thought it their duty to yield to the But, while the rulers of France were thus endeavouring to wipe off the ftain of inhumanity from their character, they were particularly anxious not to incur the fufpicion of fympathifing with the royal caufe, or its friends. They paffed, at this time, a variety of decrees tending to restrict the entrance into France, and the refidence there, of foreigners, whose attachment to the exifting government was not clearly afcertained, and to difmifs all thofe who might be fufpected of fecretly adhering to the enemies of the republic. Thefe decrees were extremely fevere, and effectually obviated all dangers that might have arifen, by permitting all foreigners indifcriminately to refide in France, at a time when fo many confpiracies and machinations were continually forming against the eftablished go vernment. 7 The dangers to which it was perpetually expoled, originated, evidently, from the want of a firm and stable government, settled on a permanent conftitution. The revolutionary movements were yet fo ftrong and rapid, that, unlels they were ftopped, it was feared they would at laft over-turn the conftitution itfelf. The nation was full of parties, each obftinate in favour of that form of government to which it inclined. The convention was full of individuals of abilities, ambition, and courage, who, therefore, might well be prefumed to aim at the poffeflion of power. The radical defect, in the prefent administration of affairs, was the fluctuation of authority from one party to another, and the total want of a regular form of government, acknowledged by all parties, and organized on principles aflented to by the nation at large. A conftitution, framed conformably to thefe ideas, was vifibly the only remedy for the confufions that had fo long, and ftill continued to agitate France. It was the earneft defire of all parties, which appeared cordially willing to lay afide their animofities, and to unite in a cordial reception of fuch a conftitution as fhould be acceptable to the majority. Impreffed with the ftrongeft conviction of the immediate neceffity of fuch a meafure, the convention, as already obferved, had, towards the clofe of April, nominated eleven members, for the execution of this great bufinefs. They had now completed it; and, on the twentythird of June, laid it formally before the convention. Faithful to the original ideas on which the primary revolution was founded, the framers of the new conftitution prefaced it by a folemn declaration of the rights rights of man, nearly fimilar to that which preceded the firft. By this conftitution, every man was declared to be a French citizen, who was born, and refided in France, was twenty-one years of age, had infcribed his name in the civic regifter, lived one year on the territory of the republic, and paid a direct contribution. Foreigners were naturalifed by refiding feven years in France, or by marrying a French woman. The rights of a citizen were forfeited by naturalization in a foreign country, or by committing any infamous crime. Primary affemblies were to meet yearly in every canton, on the twenty-firft of March, in their own right. They were to chufe the members of the electoral affembly, to elect the juftice of peace and his affeffors, with the prefident of the municipal adminiftation of the canton, and appoint the municipal offi cers. Every primary affembly was to nominate one elector for two hundred citizens. Electors to be twenty-five years of age, and poffeffed of a certain proportion of property. These were to elect the members of the legislature, the members of the tribunal of annulment, the high jurors, the adminiftrators of the department, the prefident, public accufer, and regifter of the criminal tribunals, and the judges of the civic tribunals. The legiflature was compofed of two councils, or chambers, one of ancients, and one of juniors. The first confifted of two hundred and fifty members; the fecond of five hundred. One-third of the members of each council was renewed every year; by which regulation every member was to fit three years. They might he re-elected immedi ately once, but never again, till after an interval of two years. Each department was reprefented in proportion to its population. The council of five hundred had the exclufive right of propofing the laws, and the council of ancients the fame right of accepting or rejecting them. The refolutions of the council of five hundred, when adopted by that of the ancients, became laws. When rejected, they could not again be prefented to them for acceptance till two years after. Part of a plan rejected might, however, be prefented. Primary fchools were established in every canton, to teach reading and writing, arithmetic, and the elements of morality. Schools of a fuperior kind were also established, one, at leaft, for every two depart ments. A national institution was alfo appointed, for the improvement of arts and fciences. Exclufively of thefe inftitutions, citizen's had a right to form particular eftablishments of education and inftruc tion, and focieties for the promotion of arts and sciences. A perfect equality was to fubfift between all the citizens of the republic, in all the ordinary occur rences of fociety. The only fuperi ority permitted, was, that of publie functionaries, and that only in the actual exercife of their official duties. No religious vows or engagements, inconfiftent with the natural rights of man, were fanctioned by the laws. Individuals were at liberty to fpeak, write, print, and publifh their thoughts, fubject to no other controul than that of refponfibility. Freedom of religious opinion and worship was established, and no one compelled to profess or maintain any particular particular perfuafion. The law did not authorife privileged companies or corporations, or any species of limition to the freedom of commerce, and the exercise of induftry and arts of every kind. Citizens had the fight to aflemble peaceably, and without arms; but no affembly could affume a popular denomination, or profeffing to debate about political fubjects, can correfpond with another, or affociate with it in fuch investigations. The executive power was delegated to five perfons, nominated by the legiflature. They are ftyled, collectively, the directory. They were to be forty years of age, and have been members of the legiflative body, or employed in a great office, and could not be appointed to the directory, till the expiration of a year after quitting their employment. One of the directors was to go out yearly, and to be replaced by the election of another. No one could be re-elected to this office till after an interval of five years. The bufinefs of the directory was to provide for the fecurity of the republic, at home and abroad; to difpofe of the military and naval forces; to appoint generals and admirals; to fuperintend the execution of the laws; and to direct the coining of money. To elect the directory, the council of five hundred made out a lift of ten perfons for one to be elected; and out of thefe the council of ancients chufes one. The directory might nvite the legislature to take fubjects into confideration; but could not lay plans before it, thofe of peace and war excepted. No treaties framed by them were valid, until ratified by the legislature, VOL. XXXVIÍ, without whofe confent no war can be undertaken. Such are the outlines of the French conftitution, as it was prefented to the convention, by thofe who were felected to frame one. It underwent the difcuffion not only of that body and of the nation, but of all Europe As it was framed profeffedly in contradiction to the royal fyftems prevailing in this part of the world, its imperfections were the more readily perceived; and it was generally condemned as impracticable in fo large a country, and fo populous a nation, especially as founded on the destruction of a monarchy that had lafted fourteen centuries, and the prepoffeffion for which was ftill very ftrong in the minds of a very confiderable portion of the people. Thofe in particular who adhered to the ancient religious establishments, together with the noblefle and the clergy, forming an immenfe body, and with few exceptions, warmly attached to the old fyftem in church and state, having fuffered fo much for their attachment to both, they were ready to fuffer ftill more, and to perfevere to the last in their efforts to restore them. Thofe who coolly weighed the merits and defects of this conftitution, against those that had been already tried, readily gave it the ference. It united many requifites to give it ftrength and duration. In imitation of the British conftitution, it divided the legislative body into an upper and lower house, and thus prevented that tyrannical precipitation with which the convention had fo juftly been reproached. This divifion of power rendered it alfo lefs liable to abufe; the one [H] branch branch of the legiflature operating as a counterpoife to the other. The -principal defect, in the opinion of moft, was the diftribution of the executive power into five hands, infiead of configning it to one only. A fingle chief magiftrate appeared preferable to five, in feveral refpects. The unity of perfon was certainly a complete fecurity against the difunion of fentiments, where it muft be attended with the most danger. Abilities and integrity would alfo be more perceptible and afcertainable in one than in feveral; and, by the fame reason, the want of them would be more clearly difcerned in him that was deficient. It would, at the fame time, be lefs difficult to call one individual to account, than five, among whom the praife or cenfure of good or of evil councils, being equally fhared, it might not be eafy to difcover who was the moft or the leaft deferving of approbation or of blame. Each would be defirous to appropriate to himfelf as much as he could of the applaufe due to wife meafures, and no less anxious to fhift the odium of ill advice upon others. In this conflict it would be vain to expect that unanimity could long endure be tween perfons envious of each other, from the very nature of the station they were jointly placed in. They would fplit into parties, the more inimical and violent from the great power with which they were invefted; and, in order to retain it, might not fcruple to act the moft hoftile part to their rivals, and treat them with mercilefs feverity. For this reafon, numbers of the French themselves would have been pleafed with one fupreme magiftrate, to the duration of whofe magifiracy, two years, or even three might have been allotted, instead of five; and who, enjoying the good-will of his fellow citizens, might render them more fervices, if a perfon of capacity, during that space, than could probably be done in a longer, by five perfons of equal capacity to him, but obftructing each other through difference of fentiments, and even of temper, and liable to all thofe little jealoufies that will often infeft the intercourfe of the best and wifeft of men. It has been fuggefted, on the other hand, that ambition was at the bottom of this new system, and prompted this divifion of almoft fupreme power into the hands of five individuals, that the framers of this conftitution might be able to indulge the hope of fharing it fome future day in their turn. That able and ambitious men fhould be governed by fuch motives is not furprising: but to fix an imputation of this nature on thofe perfons who were entrusted with the framing of this new fyftem of government, one ought to be furnifhed with better proofs than fimple furmifes. The majority of them were chofen on account of the moderation of their character and principles. Some were noted for their preference of a private to a public life, and none were fufpected of intending to avail themselves of this opportunity of rifing to power. It is more probable, therefore, that they fought to please the nation, than to gratify their perfonal ends. Had they lodged the chief magiftracy in a fingle perfon, it is not likely that the French would at this time have confented to accept of fuch a magiftrate. The majority of thofe who poffeffed and were able to exert much influence were decided republicans, not indeed of that vio lent: lent party, which had been guilty of fo many crimes, but of that which was equally inimical to the oppredion of many, and to the government of one. Thofe were equally averle to the rigid republicanifm of the terrorists, and to the restoration of monarchy; both which they were determined to oppofe. To fach then the appointment of one perfon, to prefide over the affairs of the nation, would have borne fuch an appearance of monarchy, that it would not have been fafe to make the attempt. Their prejudices againft royalty would not have permitted them to diftinguish between a refponfible magiftrate and a poffellor of abfolute power. It was neceflary, therefore, to confult the difpofition of the times, efpecially of the metropolis. This abounded with those who would have re As volted at the idea of a fupreme governor, which would have recalled to their remembrance no less the tyranny of Robefpierre, than the authority exercifed by the king, previoufly to the revolution. they held both in abhorrence, the former probably more than the lat ter, the very image or resemblance was carefully to be avoided. It was a common faying among the populace, that if they must have a king, a Bourbon was at least as good as any other. While fentiments of this kind prevailed among the greater number, and among the people of Paris more than any others, it was prudent, in thofe who were to plan the new constitution, to admit of nothing in it that might furnish a pretext to the jacobins, for accufing them of inclining to royalism. |