prefs him to move that way. He knew that if the king fhould get into Silefia without any oppofition from him, Laudohn might not only be deprived of all the advantages he could hope for from his late victory, but by being attacked by the united armies of the king and his brother, would run the risk of a defeat that might fully revenge that of Landfhut.

Whatever the merit of either of the commanders might be on this occafion, it is certain that Laudohn met no confiderable obstruction.

He appeared before Breflau the 30th of July; the following day the town was completely invefted; and on the first of August they had erected their batteries of cannon and mortars.

But Laudohn, who faw all things prepared for an obftinate defence, did not wholly truft to his military manoeuvres. He fent a letter to the governor count Tavenzien, to intimidate him by the difplay of his ftrength. He fet forth, that his forces confifted of 50 battalions and 80 fquadrons; that the Ruffian army of 75,000 men were within three days march; that it was in vain for the governor to expe& fuccour from the king of Pruffia, who was then at the other fide of the Elbe; that it was fill more vain to look for relicf from prince Henry, who could fcarce hope to ftand his own ground against the grand army of the Rus; that in cafe of obftinacy he could expect no reasonable terms; and that thcfe were the laft that should be offered. Moreover, he reminded him, that the place was a mercantile town, not a fortrefs; and that he could not defend it without contravening the laws of war.

These rules, by which honour is reduced to act, not by its own feelings but according to extrinsical circumftances; rules by which they have attempted to determine exactly and mechanically that niceft of all lines which difcriminates courage from rathnefs, form one of the ftrongeft inftances of the great difference between the ancient and modern methods and ideas of war. In the antient times, a brave commander would have answered this threatening meffage in general terms of defiance. But count Tavenzien respected these imaginary laws. He took care to prove that in defending the town he did not infringe them; and spoke as Laudohn had done in the character of a military jurifconfult, as well as a foldier; he gave for reply, "That the town of Breflau being furrounded with works and wet ditches, was to be confidered as a place of ftrength, and not fimply as a mercantile town. That the Auftrians themselves defended it as fuch in 1757, after the battle of Lifla. That the king had commanded him to defend it to the laft extremi- ' ty; that therefore general Laudohn might fecit was not from humour he had refused to liften to his fummons. That he was not frighted with the general's threats to deftroy the town; for he was not entrusted with the care of the houses, but the fortifications."

Laudohn had alfo fent in a menorial in the fame menacing fiyle, where he thought it might have a greater effect, to the civil magiftrates, hoping that the ruin with which the town was threatened, might induce them to join with the inhabitants, to perfuade the governor to a speedy furrender.

All thefe menacing measures feemed to argue a fear in baron

Laudohn,

Laudobn, that the Ruffians were not fo near as he pretended, and that the town might pollibly be relieved before their arrival. However he fhewed them, at nine of the very evening of the meffage, that his threats were not vain, by a terrible discharge of mortars and red-hot balls that fell in an uninterrupted shower upon the city until midnight. During this fierce bombardment, that made a dreadful havock in the town, he attempted the outworks by affault. His Croats attacked the covered way in many places at once, with the ufual impetuofity of those brave irregulars; but they were received and repulfed with refolution equal to their own, and with more fteadiness. The operation of this dreadful night having made no impreflion on the inflexible determination of the governor, baron Laudohn had once more recourse to negociation. He now changed his ftyle, and held out the most flattering propofitions; offering to grant him what capitulation he should think proper to atk, and even to leave himself to draw up the articles. The governor replied, that the firing the town had made no change in his refolution that he would wait with firmnefs for the enny upon the ramparts; but that he could not help obferving, it was

contrary to the laws of arms to begin the fiege of a fortrefs by ruining its inhabitants. The meffenger made anfwer, that the trenches would foon be opened. The governor faid, it was what he had long expected.

The Auftrians, foiled in their hopes from treaty, continued to batter the town, and made several attempts upon the outworks for three days fucceffively. They found every poft bravely defended; the Ruffian army did not appear, but they now began to perceive the approach of another army less agreeable, that of prince Henry; which having marched with the utmoft diligence, from Great Glogau, now came faft upon him; and, on the 5th of Auguft, reached within a few miles of the town.

Laudohn did not thinkit expedient to put the advantage he had gained, and those which he had yet to expect from the management of time, to the illue of a battle: he therefore decamped, and made his retreat in good order, but with fufficient quicknefs; having procured from this enterprife only the wretched fatisfaction of reducing a great part of the city to a heap of rubbish, and of having revenged upon Breflau fome part of the fufferings of Dreiden.

the theatre of fo ruinous a war, had been too much wafted to make the fubfiftence, and confequently the free motion of the armies eafy. The winter had been fevere and long; and it was not until the green forage appeared plentifully above ground, that thofe great bodies of cavalry, which make fo large a part in our modern armies, were in a condition to act. The fufferings of the English horfe, from a want of dry forage, during a great part of the winter and the fpring, had been extreme; this obliged them to fall much farther back from the French cantonments, and to moleft them lefs than they otherwife would have done. It was befides a lofs, that, at the opening of the campaign, they had not fo extentive a tract between them and Hanover; which by an artful choice of pofts might have been yielded step by step, and the campaign fo managed and fpun out, that the feafon of action must have expired, before the French could have reaped any decifive advantage from their fuperiority.

Although the French were during the winter fupplied far better than the allics with all neceffaries by the command of the Maine, the Mofelle, and the Rhine; and that the countries at their back had been much lefs confumed by the war; yet the fame difficulties embarraded them as foon as they thought of taking the field, and quitting their advantageous,cantonments. Therefore there was a flownels in the principal armies upon both parts, until the middle of fummer.

Not, however, Lut that fomething was attempted, in this interval, by eller parties. On the tide of the Rhine, fome actions happened between the army of St. Germain,

and the corps of general Sporcken, who was poiled at Dulmen, to obferve the French in that quarter. Dulmen formed the right flank of the chain of cantonments made by the allied army, which extended its left to the fouth-eaft frontiers of the country of Heffe, above an hundred and fifty miles diftant. The hereditary prince, who was on that wing, exerted, as much as circumstances would permit, his ufual activity and enterprife. He threw himself into the diftrict of Fulda; he laid it under a heavy contribution, and broke up feveral French corps that were pofted there.

Thefe actions decided nothing. The French army, fuperior in number and in fituation, advanced; and the allies, who feemed to have chofen the defenfive, gradually retired. In effect, if the French had purfued their original plan, it would have proved almost impoffible for the allied army to maintain its ground. If St. Germain, poffeffed of Cleves, Wefel, and Duffeldorp, had advanced on the fide of Munfter; and M. Broglio moving forward through the country of Heile, had made a ftrong detachment to the eastward of the Wefer, whilft with his main body he engaged the attention of prince Ferdinand, the allies would fhortly have found themfelves inclofed upon three fides; and nothing could have extricated them but a capital victory obtained under every difadvantage.

The French army was fufficiently numerous for thefe operations. But it was fufpected that the jealoufy which fubfifted between M. de St. Germain and the Duke of Broglio prevented their being carried into execution. This misunderstand

ing daily increased. Infomuch that M. Broglio thought fit to order the corps of St. Germain to unite itfelf with the grand army. The count, who could not brook obedience to a younger officer, and ote befides with whom he was not on the best terms, retired from the fervice. He had only June 23. ferved before upon condition of commanding an army entirely diflinct, and under his own particular orders. This difference deprived France of one of its moft abie generals, and difconcerted one of its most promifing fchemes of operation.

Before this mifunderstanding had produced thefe effects, the affairs of the French went on with all imaginable profperity. The principle army not retarding itfelf, by confideration of the places of ftrength which the allies poffeffed in their front, the caftles of Marpurg and Dillenbourg puthed forward into the landgraviate of Heffe, leaving detachments to reduce thole fortreffes. The firft of which furren dered on the 30th of June, the latter held out to the 16th of July: but the garritons of both furrendered prisoners of war.

July 10. In the mean time, whilft M. Broglio advanced on the fide of Heile, the corps of St. Germain had penetrated through the duchy of Weftphalia, and the two armies joined near a place called Corbach. The allied army had fallen back from the poft they occupied at Fritzlar, and were retreating towards the river Dymel. As yet they had received no advice of the dreaded junction of the French armies: but as it was imagined that the corps of St Germain only moved that way, and the vanguard only of that corps could be arrived

at Corbach, which could not be ef, timated at more than 10,000 foot,, and 17 fquadrons at the utmoft, the bereditary prince formed a scheme of attacking and driving them from that poft.

When he had begun the attack, contrary to his expectation, he found the enemy already formed; but it was now impoflible to recede. The action grew every moment more furious and bloody. The French ftood their ground with firmness; and the main army being extremely near, inftead of being waited in the action, they grew more numerous by the reinforcements that were continually fent.

In this fituation it was neceffary that the Prince fhould make as speedy a retreat as pofiible; but the difficulty of drawing out of the field in the middle of the day, before an enemy quite freth, and every inftant reinforced, may be easily imagined. To compleat, this difficulty, fome bodies of the German troops, both horie and foot, fell into great confufion. The enemy faw it at the first glance, and to increafe it to the utmost diforder, puthed forward upon them with a numerous artillery and a large body of cavalry. The allied army feenied to be in the way of inevitable ruin.

In this exigence, the hereditary prince, at his laft refource, put himself at the head of a fquadron of Bland's and Howard's regiments of dragoons. By these the uncommon heroilm of their young leader was perfe&ly feconded. They charged the enemy with the utmoit fury, flopped the career of their victorious horfe; and enabled the allied battalions to make an undifturbed retreat.

The hereditary prince waswound

the theatre of fo ruinous a war, had been too much wafted to make the fubfiftence, and confequently the free motion of the armies easy. The winter had been fevere and long; and it was not until the green forage appeared plentifully above ground, that thofe great bodies of cavalry, which make to large a part in our modern armies, were in a condition to act. The fufferings of the English horfe, from a want of dry forage, during a great part of the winter and the fpring, had been extreme; this obliged them to fall much farther back from the French cantonments, and to moleft them lefs than they otherwife would have done. It was befides a lofs, that, at the opening of the campaign, they had not fo extenfive a tract between them and Hanover; which by an artful choice of pofts might have been yielded step by step, and the campaign fo managed and fpun out, that the feafon of action must have expired, before the French could have reaped any decifive advantage from their fuperiority.

Although the French were during the winter fupplied far better than the allies with all neceffaries by the command of the Maine, the Mofelle, and the Rhine; and that the countries at their back had been much less confumed by the war; yet the fame difficulties embarraded them as foon as they thought of taking the field, and quitting their advantageous,cantonmcats. Therefore there was a flownels in the principal armies upon both parts,

until the middle of fummer.`

Not, however, Lut that fomething was attempted, in this interval, by leler parties. On the tide of the Rhine, fome actions happened between the army of St. Germain,

and the corps of general Sporcken, who was poited at Dulmen, to obferve the French in that quarter. Dulmen formed the right flank of the chain of cantonments made by the allied army, which extended its left to the fouth-eaft frontiers of the country of Heffe, above an hundred and fifty miles diftant. The hereditary prince, who was on that wing, exerted, as much as circumstances would permit, his ufual activity and enterprife. He threw himself into the diftrict of Fulda; he laid it under a heavy contribution, and broke up feveral French corps that were pofted there.

Thefe actions decided nothing. The French army, fuperior in number and in fituation, advanced; and the allies, who feemed to have chofen the defenfive, gradually retired. In effect, if the French had purfued their original plan, it would have proved almoft impoffible for the allied army to maintain its ground. If St. Germain, poffeffed of Cleves, Wefel, and Duffeldorp, had advanced on the fide of Munfter; and M. Broglio moving forward through the country of Heile, had made a ftrong detachment to the eastward of the Wefer, whilft with his main body he engaged the attention of prince Ferdinand, the allies would fhortly have found themfelves inclofed upon three fides; and nothing could have extricated them but a capital victory obtained under every dif advantage.

The French army was fufficiently numerous for thefe operations. But it was fufpected that the jealoufy which fubfifted between M. de St. Germain and the Duke of Broglio prevented their being carried in to execution. This mifunder itand