ing daily increafed. Infomuch that M. Broglio thought fit to order the corps of St. Germain to unite itself with the grand army. The count, who could not brook obedience to a younger officer, and one befides with whom he was not on the best terms, retired from the fervice. He had only June 23. ferved before upon condition of commanding an army entirely diftinct, and under his own particular orders. This difference deprived France of one of its moft able generals, and difconcerted one of its moft promifing fchemes of operation.

Before this misunderstanding had produced thefe effects, the affairs of the French went on with all imaginable profperity. The principle army not retarding itfelf, by confideration of the places of ftrength which the allies poffeffed in their front, the caftles of Marpurg and Dillenbourg puthed forward into the landgraviate of Heffe, leaving detachments to reduce thofe fortreffes. The first of which furrendered on the 30th of June, the latter held out to the 16th of July: but the garritons of both furrendered prifoners of war.

July 10. In the mean time, whilft M. Broglio advanced on the fide of Hetle, the corps of St. Germain had penetrated through the duchy of Weftphalia, and the two armies joined near a place called Corbach. The allied army had fallen back from the poft they occupied at Fritzlar, and were retreating towards the river Dymel. As yet they had received no advice of the dreaded junction of the French armies: but as it was imagined that the corps of St Germain only moved that way, and the vanguard enly of that corps could be arrived

at Corbach, which could not be es, timated at more than 10,000 foot, and 17 fquadrons at the utmoft, the hereditary prince formed a scheme of attacking and driving them from that poft.

When he had begun the attack, contrary to his expectation, he found the enemy already formed; but it was now impoflible to recede. The action grew every moment more furious and bloody. The French ftood their ground with firmness; and the main army being extremely near, inftead of being waited in the action, they grew more numerous by the reinforcements that were continually fent.

In this fituation it was neceffary that the Prince thould make as speedy a retreat as poflible; but the. difficulty of drawing out of the field in the middle of the day, before an enemy quite freth, and every inftant reinforced, may be eafily imagined. To compleat, this difficulty, fome bodies of the German troops, both horie and foot, fell into great confufion. The enemy faw it at the first glance, and to increafe it to the utmost diforder, puthed forward upon them with a numerous artillery and a large body of cavalry. The allied army feeni-. ed to be in the way of inevitable ruin.

In this exigence, the hereditary prince, at his laft refource, put himself at the head of a squadron of Bland's and Howard's regiments of dragoons. By these the uncommon heroism of their young leader was perfectly feconded. They charged the enemy with the utmoit fury, flopped the career of their victorious horfe; and enabled the allied battalions to make an undifturbed retreat.

The hereditary prince waswound

ed in this action; about 900 men were killed, wounded, or prifoners. Fifteen pieces of cannon, the whole of the artillery, was left to the enemy: but still in their circumftances to have avoided a total defeat was in fome fort victory. The welltimed impetuofity of the hereditary prince and the spirit of the English horfe could not be too highly praised. The prince retired to the main army of the allies, who had now poffeffed themselves of the ftrong poft of Saxenhaufen; whilft the French continued oppofite to them in the no less ftrong poft of Corbach, which they had acquired by their victory; and here for fome time they watched each other.

The hereditary prince fuffered more by this check than from the wounds he had received. His mind, forgetful of his pain and weaknefs, only brooded over his defeat, feeking out with anxiety an opportunity of revenging his lofs by fome bold, fignal, and unexpected ftroke against the enemy. It was not long before an occafion prefented itself.

Advice had been received, that among the detachments which the French employed to reduce thofe fortreffes which the allies had garritoned on their retreat, there was one very confiderable formed of French and Saxons, under Monf. Glaubitz, moving toward Ziegenhagen, a place of importance in the Jandgraviate of Heffe. The hereditary prince undertook 14 July. to relieve it, and for that purpose. felected fix battalions of the German troops, two brigades of hunters, a regiment of hulars, and Elliot's light dragoons. Although this laft corps was but juft arrived, had been newly raifed, and had never feen any kind of

fervice, the prince was fo well pleafed with their countenance, that he chofe them preferably to all other for this difficult enterprife; and the event proved that he was not mistaken.

Monf. Glaubitz remained in the moft perfect fecurity; he was under no fort of apprehenfion of being molefted by a detachment of an army at fixty miles distance, under the eye, and as it were guard of a fuperior body which demanded all its attention; when on a fudden he found himself attacked with the utmost July, 16. violence. The hereditary prince having reconnoitered his pofition, made a detour of two leagues through woods and mountains, fell upon his left, whilst the rest of his troops climbed the mountains on the oppofite fide, and rufhed with the fame fpirit upon the right.

Glaubitz had fcarce time to form his troops; and they were only formed to be immediately broken. They retired with precipitation, leaving their camp, and all it contained, to the enemy. The prince had fo difpofed his cavalry as to cut off the retreat of fome; but the moft confiderable part gained ground upon him. On this occafion he relied entirely on Elliot's horse, as it was altogether impoffible for the infantry, already haraffed by the action, and a most fatiguing forced march of two days, to follow them. At the head of this horfe he overtook the fugitives as they came out of a wood, charg¬ ed and broke through them five different times, feparated a body of 500 from the reft, furrounded them,' and obliged them to throw down their arms. Having routed this, with the like rapidity he flew to

another

another body who had taken poft near a wood, furrounded them in the fame manner; fummoned and received them all prifoners of war. A regiment of the enemy's huffers was entirely cut to pieces. Nothing was wanting to compleat his victory. Elliot's light horfe, proud to be led on by the prince himfelf, and worthy of that honour, had the greateft thare of the glory and fufferings of that day. So young a corps had never fo eminently diftinguished itself. No more than 79 of the allies were killed in this action, but of thefe 71 were of this fingle regiment.

The numbers of the enemy killed is not known, but for a time the flaughter was terrible. General Glaubitz himself was made prifoner, together with the prince of Anhalt. There were befides 177 officers, and 2482 private men. A greater number of prifoners could fcarcely be expected from a victory in a general engagement. The trophies were nine pair of colours, and fix pieces of cannon. In all the Petite Guerre of this campaign (and the campaign between the French and the allies was almoft wholly made up of fuch) this was by far the most brilliant action; and alone might have established the reputation of the hereditary prince, if any thing had been wanting to eftablifh him the firft man of his age in that fpecies of war. He returned to the camp of Saxenhaufen, without moleftation, having fully revenged the affair of Corbach.

Prince Ferdinand did not remain long after this action in his camp at Saxenhaufen. By fo advanced a pofition, the landgraviate, and even Hanover, lay too open to the egeny's incurfions. He therefore

took his camp at a place called Kalle, in a fituation nearer to Caffel. On this M. Broglio formed a plan, which the greatnefs of his army in fome fort enabled him to execute. The chevalier de Muy, who commanded in the room of the count St. Germain, was ordered to cross the Dymel at Statbergen, with his referve, confifting of 35.000 men, in order to cut of the allies from their communication with, Weftphalia, Whilft the reft of the French, dividing themfelves into two bodies, moved, the main army under M. Broglio towards duke Ferdinand's camp at Kalle, the referve under prince Xavier of Saxony towards Caffel.

Thefe important movements obliged prince Ferdinand to fet himself alfo in motion; and as he was not in a condition to make detachments of fufficient ftrength, he croffed the Dymel with his grand army, in order to fight the chevalier de Muy.

His ferene highnefs formed his main body on the heights of Corbach, and mov- 31 July. ed towards the enemy, who were advantageoufly pofted near Warbourg; in the mean time the hereditary prince, with two columns, wheeled round the enemy's left, and began a vigorous attack at once upon their flank, and upon their rear. The French commander poured reinforcements on that quarter. An hot engagement was there maintained with equal obftinacy for near four hours. Whilst this combat continued with uncertain fortune on the left, prince Ferdinand caufed fome bodies to file off towards the French bridges on the Dymel to their right, by which he propofed to attack alfo on that fide, and intercept them on their re C4

treat;

treat; at the fame time the main of his army advanced with the utmost expedition to charge the enemy in front.

The French now faw themfelves in the most imminent danger of being furrounded. Already their left attacked in flank and rear by the hereditary prince began to give way; his fire became every moment fuperior; and the earlieft retreat was the fafeft.

made fuch earneft efforts to come to action, that in ftraining their pallage thro'morally ground and in burning weather, feveral foldiers dropped down on their march. But they were too late to engage, and probably in their wafted coudition it was well that it fo happened.

As foon as prince Ferdinand pcrceived the enemy to retire, he faw it was abfolutely in vain to think of bringing his infantry upon their front. The English cavalry alio, upon which he chiefly confided, was too diftant to give almost any hope that they could be made to act. But the English cavalry outdid his expectations, and indeed all former examples. They confidered themfelves as defrauded of their fhare of the glory of Minden: and they panted for an occafion of fignalizing their conrage; and their commanders, lord Granby and gen. Moftyn, forwarded their ardour, knowing that great actions are commonly tranfgreffions of ordinary rules.

The French made a precipitate retreat towards Statberg; feveral were drowned in paffing the Dymel; 1500 were left on the field of battie, as many were made prifoners. Ten pieces of cannon were taken; but they confoled themfelves in having loft no colours. The lofs of the allied army in geheral has not been, that I can find, publish.d. That of the English, in killed, wounded, and milling, was 590; but then the battle lay chiefly on them, and the killed included in that number were but about 130.

They came up five miles on a full trot, (the Germans called it a gallop) without being blown, without the leaft confufion or diforder, and attacked the enemy's cavalry and infantry feveral times. The greater part of the enemy's horfe tell back and did not ftand the charge. The English artillery were brought up with the fame furpriting quicknefs, and employed with the fame powerful effect. Captain Phillips had done more with artillery than had been thought poffible at Minden; and he exceeded it at Warbourg. The English foot vied with the cavalry and artillery, and

So brilliant a fuccefs following clofe on the heels of the former, raifed the reputation of the allied arms. As confiderable an advantage might have well been expected from it; but according to the ufual play of fortune in this war, the firft account that followed the defeat of fo large a part of the French army, was, that with a rapid and unrefifted tide of fuccefs they had reduced Catfel, Eimbach, and Ziegenhayn; by which they became mafters of the whole landgraviate of Heffe; that they had pushed into the king's territories, feized upon Gottingen and Munden, and threatened Hanover itself. In fho: t, almoft the word confequenceswhich could have arifen from a defeat followed a victory; and whilft in England we gave a loose to our joy on the fucceis of our arms, the French were taking the moit importanţ places of our allies.

Th

The fact was, that prince Ferdinand must have been fenfible, that, in quitting his camp at Kalle, and taking poit to the northward of the Dymel, he in a great measure laid open Caffel and the whole territory of Helle to the French; nay, that by this movement nothing was left to hinder their entering the Hanoverian dominions on the right of the Wefer. But, notwithstanding thefe rifks, the ftep he took was prudent, and even neceflary. Had he fuffered the progrefs of the chevalier de Muy on the Dymel; had he permitted him to ftrengthen his polls upon that river, his communication with Westphalia had been inevitably cut off, and of courfe his sphere of fubfiftence greatly ftrait ened. It would have had a worse effect. For he must have entirely loft the command of the Wefer, without which he could not have ftood his ground moment; and he would on that lofs have found himfelf compelled to retire into the heart of Hanover, where he muft neceffarily be ftraitened in his winter cantonments, and where a blow of any confequence must be decifive against him.

He therefore fought the battle of Warbourg, though he loft all Helle by his victory; and he would not quit his pofts on the Dymel though he faw Gottingen and Munden in the hands of the French. He was not to be frighted from his Ready and well-choic plan, by rain rumours or threatening appearances. He was by no means

in a condition to make large detachments; it was therefore neceffary to facrifice fomething; and he made the fmalleft facrifice that circumftances would admit. For he forefaw that the French army,whilft he kept his poffeffion on the Dymel, could not poffibly take up their quarters in Hanover, or even act there in any confiderable body, and for any confiderable time, without fubjecting themfelves to the fame or greater inconveniences, than thofe to which he would have been himself liable, had he in defending Heffe fuffered them to occupy thofe critical pots on the Dymel. He knew farther, that it would prove extremely dangerous for them to hazard themselves beyond Gottingen; and that it would be more difficult for the French ariny to fupport themselves in that advanced poft, than for him to annoy them there.

It is poffible that reafons fom.ewhat like the foregoing, together with others probably far more cogent, might have determined that great commander to this conduct. But whilft he fecured that middle communication, and acted upon the defenfive plan, the troops were not idle; his detachments acted in many parts with spirit and effe&. But we muft defer for a while the narrative of thefe actions, being called from this part of the theatre to the eastern parts of Germany, where about this time fcenes of greater eclat were opened.

CHAP,