on the 14th his movement on Iodar; and, by a forced march, he had repaired himself, with some dragoons, and five companies of the second regiment of the Guard, to Baeza, in order to check the enemy, in case he should have passed Iodar, before d'Argout's arrival.

The village of Iodar, by its position, appeared to be necessarily a decisive point for him who should first occupy it. Colonel d'Argout, therefore, leaving his infantry behind, made all speed to reach it: but when he arrived on the 14th at noon, Riego had gotten to it an hour before, with about 1,500 foot and 500 horse. D'Argout took advantage of the surprise which his sudden appearance caused, and, without suffering himself to be delayed by the fire of the posts, made his regiment proceed along one of the exterior sides of the village, to the other extremity, where the enemy's infantry had formed two squares, between the roads of Quesada and Cabra. One of these squares was charged and broken by the first squadron; which, supported by the second, advanced immediately upon the cavalry, and put them to flight. During this time, the other square had succeeded in gaining the mountains against which Iodar in a manner leans; and there the men who composed it, dispersed in all directions. Riego himself escaped, and found refuge in the mountains, where he continued wandering the remainder of the day, accompanied by about twenty followers on horseback, fifteen of whom were superior officers. Exhausted with fatigue and hunger, he met the hermit of La Torre de Pedrogil, and an inhabitant of -Vilches, named Lopez Lara. He took them aside and said" My friends, you have now an opportu

nity of making your own and families' fortunes; you have only to conduct me, unobserved, to Carolina, Carboneras, and Navas de Tolosa, where I have good friends, who will procure me a guide to Estremadura, whither I am desirous of proceeding." The hermit and his companion refused his offers; but Riego caused them to be seized and mounted upon two mules, declaring to them at the same time, that, whether willing or not, they should serve as guides to the troop.

At night-fall they proceeded onward. Riego spoke to his companions, of his journey from Madrid into Andalusia, of the places where he found acquaintances, &c ; and from this unguarded conversation, the guides concluded that he was Riego. At day-break, they found themselves near a farm. Riego said, that they would demand an asylum there; on which Lara knocked at the door, and it so happened, that one of his own brothers, named Mateo, came and opened it.

Riego, fearing that too numer ous an escort would betray him, would permit only three of his followers to enter with him. One of these was an Englishman, who, impressed with mistrust, hastily closed the door, locked it, and retained the key. They fed their horses, and reposed themselves in the stable with their drawn swords by their sides. Riego on awaking, peremptorily said to Lopez Lara, that he must get his horse shed. Well,' replied the latter, I will go and get it done at Arguillas.' Riego insisted that Mateo should undertake the commission, not by leading the horse to Arguillas, but by fetching a farrier. Lopez had only time to whisper to his brother-This man

taking Barcelona in the present circumstances, left count Curial with a large detachment before the walls of that city, and pressed down upon Tarragona. Here he was equally unfortunate. Before he had completed the investment of the place, a sally was made from it, on the division that he had stationed at Torre Lambarra under General Berger. Moncey immediately ordered all the French divisions to be concentrated, and to be carried forward against Tarragoua in one great mass. His orders were executed on the 30th, and so warm was the reception which they met with from the town, that they were ultimately compelled to fall back to their former positions. Tarragona remained unshaken; and as Moncey had found it necessary formerly to collect his scattered forces that he might strengthen the blockade of Barcelona, so now he thought it prudent to withdraw his army from Barcelona to reinforce the troops that were to watch the enemy within the walls of Tarragona. In that neighbourhood an important advantage was gained by Milans over the French army, consisting of 10,000 men, and commanded by Moncey in person. The engagement took place on the 28th of August at Artafulla, some leagues N. E. of Tarragona. It was maintained with extraordinary obstinacy on both sides, and was terminated by a decisive bayonet attack along the whole line on the part of the Spanish infantry, who broke the enemy and drove them off the field; the cavalry of Milans pursuing them for several miles and in various directions. Milans made the French loss amount to near 1,700, of whom 170 were prisoners his own, to something more than 600.

In the mean time, the principal efforts of the French were directed against Cadiz. By the middle of July, they had collected a sufficient force to establish a loose blockade. The besieged passed decrees; the be siegers strengthened themselves in their posts; and for more than a month the uniformity of their transactions was varied only by a very well supported sortie which the Spaniards made on the 16th of July, with much gallantry, and a fair degree of success.

On the 28th of July, the Duke of Angoulème quitted Madrid, in order to proceed to Cadiz.

In the course of his journey thither, he wrested from the hands of the royalists the powers with which he had entrusted them, and which they had long abused. He issued a decree at Andujar, which prohibited any arrest by Spanish authorities, without the sanction of the French officer commanding in the district. All public journals, and those who conducted them, were put under the superintendence of French officers. These arbitrary arrangements were galling to the Spanish royalists, and served to cherish the hatred which had previously existed to a certain degree between the two parties.

His royal highness arrived at Port St. Mary on the 10th of August, where he found an army of 30,000 men waiting for his commands. On the following day, he dispatched colonel Lahitte, one of his aides-de-camp, with a flag of truce and a despatch to Cadiz. The despatch was addressed immediate ly to the king. The colonel was told that he could not be admitted to see the king, or to transact any business or carry on any communication with him, except through the usual medium of his responsible advisers.

success, allowed them to pass the trenches and form in front of the canal, before they knew of their approach, or offered resistance. Different accounts were given of the circumstances which led to this disaster; but the following was the most generally received: A guard, consisting, of a lieutenant and about forty men, had been appointed to keep watch in that part of the fortress which was most accessible from the canal. The men, who had been harassed with constant labour for several days, and had not had the proper reliefs, became completely exhausted, and, it was believed, fell asleep. About two in the morning, it being exceedingly dark, the French crossed the canal, having their allies, the Spanish Ultras, in their front. The noise, in some degree inseparable from the movement of so large a body of men, just served to arouse a little the attention of the sleepy garrison; but their alarm subsided when they heard themselves carelessly addressed in the Spanish tongue with the phrase of" Dont disturb yourselves; we are all friends." So re-assured, they laid themselves down, and it was not till after some time that they saw a body of men in the garrison far outnumbering them selves. They now took the alarm; the bugle sounded to arms; and presently a body of them fired: but being addressed in Spanish by their opponents, who asked them in affected astonishment how they could fire on their comrades, they became embarrassed: and in an instant, the confusion was rendered incurable by the arrival of a large body of French troops. Thus, in the confusion, resistance was impossible, and the French, with scarcely any loss, took posses→

sion of the fortress. Some of the Spaniards retreated to the mill of Guerra and entrenched themselves there; but the French attacked and took that fort on the following morning. The invaders lost no time in erecting new batteries on the Trocadero and directing their fire to the opposite shore. It is not easy to see what they aimed at in this part of their conduct. If they merely wished to do mischief in the neighbourhood of Cadiz and thus intimidate the enemy into an acquiescense with their proposals, they succeeded only to a very limited extent; for the Cortes were still loud in their abuse of the measures of the French government and their praises of constitutional independence. Besides, no injury was done within two miles of Cadiz, and to reduce that place, they ultimately had recourse to maritime bombardment. Hitherto their operations had been retarded for the want of naval co-operation; but admiral Hamelin, on account of illness real or pretended, withdrew or was removed from the command of the fleet; and rear-admiral du Përre was entrusted with the direction of the fleet and flotilla.

The occupation of the Trocadero so much dismayed the Spaniards, that Ferdinand, with the approbation of his ministers, or rather his ministers in his name, opened a correspondence on the 4th of September with the duke of Angoulême. General Alava was the bearer of the letters of Ferdinand; and the duke de Guiche of those of his royal highness. The duke of Angoulême having stated, that he could treat with the king only when free, Ferdinand proposed an interview either on board a neutral vessel or at some spot equally distant from both armies. Alava, on