fered itself to be deceived, when the party, with whom we were treating, was changing its mind from day to day. The French government was very little prepared on one day for the change which its opinions might undergo on the next. We are not to be blamed, because we could not anticipate such unexpected changes." Sir James Mackintosh expatiated chiefly on two points; first, that the internal dissentions of Spain afforded no sufficient reason, why we should abstain from assisting her; and secondly, that the occupation of Spain by France endangered the balance of power in Europe, and was an adequate cause of war.

He illustrated those topics with his usual eloquence and historical lore: but it is not easy to see how they bore upon the substance of the question that was before the House, when they were insisted on by one who declined to contend that we ought to have plunged into hostilitics. Not more than five minutes, said Mr. R. Peel in reply to him, did the hon. and learned gentleman employ in showing that the country ought to have assumed a more dignified tone in the late negotiations; and the arguments, which he had subsequently addressed to the passions, the reason, and the judgment of the House, all went to show, that the country ought to have made a declaration of war. He had referred much and often to the balance of power; and for what purpose?-to convince the House that it was now in such jeopardy, that we were bound to interfere for its preservation, even at the expense and hazard of being involved in war. The real question, however, was, did the honour of the country, and, if the honour, did the interests

of the country, render it necessary that we should become a party to the war? Did, then, the honour of the country require of us war? No. Did its interests ? No. Did the faith of treaties? No. Did the voice of the people of England? Again he boldly answered, No. Did the government of Spain? Again and again he boldly answered, No. Since, then, neither Spain, nor the voice of the people of England, nor the faith of treaties, nor the interest, nor the honour of the country, required of us war, was there any reason for criminating the government, because it had not resorted to such a course ? With respect to that part of the argument on the other side, which was intended to prove that a dignified tone had not been maintained by us in the late negotiations; Mr. Peel alleged, that a very artful attempt had been made to confound the different periods of the negotiations, and that the instructions, given by Mr. Canning in the first page of the correspondence, had been quoted to prove, that, when France first declared her intention of attacking Spain, our language had not been so strong and vigorous as it ought to have been. words of his right hon. friend, "to such interference, come what may, his majesty will not be a party," used at the very outset of the negotiations, had been applied to events which had occurred three months afterwards, and had been quoted as the only remonstrance which we made to the French on their crossing the Bidassoa. The papers themselves furnished proof that this was not the case; and he therefore could not help complaining, that such an assertion had ever been allowed to go forth to

The

the public. It appeared to him, that these negotiations were divided into three distinct periods: the first, the period between the assembling and the close of the Congress; the second, the period between the return of the duke of Wellington to Paris, and the publication of the speech of the king of France; and the third, all the period that had since elapsed. Any man, who read the despatches for the purpose of criticising them, ought to keep these three periods perfectly distinct from each other in his mind, and to apply the language used during each of them to things as they then existed. He ought also to recollect, that at present we were rendered wise by the result, and should not forget that the writer of them had to enter into calculations of probabilities, with which at present we had nothing whatever to do. The object of the British government, during the first of these periods, was, to prevent a declaration from being made against Spain by the allied powers. Now had such a declaration been made or not? If it had not, how could it be justly said that the English negotiator had been duped?

Indeed, what was the language used by France regarding these negotiations? Why, M. Montmorency said, that the measures, which the French government had contemplated for the amelioration of Spain, would have succeeded but for the conduct of England. That was at least an admission, on the part of France, that she did not consider her interests to have been forwarded by the part which we played at the late Congress. What was the opinion of Spain on the same point? Though she had complained of our conduct when she VOL. LXV.

was unacquainted with it, as soon as she was informed of its effects, her minister, San Miguel, said to sir W. A'Court, on the 24th of December.-"We are sure of England, and are satisfied with her position." Did San Miguel say, that he expected that we should go to war? No such thing: but he pointed out the course, which, he thought would be most conducive to Spanish interests. He said, "There is nothing to induce us to ask for your mediation at present, but we are at sea, surrounded by dangers and menaced by storms, and it is impossible to say that we may not yet require a friendly hand." On a still later occasion the language of Spain, whom we were accused of not having favoured, was couched in the following terms: -"To England, who has taken, in the conferences at Verona, só moderate and pacific a line, it now belongs to crown her work." To crown her work! He wished the House to attend to the expression

-did they think that the Spanish minister would have made use of it, had he been dissatisfied with our conduct?

Mr. Peel then vindicated the mission of lord Fitzroy Somerset, to Madrid, against the censures which had been cast upon it; and contended, that the advice which the duke of Wellington had offered, through him, to the members of the Spanish government, was well calculated to promote its best interests. His grace did not propose to them to make any modifications in the Spanish constitution that were not clearly for its benefit and improvement. Was there

any thing in the nature of those modifications to prevent their acceptance by Spain; or any thing in the menace of a third power, [D]

which made it imperative upon her to reject them? What would have been the result, if she had accepted them? The withdrawal of the Army of Observation from the Pyrenees, to the presence of which they attributed so much of her calamities. As, at that moment, the king of France's speech had not been made public, Spain might certainly have consented without any loss of honour; and by such consent she would have united her people, and ameliorated their condition, more than she could do by any subsequent measure. He admitted, however, that after the French king's speech, even such a modification could not have been submitted to Spain with propriety. But, was it not too much that England should be made responsible for an entire change in the policy of the French government?

Sir Francis Burdett followed Mr. Peel, and met the question much more fairly and distinctly than any other of the opponents of minis

ters.

He insisted, that the discussion had nothing to do with the question of peace or war; but simply, whether we had so conducted ourselves, as to convey to the minds of the French and other foreign ministers, the sense entertained by this country of the injustice meditated and done by France to Spain? Now, with respect to what had taken place at Verona, he thought there was, on the face of those transactions, more than sufficient to call down on the head of any English minister the censure contemplated by by the original address. The French minister, at the outset, asked the noble, duke who was our plenipotentiary, if England would concur with France in their aggression on, Spain; and he had had the inso

lence, to go on and inquire, what effectual support this country would give to France, in case of her making this attack. Now, without using violent language, or menaces leading to war, there was a dignified expression of virtuous feeling, which would have brought to the minds of the makers of such propositions a knowledge of the sentiments which this country must entertain with regard to its atrocity. If we had said, that we were astonished and shocked at such conduct, and that far from having our support, we should feel it necessary to throw the whole weight of our. moral authority into the other scale, such language would not have been without effect. There were a variety of modes of proceeding besides war, which might.. have been adopted, and which would have kept us out of the situation in which we were now. placed a situation, which even those persons, who were anxious to preserve peace at all events, must acknowledge was a most ambiguous one. Suppose we had said"Your conduct is a violation of cvery principle of justice. only will we not be an accomplice in the transaction, but we must follow the severe line of our duty, and withdraw from your court our ambassador." This would have been an answer to the question, more consonant to the dignity of England and to the character which she had hitherto supported, but which she now seemed inclined to relinquish. Such an answer would have been more likely to deter France from her vile and detestable project, than telling her that she was undertaking an “unnecessary responsibility. "It had been argued, that no member ought to vote for the address, who did not

Not

think that this country should have gone to war in the event of the invasion of Spain. He (sir Francis Burdett) could not think, that, at the outset of these negotiations, it was at all incumbent on a British minister to let France into the secret as to what this country might or might not do. War or peace should have been left to depend on the acts of the parties. But, when pains were taken to tell France, that, whatever she might do, she had nothing to fear, it was impossible to believe in the sincerity of the desire of our ministers to prevent the aggression on Spain. If they had been sincere in a different sense-sincere well-wishers to the Bourbon scheme of aggression, and sincere enemies of the interests of Spain-if they had been accomplices and not dupes he could not see what conduct they could have adopted more unfavourable to Spain, and more likely to forward the unjust views of the Bourbons, than such a proceeding. The notes of the French ministers all appeared to be written in a confidential way, as if they were addressed to persons who in their heart wished well to their designs; as if, indeed, there was something in this country, under the shape of public opinion, which the ministers could not conveniently defy, so that the force of this country could not well be applied to aid them, but as if it could not be doubted that the good-will of our government went along with them in the whole of the transactions.

It was said, that France never could effect the conquest of Spain -that there were in that country millions of men who defied invasion. If this was the case, what became of the argument, that war would be dangerous and ruinous?

Why, if we could have entered on a war with such allies, and in a cause so certain of success, what an opportunity had we lost of elevating our character, and of taking that high ground which we ought to hold in the estimation of Europe? But the truth was, that, if the French government had known, or even apprehended, that a war with England was the necessary consequence of a war with Spain, the Bourbons would never, have embarked in the unjust con

test.

That a war with France would be inconvenient at the present moment, there was no doubt. There could be as little doubt, that every man whom he addressed, would be desirous, if possible, to avoid it. But there was such a thing as national honour-a thing even more precious than national immediate interests; and England was sacrificing her honour as a ǹation, if she consented to remain at peace, when the proper course for her was war. It might be said, perhaps, that England was in a situation requiring repose, which made it necessary for her to consult her domestic arrangements, and to prefer immediate to more remote advantage. But if this was so, why not say so openly? Then there was no compromise of character— no honesty lost. But it was poor to see men standing forward and vaunting their strength, affecting to say

We are what we have been, and we can maintain the honours which were won for us by our fathers" and yet shrinking (in a cause, too, from which least of all they ought to shrink) the moment their boasted powers were in danger of being put to the proof. If England had taken part in the war, she would not have been opposed

war

to France. She would have been opposed only to the bigotted house of Bourbon, who, if they succeeded in their counter-revolutionary enterprise, would carry the principle of that enterprise back into their own country, making the evil eventually recoil upon France, which they had compelled France to become the instrument of inflict ing upon Spain. There was nothing, therefore, (the hon. bart. continued) to have made a with France, under existing circumstances, formidable. He believed he must admit, that a majority of the House was in favour of peace-of "peace, come what may;" he too was for peace, as far as that peace could be consistent with the honour and safety of England, but to barter honour and future security for the chance of present quiet was a course, to his thinking, not more cowardly than impolitic. To the whole conduct of the negotiations, therefore, he stood decidedly opposed. He did not see at all, that ministers were bound to let France at once into the secret of what was to be the course of England. But, if it was right for England to speak out, he would state what it was that England ought to have said She ought to have said to the Bourbons- We wish you well: We have been your benefactors: We wish you to remain safe where you are for it is impossible for you to commit violations of the law of nations and of the peace of Europe, without, in the end, compelling England to become your adversary." All this might have been said-all, that he thought for the honour of England, ought to have been said, in the most friendly way; and, having been so said, it could scarcely have failed to have had its effect. If France had early

seen and known, that England would take that line of conduct, Europe would now have been at peace instead of being at war. If ministers had been sincere, even their friends must admit that they had, from whatever cause been, in the last degree, unsuccessful. But he gave them no credit for sincerity in their efforts, He looked to the whole course of the published negotiations and far from seeing the cause of the oppressed taken up by his majesty's ministers, he saw nothing but a constant participation in the views of the oppressor. As far as there was any exhibition of friendship towards the oppressed party, if that friendship had not been treacherous, it had assuredly been most woefully deficient in discretion and sound sense. The hon. baronet, after observing that with respect to the immediate questions before the House, he was quite as well pleased (excepting only one or two words) with the spirit of the amendment as with that of the original motion, declared that he considered the interests of Spain and of England to have been most unjustifiably compromised, throughout the late negotiations: and he apprehended no other result, if the contest between Spain and France should be prolonged, but that England would, eventually be compelled to enter into the contest, under disadvantages which would not have attached to her in its commencement.

On the third night of the debate, after several members on both sides of the House had spoken (among whom Mr. H. Twiss distinguished himself by a speech in support of the Amendment, which was not very patiently listened to, but which exposed with great acuteness and dexterity of argu-.