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and there payment of it was secured on the faireft terms.

Mr. Pitt then entered into a minute difcuffion of the conditions propofed by the Austrian ministry, and concluded by moving, that they should be complied with, as the falest and most appropriate line of policy that could be adopted by Great Britain, in the present situation of public affairs.

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He was replied to by Mr. Fox, who reminded the house, that he had foretold, when the Pruffian fubfidy was voted last session, that it would prove the prelude to other loans of a fimilar kind, and which probably would be attended with the fame consequences. highly imprudent, he asserted, to quote as proofs of facts favourable to our views, the affirmations of members of the convention, that were contradicted by others. We had already been egregiously deceived in our calculation of the refources of France, and it were scandalous to repeat our mistakes at a time when it behoved us to look with a stedfast eye upon our remaining resources, and to compare them without exaggeration, to those of the formidable and unyielding enemy, with whom we still continued a quarrel that threatened fo many dangers. But was Austria that firm friend to this country, so warmly represented? Had the conduct of Auftria, during the last campaign, been wholly free from fufpicions? Was it wife to entrust fuch a mass of wealth as four, or perhaps fix millions, to hands that might divert it to quite other purposes than those for which we were folicited to grant #? Experience had shewn, that neither Pruffia nor Austria were to be trusted. Those who governed their

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councils had acted with notorious

perfidy, and it were despicable weakness to treat with them in any expectation of meeting with honour and punctuality. The interest of the emperor in this war, fo ftrongly insisted on by ministers, was certainly a very dubious point. He had joined with the diet of the empire in concerting terms of peace, which, if they were to take place, would clearly preclude him from continuing the war. How could he, in such a cafe, perform his ftipulations with this country? at all events, his country was exhaufted of fenfible men, as well as of pecuniary resources.

Mr. Fox advised a subsidy to the emperor, rather than a loan: we could, if occafions warranted it, stop the payment of the former; but not of the latter, however emergencies might require it, as the money would not remain at our command. The fubjects of the emperor were so defirous of peace, that he might think it prudent to gratify their wishes: but were he willing to prolong the war, he could not do it without applying to this country for loans or fubfidies: these would be regularly expected and demanded every recurring year, and were we in a condition to comply with these demands, and to fupport the war-establishment of Auftria together with our own, to fay nothing of the numerous claims on our finances by other members of the coalition? Mr. Fox detailed, with minute accuracy, the circumftances of the loan required by the imperial ministry, and concluded, by moving for its rejection: but his motion was negatived by a majority of 115.

A royal message of the fame import was delivered to the house of lords,

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lords, on the 9th of February. The marquis of Lansdowne opposed it with remarkable warmth. He reprobated the connections of Great Britain with the continent, especially with the princes of Germany. He reminded the house of the reduction from fix to four per cent. interest in the bank of Vienna: a proof how little reliance could be placed on the security to arife from the imperial finances. With his numerous fubjects, and his wide extended domains, the emperor was not, it fairly appeared, able to raise four millions to fupport himself in a conteft, in which he was more deeply involved than any other prince in the coalition. Was this a fituation wherein he could be expected to refund the prodigious advances which his minifters had the confidence to claim from this country? There were other powers to have recourse to, if we wanted allies. Denmark and Sweden, for a fourth of what was demanded by Austria, were able to fecure to us the uncontrouled fuperiority of the North and Baltic feas, and to protect our trade in those parts from all molestation. This would be acting more wisely than to provoke them by injudicious reftraints upon the freedom of their navigation, which could not fail to render them inimical to this country, and favourable to its enemies. He concluded by moving, that the house should fo far take the royal meflage into confideration, as to deliberate what measures were advise able in the present circumftances of the nation.

He was anfwered by the earl of Mansfield, who supported the propriety of continental alliances, particularly with the house of Auftria, in conjunction with which we long

had so effectually curbed the ambition of France. Lord Mansfield was seconded by the lords Hawkesbury and Aukland, and opposed by the earls of Guildford, and Lauderdale : the latter of whom observed, that the emperor's subjects were notoriously averle to the war, and that it was abfurd to expect that they would make greater efforts to regain than they had done to retain the poffeffion of the low countries. The Imperial troops were well disciplined men during the two laft campaigns, and yet were repeatedly defeated by the French. Was it confiftent with reason to presume, that inexperienced recruits would be more fuccefsful? for of fuch must the Auftrian armies be chiefly compofed, after the deftruction that had been made of them, during the three last years. It was ridiculous, he faid, to build on the pecuniary resources of the Austrian dominions, after the lofs of the Netherlands, the richest part of the Austrian domains, wheneventhese were not confidered as fufficient security for the loans folicited by the imperial minifters. The issue of the debate was, that the address in approbation of the loan was carried.

The difafters of the preceding campaign had been so fatal to the coalefced powers, and had so thoroughly broken the spirit that had hitherto kept them together, that England and Austria were the only fovereign states that remained true to each other. But the exertions of both, it was apprehended, however earnest and zealous, would not prove adequate to the object they still had in view, the reduction of the French republic. It now seemed so firmly established, by the uninterrupted fuccesses that had every where attended tended its victorious arms, that the worid in general confidered the refolu ion of Great Britain and Auftria, to persevere in their primary defigns respecting France, as proceeding from the rage of difappeinted ambition and revenge, rather than as the effect of cool deliberation. Others, however, were of opinion, that notwithstanding the fuccefsful career of the French republicans, the feeds of discord were fo profoundly fown among them, that

little would be wanted to difunite them, especially when they looked upon themselves as wholly secure from foreign attempts, which alone had compelled them to unite for their preservation. Could, therefore, the coalefced powers have remained firmly connected, and acted patiently on the defenfive, it was imagined, that the fervour of the French would gradually abate, and give way to that defire of returning to a state of tranquillity, which was evident in the majority of the French

nation.

A circumstance in the connection between Austria and Great Britain, that rendered it highly unacceptable to the people of this kingdom, was, that they were to bear the burdens of their ally in addition to their own. Though convinced that unless they fubmitted to this heavy weight, they must forswear his alliance, and fingly encounter the whole power of France, yet they confidered it as an unreasonable pressure upon them, to defray the charges of a confederate, who was reputed more deeply involved in the issue of the quarrel than themselves, and to whom far greater advantages would accrue from its profperous termination.

But the European world, though convinced of the impracticability of VOL. XXXVII.

restoring monarchy in France, through the efforts of England and Austria, decidedly approved of their union against it, without which the fituation of either would become alarming, from the vast exertions that France would make to reap every poffible advantage from their separation. It was on this ground, that the British government thought itself entitled to call upon the nation for its concurrence with their determination, to affift Auftria in refifting the attacks of the French, to the very utmost of its abilities.

A flatement of the force, that would be requifite for the service of 1795, was accordingly produced to the house of commons on the 23d of February. It amounted to one hundred thousand seamen, one hundred and twenty thousand regulars, for the guards and garrifons of the kingdom; to fifty-fix thousand militia, and forty thousand men employed, partly in Ireland, and partly in the West Indies and the plantations, exclufive of fencibles and volunteers, of foreign troops in British pay, and of embodied French emigrants. The sums required to maintain this force, together with the extraordinaries of the army, and the expences of the ordnance, were calculated at fixteen millions twenty-seven thousand pounds, of which fix millions three hundred fifteen thoufand five hundred pounds were appropriated to the navy, two millions seven hundred seventy-feven thousand to the army, two millions five hundred fixty-four thousand to the forces in Ireland and the plantations; to the militia and fencibles fixteen hundred and feven thousands to foreign troops in British pay nearly a million; to the regimented emi[N] grant

grants, four hundred twenty-seven timber, one hundred and ten thou

thousand; to the army extraordinaries, two millions ix hundred fixty-four thousand; to the ordnance, two millions three hundred twenty-two thousand. The other articles were, two hundred thousand pounds annual fobfidy to the king of Sardinia; miscellaneous services, two hundred fifty-seven thousand pounds; moneys due, one hundred and ten thousand pounds; annual addition to the finking fund, two hundred thousand pounds; deficiency of grants, seven hundred fortyfive thousand pounds; deficiency of the land and malt tax, three hundred fifty thousand, exchequerbills, fix millions. The total of these fums amounted to twenty-feven millions five hundred forty thousand pounds. The ways and means propofed for raiting this fupply, confifted of the land-tax, producing two millions; the malt-tax, feven hundred fifty thousand pounds; the confolidated fund, two millions two hundred thirty-five thousand pounds; the India company, fire hundred thoufand pounds; exchequer-bills, three millions and a half; the loan, eighteen millions; making altogether twenty-feven millions one hundred forty-five thousand, nearly four hundred thousand short of the fupply.

In order to make an ample provifion for this and all deficiencies in the articles enumerated, the following taxes were proposed: upon wine, five hundred thousand pounds; foreign and Britisa spirits, two hundred and fixty thousand pounds, tea, one hundred and eighty thou fand pounds; coffee, forty thousand pounds; insurances, one hundred and fixty thoufsand pounds; raisins and foreign grocery and fruits, feventy-seven thousand pounds;

fand pounds; writs and affidavits, fixty eight thousand pounds; by abridging the privilege of franking, forty thousand pounds; the hairpowder license, two hundred and ten thousand pounds. Such was the valuation of the taxes proposed by Mr. Pitt, according to which their produce would amount to one million fix hundred and forty-four thoufand pounds, a fum that more than covered the apprehended deficiencies.

He took this occafion to observe the extraordinary increase of the national commerce. It had, by authentic documents, exceeded in the preceding year that of the most flourishing periods of peace. He also adverted to the imperial loan, which he represented as extremely beneficial to the subscribers, yiehling an intereft of no less than fix per cent. and fecured to them by being made payable at the bank of England.

Opposition was very severe on miniftry, for not having raised the fupply by an open competition between the lenders, by which a confiderable saving would have been made. Mr. Fox was very circumstantial in the investigation of this fubject. He represented the advantages that would accrue to those who fubfcribed to the emperor's loan, as a strong presumption how little attention had been paid to that business, by his minifters, and as strong ground for suspecting that they did not mean to refund the money procured. He censured fome of the taxes proposed, as injudicious, and others as oppreffive. He accufed the minifter of having described the commercial profperity of the kingdom in terms much too advantageous:

fon allowed that privilege.

advantageous: he mentioned the limitation appointed for each perhigh price of insurance on shipping, as a proof of the precarioufnefs of trade, and how liable to be intercepted by the enemy. He took an extenfive view of the national expenditure, and adverted to the probability of its annually increasing, if we perfifted in our claim to dictate a form of government for the French: but he could not perfuade himself that the representatives of the English nation, would proceed to fuch a degree of infatuation, as to continue voting the money of their constituents in fupport of so absurd a claim, or that the nation itself I would long consent to be made the victims of fo fatal a delufion.

A minute explanation of the propriety of the taxes, and of the advantages to arife from the loan, was entered into by Mr. Pitt, who in fifted, that by the arrangements to be made, the commodities consumed, chiefly by the poorer claffes, would be obtained at a cheaper rate, and in a better condition than before. This occafioned a farther altercation, which closed at last by the resolations for the fupply being put, and agreed to by a majority that admitted of no competition.

A tax that met with the approbation of all parties, was that which abridged the privilege of franking. It had long been scandalously abused: it was computed that the lofs to the revenue by the franks, of about forty members of parliament, and by those of about a hundred clerks in public offices, was not less than fifty thousand pounds annually: Ten years before it did not exceed fix thoufand: fo rapid and enormous an increase rendered an abridgement immediately necessary, and fifteen franks a day was the

The tax on the wearing of powder was heavily felt by the numerous body of hair-dreffers, whose profits by it were confiderably diminished. Numbers, also of those individuals, who only wore powder occafionally, complained that they would be as highly rated as those who were in the constant practice of powdering: the exemptions were by many not deemed sufficient: clergymen not poffeffing one hundred a year, fubalterns in the army, and officers in the navy, under the rank of masters and commanders, were the only persons in public characters, exempted from it, and in private families all the daughters except the two eldeft.

Some members of the house were so weak as to object to this tax, on account of the expence they must incur to entitle their servants to wear powder: others objected to the very wearing of powder at a time when, through the scarcity of flour, bread had risen to a price that alarmed the whole nation, and reduced the lower classes to the most ferious distress; and when, through the fevere winter experienced throughout all Europe, general fears were entertained every where for the next harvest. The answer to these was that upon the strictest investigation, there was no reason to apprehend any scarcity, and that the greatest plenty was, on the contrary, to be expected, both in our own and in other countries.

The immenfity of the fums levied in Great Britain, for the service of the current year, was an object of aftonishment to all the European nations: they amounted, including the interest for the nationa! debt, [N2]

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