amicable settlement of the disputes with Spain. The French government, after some negotiation, declined the offer thus made; stating as the reason, that the grounds of difference between France and Spain were not of that distinct and definite kind that admitted of exact specification, and practical adjustment; that they grew out of the state of things in which the two kingdoms found themselves; and out of the influence which what was passing in Spain had upon the internal tranquillity of his most Christian majesty's dominions; that the two nations had, in fact, got into such a condition towards each other of reciprocal jealousy and irritation, that, rather than submit to all the inconveniences of such a situation, war would be the preferable alternative, as affording affording at least some ultimate solution. He (Mr. Canning) admitted, that here was a case, in which we might have said to both parties, that without something more specific on either side, some sensible and tangible cause of complaint

some exact claim of redress on the part of the country supposed to be aggrieved it would be better for us not to interfere; that we had done all that we could do with each party; and that, as our efforts had been attended hitherto with no success, we begged leave to withdraw from further interposition. Such a course was quite open to the British government: but as every thing that was stated on both sides was accompanied with the most solemn assurances of a pacific disposition; and as the British ministry did entertain an alarm, beyond any former occasion, of the danger of war, not only to Spain but to France,

and through France to Europe, it became a question very material to be debated, whether, while there remained the slightest chance of success, it was not our duty to make a further effort, as being the only power through whom it was possible that the effort should be made. There was this advantage in the present situation of affairs, as compared with the state of Europe at the opening of the Congress of Verona-that the questions were now reduced to the differences between France and Spain. The dispatches from the three continental powers had been sent; their ministers had been withdrawn the cases foreseen at Verona, in which alone the powers were bound to interpose on behalf of France, had none of them oc curred. It was a matter, therefore, merely between France and Spain; and it was for this country to decide, whether it would or would not take a step, which might prevent the occurrence of war, but which could not widen the breach, and increase the danger. Under these circumstances, his majesty's ministers determined to interpose their good offices on behalf of Spain; and their anxiety, in so interposing, was to distinguish their conduct, not only from that which the continental powers in their several despatches had displayed towards Spain-not only from that which France, in the speech of her minister, had likewise declared her determination to pursue; but to distinguish it also, by the channel through which it was made, from every species of interference that did not proceed from the most friendly terms. The channel through which it was made, was the duke of Wellington.

About the first week of January, Lord Fitzroy Somerset quitted this country, with a confidential communication from his Grace to the Spanish government; and this measure was adopted, in the hope, that the expressed opinions of so distinguished a benefactor of the Spanish nation might have much influence on many leading Spaniards, who had been his Grace's personal friends and acquaintances. Not many weeks (continued Mr. Canning) after lord Fitzroy Somerset had set out, an event occurred, which shook very strongly our hopes of bringing about any accommodation between the governments of France and of Spain -he alluded to the extraordinary speech with which the French ministers opened the chambers. Of the construction, to which the words of that speech were liable, and which indeed they most naturally bore, there was not a man in the House, who thought with more disgust and abhorrence than he (Mr. Canning) did. If that speech were to be understood in the plain meaning of the words namely, that the Spanish people were to be called upon, to consent to certain modifications in their constitution, not because it was faulty in itself, or dangerous to neighbouring states, or unsafe even to the prince who ruled by it, but because it was not an emanation from the Crown-it was clear, on the one hand, that no Spaniard, who had the slightest regard to the independence of his country, could consent either to modify, or to hear a modification proposed of that constitution; and on the other, that no British statesman, who valued his character as a member of a free state, could either think, or hear of his country being made

a party to negotiations for the purpose of discussing such monstrous proposals. Not a week, no, not eyen a day was lost, in conveying to France the expression of these sentiments on the part of the British government, and in telling her, that, if such was the meaning of the speech in question, there was an end to all further negotia tions, at least through a British channel-that the principle avowed, was one, which a British statesman could not acknowledge, that it struck directly at the root of the British constitution-and that, as it could not be accepted as part of the British code of law, it could not be recommended by a British statesman to the acceptance of any other people. The ministers of France were likewise told, that as Great Britain did not put for ward her own political institutions as the model on which those of other states were to be framed, or as the only system from which national freedom and hap piness could flow, so neither could she allow France (whose freedom and happiness she did not envy," though they were described to arise from a constitution octroyée from the throne) to make her own example a rule for other nations, much less to force that example upon Spain, in virtue of the consanguinity of the reigning dynasties of the two countries. however, added, that if this construction were disavowed, the ne¬ gotiations might still continue. The French government did subsequently disavow this obnoxious construction, and adopted another, which the words were not altogether qualified to bear. The negotiations in consequence proceeded; and it was at this period, that ministers, when interrogated

It was,

on the subject in parliament, had felt themselves bound to declare, that they had considerable hopes of bringing them to a successful termination: for, however singular and extraordinary it might appear, it was nevertheless strictly true, that when the speech of the king of France was communicated to him (Mr. Canning) by the French Chargé d'Affaires in this country, it was accompanied by more profuse assurances of the desires of the French government for accommodation, and of their wishes for the good services of the British government, in producing that accommodation, than had ever been made at any previous stage of the transactions. It was not surprising, that the effect, which the French government had anticipated, had been produced upon the British government by the communications which they then made to it; but it was surprising, that the French government, by some strange and unaccountable delusion, and in spite of all the remonstrances which his majesty's ministers had made to them on the subject, should have ever thought, and indeed should still continue to think, that, in publishing the document which they had done, they had hit a chord which could not fail to vibrate at Madrid, and that they had put forward a specific, which could not fail to cure all the evils which prevailed within its meridian.

While these communications were passing between Paris and Madrid, a new application was received from the Spanish government, calling for a more active employment of the good services of this country in producing an modation with France. majesty's ministers had previously

accom

If his

entertained any doubts of the line of conduct which they ought to pursue, that application would have decided them: for, under such circumstances, had they declined to continue their interposition, they would have appeared to be setting their own private feelings in opposition to the judgment of those who still thought their interposition worth having. The interposition was therefore continued; but, from that time forth, the British government took no active part in the transactions. No second instructions were sent out to lord Fitzroy Somerset, and he in consequence left Madrid. Sir Wm. A'Court, being three days nearer to Paris, and the duplication of three days in the conveyance and return of the correspondence causing the delay of a week, was left to conduct the intercourse of the two parties; and all that remained for him to do was, to state to each party the proposals and answers of the other. The result of these communications was a total failure of every endeavour to maintain peace. After this failure nothing remained for Great Britain to do, but to state fairly to each party the line of conduct which she was determined to pursue, in a state of things so deplorable for the tranquillity of Europe. From the beginning to the end of these transactions it was regularly stated to the Spanish government, that we would do all that we could to avert a war; but that, if war should unfortunately ensue, it was not to be supposed, that our anxiety to avert it was to be considered as the measure of our determination to take part in it, when commenced. To France, a formal declaration was made of the course of policy, which we meant

to pursue in a despatch which had been sent to our ambassador at Paris, after all hopes of an amicable arrangement had ceased, to be by him communicated to M. Chateaubriand. That despatch, after giving a history of the negotiations, concluded in the following manner :- "It remains only to describe the conduct, which it is his majesty's desire and intention to observe, in a conflict between two nations, to each of whom his majesty is bound by the ties of amity and alliance. The repeated disavowal, by his most Christian majesty's government, of all views of ambition and aggrandizement, forbids the suspicion of any design on the part of France to establish a permanent military occupation of Spain; or to force his Catholic majesty into any measures, derogatory to the independence of his Crown, or to existing relations with other powers. The repeated assurances, which his majesty has received, of the determination of France to respect the dominions of his most faithful majesty, relieve his majesty from any apprehension of being called upon to fulfil the obligations of that intimate defensive connexion which has so long subsisted between the Crowns of Great Britain and Portugal. With respect to the provinces in America, which have thrown off their allegiance to the crown of Spain, time and the course of events appear to have substantially decided their separation from the mother country; although the formal recognition of those provinces, as independent states, by his majesty, may be hastened or retarded by various external circumstances, as well as by the more or less satisfactory progress, in each state towards a regular and settled form

of government. Spain has long been apprised of his majesty's opinions upon this subject. Disclaiming in the most solemn manner any intention of appropriating to himself the smallest portion of the late Spanish possessions in America, his majesty is satisfied that no attempt will be made by France, to bring under her dominion any of those possessions, either by conquest, or by cession, from Spain. This frank explanation upon the points, on which perhaps alone the possibility of any collision of France with Great Britain can be appre◄ hended in a war between France and Spain, your excellency will represent to M. de Chateaubriand as dictated by an earnest desire to be enabled to preserve, in that war, a strict and undeviating neutrality -a neutrality not liable to alteration towards either party, so long as the honour and just interests of Great Britain are equally respected by both."

Mr. Canning, after his exposition of the course which government had pursued, entered into a justification of the system of neutrality which had been adopted. He knew, that many individuals in this country thought that the invasion of Spain by a French force ought to be considered by England as a declaration of war against herself.

But war, in the responsibi lity of those who had to make it, ought to be well and duly weighed before it was resolved on; the cause of it should not merely be sufficient, but urgent; and not merely urgent, but absolutely essential to the interest and welfare of the country which first declared it. In making these observations, did he cast any blame upon those, who, seeing a strong and powerful nation eager to crush and overwhelm with its

vengeance a less numerous but not less gallant people, were anxious to join the weaker against the stronger party? Certainly not the feeling was highly honourable to those who entertained it. The bosoms, in which it existed in full bloom and vigour, unchastened and unalloyed by any other feeling, were much more. happy than those in which that feeling was chastened, tempered, and mitigated by the considerations of prudence, interest, and expediency. He not only knew, but he envied the feelings of those who called for war, for the issue of which they were in no wise likely to be responsible for he would confess, that the reasoning, by which the war against Spain was justified, appeared to him to be much more calculated than the war itself to excite a strong feeling against those who had projected it; and he could not understand, by what process of reasoning, or by what confusion of ideas those who defended that war contrived to persuade them selves, that they had made out any thing which approached even to a shadow of a case. The right hon. secretary added, that there were some persons, who thought that, though it might not be prudent to make war, it might still be prudent to menace war against France. These individuals he conceived to be guilty of an error in principle; as the country, which menaced war, ought always to be ready to carry those menaces into execution. There were other individuals who were guilty of an error of a different kind-an error of opinion, and who thought that we should immediately send forth a maritime armament, to watch the events that might occur on the shores of the Peninsula. Such a course

would be unworthy of a great and independent nation, and would degrade us from a first to a secondary power. Whenever we determined upon war, to wage it, not as an auxiliary, but as a principal, had hitherto been our policy; and on all former occasions, when we had resorted to hostilities, we had exerted every nerve to bring them to a safe, a speedy, and an honourable conclusion. "Toto certatum est corpore regni.” This, he contended, was the only sound view in which war could be contemplated. If war were the issue, it should be a war worthy of this great country; and there was no war in which the country could be engaged at the present moment, and under the existing circumstances of Europe, which would not call forth all her power, all her strength, all her energies.

On the same evening on which Mr. Canning made his statement to the Commons, lord Liverpool gave a similar exposition of our policy to the Peers. The only difference between his lordship's statement, and that of the right hon. secretary (if difference it can be called) was, that lord Liverpool, at the same time that he earnestly deprecated departure from neutrality, declared more avowedly than his colleague, that the pacific course, adopted by ministers, did not arise from any apprehension that the resources of the country were not equal to meet the exigencies of war. "I have no hesitation or difficulty," said the prime minister, "in again declaring, what I stated on the first day of the session, that, if either the honour, or the essential interests of this country should require us to engage in war, we have the means of carrying on war with effect.