precitely the fame degree it fell to in 1709, a year like this diftinguifhed by the intenseness of the cold, and the fury of war. Birds dropped dead in their flight. At Leipfic ten centinels were frozen to death. An infectious disease which began in the armies, diffused itself among the inhabitants of Saxony, and made a dreadful havock. A peftilential contagion raged among the cattle. Famine was foon added to the rest of their calamities; and every mifery that can afflict mankind was poured out upon that unfortunate people with the most liberal measure. There was no profpect of an alleviation of these diftreffes. On the contrary, the fufferings of the people only made their fovereigns more earneft for revenge; and out of the general want a refource arofe to their armies, who were the more readily recruited, because the scanty pay and fubfiftence of a foldier became an object of envy to the wretched peafantry in moft of thefe countries; and death seemed more honourable and lefs certain by the fword, than by penury and disease. France and England vied in their endeavours to augment their forces in Germany. M. Broglio had now the command of the grand army, and the fole conduct of the general plan of operations. He had, early in this year, been honoured with the ftaff of a marshal of France. And nothing was omitted to give luftre to his command, and to furnish him with every means of exerting his talents. His corps was augmented to near 100,000 effective men. Thirty thousand drawn out of their quarters in Duffeldorp, Cleves, Cologn, and Wefel, and completed by draughts from France, formed a feparate army on the Rhine, under the count de St. Germain. This difpofition was made not only to divide the attention of the allied army, but to prevent the ill confequences of the misunderstanding which was known to fubfift between this general and the duke de Broglio. The third army propofed at the close of the foregoing campaign did not appear. On the fide of England, the preparations were not lefs confiderable in proportion to her ability for that kind of war. Six regiments of foot, commanded by major- general Griffin, were forthwith fent to rein force the allied army. Elliot's regiment of light horfe foon followed them. At the opening of this campaign, we had in Germany twelve regiments of heavy, and one of light horfe; and twelve regiments, with two Highland battalions, of foot; the whole amounting to about 22,000 men. In the course of the fummer, they were further reinforced to near 25,000. Such a number of British troops, ferving in one army, had not been seen on the Continent, for two hundred years paft. The allied army indeed fell thort of the French in numbers; but they exceeded it in the quality of the troops. Those newly arrived from England were frefh, but not undifciplined; the old were indeed harraffed, but they had been accustomed to victory. In the beginning of the year, the death of the landgrave of Heffe Caffel had ex31. Jan, cited fome apprehenfions; the difpofitions of the fucceffor were uncertain; and his withdrawing himfelf from the caufe of the allies would have made a breach in their army, army, that it would have proved almofi impoffible to ftop. But these fears were foon diffipated. The new Landgrave, among the very firft acts of his government, gave the ftrongest proofs of his fteady adherence to the fyftem of his father, and even agreed to add confiderably to the Heffian troops in the pay of Great Britain; fo that all things promifed as favourably to the allies, as from that irremediable inferiority in numbers could have been expected. The king of Pruffia was under far greater difficulties; he had felt the heaviest blows, and was most fcanted in the means of healing them. His loffes were not to be reckoned by the men killed and prifoners, but by armies deftroyed or taken. Forty generals had died, or were flain in his fervice, fince the firft of October 1756, exclufive of thofe who had been wounded, difabled, or made prifoners. And this alone would have been a lofs not to be repaired, if these murdering wars, which cut off fo many experienced officers, did not at the fame time form fo many more to fupply their places. The king had renewed his alliance on the former terms with Great Britain. By his indefatigable induftry, no gaps were feen in his armies. But they were no longer the fame troops; and if the king of Pruffia had formerly the merit of ably commanding the moft excellent armies, he was now to fill up the moft remarkable deficiency on the part of his troops by his own heroifm; and to undertake far more arduous enter prifes than his firft, with infinitely weaker inftruments. His affairs wore a bad afpect in the opening of the former year. In this they feemed altogether defperate. The Ruffans had fuffered; but they were fufficiently reinforced. The Swedes, who had been generally obliged to give ground in the winter, had in that of 1759 the advantage in feveral fmart fkirmishes, and had even taken prifoner the Prussian general Manteuffel. As to the Auftrians, victorious for a whole campaign almoft without fighting, their arniies andmagazines were full,their Gips complete, their men fresh, vigorous, and full of refolution. Several fkirmishes of confequence had been fought during the ceffation of the great operations; and they were generally to their advantage.. The king of Pruffia was fenfible, that in this, as in the former campaigns, he should be attacked by four armies; and that his dominions would be invefted on every fide. As thefe operations were very extenfive and complicated, to enable the reader to form an idea of the campaign, it will not be amifs to fay fomething of the ground the king had to defend, which is circumftanced in this manner. To the north is Pomerania. This country is very open; and it is defended, on that part on which the Swedes generally act, with but few, and thofe mean fortifications, Anclam, Deinmein, and Paffewalk. But then the Swedish army is not numerous; and if they thould attempt to penetrate far into the country, they muft leave Stetin, in which there is always a ftrong garrifon, behind them to their left, which would render their fubfiftence difficult, and their retreat, in cafe of any miffortune, extremely hazardous; and they have not fufficient ftrength to mafter this place by a regular fiege. This has always proved a check to the the progrefs of that army, even when they have been otherwife fuccefsful. This fame country to the eastward of the Oder, is one great object of the Rufian defigns. Its chief ftrength in this quarter is the town of Colberg; a place they have frequently attempted, but always without fuccefs. And their failure, in this inftance, has been the main caufe why they have never been able to take winter-quarters in the king of Pruffia's dominions, or even, during the campaign, to make any confiderable impreflion upon Pomerania. For they can have no communication with their own country by fea, for want of this port, On their rear lies the extenfive and inhofpitable defert of Waldow; and this, with the uncertain difpofition of the city of Dantzick, renders their fupplies of provifion from Poland difficult and precarious. Neither is it poffible, in thefe circumftances, to unite their forces with thofe of Sweden acting in the fame country. The Oder flows be tween them; which is fo commanded by the city of Stetin, as to make all communication between thefe armies in a great measure impracticable. Infomuch that, on the fide of Pomerania, the force of these two powers is compelled to act feparately, without concert, and therefore weakly and ineffectually. To the weftward the king of Pruffia is fufficiently covered by the city of Magdeburg, the ftrongeft place in his dominions, and in that part of Germany. Here are his greateft magazines, and his principal founderies; and this is the repofitory of whatever he finds neceffary to place out of the reach of fudden infult. To the fouthward he is obliged to defend Saxony and Silefia. Both of thefe countries, on their frontiers towards Bohemia, rife into very rough, broken, and mountainous grounds, abounding in advantagrous pofts and ftrong fituations. Lufatia lies between them; a level fandy plain, interfperfed with pinewoods, extending without any obftacle to the very gates of Berlin. Through this country the king's communication between Silefia and Saxony muft be kept up; and therefore it has been, from the beginning of this war, the great feene of thofe remarkable marches, and countermarches, by which his Pruflian majetty has acquired fo great a reputation; and alfo of thofe bold and fudden attempts which have diftinguished fome of the generals of the adverfe party. As an army cannot be advantageoufly pofted in this territory, it has not been ufual for a confiderable body to remain there long; and it is particularly unfavourable to defenfive operations. This country may be confidered as the curtain, and the frontiers of Saxony and Silefia as the baftions, that flank the fort of fortification, which the king is to maintain. No part of that monarch's territories are naturally more defenceless than the eastern; at the fame time that it is attacked by the most powerful of his enemies. A country altogether fandy and level.extends along both fides of the Oder, from the northern frontier of Silefia until it meets Pomerania, a country of the fame kind. There is no-refpectable fortification on this fide; and the river Warta, that falls here into the Oder, makes the transport of provifions, and confequently the fubfiftence of the armies that act against him, more eafy. As to Silefia, it is covered on the Bohemian fide with mountains, and it contains places of fuch ftrength as to be above the neceflity of yielding to the first army that appears before them. Indeed it is to be remarked, that fuch a degree of ftrength feems fufficient for the kind of fervice which has diftinguished this war. Never was a war of fuch a length and extent, in which fewer fieges of confequence have been formed; and the late fervice which affords fo large a field for experience in every other fpecies of military operations, affords very little matter of improving in the art of reducing or defending ftrong places. The king of Pruitia's defign feems to have been to fave himself as much as poflible to the end of the campaign; the only time when his fuccefs might be decifive, and his illfortune not ruinous. He therefore formed a defenfive plan. In purfuance of this he withdrew his outpoffs from Freyberg, and drawing a chain of cantonments from the foreft of Tharandt on his right to the Elbe, he took a moft advantageons camp between that river and the Multa: ftrongly entrenching it where it had not been previoufly fortified by nature; and furnished it with fo numerous an artillery, that they reckoned in their front only 250 pieces of cannon. In this fituation he covered the moft material parts of Saxony, kept the attention of M. Daun's army engaged, and was enabled to fend out reinforcements to prince Henry or elsewhere, as occafion fhould require, without expofing one part whilft he defended another. Whilft the king's army defended his conquefts in Mifnia, prince Henry had affembled an army about Frankfort on the Oder, and took various pofitions about that place and Croften. In this pofition, he commanded three principal communications, in fuch a manner as to protect at once Silefia, the new marche of Brandenburgh, and the avenues to Berlin; all which were threatened by feveral bodies of the enemy. Gen. Fouquet had eftablithed his quarters near the country of Glatz, and whilst he covered that fide of Silefia communicated with prince Henry; and was fo difpofed as to fend to or to receive fuccours from him, as either party thould happen to be preifed. M. Daun, as foon as he law that the king of Pruflia had fortified himself in his poft, he too buried himself in entrenchments, and kept the moft attentive eye upon all his majefty's motions. Whilft he confined himself in this pofition, in order to tie down the king of Pruffia, general Laudohn, with a strong but light and difincumbered army, moved from the camp he had occupied during the winter in Bohemia, and prefenting himself alternately on the fide of Lufatia, and on the frontiers of Silefia, threatened fometimes to penetrate to Berlin, fometimes by a bold stroke to effect a junction with the Ruffians, and attack prince Henry, fometimes to fit down before Glatz, Schweidnitz, or Breilau; and thus the alarm was fpread upon every fide, not knowing were the ftorm would fall. At length he declared himself. Having by feveral feints perfuaded general Fouquet that his intentious were against Schweidnitz, that general marched thither a confiderble body of his troops, and left Glatz uncovered. As foon as Laudolin perceived this movement, he on his fide made another, and poffeffed the progrefs of that army, even when they have been otherwife fuccefsful. This fame country to the eastward of the Oder, is one great object of the Ruffian defigns. Its chief ftrength in this quarter is the town of Colberg; a place they have frequently attempted, but always without fuccefs. And their failure, in this inftance, has been the main caufe why they have never been able to take winter-quarters in the king of Pruffia's dominions, or even, during the campaign, to make any confiderable impreffion upon Pomerania. For they can have no communication with their own country by fea, for want of this port. On their rear lies the extenfive and inhofpitable defert of Waldow; and this, with the uncertain difpofition of the city of Dantzick, renders their fupplies of provifion from Poland difficult and precarious. Neither is it poffible, in thefe circumftances, to unite their forces with thofe of Sweden acting in the fame country. The Oder flows between them; which is fo commanded by the city of Stetin, as to make all communication between thefe armies in a great measure impracticable. Infomuch that, on the fide of Pomerania, the force of these two powers is compelled to act feparately, without concert, and therefore weakly and ineffectually. To the weftward the king of Pruffia is fufficiently covered by the city of Magdeburg, the ftrongeft place in his dominions, and in that part of Germany. Here are his greateft magazines, and his principal founderies; and this is the repofitory of whatever he finds neceffary to place out of the reach of fudden infult. To the fouthward he is obliged to defend Saxony and Silefia. Both of thefe countries, on their frontiers towards Bohemia, rife into very rough, broken, and mountainous grounds, abounding in advantagrous pofts and ftrong fituations. Lufatia lies between them; a level fandy plain, interfperfed with pinewoods, extending without any obftacle to the very gates of Berlin. Through this country the king's communication between Silefia and Saxony muft be kept up; and therefore it has been, from the beginning of this war, the great fcene of thofe remarkable marches and countermarches, by which his Pruflian majetty has acquired fo great a reputation; and alfo of those bold and fudden attempts which have diftinguished fome of the generals of the adverfe party. As an army cannot be advantageoufly pofted in this territory, it has not been ufual for a confiderable body to remain there long; and it is particularly unfavourable to defenfive operations. This country may be confidered as the curtain, and the frontiers of Saxony and Silefia as the baftions, that flank the fort of fortification, which the king is to maintain. No part of that monarch's territories are naturally more defenceless than the eastern; at the fame time that it is attacked by the most powerful of his enemies. A country altogether fandy and level.extends along both fides of the Oder, from the northern frontier of Silefia until it meets Pomerania, a country of the fame kind. There is no-refpectable fortification on this fide; and the river Warta, that falls here into the Oder, makes the transport. of provifions, and confequently the fubfiftence of the armies that act against him, more eafy. As to Silefia, it is covered on the Bohe t |