It seemed like fome fudden enchantment; but it proved real; for they ufed us like part of their own family or children which had been long abfent, and now returned; and omitted nothing that could contribute to either our eafe or pleasure. The greatest part of our foldiers left Bremen with much regret. The generous and elegant entertainment we met with there, far exceeded any thing we ever experienced before, or, I may venture to fay, ever will again. A great number accompanied us out of town, and thewed every poffible refpe&t."

The British troops began to embark on board the tranfports on the 14th of April, at the mouth of a creek near Bremen lake. The whole fleet, with the convoy, was upwards of two hundred fail. On the 24th, it cleared the mouth of the Wefer. The fhips were toffed about, and driven far to the northward of the due courfe by tempeftuous weather. The Greeks who returned, under Xenophon, from an unfuccefsful and hard expedition into Afia, were not more tranfported at the fight of the Jonian Sea, than the British foldiers, when, on the twenty-feventh, being off the coaft of Northumberland and Durham, they efpied the Cheviot-hills. The fleet, the weather becoming favourable, fteered fouthward towards the Nore, when it parted into different divifions: one bound for Harwich, one for Greenwich, and one for Portsmouth. They all arrived fafely at the places of their refpective deftinations.

During thefe tranfactions in the feven provinces, the French armies on the Rhine were preparing to before the city of Mentz, the only

of importance remaining to wire on the left bank of that

river. They hoped, that by effecting its reduction before the fetting in of winter, their hands would be at liberty for the purfuit of those vaft fchemes of conqueft they had projected in Germany. Relying on the difcontents frequently exprefled among the inferior claffes, they flattered themselves that on the appearance of their armies on the right fide of the Rhine, the fubjects of the petty principalities in Germany would be tempted to throw off the yoke of their mafters, and join them; or would at leaft compel their rulers to remain neuter, and leave the House of Aufiria to the fole defence of its own people, among whom a fpirit of diffatisfaction was well known to prevail..

Induced by thefe motives, the French government directed its commanders, on the confines of Germany, to proceed towards Manheim; the reduction of which would open an entrance into the interior parts of the empire, facilitate the taking of Mentz, by diverting the attention of their enemies, and preventing them from affording it relief. They laid fiege, accordingly, to that ftrong fort on the Rhine which covered that city; and it furrendered to the French on the twenty-fourth of December. Impatient to become mafters of Mentz, in the fame manner, they made three affaults on the fort of Zahlback, in its neighbourhood; but were repulfed with confiderable lofs. This check completely retarded their operations till the enfuing fpring; as it was found impracticable to form a regular fiege of fo ftrong a place as Mentz, until the feverity of the winter was over.

The poffeffion of Holland had, in the mean while, filled the French

with the highest expectations of deriving a multitude of advantages from it. No acquifition could exceed its value and importance. Placed in the middle ground, as it were, of the prefent contention, it extended an influence on every fde, which, with fkilful manage ment, might evidently be productive of the most beneficial confequences to those whom it favoured. Hence had formerly arifen the most eflential part of its power, and that weight in the affairs of Europe, we had fo long been felt and acAnowledged by every ftate. It was now become the property of France, and it was hoped, in that country, that the effects refulting in former days, from the ftrength and epalence of the feven provinces would be transferred to the prefent poflefors. Thus reafoned the French politicians: but they feemed to forget that the great power and influence of the Dutch republic, during the periods of its profperity, was entirely founded on its independence, and on the unanimity and patriotiim of the Dutch themJelves. But this was no longer the cafe; they had long been a divided people. It was a difputed point among them, who were the real patriots; and they were now a conquered nation. The wifeft heads in France did not confider them as likely to prove an active, but rather an useful and fubordinate ally, from whom much aid might be received, for the fupport of the armies and financies of the republic. The Dutch themfelves did not incline to move out of the fphere of their do meftic concerns; and, with their beft withes for the profperity of France, viewed it chiefly as a fecufity to their own. They were not

unwilling to go confiderable lengths in providing for the various de mands, which they doubted not would be made upon them; but they confidered their compliance, in this refpect, as the price of that freedom which they expected to enjoy, in the arrangements they were medidating at home.

The French, however, feeing themfelves uncontrouled mafters of the feventeen provinces, conftituting that country called the Nether lands, could not refrain from conceiving the moft extensive views of conqueft in the neighbouring countries. After they had driven the laft remains of the allied armies, from their newly acquired terri tories, they next refolved to purfue them into the countries where they had taken fhelter, They first made themfelves mafiers of Bantham, which, indeed, was a dependence of the Dutch republic, and then carried their arms into Weltphalia, where they defeated a body of imperiai forces. The reafon why they proceeded no farther was the prof pect of a peace with Pruflia, and of a neutrality for the north of Germany. Certain it is, that the force they had collected in thofe parts fhowed they had formed great defigns; but the most prudent of thofe who prefided over their councils, prevailed upon the others to defift from attempts that might render the French odious, without conducing to their intereft. What they had already acquired was fufficient to eftablish their fuperiority over the combined ftrength of all their ene mies. The best policy they could now adopt would be, to conciliate and fecure the attachment of their new fubjects, by punctually adhering to the engagements formed

with them, and by proving, through the evidence of deeds, that an union with France was more eligible than a fubjection to their former maf

ters.

The main object of the republiean councils in France, at this juncture, feemed to be the renovation of their marine, through the means afforded by the conqueft of Holland; and the employment of it, when renovated, against that power which they looked upon as the foul of the coalition against them. They had alfo two other objects in view; the one was, to detach Pruffia from this coalition, by fowing the feeds of jealoufy and fufpicion between the courts of Berlin and Vienna. This did not appear to the French politicians a matter of much difliculty. The junction of that power with Auftria was founded on the moft extraordinary event that had happened in Europe for many centuries. The French revolution, which, by alarming all the crowned heads, reconciled at once their jarring interefts, and united them for felf prefervation. But the firft pannie was over; and, notwithstanding the antipathy with which the French beheld royalty and its adherents, it was not imagined that, provided they were delivered from the apprehenfion of its refioration in their own country, they would carry their hatred of it fo far, as to continue the war, in order to procure its abolition in any other country. A ferng connection had fubiited between Pratha and France before the labvertion of this monarchy; the weaves for that connection fübfled in their full force, and were

to perded by an accident, wch, though unfriendly to the totem of government fettled in the

Pruffian dominions, could not alter the nature of those relations exifting neceflarily between that court, and its long-standing rival the court of Vienna. The politics of this latter were inceffantly occupied with plans for the recovery of that valuable portion of its hereditary patrimony, the rich and extenfive province of Silefia. This was the firft acquifition that had placed the house of Brandenburgh on a footing of great confequence. It was relpeciable before, but had fince become formidable. This elevation of a family, at no time in particular efteem at Vienna, created the more deep and irradical rancour, that it was wholly at the expence of the houfe of Auftria. These refentments would evidently never terminate, while the caufes of them remained; and the houfe of Brandenburgh muft either confent to remove them, by reftoring the territories it had wrefted from the imperial family, in the hour of its diftrefs, or keep a continual guard againft its well-known determination to recover them, at any coft, on the first favourable opportunity.

All thefe confiderations were induftriously laid before the Prufìian monarch." They were obvious truths; but they were enforced with fo much ftrength of perfuafion, that they made the defired impreffion, and prepared that prince to liften favourably to the proposal of a feparate peace with France, in cafe the powers, with whom he had formed the coalition, fhould be averfe to treat in conjunction with bim. To this it may be added, that his fubjects were generally inclined to live on terms of amity with the French, and had never acceded to the junction with Auftria, from any

other

other motive, than mere compliance with the will of their sovereign. A friendly intercourfe had already been established between the government of France and the court of Berlin. During the fummer of 1794, a private agent of this court repaired to Bafle, in Switzerland, where he had fecret interviews and conferences with Mr. Barthelemy, the principal negotiator on the part of the French, with foreign powers. It was undoubtedly a butinefs of intricacy to the Pruffian minitry, fo to conduct itfelf, as to preferve the influence it had obtaized in Germany, and lofe none of the importance it had acquired by being the first mover of the coalition, as head of the proteftant intereft in the empire, the king of Pruffia was already the counterpoile to the exhorbitant weight of Auftria, which had hitherto been fupported by the princes and states of the Roman communion; but as religious motives had now loft much of their former prevalence, and political confiderations preponderated against all others, thefe alone feemed to govern the various courts. Hence the dread of that overbearing fway which Auftria had never failed to exercife, over those it was in any manner able to controul, had detached many of the ftates of Germany from their preceding attachment to the Auftrian politics. The minds of the generality of people, in that immenfe republic of princes and ftates, feemed more intent on a firm confolidation of their liberties and refpective independence, than on the restoration of the French monarchy, which they looked upon as a pretence of the court of Vienna, intended to conceal views of aggrandisement, which would have

given too much offence to all Europe, had they been avowed.

The ambitious difpofition of the houfe of Brandenburgh was no less notorious; but the Pruffian miniftry 'was convinced, that it could not, in the prefent fituation of affairs, be gratified at the expence of France. It turned its attention, therefore, to the only object that remained expofed to the common rapacity of its powerful neighbours. This object was Poland, of which, from its inability to refift them, they had projected the partition long before. They were now employed in executing it, and it behoved Pruffia to be prefent at the divifion of the fpoil; and to be ready, if necessary, forcibly to infift on that portion which had been affigned to its lot.

Swayed by theie views, the court of Berlin thought it more prudent to treat with France, than to confume its treasures and armies in a fruitless conteft with that power, by relinquishing a quarrel from which no benefit could be derived, it was at liberty to gratify the defire long cherished, of making vaft additions to the territories of Pruffia. This could not have been done, had it continued with the coalition. Its affociate in the partition, Ruffia, had it been left fole agent in this bufinefs, might have availed itfelf of the abfence of its Pruffian confederate, to have feized a larger fhare than was its due; and as poffeftion is ufually the right of the ftrongest, might not have been prevailed upon, by amicable means, to refign what it had feized in this