almoft wholly in his majefty's favour, and that he has taken care that he thall not draw much lefs profit from the duke of Mecklenburg as an ally, than he had derived from him as an enemy. In fhort, with regard to extent of poffeffion, the king of Pruflia is much in the fame fituation in which he was left at the clofing the foregoing campaign; but in all other refpects his condition is infinitely preferable. He had then indeed the fame poffeflions in Saxony; but he clofed that campaign with the lofs of two battles, deftru&tive in themfelves, and difgraceful in their circumftances: he clofed this by a moft beneficial and mott glorious victory, by which the reputation of his arms, greatly tarnished, was reftored to its former brightness, and which in its confequences has given him as fair a profpect of fuc. cefs as he can have, whilft the alliance against him is not in the least degree weakened by the falling off of the moft inconfiderable member, or the abatement of the smallest degree of their animofity. CHAP. X. The Allies raife the fiege of Gottingen. Winter-quarters and fufferings of the British troops. Popular debates in England concerning the German war. HE allied army in Weftpha At length therefore, they fubmit Tlia, after their failure on the ted to go into winter quarte, leav lower Rhine, turned their attention to the eastward of the Wefer, and made a vigorous attempt upon Gottingen, which from the 22d of November, until the 12th of the following month, they kept blockaded. But the French made a brave defence, and having taken a ftrong poft of the allies in a fally, they compelled them to raise the blockade. They were before heartily weary of it, having fuffered incredible hardships, both in this and all the other fervices of the campaign, in which they had so often traverfed that great tract of country which lies between the Maine, the Wefer, and the Rhine: and though the winter continued very temperate and open, fuch unusual rains had fallen, that the waters were every where out and the roads fo damaged, that their provifions could scarcely arrive, or their communication be preserved. ing the French in poffeffion of Heffe, and the whole country eastward of the Wefer to the frontiers of the electorate; by which they communicated with the Auftrians and Imperialifts, and prevented the fuccours with which the king of Pruffia, after the battle of Torgau, had intended to reinforce the allied army. The English troops were cantoned, for the winter, in the bifhopric of Paderborn; and lord Granby eftablished his head-quarters in the city of that name. But these quarters proved a very indifferent place of repofe for the British troops, worn out with the fatigues of fo laborious a campaign, partly from the natural penury of the country; and partly from the vast numbers to be supported, at a time when the fphere of their subfiftence was extremely ftraitened and even that narrow fphere exhauited by having been four years the the feat of war. This fearcity was increafed by the difficulty of the roads, and probably in fome degree by the avarice of contractors, over whom several were of opinion, as ftrict a watch had not been kept, as is at all times neceffary for that fort of people. But whatever were the causes of this fcarcity, it was bitterly felt by the troops, and was accompanied by difeafes which thinned them extremely. This raifed a general difcontent in the army, which was fpeedily communicated to England, where the people during the preceding year, not having been firuck with thofe brilliant advantages which diftinguith an offenfive campaign, did not confine their complaints to the conduct of the war, but began to fall into an almoft general difike of the very fyftem up on which it was pursued. Much of the old difpute between the naval and continental fchemes was renewed, and enforced with many additional topics.. The alliances of the war in Germany were feverely criticised. "We are purfuing, faid they, a fyftem, by which we muft certainly lofe all the advantages which we acquired for the fhort time we followed one that was more rational, and fuitable to our circumstances; a fyftem of all others the moft abfurd; a fyftem in which defeats are attended with their ufual fatal effects, and in which even victory itself cannot fave us from ruin. We will not enter, faid they, into that long and vainly-agitated queftion, Whether we ought to take any part in the differences which may arife between the powers on the continent? This difquifition is foreign to the prefent purpofe; and it is befides of too vague and general a nature to admit any precife determination; but this undoubtedly may be afferted, that we can never, confiftently with common prudence, engage in a continental war against France, without a concurrence in our favour of the other powers on the continent. This was the continental scheme of the great King William; and this principle the foundation of the grand alliance which he projected, and at the head of which, in defence of the liberties of Europe, be made the moft augue appearance towhich human nature can be raised. It was on this principle, that in conjunction with half Europe, we carried on the war with fo much honour and fuccefs against France,' under the duke of Marlborough. But to engage in a continental war with that power, not only unaffified but oppofed by the greatest part of thofe ftates with whom we were then combined, is an attempt never to be juftified by any comparative calculation of the populouinefs, the revenues, or the general ftrength of the two nations. It is a defperate firuggle, which muft finally end in our ruin. But what is the fcene which we have chofe for this ftruggle? We have chofen Gerinany; the very pot of all others which the French, if they had their choice, would have pointed out to us. By making Germany the theatre of war, they fee that country wafted and deftroyed, the ftrength of which has always proved the greateft bulwark against their overbearing ambition. They fee the fwords of the Germans, from one end to the other of that vaft and populous country, turned against each other; and they fee with joy the English, whofe in e a terest intereft it is to ferve them as much But to the English, every thing is unfavourable in fucha war; their greateft fucceffes will only carry them to greater diftance from their refources, and every fep of their progrefs muft make the tranfport of provifion, artillery, ammunition, and the infinite impediments of a large army more difficult, and in the end altogether impracticable. This is not fpeculation; the events which followed the battle of Crevelt have proved it. Prince Ferdinand, victorious in that action, was obliged, rather from the difficulty of fubfifting, than the fuperiority of the enemy, to repaís the Rhine, and to bring back to Germany that war with which he threatened France.. It is thus, that, upon this plan, victory itself cannot save us, and that all our fucceffes ferve only to accumulate new diftreffes, new difficulties, new charges. Whilft France, who has only contracted her expences by the lofs of her navy, encouraged us to enter deeper and deeper into the inextricable toils of a German war, inwhich we wafte our ftrength only to entangle ourselves further; the holds the firings, and can never be tired out at this game. From all this rifes-an expence unknown even in thought to our forefathers, and which the fingle revenue of England is by no means able to bear. The allies, if they deferve the name, fupply not the fmalleft part of it. The Hanoverians and Heflians contribute to our fervice only by enabling us to protract ftill longer our efforts in a fyftem, in which nothing can fo effectually ferve us as being defeated as early as poffible. As to the king of Pruffia, what we pay to that monarch may ráther be confidered as tribute than fubfidy; fince we receive nothing in return: and that far from being able to afford any relief to our armies, he is fcarcely in a condition to fupport himself. So that this alliance is worse than the former, as it is an heavy charge, compenfated not only with no real, but even with no apparent or fhewy advantage. Indeed, he is an ally the lait in the world we ought to have chofen, on account of his long connexion with our worst enemies, the mean and the hoftile fentiments he has always entertained towards us, the injuries he has done us, and the general lightness of his faith with regard to his former allies. We regard him, it is true, as the protector of the Proteftant religion; but how lightly he thinks of all religi on, on, his writings testify; and what mifchiefs he has done the Proteftant caufe in particular, this war will be a lafting memorial. When he entered Saxony, a Proteftant country, he found that religion no ways molefted in thofe places, where it had been established or tolerated by the treaty of Weftphalia. Even in the Popish dominions the perfecution began to lofe fomething of its edge, when he, under the name of its protector, brought upon it as great a calamity as its most determined enemies could have wished; by dividing the reformed ftates of the empire, and fetting Proteftants to cut the throats of Proteftants, whilft all the Popish powers have been forced into a strict confederacy. Had we kept ourselves clear of this ruinous fyftem; and inftead of engaging France on her strong fide, attacked and vanquished her colonies one after the other, we might withoutexhaufting our ownftrength have gradually wafted away the principal refources of her trade, and whilst we continued this method, have as little reafon to grow tired of a war (the whole funds of which would be spent at home) as France has to grow weary in the prefent manner of carrying it on. If the powers on the continent were left without our interpofition to do their own bufinefs, they would probably better understand and better defend their own rights. At worst let France enter, let them conquer, let them poffets Hanover; there is no mifchief they can do that country greater than it fuffers by the prefent war; and we, not exhauiting ourfelves by a fruitless defence, fhould in the end, by the entire poleftion of the French colonies, be able, befides the fecurity of our own juft claims, to restore the Hanoverian dominions to their lawful fovereign, and even to procure fome indemnification for what they might have fuffered in our quarrel.” This is pretty nearly the fubftance of what was urged against the German fyftem; and the argument was conducted with great management and addrefs, and interfperfed with a number of topics well calculated to fpread difcontent, and to place in an odious light every step taken in thofe alliances and in that war. Many, however, ftrongly adhered to that method; and they answered, "that the best reafons on the other fide were more fpecious than folid; and that the chief writings againft our German connexions were declamations rather than arguments. That the complaint of the expence of this war was in fome measure juft; but if the advantage was in any degree equivalent, the expence was incurred to good purpofe. That France, by engaging fo heartily as he has done in the German war, has drawn away fo much of her attention and her revenue from her navy, that it enabled us to give fuch a blow to her maritime ftrength, as poflibly the may never be able to recover. Her engagement in the German war has likewife drawn her from the defence of her colonies, by which means we have conquered fome of the most confiderable the poffeffed. It has withdrawn her from the protection of her trade, by which it is entirely deftroyed, whilit that of England has never in the profoundeft peace been in fo flourithing a condition. So that, by embarking in this German war, France has fuffered herself to be undone, e 3 undone, fo far as regards her particular and immediate quarrel with England. But has fhe had in Germany fuch fucceffes as will counterbalance this lofs? Far from it. At this moment fhe is infinitely lefs advanced than fhe was the year the entered Germany, after having fpent fuch immenfe fums of money, and loft by the fword, by difeafe, and by desertion, at least 100,000 of her people. On the other hand, the account ftands thus with regard to EngJand: deeply embarked as she has been in this German war, in her particular quarrel with France the has been carried along with an almoft uninterrupted tide of fuccefs. She has taken many of the French colonies; he has deftroyed their navy and their trade, and having infulted the enemies coafts, has ruined an harbour which might one day prove very obnoxious to us. Then how ftands the account in Germany? The French have been there frequently defeated; Hanover has been recovered and protected; the K. of Pruffia has been preferved fo long at leaft from the rage of his enemies, and in general the liberty of Germany has been hitherto fecured. So that if we have incurred a great expence, we have done by it infinitely more than France has done at an expence much greater than ours. For the advocates who declaim against the king of Pruffia, feem to have forgot that the charge of the French army muft exceed ours, as the number of their troops to be paid, exceeds the difference between French and English pay. Thofe on the English establishment in Germany, have at no time exceeded 25,000, and the reft of the confederates ferve very nearly on the fame terms with the French. Not to mention the fubfidies fo greatly fuperior to ours, which that power pays to ftates from whom the has not a fingle regiment to augment her armies. Thus although by our victories France is relieved from the charge of her navy, and that of the defence of fome of her most confiderable colonies, the German war alone has brought her finances to a diftrefs of which the whole world has been witness. And nothing lefs could have happened ; the expence. however contracted, was ftill enormous; and the refource of every war, trade, was almoft wholly deftroyed. In England, the expence was alfo undoubtedly great: but then, the old trade still remained to fupply it, and new channels were opened. Had we lain by and tamely beheld Germany in part poffeffed, and the reft compelled to receive laws from France, the war there would foon have been brought to an end; and France, ftrengthened by victory, by conqueft, and alliance, would have the whole force and whole revenue of her mighty monarchy free to act against us alone. They argued further, that common faith obliged us to an adherence to our engagements both with Hanover and Pruffia; and that the pleaded incapacity to affift them, arifing from the greatnefs of the. charge, could not excufe us; becaufe the incapacity was not real; and if the expence were inconve nient, we ought to have looked to that when we contracted our engagements. That it was not true, that we received no advantage from our alliance with the king of Pruffia; for if it be once admitted, that we entered with any reafon into the German war, (which they sup pofed |