Cumberland holds the identity of general and individual interests. The greatest good of the individual cannot, by the nature of things, be in conflict with the common good. Here he carries out more fully his remark (I. 22.) “One's own happiness is an extremely small part of the end which a truly rational man pursues; and bears only that proportion to the whole end... which one man bears to the collective body of all rational beings." This remark was of great importance in the hands of Bentham and Mils. About the liberty of each one to act according to right reason, Cumberland finds no serious difficulty; "we have the same proof of liberty that we have of our own consciousness." This position was taken up by Locke and Reid. In treating of the sanctions of morality Cumberland makes use both of reason and revelation. In the third chapter his definition of natural law embraces both the ground and sanction of morality. The will of the First Cause of all, points out through human experience the consequences of conduct on happiness, and makes known rewards and punishments. The sanction is twofold, punishment within and punishment without. It is a striking feature of his work that, unlike Hobbes, he makes no appeal to "Scripture" as authority, but on the other hand, holds with Culverwel that reason must support and defend revelation, and that it is by reason only that we can be convinced of the veracity of God. He holds with Descartes that the certainty of all that we rationally possess is grounded on God's veracity. God is, to him, the maximum of all excellency and power, the author of every true proposition, and has ever in view the happiness and perfection of his creatures. (Proleg. XII, comp. V, 19.) We are assured both by reason and experience that happiness flows from obedience, and misery from disobedience to these natural laws, not only in this world, but probably in the next. Cumberland's reply to Hobbes is restricted almost entirely to his psychology. While the importance of Cumberland's work is great, both as a rebuff to the sensualism and materialism of Hobbes, and as an

anticipation of the more thorough exposition of Locke, we must recognise that he has only indirectly weakened the power of the Leviathan. When Cumberland comes to the relations of politics and ethics, he leaves Leviathan with as much authority as Hobbes had endowed him. He holds with Hobbes that the laws of nature are prior to civil laws, and that the monarch should govern in harmony with natural laws, but he offers no redress against the despotism of the Leviathan. Culverwel and Cumberland, although strong in battle, and fruitful sources of subsequent speculation, had little effect upon the bold dogmatism of Hobbes which allied itself with selfishness.

V. The Cambridge School, though it falls within our period, is, for our purpose, of little importance. More's Enchiridion Ethicum, 1669, is the single exception. The most striking features of his system are his declaration of a special ethical faculty, in boniformi animae facultate; his argument for the existence of God from the moral nature of man, and his theory of virtue and happiness as identical, morality being with him, as with Locke, "the art of living well and happily." Shaftesbury significantly remarks that More's work "is a right good piece of sound morals." (Letters to a Student. No. IX.)

Cudworth's "Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality", although written in this period, was first published in 1731. The essence of his theory is given in his own words; "Now all that we have hitherto said amounts to no more than this, that it is impossible that anything should be by will only, that is, without a nature or entity, or that the nature and essence of anything should be arbitrary." The effective check which Cudworth put upon the theory of Hobbes is expressed in language more precise than is furnished by Locke. "Suppose such a law to be established, it must be either right to obey it, and wrong to disobey it, or, indifferent whether we obey it or disobey it. But a law which it is indifferent whether we obey or not, cannot, it is evident, be the source Curtis, Locke's Ethical Philosophy.

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of moral distinctions; and on the contrary supposition, if it is right to obey the law, and wrong to disobey it, these distinctions must have had an existence antecedent to the law.") The points of agreement between Locke and Cudworth are many and striking, so much so that we may suppose them to have exchanged thought on the general subject of ethics. Cudworth's 'Intellectual System' is noticed by Locke in complimentary terms, in "Thoughts concerning Education." (§ 193.) Certainly there is no ground for seeing with Professor Jodl "eine eigenthümliche Ironie des Schicksals"), in the fact that, for twelve years Locke made his home in the family of Sir Francis Masham, and that Lady Masham, the daughter of Cudworth, a woman of remarkable talents, should have been a most earnest disciple of Locke's views.

VI. Locke, 1632-1704. The year 1632 is marked by the birth of illustrious men, Locke, Spinoza, Cumberland, Pufendorf, Bourdaloue, Mabillon, Pepys, and Sir Christopher Wren. Of these, Locke and Bourdaloue died in 1704. It remained for Locke to review the entire philosophy of Hobbes, and assail it in each of its ethico-political strongholds. In this task the way had been prepared for him on the one hand by Culverwel and Cumberland, and on the other by the Revolution of 1688. Hobbes is the philosopher of the Restoration, Locke of the Revolution. They represent two distinct and opposing lines of thought not only in politics, but in morality and religion. The judgment of Professor Blackie, by no means partial to Locke, may represent the general judgment of the historical significance of these two widely divergent systems. In introducing his study on Utilitarianism, he remarks, "we must therefore start from Mr. Locke, the acknowledged father of whatever school of British thinking deserves the name of a philosophy. No doubt

1) "Immutable Morality". Book I. ch. I. compare Maine: Early Law and Custom. P. 388.

2) "Geschichte der Ethik". Band I. 127.

before him came Hobbes, but this man stands alone, like a huge trap rock bolt up in a flat country".1) Locke entered the lists against all dogmatism and mechanism in philosophy, religion and politics. In each of these departments he opposes the teaching of Hobbes. He saw clearly where the strength of the Leviathan lay, and thus he wrote his essays on Government, and his works on Toleration, and the Reasonableness of Christianity, to supplement his "Essay concerning Human Understanding" Hobbes had formed a consistent philosophy of persecution, and Locke was logically correct in attacking its two phases, the political and ecclesiastical. We are aware that our general position, that Hobbes and Locke represent opposing systems of thought, is contested, but, we think, on inadequate grounds. No one has associated Locke more intimately with Hobbes than has Professor Paulsen.) He remarks, "Wenn aus der Ähnlichkeit der Gedanken eines jüngeren Schriftstellers mit denen eines älteren, die Abhängigkeit jenes von diesem gefolgert werden darf, so muss Locke den erheblichsten Einfluss von Hobbes erfahren haben. Dass er ihn, so viel ich weiss, nie und nirgend nennt, steht dieser Annahme nicht im Wege" (587). It is clear that Locke had no intercourse with Hobbes although they were contemporaries for about forty years. There is, however, in the works of Locke, no lack of reference to Hobbes. Generally, his name is coupled with that of Spinoza, and both are spoken of as "those justly decried names". (Works I, 760.) Locke's indignation is never more aroused against Stillingfleet, than when the latter suggests a flavor of Hobbes and Spinoza in Locke's treatment of spirit and

1) Four Phases of Morals, Second Edition, p. 272. Essentially the same view must be maintained from the political side. "Wie Hobbes mehr der letzte edle Ausdruck eines im Verschwinden begriffenen Systems, so ist Locke der erhebenste erste Träger des neuen Princips, welches in England längst vorbereitet, durch ihn erst recht zu nationalem Bewusstsein gebracht worden ist." (Das Staats- Lexicon von Rotteck und Welcher. 3. Aufl. Bd. IX.)

2) Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie. Erster Band. Pp. 580-587.

matter. Locke regards this imputation as bordering upon insult, and charges the Bishop with bringing them into the discussion irrelevantly, and "by their names skillfully to give that character to my book with which you would recommend it to the world". (Works I. 757.) Again Locke repudiates the foundations of the religion of Hobbes and Spinoza, and declares that it resolves all, even the thoughts and will of men, into an irresistible, fatal necessity. (Works IV. 577.) Once again, Locke repudiates the ethical doctrines of Hobbes. "An Hobbist, with his principle of self preservation, whereof himself is to be judge, will not easily admit a great many plain duties of morality." (King. Life of Locke. p. 103.) Professor Fraser is certainly correct in saying, "Hobbes did not, like Descartes and Locke, make consciousness his starting point and deepest fact, but treated 'minds' as visible organisms" etc, ("Selections from Berkeley." Intro. XVI.) It is clear from Locke's inference and classification that he had a general idea, at least, of the systems of Hobbes and Spinoza, and that he considered himself out of harmony with their doctrines. In the copious lists of books which Locke recommends for study, no work of Hobbes is mentioned. The names most in favour with Locke, are, Cicero, Hooker, Aristotle, Bacon, Tillotson, Chillingworth and Pufendorf. After remarking that Hobbes "ist ein unendlich viel bedeutender Denker als Bacon", and declaring that the foundations of Locke's ethics are essentially the same with those of Hobbes, Professor Paulsen remarks, "Das Dogma von der freien Kirche im freien Staat würde Locke keineswegs unterschrieben haben .... Er giebt mit Hobbes dem Staat die höchste Autorität in Sachen des Kultus und der Predigt; sein Ideal ist offenbar eine Nationale- oder Staatskirche". (591.) This, certainly, is the reverse of Locke's view. In his first letter on Toleration in speaking of church and state, he says; "The church itself is a thing absolutely seperate and distinct from the commonwealth. The boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable. He jumbles Heaven and earth together, the things most remote and opposite, who mixes