to forty millions sterling. Neither the annual revenues of Ireland, nor of the West or East Indies, made part of this account; and these were computed twelve millions more. This prodigious income, inftead of fuffering the least diminution from the pressures of so extensive a war, was incontrovertibly on the increase, through the irrefiftible exertions of the British marine in every part of the globe, and through the spirit of enterprize that animated the commercial classes of the nation. : CHAP. CHAP. ΧΙ. The Sentiments of the French towards the English.-Motion in the House of Peers by the Earl of Stanhope, for Non-interference in the Internal Affairs of France. Unanimously rejected.-Motion of a like Tendency in the House of Commons. -Negatived.-Motion in the House of Peers for fatilitating the Opening of a Negotiation with France. - Negatived.-Motion for a vigorous Profecution of the War. Carried.--Sundry Motions for. Preparing a Way for Peace with France.-Negatived. - Motion in the House of Commons for an Inquiry into the State of the Nation.-Negatived.-Another to the fame Intent in the House of Peers.-Negatived.Motion in the House of Commons, tending to a General Pacification, by Mr. Wilberforce.-Negatived. A Motion of a fimilar Tendency in the House of Lords.-Negatived. THE French, in the midst of that they might be able ultimately their successes, against all their other enemies, were deeply exafperated at the unconquerble refiftance of the English, and at the refolute perfeverance with which these ancient rivals seemed determined to oppose them every where. The principal speakers in the convention were not wanting in their endeavours to depreciate the British character, as degenerated and fallen from that height to which it had rifen in former periods: but the people of sense and knowledge, with which France abounds, were ftrongly impressed with the conviction, that the English were the most formidable of their enemies, and that more danger was to be apprehended from them than from all the other powers of the coalition. It was from this conviction that the ruling men in France were so earnest in ftirring up the people to exert themselves, in order to overcome their other foes with all poffible speed, to encounter England, all foreign afsistance, and reduced to depend solely on itself. Until they could compass this point, they were perfuaded that the utmost effect of their fuccesses, however great, would only be to produce a temporary and precarious state of security; which, while England animated the coalition with its spirit, and supported it with its treafures, would always be liable to be shaken and destroyed through the undiminished efforts which the English would never cease to make, and the unabated courage their example would infuse into their allies. Such were the general ideas of the French at this critical period. They were no less those of the English themselves. But the heavy burdens, necessary to be borne by the public for the profecution of this expenfive contest, excited the more discontent, that the object of it did not appear clearly ascertained, and [N3] seemed seemed continually to vary in those whom it principally behoved to free it from uncertainty. Prompted by motives of this nature, the principal members of the oppofition, in both houses, refolved to renew their endeavours to procure the government's aflent to their motions for a negotiation with France. So early as the fixth of January, earl Stanhope moved, in the house of lords, that a declaration should be made, purporting that Great Britain neither ought nor would interfere in the internal affairs of France. He fupported this motion with a variety of arguments: he particularly infifted on the numbers, the discipline, and the excellent condition of the French armies, which confifted of more than a million of men, and had vanquished, during the course of a fingle campaign, the bravest and most expert veterans in Europe. He Rated their pecuniary refources at four hundred millions sterling, exclufive of their pofleffions in land. He compared the depreciation of their paper-money to what had happened in America, which, notwithstanding the hopes conceived in this country from that circumftance, had maintained its ground against all the boafted might of our treafures. It was abfurd, he faid, to pretend that our strength wasunimpaired, and that we had fuffered no lofs. Had we not loft Holland, and the Netherlands? Had not upwards of one hundred and thirty thousand of the choiceft troops of our allies either fallen in battle, or been made prifoners? Were not these mortifying circumstances to a people whole reputation had ftood fo high previoufly to this unfortunate conteft? But what was its object? one that ought to cover the British nation with shame: to deprive the French of a government, erected by them on the ruins of their former servitude. Were we the only people entitled to be free? The pretence for this quarrel was a resolution passled in the convention, which had been rescinded the moment they found it had given offence to our government. On these, and other allegations of a fimilar import, lord Stanhope moved the propriety of entering into a pacific negotiation with France. The earls of Abingdon and Carlifle opposed the motion for the many reasons that had already been alleged in preceding debates againft treating with France. Lord Aukland feconded them, and attributed the disasters of the foregoing campaign to the bad management of the allies, and the want of concert in their operations. Nevertheless, it were, he said, bad policy to betray defpondency, and prudence dictated perfeverance in the conteft, until we could terminate it honourably. Were it once made evident that France had renounced the ambitious designs the had unquestionably been profecuting, in confequence of the unexpected fuccesses, no objections could lie to a fair and just negotiation with her on safe and equitable terms: 'but till this were unequivocally manifested, our only security was to continue the war with vigour. He did not mean, however, that the restoration of monarchy should be infifted on at all hazards to this country; but only that while hoftilities lafted, we should employ our whole strength to restore it, as that species of government which would best answer the purposes of general peace and safety to all the powers In the coalition. Neither the fortune nor the power of the French were objects fo formidable as represented. Their profperous career was uncontrovertibly owing which would have enabled any enemy to be victorious. Their means of refiftance had, however, been stretched to fuch a degree, that it was highly improbable they would bear mich more extenfion. It was, therefore, incumbent on the coalition to rencaain firmly determined to improve the circumftance of their interior preffures to the utmost. Notwithstanding the French had difplayed uncommon firmness in bearing the many calamities they had brought upon themselves, yet it was clear that their patience was almost exhausted. This was the favourable moment for exerting our ftrength: our means were unimpaired, and with unanimity and resolution we yet had it in our power to compel the enemy, if not to fubmit to our own terms, at least to treat with us on a footing of equality. The earl of Mansfield infifted on the right of a nation to interfere in the government of another that acted on principles dangerous to its neighbours: the French having indifputably adopted fuch principles, those against whom they were levelled, raight justly challenge their renunciation, and till this were pro I cured, to the fatisfaction of all the parties concerned, these could not I be censured for exerting all the means in their power to accomplish an object they had the cleareft title to look upon as their indubitable claim. The duke of Bedford, and the marquis of Lansdowne, coincided with earl Stanhope's motion, though they did not approve his manner of expreffing it. The earl replied to the animadverfions of his opponents with much accuracy, asserting, among other particulars, that the obnoxious decree of the 19th of November, 1792, was erroneoufly attributed to the convention, by which it had never been regularly adopted. His motion was rejected by a majority of fixty-two, himfelf ftanding alone against all his opponents. In the house of commons, a motion of a like tendency was made by Mr. Gray, on the 26th of February. The direct purport of it was, that the present government of France ought not to be confidered as ' precluding a negotiation for peace. Two years of a moft bloody and expenfive war had, he obferved, now elapfed without bringing us nearer to the object proposed, than at its commencement. It was a war which, from the minifterial lan guage, could only terminate with the destruction of one of the combatants. He asked whether the house serioufly approved this dreadful determination? The nation had a right to know the minister's mind on fo important a question. The French theinselves had a right to demand from the English, what the object was for which they were contending. He noticed that, prior to the commencement of the war, the king had received the thanks of the houte for his prudence in abstaining from interference in the affairs of France; and yet the people of that country had dethroned their king at that time, and abolished the monarchy. Hence it plainly appeared, that we did not confider the republican form of government they had adopted, as incompatible with the FN4] fafety fafety of our own. If, however, the sense of the house went to the indifpenfible neceffity of destroying the system now established in France, it was their duty to reflect, without animofity or prejudice, whether fuch an attempt were practicable. The only chance we could reasonably look to, for the accomplishing lo arduous a task, was a counter-revolution, to be effected by the French themselves, or fuch a depression of their finances as would absolutely deprive them of the means to refift their enemies; but, was either of these the cafe? was it not clear, to unbiaffed observers, that an irrefiftible majority of the French were decided republicans, and sworn enemies to a monarchy? their finances, however unfixed and irregular, had hitherto answered every purpose they had proposed. The example afforded, of the uncertainty of pecuniary calculations, by the late conteft with our loft colonies, ought to teach us, that national energy and spirit are the best and surest refources, and that money is far from being the principal finew of war. The real debts of France, free from exaggeration, did not at the present hour exceed, if they approached, four hundred millions; but, to counterbalance them, the landed poffeffions of the state amounted to more than fix hundred. Great Britain, doubtless, abounded in resources; but, what were those of our allies? Did they not explicit ly acknowledge, that they depended on our treafures for the maintenance of their armies in prosecuting this war? Were they not, therefore, rather mercenaries, than allies, fighting for pay, and not from principle? Could we trust such confederates? Had not a principal one of these al lies betrayed us, in the most scandalous manner, and materially injured the interefts of the coalition? Thus we were undeniable reduced to the neceffity of fupporting every one of our confederates, with the alarming reflection, that we could not place the leaft reliance upon any one of them. Was this a fituation to be embraced by a people who were not governed by the most fatal delufion? Ought not the confiderat on of these various circumftances to induce us to liften to those who hold up the propriety of terminating the contest, upon any terms that were fafe and honourable, rather than to continue it at an expence that must ultimately involve us in the most obvious and unavoidable danger? To treat was not to fubmit: if the French, grown prefumptuous from our moderation, should make unreasonable demands, it would become our duty to refuse them; and the magnanimity of the British nation would cordially adopt every measure that a spirited minif try might think proper to propofe. To these and other allegations, Mr. Pitt replied, that, notwithstanding the French had been fo fuccefsful, there was no motive fufficiently strong to induce this country to look upon the affairs of the coalition as in a state of danger: he would not, therefore, swerve, in the leaft, from his resolution to move, that it was the determination of the house to prosecute the war, as the only means of procuring a permanent and secure peace; relying on a vis gorous employment of the force of this country, to effect a pacification with France, under any govern ment capable of maintaining the relations of peace and amity. This surely, faid Mr. Pitt, was not to in |