judgment by the British general, and executed with equal courage and disciphne by his troops, and which in different quarters lasted till evening, the assailants were finally repulsed in all parts During the course of the might of the 7th, they began retiring from the Duas Casas; and on the Sth the whole French army was collected in the woods between Espeja, Gallegos, and Fuentes d'Honor, their superiority in cavalry having protected them from pursuit. They broke up on the following night, and at length crossed the Agueda, leaving Almeida to its fate. The whole loss of the British and their allies on these two days was not much short of 1,700 in killed, wounded, and missing, of all descriptions. That of the French, though not known, must have been very considerable; besides a number of prisoners taken from them, they left 400 dead in the village of Fuentes d'Honor, against which their principal efforts were directed.

The garrison of Almeida, commanded by General Brennier, evacuated that place on the night of the 10th, after having blown up a part of the works. They marched in great silence, dexterously winding their way through the several bodies of blockaders, so as not to be perceived till they had nearly reached the bridge over the Agueda. They were, however, pursued as soon as the alarm was given, and incurred a considerable loss; but the remainder were protected by a French division which had not yet quitted the bank of that river. The whole of the French army then continued its retreat towards the river Tormes,

In the mean time, the investment of Badajos by the allied army under Marshal Beresford, which had been interrupted by a sudden inundation of the Guadiana, and the consequent destruction of the bridge over that river, was renewed, and the bridge was restored. The preparations for a siege being completed, approaches were made, which produced two sorties from the fort of St. Christoval attended with considerable loss to the garrison. On May the 12th, Marshal Beresford, being informed that Marshal Soult, having quitted Seville, and formed a junction with General Latour Maubourg, was advancing with the intention of attacking the allied army, and relieving Badajos, suspended his operations against the town, sent his heavy artillery and stores to Elvas, and concentrated his force to withstand the threatened assault. He marched forward to meet the enemy, and took a position near the village of Albuera; and on the morning of the 16th, having been joined by a Spanish force under General Blake, be drew up his troops in two lines parallel to the river of Albuera, on the ridge of ground gradually ascending from it, and covering the roads to Badajos and Valverde. The French did not long delay their attack, in which their principal object seemed to be, to push across the river beyond the right of the allies, and endeavour to turn their flank, whilst another attack was directed against the river and bridge of Albuera. The Spanish troops, who were posted on the heights to the right of the line, after a gallant resistance, were driven from their ground, which

was

was occupied by the enemy; and as this situation enabled them to keep up a raking fire upon the whole position of the allies, it became necessary to attempt its recovery. A vigorous effort for this purpose was made by the division of General Stewart, headed by himself. At the beginning of the action a heavy storm of rain had come on, which, with the smoke from the firing, rendered it impossible to discern any thing distinctly, which circumstance, with the nature of the ground, had greatly favoured the enemy in forming his columns and making his attack. The right brigade of General Stewart's division, commanded by Lieut.-Col. Colborne, was bravely charging the enemy with the bayonet, when a body of Polish horse-lancers coming unperceived, turned their flank, and charged them in the rear. A dreadful carnage ensued, by which some regiments were nearly annihilated, for these ferocious assailants never spare a wounded or fallen foe. One regiment alone escaped the fury of this attack, and kept its ground till the arrival of the third brigade under Major-General Houghton, who fell pierced with wounds as he was cheering his men to advance. At length the enemy was forced to abandon the post he had gained, and was driven back with great slaughter across the Albuera. After his main attack was defeated, he relaxed in that of the village, where he had never been able to make any im. pression; and the battle having continued without cessation from nine till two, the remainder of the day was spent in cannonading and skirmishing. Soult retired to the

ground he had previously occupied; and on the night of the 17th he commenced his retreat towards Seville by the road he had come, leaving Badajos to its own defence, and relinquishing many of his wounded to the care of the victors. That the action of Albuera was really a victory on the part of the allies, the result rendered undeniable, for the French general was completely foiled in his attempt, and was obliged to quit the purpose he had in view. It was, however, so dearly purchased, that in a sober estimate the day will perhaps rather be reckoned among the disastrous than the triumphant ones, for the loss incurred seems to have exerted a serious influence on subsequent transactions. That of the British alone exceeded 4,000 in killed, wounded, and missingof the latter, however, a great part afterwards found means to rejoin their regiments. The Portuguese loss amounted to about 350; that of the Spaniards is not ascertained, but must have been heavy. It is computed by Marshal Beresford that the loss of the French of every kind could scarcely fall short of 9,000. By an intercepted letter from General Gazan to Soult some time after the battle, it appears that he had more than 4,000 wounded under his conduct.

The bravery of the British troops on this memorable occasion drew the warmest encomiums from the commander, and furnished ample matter for the eulogies of the parliamentary orators when thanks were moved in both houses for their services. It was indeed scarcely ever more conspicuous; and the misfortune with which the day commenced only contributed to af

ford

ford more striking though melancholy examples of firmness and discipline. Thus, the 37th regiment, which particularly suffered from the charge of the Polish lancers, is represented as lying in ranks as they were drawn up, with every wound in the front. The behaviour of the allies also obtained high commendation. The generalship displayed has not equally stood the ordeal of military criticism.

Lord Wellington who, with his characteristic zeal and activity, had repaired to Elvas immediately after the final retreat of the French from the neighbourhood of Almeida, but was unable to arrive in time for the battle, directed that Badajos should be closely invested upon the right of the Guadiana on May the 25th, and afterwards re newed the operations of the siege. The enemy had withdrawn their main body upon Llerena, and had their advanced posts of cavalry at Usagre, near which place, on the 25th, the allied cavalry fell in with that of the French, and charged them, though much superior in number, with so much gallantry, that they were driven from the field with considerable loss.

The siege of Badajos was pushed with vigour, and a breach having been effected in the fort of St. Christoval, an attempt was made on the night of June the 6th, to storm that outwork. The escarp, however, had been so well cleared by the defenders, that it was found impossible to mount, and the assailants were obliged to retire with some loss. The fire from the batteries on the three following days having apparently rendered the

breach practicable, a second attempt was made on the night of the 9th, but the activity of the enemy in removing the rubbish again rendered all the efforts of the assailants ineffectual, and they suffered considerably before they received orders to retreat. In these endeavours about 300 were killed and wounded, of whom there was an unusual proportion of officers.

It had been Lord Wellington's expectation that the reduction of Badajos could be effected before the second week in June, at which time he supposed that the reinforcements for the enemy's southern army detached from Castile would join Marshal Soult. On the 10th he received an intercepted dispatch from Soult to Marmont, announcing the intention of collecting the whole French force in Estremadura; and he had reason to believe that Drouet's corps from Toledo would have joined the southern army by the 10th. Accounts also teached him which left no doubt of the destination of the army of Portugal (as it was called) for the southward. It became therefore absolutely necessary to raise the siege of Badajos, which Lord Wellington put in execution, still, however, maintaining a blockade. The advance of the enemy finally determined him to quit the blockade, and to withdraw the allied troops across the Guadiana, which was effected on the 17th, without loss of any kind. On the 20th the French began to appear in the neighbourhood of Badajos, with an army composed of all their force from Castille, except the garrison of Madrid, and all that of Andalusia, with the exception of what was ne

cessary

1

cessary to maintain their position' before Cadiz, and the body commanded by Sebastiani in the eastern part of that kingdom. They occupied both banks of the Guadiana, trom Badijos to Merida, and made various movements towards the frontiers of Portugal with the intention of cutting off detachments of the ailies, but with incon-iderable success. On July the 14th the army of Portugal broke up from its position on the Guadiana, and moved towards Truxillo, whence they afterwards march ed further northwards Lord Wellington, who had been strongly posted on the Portuguese border in Alentejo, now moved his army to cantonments in the Lower Beira; and thus the seat of war was transferred from the vicinity of Badajos.

It may be useful to close this narrative of the military transactions in Portugal with some account of the state of the Portuguese army, as modelled by the commander-in-chief, Marshal Beresford, whose activity and talents in this department are universally acknowledged.

When the marshal first took the command, the cavalry of the line, consisting of twelve regiments, were in a wretched condition; and though he bestowed much attention on their improvement, their progress had not yet been equal to that of the infantry, with the. exception of some regiments under the immediate direction of British officers. When the business of organizing the cavalry was first undertaken, a set of rules and regulations was drawn up, similar to those of the British cavalry, and printed for the guidance of

the officers; and the organized regiments are now in every respect similar to the British, and manœuvre upon the same principies The establishment of the different regiments has been raised to 520, and the whole are very complete in men; but the Portuguese are not calculated to excel in this kind of service, the men being too indolent to pay due attention to their horses, and the country not producing forage in sufficient abundance to maintain any considerable body of cavalry Out of the twelve regiments, only six are actually complete, forming little more than 3,000 men.

The Portuguese artillery are formed into brigades similar to those of the British, with which they are dispersed in the different divisious of the allied army; and whenever they have had an opportunity of coming into action, they have much distinguished themselves.

The light troops of the line, or Cacadores, are the favourite service of the natives. Of those there are six battalions, some of which are as fine bodies of this description as are to be found in any army. There is besides a Loyal Lusitanian Legion, which has been formed into two excellent battalions of Cacadores; and other battalions of this species are in the process of organization.

The irregular force of Portugal is composed of the militia and the Ordenanza. The militia is formed of such of the inhabitants, capable of bearing arms, as can be taken from from agricultural employments with the least inconvenience; the ordenanza comprehends every male vassal of the age of manhood, who

is

is not a member of the church, the regular army, or the militia. There are 48 regiments of militia; and though still upon the old system, they have been found very useful in the present war. At the beginning of the campaign they, indeed, displayed a want of steadiness, but they have since much improved.

The ordenanza consists of companies of infantry, and troops of cavalry, the last formed of persons of superior condition. They are exercised once or twice in every month, and are inspected twice in the year. Like the guerillas in Spain, they have greatly harassed

the French armies, and have de stroyed a number of the stragglers Every man in Portugal is a soldier of some description, and is obliged to have arms in his possession n; those who are not masters of firearms, being provided with pikes, or long poles with a bayonet fixed ou the end. From the preceding relation it appears, that few countries of the same population are so well furnished with materials for an effective force against an invading enemy, and that proper discipline and a hearty good will in the cause, are alone requisite to render it formidable in defence.

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