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fft on the restoration of the old
monarchy, as an indifpenfible con-
dinon of peace.
He eagerly main
taine, that the perils attending the
present war, did not equal thofe
that would refult from fuch a peace
as could be made between the two
countries, at this uncertain crifis.
The internal fituation of France,
and the well-known difpofition of
its rulers, rendered every compact
with them precarious and unftable.
Terror and feverity, though fome-
what abated fince the fall of Robe-
fpierre, fill fubfifted in full force,
and parties were ftill animated
against each other, to a degree that
left them no other fecurity for their
refpective exiftence, than the de-
ftruction of their antagonists, whofe
meafares they obftinately reprobated,
as tending to the deftruction of the
commonwealth. While fuch were
the reciprocal fentiments of thefe
furious and implacable enemies to
each other, whatever was effected
by the one would be controverted
by the other, as injurious to the
ffate; and annulled on the very
firt opportunity. Could, therefore,
any other ftate fecurely reft on the
faith of any contract or ftipulation
made with people of this character?
Until another lyftem took place of
this one, he could not think him-
felf authorized in reafon to enter
into any negotiation with those who
held the reigns of government, in
the midft of fuch inceffant fluctua-
tions. A powerful proof, how great
the number was of thofe, in France,
who were inimical to the prefent go-
vernment, evidently appeared in the
prodigious fums levied by confifca-
tions: the total had not been lefs,
during the foregoing year and- a
half, than three hundred millions
fterling. Did not this fufficiently

evince the fallacy, or the error, of those who afferted the inc nfiderable quantity of adherents to monarchy? Thefe were, to a man, the friends to this country, and waited only an occafion to declare themselves ready to fecond our efforts in their caufe. Would it be policy to deprive ourfelves of the good withes and cooperation of the multitudes, whom no terrors nor barbarities had been able to reduce to any degree of fubmiffion to the exifting fyftem? but were we difpofed to negotiate, with the French republicans, could we be certain of a fimilar difpofition on their part? was it not notorious, that they harboured an irreconcileable hatred to this country, and its inhabitants; and that the principal. motive, of their willingness to make peace with the other members of the confederacy, was, that they might convert their whole rage againft us? would they not interpofe fuch obftructions to a pacification, that it must remain unattainable, without facrificing, at once, both our honour and our intereft to obtain it? The very principles on which the French republic was founded, were fuch, that to ac knowledge it, which muft be done in cafe of a treaty, was to confefs all other governments founded upon injuftice. A peace built on fuch grounds would be not only difgraceful, but fatal to our own conftitution, by undermining its principles, and empowering its many domestic enemies to reprefent it as inequitable and oppreffive. Such a peace would be worfe than war. French emiffaries, under the various pretences of bufinefs and commercial tranfactions, would be let loofe upon us in fwarms, and, united with the difcontented and factious here,

would

would gradually poifon the public mind, while the fufpicions and jealoufies of government, would compel it to remain in a ftate of preparation and defence that would continue to exhauft the country, and to perplex the people.

It was obferved by Mr. Wilberforce, that though parliament was agreed in declaring the republican form of the French government no obftruction to peace, yet the language of our minifters, in unifon with that of the princes in the coalition, afforded ftrong reafons to fufpect that their real intention was to reftore the monarchy. But it were more prudent to give up this defign, which paft endeavours had fhewn to be vain, than to prolong the conteft, probably to no other end than to find ourselves obliged, at laft, to accept of terms which we might have procured at first. Peace would, in all likelihood, prove more prejudicial to the enemy than to us. The immenfe armies of France, when returned to that country, would certainly take part in its internal diffentions, and effectually contribute to reduce it to defolation. But by perfevering in the war we fhould neceflarily conftrain them to act with unanimity in their own defence. The encrease of their paper-money would follow, with that of confifcations, and the holders of the one, and purchasers of the others, would augment in the fame proportion, and add to the numbers and strength of thofe who fupported the republican fyftem. Hiftory had fhewn how much it was our interest to remit of our native obftinacy in the profecution of foreign wars. We had more taan once rejected terms of peace;

ch, after expending much treaand hedding much blood, we

had, at length, thought proper to accept.

pre

Mr. Fox reminded minifters, that they had branded oppofition with the moft injurious epithets for having moved the adoption of fentiments fimilar to thofe which they had this day brought forward as juft and proper. It was time, he faid, to be fair and explicit in the mani feftation of our thoughts on the fent fituation of affairs, and on the measures we meaned to pursue. The restoration of tranquillity to France, on the plan propofed by minifters, was evidently unattain able. The royalifts themselves were the principal champions in their own caufe, and fo far from relying upon our exertions in their favour, that they had confiantly added fresh vigour to their own, on the failure of the various efforts we had made to affift them. The confiftency of parliament had been pleaded for its continuing to infift on the conditions it had held out at the commencement of the conteft. But events had not correfponded with the fanguine expectations then formed, and neceflity required, that we should con fult what was feafible, in preference to what had been projected antecedently to thofe difafters that had defeated our fchemes. A refufal to treat with the French, unless they fubmitted to our demands, was no lefs unjuft and abfurd, than if they were to require the English to yield to theirs, previoufly to their confenting to liften to terms of peace. Arrogance was not to be tolerated in the intercourfe between nations that fought to re-establish amity. While we challenged the right of dictating forms of government to the French, we must expect that they would refift us with all the rancour

and

and enthufiafm of juftly excited indignation. As to the apprehenfion of danger, from the influx of French principles, experience had taught the English to beware of imitating their unhappy neighbours, and to adhere, more firmly than ever, to the principles of their own conftitution. He concluded, by reminding Mr. Pitt, that, notwithstanding the declaration made by his father, that the English fhould die, on the laft breach, before they confented to the independence of America, he did no think himself bound to abide by it, and had commenced his political career, by declaring for their independence. By the fame rule he ought to retract his determination, respecting France.

Mr. Dundas oppofed the motion in queftion, on the ground that it would interfere with the plans of government, and that the arrange ments for the enfuing year were fo promiffory, that we had every motive to expect a change of fortune in in our favour. The allegations of miniftry occafioned Mr. Gray to refume the fubject with great warmth and perfeverance. He dwelt principally on the improbability of thofe calamities that were pretended by the adverfaries to a negotiation. Other powers had treated with France without expreffing any dread of the confequences; why fhould Great Britain, therefore, entertain any? His motion was negatived by a majority of 183, and that of Mr. Pitt carried.

In the houfe of lords, a motion was made on the 27th of February, by the duke of Bedford, the purport of which, like Mr. Gray's, was, that no form of government that might prevail in France, fhould preclude a negotiation with that

country, or prevent a peace, whenever it could be made confiftently with the honour, intereft, and fecurity, of this nation. He fupported his motion with a variety of arguments. Such a declaration would not oblige miniftry to accept of any other conditions than they chose, nor to treat but at their own time. Were it to be admitted as a fixed rule, that no peace fhould be fued for but by the aggreffor, wars might be endlefs. But the French, ftrictly fpeaking, had not begun the content. They had formally retracted the decree that had given fo much offence, and had made it an article of their new conftitution, to interfere with the government of no country. As to that permanency of peace fo ferupuloufly required, had the world ever witneffed any peace that lafted beyond the intereft or conveniency of either of the contracting parties? the duration of a peace was chiefly founded on its equitablenefs, and, he would add, more likely to be lafting with a republic than with a monarchy: the decision for peace or war in the former of thefe, refted on the judgement and confultation of many; but in the latter was in the breaft of only one individual, ufually influenced by perfonal motives, and whom no one dared to contradict. Our propofed exertions, doubtlefs, would be great to repair the difafters of the preceding campaigns: but could they poffibly be greater than those that had already been made to fo little effect? Our allies manifefted unequivocal difpofitions to peace; why thould we be more averfe to it than they were, who certainly could not be more interefted in procuring peace than ourfelves? The fituation of the French republic was in no wife to

be

be confidered as lefs formidable than at its primary formation. The fuccefles of France had been ftupendous, and the people were animated with the conviction, that they were fighting for their existence, and that no medium remained for them, but to conquer their enemies, or become their flaves. While this idea, which was a juft one, was uppermoft in their minds, they would facrifice their property with out reluctance to preferve them felves from fo great an evil as that of becoming a conquered nation." This war, he noticed, had been dignified by its abettors, as waged in the caufe of God, and humanity: but was it promoting the honour of the divine Being, or the welfare of the human race, to facrifice hundreds of thoufands of men in the field of battle, and to involve whole countries in mifery and defolation? The unbiaffed and unprejudiced agreed, that the condition of the generality of people in France, efpecially the inferior claffes, who conftituted every where the bulk of fociety, was preferable to what it had been under the former monarchy. What, therefore, could be our pretence for infifting on the propriety of a change of government in that Country? Whatever had been af ferted about the vaft proportion of royalifts, and their refolution never to fubmit to the republicans, facts had proved that they could not avoid fubmiflion, and that they were conftantly not only overcome, but outnumbered wherever they ventured to rife against the government. Their refiftance now was no other than of banditti, aflociated for the purposes of plunder. Was it on fuch men, without order or difcipline, that we could depend for

5

any regular and substantial affistance? Peace therefore was the moft judicious, as well as the fafeft measure we could embrace: France, it was experimentally found, was not to be fubdued by force of arnis. Neither did it appear that we fhould be able to weary out the French by dint of fuperior finances: the depreciation of their affignats had not operated as we had long expected and predicted. Such as they were, they fill upheld the fabric for the fupport of which they had been created, and had proved inore ferviceable than our hatred and prejudices would permit us to acknowledge. Our own finances had undeniably fuffered through this war, and it would be wife to terminate it before we made a much longer trial how far the resources of this country might be stretched, without bringing it to ruin.

The duke was anfwered by lord Grenville, who re-adduced thofe numerous arguments, fo often alleged againft treating with France in its prefent fituation. He afferted, that it appeared to him that a majority of the French were inclined to the royal caufe. A Frenchman, of fenfe and erudition, had lately published a performance, wherein he expressed a doubt which of the two parties was the moft numerous in France, the royalifts or the republicans. But fo great was the alarm of the French government, left the royal party fhould be proved the moft numerous, that the work was fuppreffed, and the author threatened to be brought before the revolutionary tribunal. A proof of the inftability of that system of moderation, faid to prevail at prefent, was the difficulty which that party experienced in bringing to

juftice

juftice, Lebon, one of the moft wicked and execrated affociates of Robespierre. Other inftances might be mentioned to prove that tyranny and terror were far from being laid afide, and that the violence and audacity of thofe who oppofed the ruling party, were fupported by fuch numbers, that its duration was daily becoming extremely precarious. In fuch a ftate of uncertainty, no confidence could be placed in the faith of negotiations, framed with either of the parties. No peace, therefore, was defirable in the prefent circumstances of affairs, and he would, for that reafon, move a vigourous profecution of the war, as the moft effectual means of arriving at a folid and fecure peace.

This motion was oppofed by the duke of Norfolk, and fupported as earneftly by the earl of Darnley. The billiop of Landaff took this occafion to make an animated difcourfe on the fubject of the war. Though Scripture, he obferved, did not condemn, in exprefs terms, the practice of war among nations, yet few were the occafions when it could be law ful. Juflice and neceifity were indifpenfible to authorize the ufe of the fword: but what might be juft, was not therefore neceffary: no war could confcientioufly be undertaken, without previoully employing all the poffible means to avoid it. He would not affert, whether we had or not exerted our utinoft endearoars to avert it; but he would declare himfelf of opinion, that the clofe of the campaign of 1792 had offered a fair opportunity to prevent the calamities that followed. After the attempts of

Auftria and Pruffia had been fruftrated, Great Britain might, with great propriety, have interfered, fo far, as to have infifted that France fhould have ufed her fuc cefles with moderation; and, conformably to her conftitutional principles, have confined herfelf within her ancient limits, But this interference fhould alfo have been accompanied with a folemn engagement, on our part, to have abftained from obtrufion in their domeftic affairs, and to have left the fettlement of them entirely to them!elves. It was abfurd to confider the war as indifpenfible, to ftop the propagation of republican principles, Armies and coertion were feeble inftruments against opinions that were acceptable to mankind, and lenity alone could render royalty defirable. In this country efpecially, while the crown remained within the limitations affigned by the conftitution, a king had nothing to apprehend, The difaffected

among us were few, and could eafily be contained within bounds by the exifting laws. The title of republic might be affumed in France, without caufing any alarm in England. The hiftory of thofe nations that had adopted repub. licanifm had nothing fafcinating nor enviable; and neither the cons fiitutions of France nor of Ameri ca, however founded on the po pular maxims of univerfal rights. and equality, could be propofed as objects of imitation, till the experience of many years had fhewn they were deferving of it: this experience was confpicuously on the fide of the British conftitution; and the people of this country were fo well convinced of it, that

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