-had sent them back for re-consideration;-whether with a view to obtain a change in their context, or to prevent their being forwarded to their destination at all, did not appear. At the same time, it was notorious, that a change was likely to occur in the cabinet of the Tuilleries, which did in fact take place shortly afterwards, by the retirement of M. de Montmorency, the adviser of war against Spain. And, in the third place, it was precisely at the moment of the duke of Wellington's return to Paris that we received a direct and pressing overture from the Spanish government, which placed us in the alternative of either affording our good offices to Spain, or of refusing them.

Add to this, that the question had assumed a different shape; it was reduced from a contest between Spain and a self-constituted corporate power, to one between kingdom and kingdom. Accordingly, although at Verona a discouraging answer had been given to a proposal of mediation, our plenipotentiary,

result of the congress at Verona to be such as I have described it--by giving to the quarrel with Spain the character of a French quarrel. "When I first described the question respecting Spain as a French question, the duke de Montmorency loudly maintained it to be a question toute Européenne; but M. de Chateaubriand, upon my repeating the same description in the sequel of that correspondence, admitted it to be a question at once and equally toute Française et toute Européenne:-an explanation, the exact meaning of which, I acknowledge, I do not precisely understand; but which, if it does not distinctly admit the definition of a question Française, seems at least to negative M. de Montmorency's definition of a question toute Euro·péenne."

Mr. Canning passed next to the last stage of the proceedings our negotiations at Madrid. The first point complained of here, was, that we had asked the Spanish government for assurances of the safety of the royal family. The answer was, that one of the causes of war prospectively agreed upon at Verona, was any act of personal violence to the king of Spain or his family. We endeavoured, therefore, to obtain such assurances from Spain as should remove the apprehension of any such outrage-not because the British cabinet thought those assurances necessary-but be because it might be of the greatest advantage to the cause of Spain, that we should be able to proclaim our conviction, that upon this point there was nothing to apprehend; and that we should thus possess the means of proving to France that she had no case, arising out of the conferences of Verona, to justify a war. Such assurances Spain might

have refused she would have refused them-to France. To us she might she did give them, without lowering her dignity.

The other disputed point, on this part of the case, was our suggestion to Spain of the expediency of adopting some modifications of her constitution. The channel, through which that suggestion was made, was the most proper that could have been selected; and the suggestion itself was such as Spain might have acceded to without disgrace and without danger, and, if followed, would have prevented all the evils that now threatened Europe. Mr. Canning did not blame the Spaniards for having refused to make any sacrifice to temporary necessity; but still he lamented the result of the refusal. Of this he was quite sure, that even if the Spaniards were justified in point of honour in objecting to concede, it would have been a most romantic point of honour in Great Britain which would have induced her not to recommend concession. It had been said, that every thing was required of Spain, and nothing of France. That he utterly denied. France said to Spain, "Your internal state disquiets me;" and Spain replied to France, "Your Army of Observation disquiets me." There were, therefore, but twe remedies -war or concession; and why was England fastidiously to say, "Our notions of non-interference are so strict, that we cannot advise you even for your good; though, whatever concession you may make, will be met by corresponding concession on the part of France." Undoubtedly the removal of the Army of Observation was as much an internal measure as the removal of any blot in the constitution af