modern inductive and critical methods in philosophy.1) Yet his failure to adhere strictly to his purpose of limiting the investigation to the discerning faculties of a man as they are employed about the objects with which they have to do, carefully excluding ontological and physiological considerations of the mind, has involved his system in some confusion, and afforded opportunity to hostile criticism.

The division of Locke's work is not to be overlooked, especially in reference to his theory of ideas and knowledge. The first book is no part of his constructive theory. (I. 4;25.) It does not appear in the abstract of his Essay, which was prepared for University use, under Locke's supervision. It is a refutation of innate ideas and principles, which Locke represents as an "established opinion", and "received doctrine" in his day. The second book inquires into the original of our ideas, and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them. The third book was no part of the original plan, but was afterward introduced as a preliminary treatise to the fourth book, on discovering that a treatise on the nature, use, and signification of language was necessary before proceeding to make enquiries respecting our knowledge. The fourth book shows what knowledge the understanding has by its ideas; the certainty, evidence, and extent of such knowledge, as well as the nature and grounds of faith and opinion. Thus, the second book contains the theory of ideas; the fourth, the theory of knowledge. The one shows how the materials of knowledge are furnished to the mind; the other, how the mind orders or arranges this material into knowledge. This is evidently Locke's view in the following passage; "I must confess then, that when I first began this discourse of the understanding, and a good while after, I had not the least thought that any consideration of words was at all necessary to it. But

1) H. U. I. 1; 2. 8. II. 11; 15. II. 1; 4. I. 4; 25. II. 1; I. II. 11; 15. I. 1; 2. Locke's method and spirit is well shwn in his fragment "De Arte Medica" 1668. Fox Bourne. Life of Locke. I. 222. etc.

when, having passed over the original and composition of our ideas, I began to exanime the extent and certainty of our knowledge, I found it had so near a connection with words, that unless the force and manner of signification were first well observed, there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge; which, being conversant about truth, had constantly to do with propositions." (III. 9; 21. III. 5; 16.) This is a clear statement that Locke's doctrine of knowledge is not his doctrine of ideas. It is from this point of view that the apparent contradiction between the second and fourth books of the Essay is to be explained. In II. 1; 2, Locke says, "in experience all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself, but in IV. 2; I., we read", it is on intuition that depends all the certainty and evidence of all our knowledge." The distinction between knowledge as material or ideas, and knowledge as form or proposition we shall find maintained by Locke in treating of the origin of ideas and of knowledge, and again in the last division of the present chapter in speaking of ideas and propositions. One of the chief sources of confusion concerning Locke's theory of knowledge is in supposing it to be contained in the first and second books of his Essay.

Locke also calls attention to the fact that the Essay, "begun by chance, was continued by entreaty; written by incoherent parcels; and after long intervals of neglect, resumed again, as humor or occasions permitted". (Epistle to the Reader.) This will explain much of the confusion, both in arrangement and in the use of terms in the four books. II. The Significance of Tabula Rasa. Locke assumes the existence of ideas in men's minds. "I presume", he says, "it will be granted me that there are such ideas in men's minds; every one is conscious of them in himself, and men's words and actions will satisfy him that they are in others. Our first enquiry shall be, how they come into the mind". (I. 1. 8.) It is clear that Locke is here speaking, not of the mind, but of the ideas in the mind, ideas which the mind

is conscious of possessing, and that his enquiry is not concerning the origin of either mind or knowledge, but of the origin of ideas. But what does Locke mean by the term idea? After apologising for the frequent use of the term and its vagueness, he defines it to be "that which serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks", or, "whatsoever the mind perceives in itself or is the immediate object of perception, thought or understanding". (I. 1; 8. II. 8; 8.) 1) These definitions of the term Idea come nearest to its general use in Locke's system. It is allowed a very broad meaning. It may stand for concepts and propositions, or whatever the mind is conscious of, and uses as material of knowledge. These materials of knowledge are simple or complex, or the result of an empirical and rational process, as in the case of the idea of power. As with Descartes, so with Locke, it is impossible to hold the term to any one meaning.

In answer to the question, how ideas come into the mind, Locke postulates the mind, originally, as "white paper", or "an empty cabinet". (I. 2; 15, I. 3; 22. II. 1; 2.) But these, like Aristotle's tabula rasa, are mere figures of speech, and cannot be fixed upon solely as a centre of interpretation. It is evident from the above definitions that the understanding and its ideas are different; that the one is subject with percipient powers, and the others the objects of these powers. When Locke postulates ideas as being in the mind, he postulates capacity for the mind; when he defines his term idea, he gives to the understanding the two powers of perceiving and thinking; and when he postulates a tabula rasa, he only declares that before the mind has something to think upon or perceive, it thinks upon and perceives nothing, although

1) The definition of Idea as "the immediate object of the mind in thinking" is defended by Locke in his controversy with Stillingfleet. Works I. 687. Locke's "idea" appears to be a modification of mental energy which has no existence apart from consciousness. H. U. II. 10; 2 and 7. I. 4; 20. III. 10; 14. III. 9; 18. IV. 44. For the history of this word, see Hamilton's Reid, note G. p. 925.

it has the innate powers of thinking and perceiving. “Truly before ideas are known, there is nothing of them in the mind but the capacity to know them." (II. 28; 11. note.) This capacity of the understanding is nowhere denied, but everywhere affirmed by Locke. "The first capacity of the human intellect is that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it, either through the senses by outward objects, or by its own operations when it reflects on them." (II. 1; 24.) But this is clearly a receiving or passive power of the mind. Does Locke admit power as passive? This is one of the fundamental positions of his entire theory, yet its significance is generally overlooked. "Power is twofold, viz, as able to make or able to receive any change; the one may be called active, the other, passive power." (II. 21; 2.)1) The mind in sensation and reflection is receptive, an empty cabinet, fitted to receive the impressions of sensation and reflection, and for the most part passive. But has the mind no active power, or powers? Locke replies, "The mind has powers intrinsical and proper to itself." (II. 1; 24.)

Locke denies with Aristotle, Culverwel, and Cumberland, that moral ideas and principles are innate. His polemic against innate ideas has become classic. The ground of it is threefold. First, the supposition of innate ideas cannot be sustained by observation and history. Here he had been preceded by Aristotle, Montaigne and Pascal. Secondly, if certain ideas and principles were universal, this would not prove them innate, but only support a law of the mind. (I. 2; 3, 14.) This was essentially the ground of Culverwel and Cumberland. Thirdly, in his second book, "it is unphilosophical to multiply principles without necessity". (II. 1; 1.)

1) Sir Wm. Hamilton combats Locke's theory of active and passive powers, holding that there is no pure activity or passivity in creation but that they are always conjoined. Lectures on Metaphysics. Vol. I. p. 310. Locke would not insist on the purity of either power, but holds the distinction to be real, as well as necessary for clearness in psychological discussion.

This is the Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem of Occam applied to the subject in hand. The general position of Locke on innate ideas and principles is not much removed from that of Aristotle. Leibniz, (Noveaux Essais; Avant-Propos,) was right in placing Locke and Aristotle side by side on this question. The tabula rasa, or book in which nothing is written, of Aristotle, is the empty cabinet, or white paper, of Locke. With Aristotle the mind has no elon voηtá antecedent to experience. The same position is taken by Locke against the zovai evroiai. Neither Aristotle nor Locke denied innate powers or capacities to the mind. Aristotle, in his Ethics, argues in the Lockian spirit, “not one of the moral virtues are in us by nature. The virtues come then to be in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature; but we are furnished by nature with a capacity for receiving them, and are perfected in them through the influence of habit.") Aristotle also maintains that "such things as exist by nature cannot be changed by custom". The parallel between Locke and Aristotle extends still further. In the first part of his treatise Aristotle seems to stumble at the great variety and uncertainty of opinions respecting virtue, and is almost led to think virtue a matter of civil law or custom. But in V. 10, he assails the view of the Sophists that virtue is a mere matter of legal enactment, and declares a natural, eternal, and unchangeable law, independant of human conventionality.

The force of Locke's polemic against the theory of innate ideas and principles is not difficult to discover. He held that so called innate ideas are to be accounted for, and that they may be accounted for by giving attention to experience. This theory of innate ideas was a part of the dogmatism of the age, and Locke held that it gave an un

1) De Anima III. 4. 11. Compare Analyt. Post. II. 15. 2. 5. Heinze: Zur Erkenntnisslehre der Stoiker. pp. 7. 16. 17.

2) Nic. Eth. II. I compare I. 3. de Anima III. 7. II, 5. Locke, H. U. I. 3; 9 and 17.