and there payment of it was fecured on the faireft terms. Mr. Pitt then entered into a minate difcuffion of the conditions propofed by the Auftrian ministry, and concluded by moving, that they fould be complied with, as the fateft and moft appropriate line of policy that could be adopted by Great Britain, in the prefent fituation of public affairs. He was replied to by Mr. Fox, who reminded the house, that he had foretold, when the Pruffian fubfidy was voted laft feffion, that it would prove the prelude to other loans of a fimilar kind, and which probably would be attended with the fame confequences. It was highly imprudent, he afferted, to quote as proofs of facts favourable to our views, the affirmations of members of the convention, that were contradicted by others. We had already been egregiously deceived in our calculation of the refources of France, and it were fcandalous to repeat our mistakes at a time when it behoved us to look with a ftedfaft eye upon our remaining refources, and to compare them without exaggeration, to thofe of the formidable and unyielding enemy, with whom we ftill continued, aquarrel that threatened fo many dangers. But was Auftria that firm friend to this country, fo warmly reprefented? Had the conduct of Auftria, during the laft campaign, been wholly free from fufpicions? Was it wife to entrust fuch a mafs of wealth as four, or perhaps fix millions, to hands that might divert it to quite other purposes than thofe for which we were folicited to grant it? Experience had fhewn, that neither Pruffia nor Auftria were to be trufted. Those who governed their 9 councils had acted with notorious perfidy, and it were defpicable weakness to treat with them in any expectation of meeting with honour and punctuality. The intereft of the emperor in this war, to ftrongly infifted on by minifters, was certainly a very dubious point. He had joined with the diet of the empire in concerting terms of peace, which, if they were to take place, would clearly preclude him from continuing the war. How could he, in fuch a cafe, perform his ftipulations with this country? at all events, his country was exhaufted of fenfible men, as well as of pecuniary refources. Mr. Fox advised a fubfidy to the emperor, rather than a loan: we could, if occafions warranted it, ftop the payment of the former; but not of the latter, however emergencies might require it, as the money would not remain at our command. The fubjects of the emperor were fo defirous of peace, that he might think it prudent to gratify their wifhes: but were he willing to prolong the war, he could not do it without applying to this country for loans or fubfidies: thefe would be regularly expected and demanded every recurring year, and were we in a condition to comply with thefe demands, and to fup-. port the war-establishment of Auftria together with our own, to fay nothing of the numerous claims on our finances by other members of the coalition? Mr. Fox detailed, with minute accuracy, the circumfiances of the loan required by the imperial miniftry, and concluded, by moving for its rejection: but his motion was negatived by a majority of 115. A royal meffage of the fame import was delivered to the house of lords, lords, on the 9th of February. The marquis of Lansdowne oppofed it with remarkable warmth. He reprobated the connections of Great Britain with the continent, efpecially with the princes of Germany. He reminded the houfe of the reduction from fix to four per cent. intereft in the bank of Vienna: a proof how little reliance could be placed on the fecurity to arife from the imperial finances. With his numerous fubjects, and his wide extended domains, the emperor was not, it fairly appeared, able to raife four millions to fupport himself in a conteft, in which he was more deeply involved than any other prince in the coalition. Was this a fituation wherein he could be expected to refund the prodigious advances which his minifters had the confidence to claim from this country? There were other powers to have recourfe to, if we wanted allies. Denmark and Sweden, for a fourth of what was demanded by Aufiria, were able to fecure to us the uncontrouled fuperiority of the North and Baltic feas, and to protect our trade in thofe parts from all moleftation. This would be acting more wifely than to provoke them by injudicious reftraints upon the freedom of their navigation, which could not fail to render them inimical to this country, and favourable to its enemies. He concluded by moving, that the houfe fhould fo far take the royal meflage into confideration, as to deliberate what measures were advifeable in the prefent circumftances of the nation. He was anfwered by the earl of Mansfield, who fupported the propriety of continental alliances, particularly with the house of Aufiria, in conjunction with which we long had so effectually curbed the ambition of France. Lord Mansfield was feconded by the lords Hawkesbury and Aukland, and opposed by the earls of Guildford, and Lauderdale: the latter of whom observed, that the emperor's fubjects were notoriously averle to the war, and that it was abfurd to expect that they would make greater efforts to regain than they had done to retain the poffeffion of the low countries. The Imperial troops were well difciplined men during the two laft campaigns, and yet were repeatedly defeated by the French. Was it confiftent with reafon to prefume, that inexpe rienced recruits would be more fuccefsful? for of fuch muft the Auftrian armies be chiefly compofed, after the deftruction that had been made of them, during the three laft years. It was ridiculous, he faid, to build on the pecuniary refources of the Auftrian dominions, after the lofs of the Netherlands, the richest part of the Auftrian domains, when even these were not confidered as fufficient fecurity for the loans folicited by the imperial minifters. The iffue of the debate was, that the addrefs in approbation of the loan was carried. The difafters of the preceding campaign had been fo fatal to the coalefced powers, and had fo thoroughly broken the fpirit that had hitherto kept them together, that England and Auftria were the only fovereign ftates that remained true to each other. But the exertions of both, it was apprehended, however earnest and zealous, would not prove adequate to the object they still had in view, the reduction of the French republic. It now feemed fo firmly etablished, by the uninterrupted fuccefies that had every where at tended tended its victorious arms, that the word in general confidered the refolu ion of Great Britain and Auftria, to perfevere in their primary defigns refpecting France, as proceeding from the rage of difappainted ambition and revenge, raher than as the effect of cool delibenation. Others, however, were of opinion, that notwithstanding the fuccesful career of the French republicans, the feeds of difcord were fo profoundly fown among them, that little would be wanted to difunite them, especially when they looked upon themfelves as wholly fecure from foreign attempts, which alone had compelled them to unite for their prefervation. Could, therefore, the coalefced powers have remained firmly connected, and acted patiently on the defenfive, it was imagined, that the fervour of the French would gradually abate, and give way to that defire of returning to a ftate of tranquillity, which was evident in the majority of the French nation. A circumstance in the connection between Auftria and Great Britain, that rendered it highly unacceptable to the people of this kingdom, was, that they were to bear the burdens of their ally in addition to their own. Though convinced that unless they fubmitted to this heavy weight, they muft forfwear his alliance, and fingly encounter the whole power of France, yet they confidered it as an unreasonable preffure upon them, to defray the charges of a confederate, who was reputed more deeply involved in the issue of the quarrel than themselves, and to whom far greater advantages would accrue from its profperous termination. But the European world, though convinced of the impracticability of VOL. XXXVII. reftoring monarchy in France, through the efforts of England and Auftria, decidedly approved of their union against it, without which the fituation of either would become alarming, from the vast exertions that France would make to reap every poflible advantage from their feparation. It was on this ground, that the British government thought itfelf entitled to call upon the nation for its concurrence with their determination, to affift Auftria in refifting the attacks of the French, to the very utmoft of its abilities. A ftatement of the force, that would be requifite for the fervice of 1795, was accordingly produced to the houfe of commons on the 23d of February. It amounted to one hundred thousand feamen, one hundred and twenty thoufand regulars, for the guards and garrifons of the kingdom; to fifty-fix thousand mi-. litia, and forty thousand men employed, partly in Ireland, and partly in the West Indies and the plantations, exclufive of fencibles and volunteers, of foreign troops in British pay, and of embodied French emigrants. The fums required to inaintain this force, together with the extraordinaries of the army, and the expences of the ordnance, were calculated at fixteen millions twenty-feven thoufand pounds, of which fix millions three hundred fifteen thoufand five hundred pounds were appropriated to the navy, two millions feven hundred feventy-feven thoufand to the army, two millions five hundred fixty-four thousand to the forces in Ireland and the plantations; to the militia and fencibles fixteen hundred and feven thousands to foreign troops in British pay nearly a million; to the regimented emi[N] grant grants, four hundred twenty-feven timber, one hundred and ten thou thoufand; to the army extraordinaries, two millions x hundred fixty-four thousand; to the ordnance, two millions three hundred twenty-two thoufand. The other articles were, two hundred thousand pounds annual fbfidy to the king of Sardinia; mifcellaneous fervices, two hundred fifty-feven thoufand pounds; moneys due, one hundred and ten thousand pounds; annual addition to the finking fund, two hundred thousand pounds; deficiency of grants, feven hundred fortyfive thousand pounds; deficiency of the land and malt tax, three hundred fifty thoufand; exchequerbills, fix millions. The total of thefe fums amounted to twenty-feven millions five hundred forty thoufand pounds. The ways and means propofed for railing this fupply, confified of the land-tax, producing two millions; the malt-tax, feven hundred fifty thousand pounds; the confolidated fund, two millions two hundred thirty-five thoufand pounds; the India company, five hundred thoufand pounds; exchequer-bills, three millions and a half; the loan, eighteen millions: making altogether twenty-feven millions one hundred forty-five thoufand, nearly four hundred thousand fhort of the fupply. In order to make an ample provifion for this and all deficiencies in the articles cnumerated, the following taxes were propofed: upon wine, five hundred thoufand pounds; foreign and Britifh firits, two hundred and fixty thousand pounds; tea, one hundred and eighty thoufand pounds; coffee, forty thoufand pounds; infurances, one hundred and fixty thousand pounds; raifins and foreign grocery and fruits, feventy-feven thousand pounds; fand pounds; writs and affidavits, fixty eight thoufand pounds; by abridging the privilege of franking, forty thousand pounds; the hairpowder licente, two hundred and ten thousand pounds. Such was the valuation of the taxes propofed by Mr. Pitt, according to which their produce would amount to one million fix hundred aral forty-four thoufand pounds, a fum that more than covered the apprehended deficiencies. He took this occafion to obferve the extraordinary increafe of the national commerce. It had, by authentic documents, exceeded in the preceding year that of the most flourishing periods of peace. He alfo adverted to the imperial loan, which he reprefented as extremely beneficial to the fubfcribers, yieh!ing an intereft of no less than fix per cent. and fecured to them by being made payable at the bank of England. Oppofition was very fevere on miniftry, for not having raifed the fupply by an open competition between the lenders, by which a confiderable faving would have been made. Mr. Fox was very circum ftantial in the investigation of this fubject. He reprefented the advantages that would accrue to those who fubfcribed to the emperor's loan, as a ftrong prefumption how little attention had been paid to that bufinefs, by his minifters, and as ftrong ground for fufpecting that they did not mean to refund the money procured. He cenfured fome of the taxes propofed, as inju dicious, and others as opprefive. He accufed the minifter of having defcribed the commercial profperity of the kingdom in terms much too advantageous: advantageous: he mentioned the high price of infurance on fhipping, as a proof of the precarioufnefs of trade, and how liable to be interrepted by the enemy. He took an extenfive view of the national expenditure, and adverted to the probability of its annually increafing, if we perfifted in our claim to dictate a form of government for the French: but he could not perfuade himfelf that the reprefentatives of the English nation, would proceed to fuch a degree of infatuation, as to continue voting the money of their conftituents in fupport of fo abfurd a claim, or that the nation itself would long confent to be made the victims of fo fatal a delufion. A minute explanation of the propriety of the taxes, and of the advantages to arife from the loan, was entered into by Mr. Pitt, who infifted, that by the arrangements to be made, the commodities confumed, chiefly by the poorer claffes, would be obtained at a cheaper rate, and in a better condition than before. This occafioned a farther altercation, which clofed at laft by the refolations for the fupply being put, and agreed to by a majority that admitted of no competition. A tax that met with the approbation of all parties, was that which abridged the privilege of franking. It had long been fcandaloufly abuled: it was computed that the lofs to the revenue by the franks, of about forty members of parliament, and by thofe of about a hundred clerks in public offices, was not lefs than fifty thoufand pounds annually: Ten years before it did not exceed thoufand: fo rapid and enormous an increafe rendered an abridgement immediately neceffary, and fifteen franks a day was the limitation appointed for each perfon allowed that privilege. The tax on the wearing of powder was heavily felt by the numerous body of hair-dreffers, whose profits by it were confiderably diminifhed. Numbers, alfo of thofe individuals, who only wore powder occafionally, complained that they would be as highly rated as thofe who were in the conftant practice of powdering: the exemptions were by many not deemed fufficient: clergymen not poffeffing one hundred a year, fubalterns in the army, and officers in the navy, under the rank of masters and commanders, were the only perfons in public characters, exempted from it, and in private families all the daughters except the two eldest. Some members of the house were fo weak as to object to this tax, on account of the expence they muft incur to entitle their fervants to wear powder: others objected to the very wearing of powder at a time when, through the fcarcity of flour, bread had rifen to a price that alarmed the whole nation, and reduced the lower claffes to the most ferious diftrefs; and when, through the fevere winter experienced throughout all Europe, general fears were entertained every where for the next harveft. The answer to these was that upon the frictest investigation, there was no reason to apprehend any fcarcity, and that the greatest plenty was, on the contrary, to be expected, both in our own and in other countries. The immenfity of the fums levied in Great Britain, for the service of the current year, was an object of aftonishment to all the European nations: they amounted, including the intereft for the nationa! debt, [N2] to |