2 much fuccefs, for the mitigation it. But he endeavoured to reprefs the licentious and tyrannical fpirit of the higher nobility. He reftored the peafants to the protection of laws, abolished perfonal flavery, and prohibited, under fevere penalties, the cruel exactions to which the nobles had fubjected all who had the misfortune to be born on their eftates. His humane attention to this unhappy clafs of men led the nobility to diftinguifh him with a mifplaced ridicule, by the title of king of the peasants. By railing the mats of the people to the rank of freemen, he gave them an intereft in the welfare of the ftate. Had the prudent and benevolent spirit of his laws been adhered to, Poland muft have ftill continued to be a great and flourishing nation. 2nd gradual abolition of domestic and predial flavery; whether, as we would charitably believe, from a genuine fpirit of Chriftianity, or, as tome contend, and may perhaps have been, in fome inftances, the cafe, from an ambition of engrof ing to themfelves all power over the bodies, as well as the fouls, of mea. The fact is nevertheless true, that, through their collufion and concurrence, the Poles, as well as other nations, were gradually deprived of their political privileges. Tewards the clole of the twelfth century, Cafimir II. endeavoured to reprefs the tyranny of the ariftocracy; but the influence of his regulations, as it arofe chiefly from his perfonal character, produced only a transitory alleviation of griev ances. The pride of the most turbulent of the nobility was offended, at this attempt to fet hounds to their ufurpations; and this circumftance, joined to the uncertain ideas entertained concerning the right of fucceflion to the fovereignty, fplit the nation into factions: from which arole a train of civil wars, that convulfed the state, with only occafional intervals of tranquillity, till towards the middle of the fourteenth century. At this period, when as yet there were no written laws in Poland, arofe Cafimir the Great, who became the legiflator of his country. Without attempting to remedy the fundamental errors of the government, he latisfied himfelf with regulating the internal police of his kingdom, and correct ing a mafs of abufes, which had been accumulating for ages. He allowed the order of fucceffion to the crown to remain in the fame anfettled ftate in which he found But after the death of Cafimir, the nobles were quickly thrown back into that state of mifery and degradation from which he had attempted to raise them. The fituation of this clafs of men became even more deplorable and hopeless, from the attempt that had been made to relieve them. Their mafters feem to have taken the hint, from this circumftance, to secure their future ufurpations with all the folemnity of legal exactment. Pains and penalties without number were denounced against all of them who fhould dare to think themselves entitled to the common rights of human nature; and they were again fubjected to the caprices of every gentleman who chofe to indemnify their mafters, or pay a trivial fine, as a compenfation for their murder. In confequence of this fyftem of oppreffion, equally inhuman and impolitic, the ftate was, in a great meafure, deprived of their fervice in fupporting the honour of the na[D2] tion, tion, and defending the frontier. Deprefled by long habits of the moft abject flavery, they loft that elaftic vigour of both body and mindwhich is necellary to conftitute a foldier. They had hardly the fhadow of intereft in the public welfare. Being already as low as it was poffible to reduce them, they might, if forced to change masters, be placed in a better fituation, but not in a worfe. Hence the defence of the state was left intirely to the nobility: a clafs of men, whom habits of licentious independence had already rendered totally unfit for fubmiflion to the necellary ftrictness of military fubordination. While Charles XII. of Sweden over-ran Poland in fo fhort a time, and a few Ruffian regiments at the election of the late and laft king, overawed the Polish nation, once fo powerful, the pealants, as in all fimilar cafes, flood neuter, and the nobility, purfuing all of them feparate measures, left the whole an eafy prey. The nobles having become, after the death of Cafimir the Great, the indifputed mafters of the lives and fortunes of their pealants, next turned their attention to retrench the power of the crown. The royal prerogative was indeed exorbitant, and totally incompatible with the principles of a free government. It accorded, however, with the irregular spirit of feadal times, when the nobility, although they poffeffed not any comititutional check on the power of the crown, could yet overcome the king, and extort from his fears, the enjoyment of an independence which was not fecured to them by any legal conceflion. But the time was now arrived when this jrecarious freedem could no longer Itisly a high fpirited nobility.— Lewis, the nephew and fucceffor of Cafimir, poffeffed extenfive hereditary dominions, and might employ his Hungarian army to crush the liberty of his Polifh fubjects. The nobles refolved to prevent these dangers, and the occafion was highly favourable to their defign. Lewis, when his uncle breathed his laft, was in Hungary. The nobles profiting of this circumftance, refolved to ftipulate with him for their own privileges, before they would admit him into the kingdom. A deputation of their number waited on him at Buda, and demanded and obtained a formal renunciation of fome branches of the prerogative, as the conditions on which they were willing to become his subjects. Of these the most important were, that the king fhould not impofe taxes without the confent of the states; that, in the event of his dying without heirs male, the election of his fucceffor thould be left to the ftates; that he thould reimburse to the nation the expences and even damages occafioned by his wars; that he fhould reinftate the grand proprieters in their tyrannic privileges; and that it should not be lawiul for a pealant, or in other werds, a predial flave to bring an action against his lord. This is the origin of that compact termed in Poltth latin Pacta Onventa, which, with occational variations, conformable to the circumftances of the times, every fubiquent king was obliged to raily previously to his coronation. The nobles began now, agreeably to the ufual progreis of fuccesful ambition, to form other pretentions, and to graip at new privileges. Practiling on the predominant pallons of their fuccellors, and particularly particularly on the defire which was ger erally manifefied by them all, of tranfmiting the crown, through the concurrence of the nobles, to their fons, or other near relations, they procured a renunciation, on the put of the crown, of the right of coding money, without the confent of the ftites; and an exception to the nobility from arreft, till after legal conviction of the crime with which they were charged. Various pretences were furnished to the nobles for encreafing their power, by the long and unquiet rega of Cafimir IV. who governed Poland for near half a century, and died in 1492. Although he had fcceeded in uniting the lovereignty of rival ftates in his own family, Poland felt her internal ftrength debilitated, and her refources exhauted, by the splendour of her monarch. Accordingly, the nobles eagerly feized every occafion which the king's necefiities afforded them of farther abridging his power, and eftabathing, in their own hands, a more general and immediate influence on all the measures of govern ment. Previoufly to this period, all who were comprehended in the clafs of nobles, together with a certain number of the inhabitants of cities, poffelled the right of voting in the general diet. Hence thole meetings generally bore a nearer refemblance to the tumultuoufnefs of a mob, than to the folemnity of a great national afmbly. Too numerous to be comprehended within the limits of any regular forms of procedure, and too much broken by party diftinctions to be capable of calm and rational difcuffion, they could only give or refufe a general fanction to the objects that were laid before them. To remedy thefe radical defects, and prevent the confufion infeparable from univerfal fuffrage, the nobles agreed to wave this right, and to vote by reprefentation. The general diet thus conflituted, preferved its form to the present times, with one material exception, which, as it marks the continued ufurpation of the nobles on every branch of government, and order of fociety befides their own, is worthy, in this review, of being mentioned. At the time when the general diet was eftablifhed in its prefent form, and during the reigns of all the Jaghello family, the right of reprefentation was poffefled by the free towns. The firft attempt to procure their exclufion was made by the nobles, in the reign of Sigifmond I. At that time, however, they were unfuccefsful: but as foon as all ideas of hereditary right to the throne. were not only, in fact, given up, but formally renounced and prefcribed by statute, there was no longer any power to check their continued encroachments. The whole autho rity of the flate was, at every vacancy, actually lodged in their hands; and one of the firft ufes they made of it was, to ftrip the towns of their right of reprefentation in the general diet. The general diet, conftituted on thefe principles, proved highly favourable to the defigns of the ariftocracy. By condenfing and con centrating their power, it enabled them to act with unanimity and concert. It formed a conftitutional body, neither too unwieldy to be [D3] aduated actuated by one fpirit, nor too feeble to enforce its authority. Accordingly, the inftitution of the general diet foon gave a new direction to the views of the ariftocracy. Previously to this æra, the nobles aimed rather at an exemption from grievances, than at the poffeffion of power. The oppofition lay rather between the exertion of the prerogative, and the enjoyment of independence, than between the acinal power of the fovereign, and the claimed power of the nobles. But, from this period, the crown and the diet were directly oppofed to one another; each aimed at a direct afcendency in the legiflature; and neither could gain, except in as far as its antagonist loft. In addition to the conceffions already made to the nobles, the neceffities of Cafimir IV. obliged him to refign yet another very important right of the crown, namely, the right of fummoning the feudal barons to attend his ftandard, at the head of their retainers, whenever he fhould be engaged in hoftilities with any of his enemies. The nobility, harralled by his frequent wars, withed to fecure themfelves against the deftructive effect of the ambition of their kings. Cafimir withed to replenish his exhaufted treafury; and money was to be procured in no other way than by yielding to the claims of the Accordingly, the bargain, being mutually adventageous, was foon concluded, and the feudal fervices abolithed. The establishment of general diets may be confidered as the æra of the Polifh conftitution. It was intended as a regular counterpoife to the power of the crown; but the government was as irregularly balanced as before. The king, who, by economy, could confine the expences of his government within the hereditary revenue of the crown, was under no neceflity of fummoning the diet; and confe quently there was no legal remedy for whatever grievances might exift during his reign. On the other hand, the elective nature of the crown threw the whole power of the fate, at every vacancy, into the hands of the ariftocracy, who might, under the pretence of fecuring their privileges, impofe whatever limitations they pleated on the fucceffor, or even annihilate the fovereign power. There was no hereditary body of men, who, from a fimilarity of interefts, were induced to fupport the dignity of the crown. The king was obliged to chufe his fervants out of that order whose views were directly contrary to his own. By a peculiarity in the Polifh conflitution, the great officers of the crown had an intereft direct ly contrary to that of their mafter. Inficad of deriving fupport and firength from the power of the crown, they derived the importance and fplendour of their offices from its diminution. They were appointed for life, and, of course, independent of the king. Their weight in the government increased, in proportion as the royal authority was diminished. Still, however, the crown would have retained fufficient energy for the purpotes of regular government, had it been poffible for the Poles to fix their conftitation on the principles on which it refted at the death of Cafimir IV. and to prevent all farther innovation; but the пе the king was a folitary friendless power, and the nobles were turbukat and afpiring. A principle of change operated without ceafing; and no expedient could be found to counteract its effect, until, by the fatal introduction of the liberum * in the reign of John Cafimir, who was elected to the Polith throne, in fucceffion to his brother, Ladiflaus, in 1648, the power of the crown was reduced almost to nothing, and the nobles left wholly without controul. This new principle crowned the Polifh Coitution, the moft fingular affemblage of incoherent materials that was ever exhibited, with the ne plus ultra of ariftocratical licentioufnefs. When all queftions were decided in the diet by plurality of voices, the nuncios, or deputies, neceflarily poffeffed confiderable weight in the government. The fervants of the crown were led to confult the public good, in order to efcape the animadverfion of the general diet; but when the establishment of the liberum veto enabled them to buy the negative of a nuncio, this check on their conduct was removed. ftead of making themselves agree able to the nation, they had now nothing more to do than to make themfelves rich, and they were fure of impunity. The exigencies of the public were never fo great, but that a nuncio might be found to fell his negative; nor the deliberations of the diet fo regular, but that a pretence might be found for interpofing it. It was feldom that the great officers of ftate could all be brought to concur in the fame views; on the contrary, they were In generally divided by hereditary feuds, which nothing could allay: nor did they always wait the flow iffue of intrigue in their competitions. As there did not exist any power fufficient to reftrain the whole, they not unfrequently raifed armies, fought pitched battles, befieged one anothers houses, and defolated one anothers eftates, with all the fury of incenfed favages. As the pra&ice of fetting up the crown to the highest bidder invited the interference of foreign nations in the affairs of the Poles, fo alfo did their internal diffentions and contefts. Ideas were nourished in the breafts of neighbouring potentates, that Poland was unfit for governing itfelf; but inftead of endeavouring to remedy that defect, by fuggefting or encouraging any falutary change in the conftitution, they fubverted fuch a conflitution the moment it was framed, and fhared among themfelves a kingdom which they had been taught to dif refpect and defpife as venal, feeble, and dependent. Thus, it is plainly to be perceived, that although Poland had not the advantage of any fuch barriers as ufually define and defend great kingdoms, the great caufe of its ruin lay not in this circumstance, but in the faults of its conftitution. The hiftory of Poland, difplaying the defects and difadvantages of political fyftems, as by a magnifying glafs, offers to legiflators, and all who can, either directly or indirectly, influence the bufinefs of legiflation, the moft important confiderations. It illuftrates, in the most ftriking manner, the ultimate ruin • Or right which every provincial deputy enjoyed of putting a stop, by his fingle negative, to the proceeding of the general diet. [D4] that |