the great enemies of our Church.") But Shaftesbury's jugment undergoes a violent change, his 'moral sentiments are suddenly convulsed with horror. "It was Mr. Locke", he exclaims, "that struck at all fundamentals, threw all order and virtue out of the world, and made the very ideas of these, which are the same as those of God, unnatural and without foundation in our minds. Thus virtue, according to Mr. Locke, has no other measure, law, or rule, than fashion or custom".) That this twofold judgment throws more light on Shaftesbury's temperament than on Locke's doctrine will appear presently. Shaftesbury's disciples in criticism, have been numerous. Leslie Stephen, after remarking that Mandeville, in his denial of the real existence of virtue, "simply carried Locke's method one step farther", says, “No conclusion, of course, could be more repulsive to Locke himself, and it is curious that he did not perceive the application which might be made of his doctrine." It would, indeed, have been curious if Locke had perceived such an application of his doctrine. That Locke was mistaken as to his own view of the question we cannot admit. The error so generously attributed to him, may turn out to belong to his critics.

These judgments of Locke's doctrine of the nature of virtue are erroneous. In the first place, he repudiates them with the contempt they deserve; in the second place, he rejects all three of the forms attributed to him, and propounds the doctrine of the eternal and immutable nature of moral distinctions. His reply to Burnet's imputation is sharp with indignation. "A man that insinuates, as he does, as if I held the distinction of virtue and vice was to be picked up by our eyes, or ears, or nostrils; shows so much ignorance or so much malice that he deserves no other answer but pity." (Works I. 576.) To the charge of Lowde,

1) Characteristics.

Vol. I. 316. first letter to a student.

2) Characteristics. Vol. I. 344-347.

*) English Thought in the Eighteenth Century. Vol. II. 83.

ocke replies: "If he had been at pains to reflect on what had said, he would have known what I think of the eternal nd unalterable nature of right and wrong, and what I call irtue and vice, and if he had observed that in the place e quotes, I only report as matters of fact what others call virtue and vice, he would not have found it liable to any great exception."1) In a letter to Tyrell, Aug. 4. 1690, speaking of this matter, Locke says, that in the passages in question he is not treating of the grounds of true morality, but only showing the different ways in which men regard moral law, and the different standards they take, without any reference to whether they are true or not.2) Locke's critics, then, have supposed him to be enunciating his theory of virtue when he is only describing popular phases of morals. Now let us put the same question to Locke which Locke put to the Christian, the Hobbist, and the Heathen. "Why should a man keep his word or contract." Locke answers, "Truth, and keeping of faith belong to men as men, and not as members of society". (Gov. II. 14.) "Truth, whether in, or out, of fashion, is the measure of knowledge and the business of the understanding; whatever is, beside that, however authorized by consent or recommended by rarity, is nothing but ignorance or something worse... And it is true that it is every man's duty to be just, whether there is any such thing as a just man in the world or no.") He appeals to the law of nature as that standing and unalterable rule of moral rectitude and pravity, and declares that human laws are only so far right as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.) Moreover, Locke treats with sarcasm the very theory attributed to him. "This cuts out the dresses for the women, and makes the fashions for the

1) II. 28; 11. note.

2) Lord King, Life of Locke. Pp. 200. 20.

3) Conduct of the Understanding, § 24. King, Life of Locke, p. 122. 4) II. 28. 2 note. Gov. II. 12.

men. This makes men drunkards and sober, thieves and
honest, and robbers themselves true to one another." He
ridicules those who make custom serve for reason, and com
plains to Collins that "to be rational is so glorious a thing,
that twolegged creatures generally content themselves with
the title".1) According to Locke, moral distinctions rest not
upon the arbitrary will of the Deity; not upon the will of
the Leviathan, not upon human custom and fashion. Moral
distinctions rest in eternal and immutable law; a law which
neither God, nor the state nor public opinion can alter.
On this question Locke stands in line with Culverwel, Cumber-
land, Cudworth and Clarke.

IV. Natural Law. We have seen that Locke places the conception of God and the nature of virtue in very close relations. His idea of God is his idea of virtue, and the nature of the one is the nature of the other. God, from his nature, can will only that which is best. Thus, when Locke speaks of the will or commands of God, he has in view that which is in essence the best, and in its nature unchangeable. "But", says Locke, "we may know that virtue is conformity to the law of God, which is the true and only measure of virtue", we may know that virtue is that "which is, in its own nature, right and good", we may know that virtue is the best worship of God, and yet be far from knowing what the true principles of virtue are. We must "prove a law", we must show how "God hath Ideclared His will and law". We must show that there are certain rules, certain dictates, which it is His will all men should conform their actions to, and that this will of His is sufficiently promulgated, and made known to all mankind. Locke argues that this requirement cannot be met by either "the Mosaic or Evangelical law of God. For neither of ( those, as I take it, was given to mankind; which is a term, which in my sense, includes all men. It is plain that the

1) King, Life of Locke. p. 109. Education § 164. Letters to Collins, Jan. 24 and Feb. 28. 1704.

1

Mosaical law was not given to mankind, for it was 'Hear, O Israel', and I never yet met with any one who said the laws of Moses were the laws of mankind, and as for the revealed will of God in the New Testament, which was a revelation made to the children of men 2000 years after Moses, and 4000 years after the Creation, how that can be called a law given to mankind is hard to conceive, unless that men born before the time of the Gospel were no part of mankind, or the Gospel was revealed before it was revealed."1) Locke is far from making Revelation the source of his moral precepts. This would contradict his conception of man and the first certainty of the demonstrative reason, by postulating for man an unsocial, irrational, immoral nature, as well as atheism of the reason.2) The faculty which must prove this law is the reason. Instead of fixing upon revelation as the source of our knowledge of the principles of virtue, he fixes upon natural reason. "Reason is natural revelation, whereby the eternal Father of light and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to man that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties." (IV. 19. 4.) This expression of the eternal reason in the nature and through the experiences of humanity, reveals moral principles, and makes known a natural law among men.

The conception of a law of nature, comprehending all morality, public and private, having God for its author, and V the common or natural reason for its interpreter, appears し with Heraclitus. For him, "the only piece of real wisdom is to know that principle which by itself will govern everything on every occasion".") This principle is the universal and divine reason which is participated in by man, and, in him, is the criterion of truth. That which appears common to all, is true and certain. "Understanding is common to

1) King, Life of Locke, p. 178.

2) King, Life of Locke, p. 312–313. I. 3; 12.

) Diog. Laert. IX. 2.

all. When we speak with reason, we must hold fast to that which is common, even as a city holds fast to the law, yea, and far more strongly; for all human laws are fixed by one law, that of God, which prevails wherever it will, and is sufficient for all, and in all prevailing.") These ideas, represented by Heraclitus were taken up by later philosophers, and finally, by the Stoics and Roman lawyers; by the one, raised into a system of philosophy, by the other, into a system of law. Thus it is that Stoicism and Roman law have played a most important part in the history of moral and political philosophy. It was among the Roman lawyers that jus naturale and lex naturalis received a full exposition under the term jus gentium. This term denoted those principles of justice which were common both to Rome and her conquered peoples, and which Rome made use of in administering justice in and among her colonies. The lawyers entertained the belief that the jus gentium was the foundation of all positive law; that it was indeed the lost code of nature, and that in building their laws upon it and following its outlines, they were restoring a type, from which law had only departed to deteriorate. As in Greece, so in Rome, this law was regarded as being so clear and universal in its principles that it came to be regarded as divine law.) This conception of a law eternal and divine, superior

1) Stob. Serm. III. 84. Ueberweg-Heinze. I. 52. Sext. Emp. Adv. M. VII. 129-133. Similar views were common among Greek philosophers and poets. "Auf den Willen der Götter wurden bei den Griechen, wie überall auch die allgemein anerkannten sittlichen Gebote zurückgeführt, und die Unverletzlichkeit derselben mit dem Glauben an die vergeltende Gerechtigkeit der Götter begründet." Zeller: Grundriss, p. 22.

2) Cicero makes the law of nature and the law of nations identical, "Lege naturae id est gentium." De Off. I. 23. see Dante; De Monarchia II. 2. Jeremy Taylor. Duct. Dub. II. I; 1. Cumberland, De Leg. Nat. V. I Ahrens, Cours de droit naturel. I. 1. says, "The philosophy of law, or natural law, is the science which discourses of the first principles of right, conceived by reason, and founded on the nature of man, considered in itself, and in its relations to the universal order of things." The Roman law is elaborated in M. Demangeat's Cours de Droit romain. Aristotle