ist on the restoration of the old monarchy, as an indispensible condinon of peace. He eagerly mainlaine, that the perils attending the present war, did not equal those that would refult fiom fuch a peace as could be mate between the two cantries, at this uncertain crisis. The internal fituation of France, and the well-known difpofition of its rulers, rendered every compact with them precarious and unstable. Terror and feverity, though fome what abated fince the fall of Robefpierre, ftill fubtisted in full force, and parties were still animated against each other, to a degree that left them no other security for their refpective exiftence, than the deftruction of their antagonists, whose meafares they obstunately reprobated, as tending to the destruction of the commonwealth. While fuch were the reciprocal fentiments of these furious and implacable enemies to each other, whatever was effected by the one would be controverted by the other, as injurious to the ftate; and annulied on the very first opportunity. Could, therefore, any other ftate fecurely reft on the faith of any contract or ftipulation made with people of this character? Until another system took place of this one, he could not think himself authorized in reason to enter into any negotiation with those who held the reigns of government, in the midst of fuch incessant fluctuations. A powerful proof, how great the number was of those, in France, who were inimical to the present government, evidently appeared in the prodigious fums levied by confiscations: the total had not been lefs, during the foregoing year and a half, than three hundred millions fterling. Did not this sufficiently evince the fallacy, or the error, of thofe who asserted the inc nfiderable quantity of adherents to monarchy? These were, to a man, the friends to this country, and waited only an occafion to declare themselves ready to second our efforts in their caufe. Would it be policy to deprive ourselves of the good wishes and cooperation of the multitudes, whom no terrors nor barbarities had been able to reduce to any degree of fubmiffion to the exifting system? but were we disposed to negotiate, with the French republicans, could we be certain of a fimilar difpofition on their part? was it not notorious, that they harboured an irreconcileable hatred to this country, and its inhabitants; and that the principal motive, of their willingness to make peace with the other members of the confederacy, was, that they might convert their whole rage against us? would they not interpofe such obstructions to a pacification, that it must remain unattainable, without facrificing, at once, both our honour and our interest to obtain it? The very principles on which the French republic was founded, were such, that to ac knowledge it, which must be done in case of a treaty, was to confess all other governments founded upon injustice. A peace built on fuch grounds would be not only disgraceful, but fatal to our own conftitution, by undermining its principles, and empowering its many domeftic enemies to represent it as inequitable and oppressive. Such a peace would be worse than war. French emissaries, under the various pretences of business and commercial transactions, would be let loose upon us in fwarms, and, united with the discontented and factious here, would would gradually poison the public mind, while the fufpicions and jealoufies of government, would compel it to remain in a state of preparation and defence that would continue to exhauft the country, and to perplex the people. It was observed by Mr. Wilberforce, that though parliament was agreed in declaring the republican form of the French government no obstruction to peace, yet the language of our minifters, in unison with that of the princes in the coalition, afforded strong reasons to fufpect that their real intention was to reftore the monarchy. But it were more prudent to give up this design, which past endeavours had shewn to be vain, than to prolong the conteft, probably to no other end than to find ourselves obliged, at last, to accept of terms which we might have procured at first. Peace would, in all likelihood, prove more prejudicial to the enemy than to us. The immense armies of France, when returned to that country, would certainly take part in its internal diffentions, and effectually contribute to reduce it to defolation. But by perfevering in the war we should neceflarily conftrain them to act with unanimity in their own defence. The encreasfe of their paper-money would follow, with that of confiscations, and the holders of the one, and purchasers of the others, would augment in the fame proportion, and add to the numbers and strength of those who fupported the republican fystem. Hiftory had shewn how much it was our interest to remit of our native obftinacy in the profecution of foreign wars. We had more than once rejected terms of peace; wich, after expending much treaand shedding much blood, we had, at length, thought proper to accept. Mr. Fox reminded ministers, that they had branded oppofition with the most injurious epithets for having moved the adoption of fentiments fimilar to those which they had this day brought forward as just and proper. It was time, he faid, to be fair and explicit in the manifeftation of our thoughts on the present situation of affairs, and on the measures we meaned to purfue. The restoration of tranquillity to France, on the plan proposed by minifters, was evidently unattainable. The royalists themselves were the principal champions in their own caufe, and fo far from relying upon our exertions in their favour, that they had conftantly added fresh vigour to their own, on the failure of the various efforts we had made to affift them. The confiftency of parliament had been pleaded for its continuing to infift on the conditions it had held out at the commencement of the contest. But events had not corresponded with the fanguine expectations then formed, and neceffity required, that we should confult what was feafible, in preference to what had been projected antecedently to those difasters that had defeated our schemes. A refusal to treat with the French, unless they fubmitted to our demands, was no less unjuft and abfurd, than if they were to require the English to yield to theirs, previously to their consenting to liften to terms of peace. Arrogance was not to be tolerated in the intercourse between nations that fought to re-establish amity. While we challenged the right of dictating forms of government to the French, we must expect that they would refift us with all the rancour and and enthusiasm of justly excited indignation. As to the apprehenfion of danger, from the influx of French principles, experience had taught the English to beware of imitating their unhappy neighbours, and to adhere, more firmly than ever, to the principles of their own conftitution. He concluded, by reminding Mr. Pitt, that, notwithstanding the declaration made by his father, that the English should die, on the last breach, before they consented to the independence of America, he did not think himself bound to abide by it, and had commenced his political career, by declaring for their independence. By the fame rule he ought to retract his determination, refpecting France. Mr. Dundas opposed the motion in question, on the ground that it would interfere with the plans of government, and that the arrangeIments for the enfuing year were so promiffory, that we had every motive to expect a change of fortune in in our favour. The allegations of ministry occafioned Mr. Gray to refume the subject with great warmth and perseverance. He dwelt principally on the improbability of those calamities that were pretended by the adversaries to a negotiation. Other powers had treated with France without expreffing any dread of the confequences; why should Great Britain, therefore, entertain any? His motion was negatived by a majority of 183, and that of Mr. Pitt carried. In the house of lords, a motion was made on the 27th of February, by the duke of Bedford, the purport of which, like Mr. Gray's, was, that no form of government that might prevail in France, should preclude a negotiation with that country, or prevent a peace, whenever it could be made confiftently with the honour, interest, and fecurity, of this nation. He supported his motion with a variety of arguments. Such a declaration would not oblige ministry to accept of any other conditions than they chose, nor to treat but at their own time. Were it to be admitted as a fixed rule, that no peace should be fued for but by the aggreffor, wars might be endless. But the French, ftrictly speaking, had not begun the contest. They had formally retracted the de. cree that had given fo much offence, and had made it an article of their new conftitution, to interfere with the government of no country. As to that permanency of peace so fcrupuloufly required, had the world ever witnessed any peace that lasted beyond the interest or conveniency of either of the contracting parties? the duration of a peace was chiefly founded on its equitableness, and, he would add, more likely to be lasting with a republic than with a monarchy: the decifion for peace or war in the former of these, refted on the judgement and confultation of many; but in the latter was in the breast of only one individual, usually influenced by perfonal motives, and whom no one dared to contradict. Our proposed exertions, doubtless, would be great to repair the disasters of the preceding campaigns: but could they poffibly be greater than those that had already been made to so little effect? Our allies manifested unequivocal difpofitions to peace; why should we be more averse to it than they were, who certainly could not be more interested in procuring peace than ourselves? The situation of the French republic was in no wife to be be confidered as less formidable than at its primary formation. The fucceffes of France had been stupendous, and the people were animated with the conviction, that they were fighting for their existence, and that no medium remained for them, but to conquer their enemies, or become their flaves. While this idea, which was a just one, was uppermoft in their minds, they would facrifice their property with out reluctance to preserve them selves from fo great an evil as that of becoming a conquered nation. This war, he noticed, had been dignified by its abettors, as waged in the cause of God, and humanity: but was it promoting the honour of the divine Being, or the welfare of the human race, to sacrifice hundreds of thoufands of men in the field of battle, and to involve whole countries in misery and defolation? The unbiassed and unprejudiced agreed, that the condition of the generality of people in France, efpecially the inferior classes, who constituted every where the bulk of fociety, was preferable to what it had been under the former monarchy, What, therefore, could be our pretence for infifting on the propriety of a change of government in that country? Whatever had been afferted about the vast proportion of royalifts, and their resolution never to fubmit to the republicans, facts had proved that they could not avoid fubmiffion, and that they were constantly not only overcome, but outnumbered wherever they ventured to rife against the government. Their refiftance now was no other than of banditti, associated for the purposes of plunder. Was it on fuch men, without order or difcipline, that we could depend for 5 any regular and substantial assistance? Peace therefore was the most judicious, as well as the fafeft measure we could embrace: France, it was experimentally found, was not to be fubdued by force of arnis. Neither did it appear that we should be able to weary out the French by dint of fuperior finances: the depreciation of their affignats had not operated as we had long expected and predicted. Such as they were, they still upheld the fabric for the fupport of which they had been created, and had proved more ferviceable than our hatred and prejudices would permit us to acknowledge. Our own finances had undeniably fuffered through this war, and it would be wise to terminate it before we made a much longer trial how far the resources of this country might be stretched, without bringing it to ruin. A The duke was answered by lord Grenville, who re-adduced those numerous arguments, fo often alleged against treating with France in its present situation. He afferted, that it appeared to him that a majority of the French were inclined to the royal caufe. Frenchman, of fenfe and erudition, had lately published a performance, wherein he expressed a doubt which of the two parties was the most numerous in France, the royalifts or the republicans. But so great was the alarm of the French government, left the royal party should be proved the most numerous, that the work was fuppressed, and the author threatened to be brought before the revolutionary tribunal. A proof of the instability of that system-of moderation, faid to prevail at prefent, was the difficulty which that party experienced in bringing to juftice justice, Lebon, one of the most wicked and execrated associates of Robespierre. Other instances might be mentioned to prove that tyranny and terror were far from being laid afide, and that the violence and audacity of those who opposed the ruling party, were fupported by fuch numbers, that its duration was daily becoming extremely precarious. In fuch a fiate of uncertainty, no confidence could be placed in the faith of negotiations, framed with either of the parties. No peace, therefore, was defirable in the present circumstances of affairs, and he would, for that reafon, move a vigourous profecution of the war, as the most effectual means of arriving at a folid and fecure peace, This motion was opposed by the duke of Norfolk, and fupported as earnestly by the earl of Darnley. The bishop of Landaff took this occafion to make an animated difcourse on the fubject of the war. Though Scripture, he observed, did not condemn, in express terms, the practice of war among nations, yet few were the eccafions when it could be lawful. Justice and neceifity were indifpenfible to authorize the use of the fword: but what might be juft, was not therefore neceffary: no war could confcientioufly be undertaken, without previously employing all the poffible means to avoid it. He would not affert, whether we had or not exerted our utmost endeavours to avert it; but he would declare himself of opinion, that the close of the campaign of 1792 had offered a fair opportunity to prevent the calamities that followed. After the attempts of en Austria and Prussia had been fruftrated, Great Britain might, with great propriety, have interfered, so far, as to have insisted that France should have used her fuccesses with moderation; and, conformably to her conftitutional principles, have confined herself within her ancient limits, But this interference should also have been accompanied with a folemn gagement, on our part, to have abstained from obtrufion in their domestic affairs, and to have left the settlement of them entirely to themselves. It was abfurd to confider the war as indispensible, to stop the propagation of republican principles, Armies and coertion were feeble instruments againft opinions that were acсерtable to mankind, and lenity a lone could render royalty defirable. In this country especially, while the crown remained within the limitations affigned by the conftitution, a king had nothing to apprehend, The disaffected among us were few, and could eafily be contained within bounds by the exifting laws. The title of republic might be assumed in France, without caufing any alarm in England. The history of those nations that had adopted repub. licanism had nothing fascinating nor enviable; and neither the con ftitutions of France nor of Ameri ca, however founded on the po pular maxims of universal rights and equality, could be proposed as objects of imitation, till the experience of many years had thewn they were deserving of it: this experience was confpicuoufly on the fide of the British conftitution; and the people of this country were so well convinced of it, that there |