ters had not yet arrived at the point which made the preservation of peace impossible; but deprecated any further discussion, as the negotiations were still continued. He added, that special circumstances had occurred, some of them very recently, which made him more averse than before, to enter more fully into the subject. The forbearance, which parliament had already shown, had been of material advantage to the ministers in their negotiations with foreign powers; and that forbearance, he hoped, would be extended somewhat longer. The marquis of Lansdown then inquired, whether the country was perfectly unshackled as to the course, which, under future circumstances, it might be necessary to adopt with a view to its own interests or honour. Lord Liverpool replied, that we had entered into no engagement whatever that could prevent us from following any path which our honour or interests might prescribe.

M. de Chateaubriand, had, in one of his speeches, asserted, that the principles on which France proceeded, were admitted even by Mr. Canning; and, in proof of his assertion, he pretended to quote some passages from the official correspondence of the secretary for the foreign department. On the 28th of February, Mr. Brougham put a question to Mr. Canning, with respect to the colour given to the foreign policy of the British ministry in that speech of M. de Chateaubriand's, and more particularly with respect to a pretended quotation, given in it, from a note said to have been written by the right hon. secretary. Mr. Canning replied, that the extracts were not fairly given, and VOL. LXV.

that they conveyed, as absolute, propositions which, in fact, were stated with a qualification. The right hon. gentleman admitted, that the grounds of hoping for a continuance of peace had been greatly diminished; but he suggested, that while any hope remained, it would be improper to make a complete disclosure of all the circumstances connected with the late negotiations.

In

Upon the conclusion of peace between England and Spain, in 1814, an article was introduced into the treaty, which bound this country not to furnish succours to the South American colonies. 1818, the de facto independence of these states having existed for several years, neutrality between them and the mother country required, either that the prohibition should be withdrawn, or that it should be extended to both parties. The latter course was the one which was adopted. But it was obvious, that, if this state of things were to remain unaltered upon the eve, and during the continuance, of a war between France and Spain, the latter power would be exposed to no small inconvenience from a prohibition which did not operate upon the former. Accordingly, when, from the tide of events, war became probable, his majesty's government stated to Spain, that there were two modes in which the difference between the privileges of France and those of Spain might be equalized by an order in council; either by prohibiting the exportation of arms and ammunition to France, or by removing the prohibition upon their exportation to Spain; but it was also stated, that his majesty's government could not remove that prohibition as it respected Spain, without removing it also as it re C

spected the South American colo nies. The extension of the prohibition to France, would have been a prohibition in words only and not in fact; for the vicinity of the Belgic ports would have rendered indirect exportation to France so easy, that the prohibition of direct exportation would have been nugatory. Our government therefore, anxious to preserve a real and not merely a seeming neutrality, adopted the other mode of proceeding and issued an order in council, taking off the prohibition of exporting arms and ammunition to Spain.

On the 26th of March, lord Liverpool gave notice, that he would on the 14th of April, lay upon the table of the House the papers relative to the late negotiations on the state of affairs between France and Spain. The interval between this communication and the day appointed for the production of the papers, was filled up by the Easter holidays; for both houses adjourned to the 10th of April,-the Lords, from the 26th of March; and the Commons, from the 27th. A ridiculous enough attempt was made in the House of Commons to abridge, by a few days, the usual duration of the adjournment under the pretext, that, in so critical a state of Europe, the sittings of the house ought not to be suspended so long.

On the 14th of April, the diplo matie papers, relative to the negotiations on the relations between France and Spain, were laid before parliament; in the House of

These papers (with the exception of merely formal communications) will be found among the Public Documents in a subsequent part of this volume. Mr. Canning's share in this diplomatic correspondence deserves unqualified

Peers, by lord Liverpool, and in the Commons, by Mr. Canning. On this occasion, these two leading members of the cabinet entered into an exposition of the course of conduct which had been pursued by his majesty's government, and of the principles by which that conduct had been guided. When the duke of Wellington, said Mr. Canning, set out to join the Congress of Verona, it was not understood that it was in contemplation to discuss at that meeting the affairs of Spain. The matter, of which it was expected that the Congress would take cognizance, and to which the preparation of instructions had been particularly directed, was the state of affairs in the east of Europe, and the complicated transactions between Russia and Turkey. It was only on his arrival in Paris, that the duke of Wellington found that the state of Spain was likely to occupy a most important place in the deliberations of the Congress at Verona; and he instantly applied for specific instructions on that point. The requisition of the duke of Wellington (who left London, within about forty-eight hours after Mr. Canning had accepted the seals of the foreign office) was dated from Paris on the 21st of September; and the instructions transmitted in consequence were in the following terms: If there be a determined project to interfere by force or by menace in the present struggle in Spain, so convinced are his majesty's government of the uselessness and danger of any such interfe

praise for the united perspicuity, precision, and manly elegance, with which he states the principles and views of the English cabinet.

rence, so objectionable does it appear to them in principle, as well as utterly impracticable in execution, that when the necessity arises, or (I would rather say) when the opportunity offers, I am to instruct your grace at once frankly and peremptorily to declare, that, to any such interference, come what may, his majesty will not be party." These instructions did not go into much detail, and admitted no qualification; they were positive and peremptory, and from them the duke of Wellington never for one moment swerved. So far was the British government at that time from entertaining any idea that a proposition of a nature hostile to Spain would be made by France, that there was every previous reason for believing, that France would be the last quarter from which such a prohibition would come. It was a matter of public notoriety, that the king of France, on the 5th of June, declared, in allusion to the force he had stationed on his Pyrenean frontier, that the precaution thus adopted had kept from his provinces a contagion which had ravaged a great part of Spain; that with the same object only he meant to maintain the forces he had stationed; and that nothing but ill-will and calumny could find a pretext for ascribing to this precautionary measure a different purpose. Such was the statement in the last document France had issued with relation to the affairs of Spain; and the right hon. secretary mentioned it only to account for the fact, that the instructions of the British government were not, in the first instance, framed with a view to meet propositions hostile to Spain on the part of the French government. When the Congress of Verona met,

and when the propositions of the French government regarding Spain were brought forward, they were not directed to a hostile object-they were in their nature purely defensive, conditional, and hypothetical. They did not then call for the assistance of the allies against Spain: they asked merely what would be the conduct of the allies in three given cases, which all presupposed some active offence in the first instance on the part of Spain. To these inquiries, answers were given on the part of three of the continental powers, professing their readiness to countenance, and, if necessary, to support France in the specified cases. The British plenipotentiary gave no such answer. He said, that he was precluded from entering into any hypothetical engagement. He demanded, before he was called upon to give even a hypothetical concurrence to a hypothetical promise in a hypothetical case, that he should be informed, distinctly and practically, what of fence Spain had actually given to France, and what were the grounds of future offence anticipated by France. The congress of Verona, during the weeks of its sittings, discussed the question in all its bearings; but the language of the duke of Wellington was the same on the last day of meeting as on the first-a positive refusal to give any answer to the inquiries of France-a positive refusal to have any thing to do with interference, by force or menace, in the internal affairs of Spain.

At the conclusion of the congress, the three great Continental Powers agreed with France to transmit to their ministers at Madrid several despatches, remonstrating with Spain on the state

of her institutions, and calling for changes in them as the price of their continued friendship and forbearance. The British plenipotentiary, however, declined any participation in that proceeding, and declared, on the part of his sovereign, that all he could do would be, to continue his minister at MaIdrid when the others were withdrawn, in the hope of abating the irritation such a measure must occasion, and of preventing the evil by friendly counsel and assist

ance.

So broke up the congress at Verona. The plenipotentiary of France left it to return to Paris, to consider what step his government would take more in advance than the rest of the continental allies: the plenipotentiaries of the continental allies, to prepare their despatches for Madrid; the British plenipotentiary, to renew at Paris the remonstrances he had ineffectually made at Verona, and in the last resort, to report to his government his disappointment, if disappointment it should be, in order that, to the minister at Madrid instructions might be sent, to disavow, on the part of this country, any participation in these proceedings; but, at the same time, to advise, and strenuously implore, that the slightest excess might be studiously avoided, which could retrospectively justify, or prospectively encourage, the war threatened by France.

The duke of Wellington arrived at Paris about the beginning of December. The French government, far from being in a more warlike disposition, were, on the contrary, inclined to maintain peace, and disposed to send back to Verona, at least to the sovereigns who had not then actually quitted

that city, the despatches prepared for Madrid, and to entreat them to reconsider the contents of those despatches, and the impropriety of the time for sending them.

Such was the first report received from the duke of Wellington. Up to this period, no communication had taken place between this country and Spain on the subject of what was passing at Verona; and the reason why no such intercourse had occurred, lay in the following circumstances: Towards the end of the last session of parliament, a loud complaint had been raised in this country respecting the state of our commercial navigation in the West Indies. Pirate-vessels, some bearing the flag of independent colonies of Spain, and others of Spain herself, had committed the most grievous depredations on British trade, to an enormous amount, and attended with circumstances of such violence and cruelty, as to call for national interposition. Not long, therefore, after parliament rose, it had been thought necessary by the British government to send orders, and therewith an armament, to the West Indies, to take into our own hands that redress which had been in vain sought by representation and remonstrance at Madrid. Orders were given to the commander, in the event of the owners of pirate vessels continuing to find refuge on the shores of Cuba, that, after first communicating with the Spanish governor of the island, and asking his assistance, he should either conjointly, or, upon his refusal, separately, effect a landing in Cuba, and root out the nest of marauders that infested those seas. About the same time, pretensions, utterly obsolete, were revived by commanders on the Spanish main,

to declare constructive blockades of the whole coast of what was Spanish America, and to capture all trading vessels that should presume to violate these blockades. Many instances, recent and flagrant, had occurred, in which the laws of these blockades had been rigorously carried into execution, and outrages of the same sort had been continued, more or less, for many preceding years. Almost from the year 1815, there had been a series of unanswered representations of unredressed grievances preferred to the Court of Madrid, which it was at length thought expedient to bring directly to a point. That justice was on the side of the British complaints, might be inferred from the cirstance, that, after negotiation, redress was finally accorded; and that the amount of the grievance was not small, might be gathered from the sum which the Spanish government itself appropriated to the liquidation of the claim, being about half a million sterling. The business, on which sir W. A'Court (our minister at Madrid) was first employed there, was in making these remonstrances, and in demanding redress. He was to communicate to the Spanish government-first, the instructions with regard to Cuba; and secondly, the further fact, that an armament had been sent to the West Indies, with orders to make reprisals, if our maritime rights should not be observed. Redress was promised on the part of Spain, and instructions were accordingly sent out to sir John Owen. Remonstrance having been once made, redress once claimed, and satisfaction accorded, no hostile feeling could possibly remain on the part of this country. But it was

not in the midst of negotiations like these, that it would have been either delicate or proper, to have entered into discussions, or made declarations, of the part Great Britain was taking on behalf of European Spain. This country had pursued two courses of action: on the one hand, it had claimed of Spain, redress for injuries inflicted under her flag in South America; and on the other, she had defended Spain against an invasion by European powers. The British government well knew, that a time must come, when a disclosure of the latter course might be made to the ministry at Madrid; and by a coincidence in point of time, it was at the close of the Congress at Verona, that our negotiations for redress had been brought to a favourable conclusion.

Before this disclosure of the discussions at Verona was made to Spain, and while she was yet uncertain what steps had been taken at Congress, an application was made on the part of the Spanish government, first, to ascertain what the precise course of the negotiations had been; and next, to interest this country to employ her good offices for the maintenance of peace. In making this request, pains were taken to make it appear distinctly, that the good offices she asked were not inconsistent with the most strict neutrality. She asked counsel and mediation that Great Britain should offer advice to one friend, on behalf of another. Upon receiving this application, his majesty's government hesitated not a moment to write to the duke of Wellington, then expected at Paris, and to direct his grace to offer to the French government the mediation of Great Britain for the