ronfidered as a powerful argument for the neceffity of counteracting them, and of exerting the strength of Great Britain, in oppofition to its most inveterate enemy.

The marquis of Lansdown expressed himself with his usual fervour against ministerial measures. He was particularly fevere on the frequent refusal of ministers to lay before the house copies of infructions to admirals and generals. This practice had begun, he obferved, in the reign of George I. to the high disgrace of parliament, of which it had greatly wounded the dignity in the eyes of the naton. It was incumbent on this body to affert the right it had enjoved till that period, of claiming, without denial, a participation in the knowledge of those public documents, on which alone it could form a clear conception of the propriety of ministerial measures in matters of the most essential confequence. The marquis entered with great accuracy into an examination of the relative interests of the chief European powers. He represented the defire of Ruffia, to form a connexion with England, as flowing from the dread entertained by that power, that the potentates of Europe were meditating an union against this overgrown empire, in order to fet bounds to its ambition. This was a measure of fuch ne(effity, that it were the height of impolicy to counteract it. But no naton could fo effectually oppose the enterprifes of Ruffia, as the Germans affifted by the French, who bad always been the fureft friends to the independence of the German princes. This connexion ought not therefore to be disturbed, nor the

French prevented from acting the part they had already done in behalf of Germany, merely on account of their having changed the form of their government, from monarchical to republican. The interests of France were invariably the fame, whether a monarchy or a republic: but the infatuation of those, who opposed the establisument of the republic, might induce it, in order to attain that object, to con nive at the pretenfions of its principal enemies, and permit them to swallow up the smaller states of the German empire, provided the settlement of the republic was no longer obstructed. The prospects that arose from this new arrangement of things, were, in the opinion of the marquis, more critical than any alterations that had happened in the course of many centuries. It was easy to foresee, that if France allowed the greater powers to adopt the system of partition, they must in return permit the same to the French. Thus Europe would be thrown into a state of confufion highly unfavourable to the interests of this country, which evidently required that the political situation of Europe should remain as heretofore, and that no power whatever should be aggrandized at the expence of another. The greater the number of smaller powers, the greater must be the safety and influence of Great Britain. Were Europe to be divided, on the partitioning plan in contemplation at the ambitious courts well known to defire it, no peace could henceforth be lasting or secure. The thirst of dominion once excited, and partially gratified, would never rest, and the dividers of states and kingdoms [02] would, would, like plunderers on a smaller feale, fall out among themselves about the divifion of the booty, and keep the world in continual alarms and distensions. Two of the members of the coalition had already acted on this plan, in the business of Poland. One of them, Pruffia, had deferted us, and the other would probably do the fame, were France to proffer better terms than England. Thus, after throwing away immenfe treafures, we might at length be abandoned to our fole exertions against an ancient enemy, provoked at our endeavours to reduce him to a worfe degree of fervitude than he had ever experienced; and become, through our folly, more able than at any former period to make us feel the weight of his resentment. It was in the mean time illusory to boast of the extent of our commerce. Infurance, the best criterion of lofs or gain, was continually rifing; and of three islands taken by us in the West Indies, one only, Martinico, remained. Instead of inciting the Chouans and other infurgents to perfevere in a fruitless resistance, were it not more confiftent with humanity and good policy to treat with the French government for an amnesty to the emigrants, or on failure, to make them a donation of half a million, or more if necessary, to enable them at once to fix themfelves in fome fettled way of living? The marquisconcluded by adverting to the affairs of Ireland, on which the expreffed himself in the fame manner as the other fpeakers in the oppofition.

The other adherents and opponents to ministerial measures took part alfo in this debate. Lord Lauderdale in particular took notice, that, according to minifters, our

allies were the whole human race, and our wealth that of the whole world. Yet, with allies innumerable, and wealth inexaustible, we could not, he observed, bring the French to our terms. The earl of Guildford's motion was negatived by a majority of ninety.

As a final struggle on the part of oppofition, Mr. Wilberforce, on the 27th of May, moved the house of commons to declare itself of opinion, that in the present circumstances of France, the British government ought not to object to proposals for a general pacification, and that it was the interest of the nation to put an end to the war as foon as just and honourable terms could be obtained. He supported his motion in a long and pertinent speech. Though he would not, he faid, insist on the common axiom, that the voice of the people was the voice of God, yet much weight should be allowed to sentiments generally received. Thus the publie being in the perfuafion that a speedy end ought to be put to the present ruinous war, it was incumbent on the legislature to pay a due deference to the inclinations of its corstituents, and earnestly to feek for every facility in the way to attain it. The people were the more justified in their warm expression of fo reafonable a defire, when they heard how readily the most potent of our allies acceded to the wishes of his people in this particular: the very day on which the emperor figned the treaty for a loan of money from this country, he also signed a refcript, expressing that he was ready to enter into a negotiation with the French. What were we to think of fuch behaviour? Did he really mean to be true to the conditions on

of discontent: at home itself the people were exafperated at their fufferings, and the less disposed to bear them, that they did not clearly comprehend why they should. The effects of the war were of a truly alarming nature: it not only spread calamity through the land, but diverted a large portion of the people from peaceable occupations, to which they never returned with alacrity after they had been used to a military life, and contracted those habits of idlenets and diffipation always attending it? Another effect was that the Americans were apprehenfive, lest, if successful in our atempts against the French islands, we might narrow their commerce in those parts: nor were they disposed to bear with patience the haughty and contemptuous language we bestowed on republican principles and governments. The longer the war lasted, the stricter would be the union of the French, and the more fervent their resolution to maintain their domeftic independence, with which their present form of government was daily becoming to intimately connected. The rulers in that country, fenfible of the general inclination to peace, were very for from averse to it themselves: the difficulties perpetually arifing in providing the means to continue the war, and their anxiety not to run counter to the reasonable wishes of the majority, were motives that must strongly influence them to close with equitable offers. All these were objects that called for the most ferious attention on our part.

He

had proposed them in the clearest point of view they appeared peared to him, and to those who coincided with his sentiments.

This speech occafioned a warm reply from Mr. Wyndham, who contended, that it was nugatory to talk of the willingness of the French government to liften to overtures from this country, after the explicit manner in which they had determined to reduce, its power and influence throughout Europe. France was at the present hour in a state of universal agitation: jealoufies and mistrufts of each other distracted its rulers, and irritation at their conduct pervaded the mass of the people, who had never been so prone to shake off the ufurpations of their governors, as they appeared of late. Motions to treat for peace were totally unseasonable for those reasons: they tended to dishearten the publie from the prosecution of a war which promised to terminate fo favourably to the cause of this country and its allies: they promoted difaffection, and placed government in an odious light. He would, therefore, oppose the present motion, by moving the order of the day.

Herein he was feconded by fir B. Hammet; but vigoroufly opposed by Mr. Fox, who amidst a variety of other ailegations, particularized the fatisfaction exprefled by the fubjects of those powers that had made peace with France. He inflanced the grand duke of Tufcapy, who had rendered himself highly popular by abandoning the coalition; which was an object of hatred to the commonalty of all Europe. The conftitution which the coalition held out to the French. as the price of peace, was precifely that which they had proscribed. This alone was fufficient to excite their averfion to it; no spirited people being willing to accept of a government upon compulfion, But did our allies require from us a continuation of this war? Were they not all inclined to peace? Was it not alfo a fact, that fo far from ex tuguishing jacobinism in this country, which was one of the most common pretences for the war in those who approved it, those who went under that name rejoiced in its continuance, from the profpect it afforded of accelerating the ruin of miniftry, and of the party that fided with them, and of promoting all the views of their adverfaries, The good faith of the French was at least equal to that we had experienced from our allies: were the French to deceive us, they would do no more than had been done by our allies under the matk of friendship to this country, and after having, through that pretence, drained it of as much treasure as they could prevail on our credulity in their promifes to bestow. We had fufficiently felt the evils of war: those prognofticated from peace had no exiftence bat in the speculations of perfons who did not feel the calamities of the times: but ought the mere fpeculations of men in power to outweigh the contrary opinions of the great mass of the community? among whom it were an infult to common sense and experience to deny that as much knowledge and understanding might be found as in any ministry.

It was argued by Mr. Pitt in reply, that to represent it as the duty of minifters, to acknowledge them felves ready to accept of overtures of peace from the enemy, was take ing from them the advantages they ought to poffefs in relation to them: they must, from their situation, best

know the language to be held with him. For this reason the constitution had invested the executive power with the exclufive right of foreign negotiations, from the superior degree of information it could. not fail to derive through the various channels of which it had the sole direction. From sources of this nature proceeded the reluctance of government to comply with the opinion of those who were defirous. to shew a willingness to treat with the rulers in France. From authentic intelligence the situation of that country was more critical than ever: the refources were univerfally diminished in every quarter from whence they had arifen, or been ex. torted. Difunion reigned in every department of the state, and diffatiffaction extended through all classes. Was this, therefore, a time to come forward with proposals to negotiate, while, through the patient delay of a short lapse of time, alterations might happen in the internal parts of that country, more favourable to us, than we could expect from the most advantageous treaties that could be framed at the present mo ment. To negotiate now would therefore be precipitation and imprudence unbecoming the difcretion of government, while so thoroughly acquainted with the diminution of strength in the enemy, and that notwithstanding the apparent vigour and success of his exertions, they could not laft much longer. This description of the state of France he compared with that of England, of which the resources still remained unexhausted, and where, though impofitions had been numerous, they had not deprefled the industry, nor affected the general welfare of society. The debate closed by the [04] order