CHAP. VII. the mutual confidence and honour of the con1778. tracting generals, and had no intention either

of binding his nation, or of extending the cartel beyond the limits and duration of his own command.

This explanation was totally unsatisfactory to the American commissioners, who objected altogether to a treaty dependent on the personal faith of the generals, as being unequal and ineffectual: unequal, because by the terms in which their powers were expressed, the faith of the United States was pledged for the observance of the stipulations they might enter into, while the British government would remain unbound; and ineffectual, because the object was, not only to settle past differences, and effect a present exchange of prisoners, but also to establish principles which should govern in future, and which would include matters of very interesting civil concern, as well as those of a military nature.

General Howe persisting in his refusal to make the alteration in his powers which had been acquired, the negotiation broke off, and this fair prospect of terminating the distresses of a great number of unfortunate persons, passed away without effecting the good it had promised.

Some time after the failure of the negotiation relative to a general cartel, sir William Howe proposed that all prisoners actually exchange..

able should be sent in to the nearest posts, and CHAP. VII:
returns made of officer for officer of equal rank, 1778.
and soldier for soldier, as far as numbers would
admit; and that if a surplus of officers should
remain, they should be exchanged for an equi-
valent in privates.

On the representations of general Washing-
ton, congress acceded substantially to this pro-
position, so far as related to the exchange of
officer for officer, and soldier for soldier, but
rejected the part which admitted an equivalent
in privates, for a surplus of officers, because
the officers captured with Burgoyne were ex-
changeable within the powers of general Howe.
Under this agreement, an exchange took place
to a considerable extent: but as the Americans
had lost many more prisoners than they had
taken, unless the army of Burgoyne should be
brought into computation, numbers unex-
changed were still detained in captivity.

1778.

CHAPTER VIII.

General Lacy surprised....General Howe resigns his com-
mand, and returns to England; is succeeded by sir H.
Clinton.... The British army evacuate Philadelphia, and
march through the Jerseys....Council of war called by
general Washington, decide against attacking the ene-
my on their march.... The opinion of the general against
this decision....He attacks the enemy at Monmouth
court-house....The action severe, but not decisive....
General Lee arrested for his behaviour in this action,
and afterwards to the commander in chief....Court
martial appointed to try him....Sentenced to be sus-
pended from his command for one year....The thanks
of congress presented to general Washington and his
army, for their conduct in the battle at Monmouth.

THE
position at Valley forge had been taken
by the American army, for the purposes of
covering the country of Pennsylvania, protect-
ing the magazines laid up in it, and cutting off
those supplies to the British in Philadelphia,
which would be of great utility to them, and
with which very many of the people were well
disposed to furnish them. It was impossible
without a vast increase of force, to station
troops in sufficient numbers on both sides of
the Delaware, and the Schuylkill, to repel large
parties which it was easy for the enemy to
detach; and of course, this formed no part of
the system of operations laid down for the
winter. The plan extended no further, than
to guard, with the militia of Pennsylvania, the

north of the Schuylkill, and with the militia of CHAP. VIIL New Jersey, the east of the Delaware, so as to 1778. restrain the people of the country from carrying in their provisions to a market, to which they were irresistibly allured by receiving payment in specie.

These light irregular parties, it was hoped, would not only restrain and check an intercourse, which, though beneficial to individuals, was deemed highly pernicious in a national point of view, but would be sufficient to repel small foraging parties; and, consequently, would render it necessary for the enemy to come out in force, or to want those important supplies, which they depended on collecting in the adjacent country.

On such occasions, the operation could not be suddenly completed, and, it was expected, might often be defeated by small detachments of Continental troops from the army, to be re-enforced by militia, who, it was supposed, would turn out with alacrity, and in greater numbers, to save themselves from being plundered. This hope was the rather indulged, because in the intervals between these incursions, only small portions of the militia were required to keep the field. On a great and pressing emergency, therefore, a greater exertion was expected.

In the species of war which this state of things introduced, the advantage was manifestly

CHAP. VIIL with the enemy; who, being unassailable in 1778. their quarters, and possessing the command of the Delaware, could, at any time, with great facility, ravage the coast of Jersey to a considerable extent, before any assistance could be received from Continental troops to be detached from the army. But of this advantage it was impossible to deprive them, unless two camps could have been formed, either of which would have been sufficiently strong to repel them; or, unless the militia would have assembled universally, at the first alarm, with arms in their hands, to drive back the invaders of their country.

This was not counted on. A much smaller degree of service was expected, and even this was not always performed. The lines were often so ill guarded that the communication with Philadelphia experienced but little interruption.

Yet the wants of such a number of persons and horses required a greater supply of fresh provisions and forage, than could be brought in by these means, and as the spring opened, several expeditions were undertaken, both to relieve the British army, and to distress that of the United States.

About the middle of March, an expedition into Jersey, under colonel Mawhood and major Simcoe, with about twelve hundred men, was projected, and carried into execution. Having