finance. The former ministers, however, were to continue in the management of affairs, till they had made the necessary reports to the Cortes, and till the government had reached its ultimate destina

tion.

On the 1st of March, the session of the ordinary Cortes was opened. The king, pleading indisposition as his excuse, did not attend in person; butthe secretaries of state, on his behalf, delivered to the president his speech to the deputies, the language of which was such as became the circumstances of the country.

"The Most Christian king," said Ferdinand, "has stated that 100,000 Frenchmen are to come to settle the domestic affairs of Spain, and to amend the errors of our institutions. When before were soldiers commissioned to reform laws? In what code is it written, that military invasions may be the precur sors of national felicity to any people? It would be unworthy of reason to refute such anti-social errors, and it would not be decorous in the constitutional king of the Spains to apologise for the just national cause before those, who, in order to subdue every feeling of shame, cover themselves with the mantle of the most detestable hypocrisy.

"I trust that the energy, the firmness, and the constancy of the Cortes will form the best reply to the speech of the Most Christian king. I hope, that, steady in their principles, and resolved to walk in the path of their duty, they will always be the Cortes of the 9th and 11th of January, and ever be found in all respects worthy of the nation which has intrusted to them its destinies. For my part, I once more offer to the National

Congress the co-operation of all my efforts to realize hopes which the friends of liberal institutions place in Spain, by carrying into execution all the measures within the compass of my authority to repel force by force. The seasonable removal of my person and the Cortes to a point less subject to the influence of military operations, will paralyze the enemy's plans, and prevent any suspicion in the impulse of the Government, the action of which ought to be felt in every point of the monarchy.” To this speech, a suitable answer was returned on the 5th.

In the sitting of the 2nd of March, a member proposed, that the Ministers should be called in, and required to state, what precautions they had taken for the defence of the kingdom, and what arrangements they had made to transfer the seat of government to a safer place than Madrid. The ministers declared, that they had taken all the measures in their power for the defence of the king dom against foreign invasion, but that they experienced obstacles in changing the seat of government. The Cortes on this decreed, that on the following day (the 3rd) they would take into consideration the necessity of changing the seat of government, and determine on the city to which it should be transferred.

Seville was finally the place which was selected; its principal recommendations were, its remoteness from the French frontier, and its moderate distance from, and facility of communication with Cadiz, which was with reason looked upon as the last strong-hold of the constitutional cause.

When it was announced to his Majesty, that the court and govern,

ment were to be transferred to Seville, he endeavoured to avoid the journey, on the plea of indisposition. A committee, composed chiefly of Physicians, was appointed to report on the royal health; and as his Majesty's real or pretended attack of the gout was found not to be so severe as to render him unable to travel, his departure from Madrid was fixed for the 17th of March. A further respite of three days was afterwards granted to him: and on the 20th of March, he set out from the capital. He was escorted on the road by a body of troops, composed chiefly of Militia, and arrived in Seville upon the 10th of April.* Though the preparations of Spain to meet the impending conflict were far from being proportioned to the danger which threatened the constitutional system, her rulers did not altogether neglect the means of resisting the invader. Armies were ordered to be levied, and allotted to the defence of the different provinces; and considerable assiduity was displayed in provisioning and putting in a state of defence the fortresses on the eastern and western frontiers -Figueras, Barcelona, Tarragona,

The following is the Itinerary of his Majesty's journey from Madrid to Seville, as arranged before his departure:-March 20, Aranjuez, 7 leagues; 21st, Temblique, 7; 22nd, Madridejos, 4; 23rd, Villarta, 5; 24th, Manzanares, 5; 25th, a halt; 26th, Valdepinas, 4; 27th and 28th, a halt; 29th, Visillo, 4; 30th, La Carolina, 6; 31st, a halt; April 1st, Balen, 4; 2nd, Andujar, 5; 3rd, Corpio, 7; 4th, Cordoba, 5; 5th and 6th, a halt; 7th, Carlota, 6; 8th, Ecija, 4; 9th, La Luisina, 3; 10th, Carmona, 6; 11th, Seville, 6.- Total, 88 leagues.

The journey was, however, actually completed in one day less than the time proposed.

Lerida, and Urgel on the one; and Pampeluna, St. Sebastian, and Santona on the other. The armies were commanded by the first military characters of Spain. Mina was appointed to conduct the struggle in Catalonia; Abisbal had been invested with the command of Madrid. Ballasteros, although holding a seat in the Cortes, whose members were held by the constitution incapable of filling any office under the crown, was exempted from that disability by a special law, and set over the eastern provinces of Arragon, Valencia, and Murcia ; while Morillo declared his readiness to forget the clamour which had not long before compelled him to leave Madrid, and assumed the command of the North of Spain, including Galicia, Asturias, Leon, and the bordering part of old Castile. Villacampa, in the mean time, was to form an army of reserve in Andalusia; while Morillo and Ballasteros were to harass the enemy by provoking them to frequent skirmishes; and thus, by gradually weakening them, to prevent the French army from marching into the interior. The superior numbers of the invaders, however, defeated this plan. Out of the 70,000 men that composed it, it was not difficult to find a number sufficient to neutralize the efforts of those Spanish troops that were to operate on their flanks, and allow the main body of the army to march forward into the interior without danger or embarrassment.

d'Angoulême, generalissimo of the On the 15th of March, the Duke French forces, left Paris and proceeded to the frontiers. When he arrived at Perpignan, he found it necessary to take measures to crush a plot which had been formed against the success of his expedition

among several French insurgents, and which, it was generally believed, embraced officers of high rank. The whole affair has remained wrapt in mystery; for, although General Piat, the alleged ring-leader of the plot, and two of his accomplices were arrested, the French government took no further public measures in the affair. On the 2nd of April, the duke d'Angoulême published a proclamation addressed to the Spanish nation. He assigned as his reasons for approaching their territories, and interfering in their political arrangements, the repeated provocations that had been given to his Most Christian Majesty by the revolutionary faction that seemed to bear sway in Spain. He thought it high time to counteract the fatal effects of a contagion, which had already spread itself over Naples and Piedmont, and had gone far to destroy the loyalty of the French army. He hoped that he would be assisted in his attempt to save the independence and glory of Spain, by the steady and faithful co-operation of all who were the friends of order and established law.

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Spaniards," said he, "all will be done for you, and with you. The French are, and wish to be, only your auxiliaries; your standard alone will float on your cities; the provinces traversed by our soldiers will be administered in the name of Ferdinand by Spanish authority; the most severe discipline will be observed; all that shall be necessary for the service of the army, will be paid for with religious exactness." A formal or der was immediately issued to the French troops,enforcing the strictest discipline: and in the event it was proved to the world, that a French army does not necessarily carry

along with it spoliation and crime. Their progress through Spain was marked by no cruel excesses. In every instance they manifested a desire to respect the laws and property of the country through which they marched. The French soldiers formed, in this respect, a very striking contrast to the conduct of the army of the Faith, who indulged in all manner of excesses towards those who differed from them in opinion. It was intended, that they should have formed the van-guard; but their wanton misconduct rendered it necessary to place them in the rear; and the approach of the French soldiers was hailed in every district, by the more respectable Spaniards, as a deliverance from the barbarities of their own countrymen.

On the 6th of April, military operations commenced, and some of the divisions of the French army reached the banks of the Bidassoa. Here another attempt was made to shake the fidelity of the invading troops. Not more than a hundred exiled Frenchmen, commanded by one Carron, were seen on the further side of the river, clothed in the uniform of the old imperial guard, and waving the tricolor standard surmounted by the eagle of Austerlitz. In thus displaying every ensign, that was most likely to revive in the army associations of the revolutionary war, and feelings of hostility to the reigning. family of France, they seem to have acted, more for the sake of parade, or from the impulse of the moment, than in pursuance of any regular and well-concerted scheme. Three discharges of grape and one of shot from a small battery of cannon, followed by a volley of musquetry, put the refugees to flight; and when terror no longer

prevented them from stopping to mark the consequences of their folly, they found that four of their officers and seven privates had been killed or wounded.

On the 7th, a bridge was thrown across the river, and on that and the following day, the whole of the French army passed. The Spanish detachments which were in the small frontier towns, retreated before them in good order, and threw themselves into St. Sebastian. The French immediately appeared before this town; and about two o'clock of the afternoon of the 9th of April, sent in a flag of truce, requiring the surrender of the place, to be held in deposit for Ferdinand 7th, by a Bourbon prince. While the answer to this proposition was preparing, the left wing of the French made a movement in advance, and opened a heavy fire of musquetry on a Spanish galliot which was anchored in the harbour. A message was imme diately sent to the French commander, informing him, that, if he did not withdraw his troops and replace them in the points which they occupied when he sent in the flag of truce, reprisals would be made upon it. This threat had the proper effect: the fire was discontinued, and the enemy's troops withdrew to their former position. After the flag of truce had returned to the French camp, a detachment of 160 men was sent out from San Sebastian, for the purpose of reconnoitring the enemy. This detachment, however, got engaged with some advanced corps of the French, and was finally charged by 1,500 of the Royal guard. A battalion was sent out from the garrison to support the detachment, and prevent it from being eut off. A warm action then commenced.

The Spanish troops, though greatly inferior in number to the enemy, fought gallantly, and succeeded in saving the detachment. On the Spanish side, there were two officers killed, three wounded, and 18 privates killed and wounded. The French loss was considerable. During the remainder of the campaign, a loose blockade of the place was maintained. The governor, to facilitate the procuring of the necessary supplies, declared the port free.

On

Leaving the blockade of San Sebastian to be managed by prince Hohenlohe, the duke d'Angoulême proceeded towards Madrid. his march to the capital he remained several days at Tolosa, and arrived at Vittoria just about the time that general Vallin was passing the Ebro without resistance. It was difficult to ascertain, what were now the precise plans which the Spaniards intended to pursue. They abandoned almost every thing; yet, at insulated points, they fought obstinately: they retreated before the French, and yet the latter seemed to dread their strength or their cunning: for their advances into the interior were made with much caution and slowness. Many instances might be given of the inconsistency with which the Spaniards acted. Thus, they made no exertions to defend the bridge of Miranda, the consequence of which was, that not only general Vallin, but likewise the duke of Reggio, crossed the Ebro without difficulty; while, at Logrono, a corps of about a thousand Spaniards, commanded by the Brigadier Julian Souchez, were fighting desperately against the van-guard of general Obert; and when they were compelled to yield to superior numbers, they continued the struggle in the houses and

streets of the town. The same spirit pervaded the inhabitants of Pampeluna and Santona. They refused to comply with the terms proposed to them, and made preparation for a protracted siege.

The head-quarters, after continuing for about a month at Vittoria, were moved to Burgos; and there the duke d'Angoulême joined the divisions of the duke of Reggio, which had arrived there on the 22nd of April. The halt at Vittoria arose, it was supposed, from an expectation that the left wing of the army under Moncey would soon penetrate through Catalonia, and establish communications with the main body. For a while Moncey met with but few obstacles in his career; and the road to Barcelona was open before him. But he saw the danger of advancing rashly. The French army could have proceeded along the plain which stretches between the mountains and the sea through the whole extent of Catalonia to the frontier of Arragon and Valencia, if Mina could have been dislodged from the stations which he occupied on the mountains: until that was effected, Moncey saw it would have been madness to penetrate further: for the troops of Mina would have immediately descended from the mountains and harassed his rear. Mina's forces, distributed into three divisions, each consisting of 3,000 men, were spread along the banks of the Fluvia; and to this point accordingly the French general directed the strength of his army. Having concentrated his scattered troops, he presented himself before Mina. General Donnadieu was, at the same time, bringing down, through Campredon, the reserve divisions to attack his rear. Mina retreated

without giving battle. Two great advantages were now gained by Moncey. He, first of all, possessed himself of Gerona, and, in the second place, had it in his power to advance further into the interior, whenever he thought it expedient to do so for Mina was now so far behind him, that he could not be suddenly attacked on the rear. Although, however, the path was open before him, and although he would have been justified in acting with more confidence since the fall of Saragossa, which, being evacuated by Ballasteros, had yielded to the left wing of the French army, under the command of Molitor, he saw that he could not co-operate effectually in the general plan of the campaign. The obstacles presented in Catalonia put it out of the power of the invaders to bring it immediately under subjection. The contest in that quarter would obviously be protracted, and would afford Moncey sufficient employment: but provided he was active in watching the enemy's movements, the skirmishing in Catalonia could have but little influence on the fortunes of the war in the other parts of Spain.

The duke d'Angoulême arrived at Burgos on the 10th of May; and from thence, the whole army began its march upon Madrid. The generalissimo was himself at the head of the centre division. They met with no opposition. Morillo gave way before them on their right; and, on their left, Ballasteros was employed in watching the movements of Molitor. When they arrived before the capital, terms were proposed by the constitutionalists: and a convention was agreed upon, by which Zayas, with those troops which were under his command, was to retain