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general fenfe of commiferation,
openly teftified in behalf of the cap-
tiveprincess. In order, however, not
to be ftigmatized as forgetful of the
interests of the republic, they made
her enlargement inftrumental in pro-
curing that of those members of the
convention whom Dumourier had,
at the time of his defection, deliver-
ed into the hands of the Austrians,
and of the two ambassadors to the
Ottoman court, who had been fei-
zed on neutral ground by order of
the imperial court. A negotiation
for these purposes was opened with
the Auftrian ministry, in the month
of July, and, towards the close of
December, she was delivered from
berimprisonment in the Temple, and
conducted to Bafle, in Switzerland,
where she was exchanged, pursuant
to the agreement with the court of
Vienna, for the persons above inen-

full

thought it their duty to yield to the The dangers to which it was perpetually exposed, originated, evidently, from the want of a firm and stable government, fettled on a permanent constitution. The revolutionary movements were yet fo ftrong and rapid, that, unless they were stopped, it was feared they would at last over-turn the conftitution itfelf. The nation was full of parties, each obstinate in favour of that form of government to which it inclined. The convention was of individuals of abilities, ambition, and courage, who, therefore, might well be prefumed to aim at the poffeffion of power. The radical defect, in the present administration of affairs, was the fluctuation of authority from one party to another, and the total want of a regular form of government, acknowledged by all parties, and organized on principles assented to by the nation at large. A constitution, framed conformably to these ideas, was visibly the only remedy for the confufions that had fo long, and still continued to agitate France. It was the earneft defire of all parties, which appeared cordially willing to lay afide their animofities, and to unite in a cordial reception of fuch a conftitution as should be acceptable to the majority.

tioned.

But, while the rulers of France were thus endeavouring to wipe off the ftain of inhumanity from their character, they were particularly anxious not to incur the fufpicion of lympathifing with the royal cause, or its friends. They passed, at this time, a variety of decrees tending to restrict the entrance into France, and the refidence there, of foreigners, whose attachment to the exifting government was not clearly afcertained, and to dismiss all those who might be suspected of secretly adhering to the enemies of the republic. These decrees were extremely severe, and effectually obviated all dangers that might have arifen, by permitting all foreigners indifcriminately to reside in France, at a time when so many conspiracies and machinations were continually forming against the established go

vernment.

7

now

Impressed with the strongeft conviction of the immediate necessity of such a meafure, the convention, as already observed, had, towards the close of April, nominated eleven members, for the execution of this great business. They had completed it; and, on the twentythird of June, laid it formally before the convention. Faithful to the original ideas on which the primary revolution was founded, the framers of the new conftitution prefaced it by a folemn declaration of the rights rights of man, nearly similar to that which preceded the first. By this conftitution, every man was declared to be a French citizen, who was born, and refided in France, was twenty-one years of age, had infcribed his name in the civic register, lived one year on the territory of the republic, and paid a direct contribution. Foreigners were naturalifed by refiding seven years in France, or by marrying a French woman. The rights of a citizen were forfeited by naturalization in a foreign country, or by committing any infamous crime.

Primary afsemblies were to meet yearly in every canton, on the twenty-first of March, in their own right. They were to chufe the members of the electoral assembly, to elect the justice of peace and his affeffors, with the prefident of the municipal administation of the canton, and appoint the municipal offi

cers.

Every primary assembly was to nominate one elector for two hundred citizens. Electors to be twenty-five years of age, and possessed of a certain proportion of property. These were to elect the members of the legislature, the members of the tribunal of annulment, the high jurors, the adminiftrators of the department, the prefident, public accuser, and regifter of the criminal tribunals, and the judges of the civic tribunals.

The legiflature was composed of two councils, or chambers, one of ancients, and one of juniors. The first confifted of two hundred and fifty members; the second of five hundred. One-third of the members of each council was renewed every year; by which regulation every member was to fit three years.

They might he re-elected immedi ately once, but never again, till after an interval of two years. Each department was represented in proportion to its population. The council of five hundred had the exclusive right of propofing the laws, and the council of ancients the same right of accepting or rejecting them. The resolutions of the council of five hundred, when adopted by that of the ancients, became laws. When rejected, they could not again be presented to them for acceptance till two years after. Part of a plan rejected might, however, be presented.

Primary schools were established in every canton, to teach reading and writing, arithmetic, and the elements of morality. Schools of a superior kind were also established, one, at least, for every two depart ments. A national institution was also appointed, for the improvement of arts and sciences. Exclufively of these inftitutions, citizens had a right to form particular eftablishments of education and instruc tion, and societies for the promotion of arts and sciences.

A perfect equality was to fubfift between all the citizens of the republic, in all the ordinary occurrences of society. The only fuperi ority permitted, was, that of publie functionaries, and that only in in the actual exercise of their official duties. No religious vows or engagements, inconfiftent with the natural rights of man, were sanctioned by the laws. Individuals were at liberty to speak, write, print, and publish their thoughts, subject to no other controul than that of responsibility. Freedom of religious opinion and worship was established, and no one compelled to profess or maintain any particular

1

particular perfuafion. The law did not authorile privileged companies or corporations, or any species of limitation to the freedom of commerce, and the exercise of industry and arts of every kind. Citizens had the tight to affemble peaceably, and without arms; but no affembly could affume a popular denomination, or profeffing to debate about political subjects, can correspond with another, or associate with it in fuch investigations.

The executive power was delegated to five persons, nominated by the legiflature. They are styled, collectively, the directory. They were to be forty years of age, and have been members of the legiflative body, or employed in a great office, and could not be appointed to the directory, till the expiration of a year after quitting their employment. One of the directors was to go out yearly, and to be replaced by the election of another. No one could be re-elected to this office till after an interval of five years. The business of the directory was to provide for the fecurity of the republic, at home and abroad; to dispose of the military and naval forces; to appoint generals and admirals; to fuperintend the execution of the laws; and to direct the coining of money. To elect the directory, the council of five hundred made out a lift of ten perfons for one to be elected; and out of these the council of ancients Chufes one. The directory might invite the legislature to take fubjects into confideration; but could not lay plans before it, those of peace and war excepted. No treaties framed by them were valid, until ratified by the legislature, VOL. XXXVIÍ.

without whose consent no war can

be undertaken.

im

Such are the outlines of the French conftitution, as it was prefented to the convention, by those who were selected to fraine one. It underwent the difcuffion not only of that body and of the nation, but of all Europe As it was framed professedly in contradiction to the royal systems prevailing in this part of the world, its imperfections were the more readily perceived; and it was generally condemned as practicable in so large a country, and so populous a nation, especially as founded on the destruction of a monarchy that had lasted fourteen centuries, and the prepoffeffion for which was still very strong in the minds of a very confiderable portion of the people. Those in particular who adhered to the ancient religious establishments, together with the noblesse and the clergy, forming an immenfe body, and with few exceptions, warmly attached to the old system in church and state, having fuffered so much for their attachment to both, they were ready to fuffer ftill nore, and to perfevere to the last in their efforts to restore them.

Those who coolly weighed the merits and defects of this conftitution, against those that had been already tried, readily gave it the preference. It united many requifites to give it strength and duration. In imitation of the British conftitution, it divided the legiflative body into an upper and lower house, and thus prevented that tyrannical precipitation with which the convention had so justly been reproached. This division of power rendered it alfo less liable to abuse; the one

[H]

branch lent

branch of the legiflature operating as a counterpoise to the other. The -principal defect, in the opinion of most, was the distribution of the cxecutive power into five hands, inftead of configning it to one only. A fingle chief magiftrate appeared preferable to five, in several respects. The unity of person was certainly a complete security against the difunion of fentiments, where it must be attended with the most danger. Abilities and integrity would also be more perceptible and afcertainable in one than in several; and, by the fame reason, the want of them would be more clearly difcerned in him that was deficient. It would, at the same time, be less difficult to call one individual to account, than five, among whom the praise or cenfure of good or of evil councils, being equally shared, it might not be easy to discover who was the moft or the leaft deserving of approbation or of blame. Each would be defirous to appropriate to him felf as much as he could of the applause due to wife measures, and no less anxious to shift the odium of ill advice upon others. In this conflict it would be vain to expect that unanimity could long endure be tween persons envious of each other, from the very nature of the station they were jointly placed in. They would fplit into parties, the more inimical and violent from the great power with which they were invested; and, in order to retain it, might not fcruple to act the most hoftile part to their rivals, and treat them with merciless severity. For this reason, numbers of the French themselves would have been pleased with one fupreme magistrate, to the duration of whose magistracy, two years, or even three might have

been allotted, instead of five; and who, enjoying the good-will of his fellow citizens, might render them more fervices, if a person of capacity, during that space, than could probably be done in a longer, by five perfons of equal capacity to him, but obstructing each other through difference of fentiments, and even of temper, and liable to all those little jealoufies that will often infeft the intercourse of the best and wisest of men.

It has been suggested, on the other hand, that ambition was at the bottom of this new system, and prompted this division of almost supreme power into the hands of five individuals, that the framers of this conftitution might be able to indulge the hope of sharing it some future day in their turn. That able and ambitious men should be governed by such motives is not surprising: but to fix an imputation of this nature on those persons who were entrusted with the framing of this new system of government, one ought to be furnished with better proofs than fimple furmises. The majority of them were chofen on account of the moderation of their character and principles. Some were noted for their preference of a private to a public life, and none were fufpected of intending to avail themselves of this opportunity of rifing to power. It is more probable, therefore, that they fought to please the nation, than to gratify their personal ends. Had they lodged the chief magiftracy in a fingle person, it is not likely that the French would at this time have consented to accept of fuch a magistrate. The majority of those who poffefled and were able to exert much influence were decided republicans, not indeed of that vio

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volted at the idea of a fupreme governor, which would have recalled to their remembrance no less the tyranny of Robespierre, than the authority exercised by the king, previously to the revolution. As they held both in abhorrence, the former probably more than the lat ter, the very image or resemblance was carefully to be avoided. It was a common saying among the populace, that if they must have a king, a Bourbon was at least as good as any other. While sentiments of this kind prevailed among the greater number, and among the people of Paris more than any others, it was prudent, in those who were to plan the new constitution,' to admit of nothing in it that might furnish a pretext to the jacobins, for accusing them of inclining to royalifm.

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