Two hours before sunset, the four consuls-general of Austria, England, France, and Russia, proceeded simultaneously to the pasha. In this interview renewed endeavours were made to induce Mehemet Ali to give up the fleet forthwith, and to restore it to its lawful owner; but here, again, our representations were entirely thrown away.

He declared his conservative intentions; recapitulated afresh the declaration which he had made to us the evening before; modified in some degree the expressions contained in it, and endeavoured above all to convince us of the necessity for the fall of Hosrew pasha.

On this subject he said, "As long as the grand vizier remains in office, there will be no real reconciliation between the sultan and me. Let his highness name whom he will grand vizier, and I will be the first to co-operate for the consolidation of his throne. I do not aspire to that post myself, for I should refuse it if it were offered to me; but I ardently wish for the removal of a man who is detested by the whole nation, and who avails himself of any means, even

the sword and poison, to attain his end. So long as the representatives of the four great cabinets support Hosrew pasha, he may remain in office, but the day that he ceases to enjoy their protection he will fall. If at this moment tranquillity is not threatened at Constantinople, it is owing to the support of the great powers. Let Hosrew retire, and tranquility will be preserved in the capital without their co-operation. I have just written a private letter to the grand vizier, in which I advise him to retire from affairs, and to tender his resignation. This letter will be given to Akiff Effendi, whom I despatch to Constantinople to-morrow. By the next French steamer I shall write to the same effect to the sister of sultan Mahmoud, and the validé sultana; for, if I send them my letters by Akiff Effendi, Hosrew pasha is capable of withholding them.

Before leaving the viceroy, he requested us to take advantage of the departure of the Turkish steamer for Constantinople, to send our reports to our respective ministers.

St. Petersburg, July 15 (27) 1839. Sir,-By my messenger of the 8th of this month, I communicated to you the despatch from lord Palmerston, with a copy of which the marquess of Clanricarde was directed to furnish me, in reply to our late overtures on the affairs of Egypt.

I informed you, Sir, that I should not delay to transmit to you the reply which the emperor might

direct me to make to this communication.

In fulfilling this duty to-day, I have to request you in the first place to express to lord Palmerston how glad the emperor is to acknowledge the friendly reception given by the British government to our propositions of the 3rd of June last, the object of which was to secure the peace of the Levant, by confining the action of the

pasha of Egypt to limits which he would not be allowed to pass without placing himself in a state of hostility with all Europe.

We congratulate ourselves sincerely that our ideas on this important question should have so completely coincided with those of the English cabinet.

The government of her Britannic majesty has, in fact, as well as we ourselves, been convinced of the indispensable necessity of applying ourselves in the first instance to what was most urgent, by bringing matters within our control, that is to say, preventing the struggle between the sultan and the pasha of Egypt, from becoming dangerous to the security of the Ottoman empire. It is to avert this danger that our efforts, as well as the decisive steps which England and France have considered it necessary to take at Alexandria, have been directed.

The remonstrances which the representatives of the allied cabinets have been called upon to make to Mehemet Ali, have completely answered our expectations. Ibrahim pasha has received orders to stop the march of his troops. Hostilities, thanks to the unanimity of the efforts made by the cabinets of Europe for their repression, have been suspended.

This primary object once attained, the great powers have still a task of not less importance to perform that of henceforth consolidating the repose of the East by means of a pacific arrangement between the porte and the pasha.

We entirely coincide in the opinion which lord Palmerston has pronounced as to the necessity of such an arrangement.

You are already aware, Sir, that our august

master hastened to give his assent to the bases of this pacification as proposed in the first instance by the court of Vienna. They do not essentially differ from those contemplated by the English government. According to prince Metternich's plan, the porte would resume possession of Syria, either during Mehemet Ali's life-time or after his death. According to lord Palmerston's opinion, the immediate giving up of Syria should be considered as the absolute condition of any lasting arrangement between the porte and Egypt.

As far as we are concerned, we shall not hesitate, Sir, to accede to either one or the other of these combinations, provided it shall have been freely adopted by the porte itself. This condition forms in our opinion the basis of any arrangement in which our august master should be called upon to take a part. This is the only point in which our opinions appear to differ from those expressed in lord Palmerston's despatch of the 9th of July. According to the view. taken of this matter by the British minister, "it would be for the five powers in the first instance to communicate to each other their opinions with respect to the definitive arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Egypt; and it would be as a consequence of such communication of ideas, that the opinion of the five powers would have to be announced to the two parties, by means of their representatives at Constantinople, and at Alexandria; and thus the repugnance which either one or the other of the two parties might from the commencement have evinced with regard to the arrangement which might have been pro

posed to them, would finally be

overcome."

This plan of action, which would establish an entire parity between the sultan and the pasha, would not, according to our opinion, be without inconveniences, inasmuch as it would admit as a possible contingency that we should have to combat and conquer a resistance opposed to us by the sultan, whereas it is solely in his favour and with his consent, that a European intervention, having for its object to strengthen the existence of the Ottoman empire, can legitimately take place.

In order, consequently, to remain true to the principle of conservation which forms the basis of the policy of the five courts as regards the affairs of the East, and not to run the risk of finding ourselves opposed to the views of the Ottoman government, it would appear to us preferable to commence, in the first place, by ascertaining whether the plan of pacification projected by the allied cabinets is really of a nature to obtain the assent of the sultan. It is not till after the cabinets of Europe shall have acquired the certainty of a complete and willing accession on the part of that sovereign, that they will be able to come to an ulterior understanding as to the measures to be adopted in common, in order to impose upon the pasha of Egypt the conditions of arrangement freely agreed to by the porte.

Such are the reflections which we were on the point of communicating to lord Palmerston in reply to his despatch of the 9th of July, when despatches from Constantinople, dated 24th June and 6th July, (of which I sent you the abstract by my last courier) made VOL. LXXXII.

us acquainted with the determination which the divan has thought it necessary to take in order to bring the Egyptian affair to a speedy and decisive solution.

These determinations, dictated by a genuine spirit of conciliation and wisdom, simplify greatly the question, the solution of which the allied cabinets have at heart. The porte, induced by a just appreciation of its true interests, has anticipated the propositions which the five powers were on the point of making to it. It has taken the lead in regard to the steps which it was proposed to take at Alexandria. It has resolved to offer to Mehemet Ali the inheritance of Egypt in return for the cession of Syria. Finally it has called together in conference the representatives of the allied cabinets, for the purpose of announcing these resolutions to them, and of requesting their moral support to the offers of arrangement which it had made to the pasha.

The basis of negotiation has thus been laid down by the porte itself. It has of its own accord opened the deliberation, and has virtually fixed its locality at Constantinople, the only place where it was fitting that interests, having direct reference to the future fate of the Ottoman empire, should be discussed.

It is our duty, now that this important deliberation has been opened under the most favourable auspices with the sanction of the porte, and with the unanimous consent of the representatives of the allied powers, calmly to await the replies which the pasha shall make to the propositions which he has received on the part of the porte.

2 H

Three possible contingencies here occur to us :

1. Mehemet Ali may wholly and simply accede to the offers that have been made to him: in that case all difficulties will of themselves be removed.

2. Mehemet Ali may, without absolutely rejecting the terms of the proposed arrangement, endeavour to obtain more favourable conditions from the porte. In this case, a negotiation between the two parties will be opened at Constantinople; and it will then be for the representatives of the allied cabinets to lend their good offices whenever the divan shall see occasion for them. Lastly

3. Mehemet Ali may obstinately refuse all reconciliation with the porte. If, contrary to our expectation, this latter supposition should turn out true, the divan may consider itself justified in having recourse to the allied representatives for support, in order to overcome the resistance of the pasha; in such case we should think it right and necessary that the great powers should unite their efforts to compel the pasha of Egypt to agree to an equitable

arrangement, which shall have obtained at once the sanction of the porte, as well as the concurrence of all the powers of Europe.

This, Sir, is the course which to us appears to be the most simple and the most certain to lead to a satisfactory termination of the unfortunate difference which has for a long time placed the security of the Ottoman empire in danger, and has kept the peace of Europe in suspense.

The emperor directs you, Sir, to bring the whole of the considerations embodied in this despatch to the knowledge of the English government. You will furnish lord Palmerston with a copy of the same, and you will express a hope, that the opinions of our cabinet contained in this despatch, will be received by the government of her Britannic majesty with the same satisfaction with which our august master has been pleased to receive the communication of which the marquess of Clanricarde was the channel. Receive, &. (Signed) NESSELRODE.

Therapia, July 26, 1839.

I expect that, long before this arrives in London, the settlement between Mehemet Ali and the Porte will have been made. The answer to be given to-morrow to the demands of the pasha of Egypt may not be satisfactory to him: but I think that either the pasha will insist upon his demands, and the porte will yield to them, or the pasha will take what is offered, and defer exacting the full measure

until after he shall have completely established his authority in Constantinople, which he will do with very little delay. Perhaps this latter mode of acting may be the best for him; because the proceeding can be so managed that the grant will have the air and the form of an act springing spontaneously from the porte; and as such it will be less subject to the criticism of foreign governments. I consider the Ottoman empire to

Ali.

In the absence of instructions to direct my conduct, I remain passive, after having taken those steps (reported in my late despatches) which were intended to delay any settlement that should not be in concurrence with the interests and counsels of England and France.

Her majesty's government has learned from colonel Campbell the demands made by Mehemet Ali. I am informed, and I think cor

swer to be given by the porte is, "The hereditary government of Egypt to be granted to Mehemet Ali, and the government of Syria to be granted to Ibrahim pasha till the death of Mehemet Ali, when the government of Syria is to be again at the disposal of the porte."

This answer given by the porte would be inconsistent with the promises made to me by the grand vizier.

Therapia, July 29, 1839.

I inclose copy of a collective note signed by the representatives of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, and myself, on the 27th inst.

The note was yesterday presented by the dragomans of the five powers to the Sublime Porte, and cheerfully and gratefully received by the grand vizier, on the 28th. I inclose dragoman Pisani's report to me of what took place on that

occasion.

Baron Sturmer received prince Metternich's instructions on the morning of the 27th, and the note, signed, was ready in the evening. I beg leave to express with all humility my approbation of the activity and promptitude with which the baron acted; and I consider the measure to be the most salutary step that could have been taken. It was also most fortunately welltimed, for the Ottoman ministers had actually resolved upon concessions to the Egyptian pasha, which would have been at this moment on their way to Alexandria, and which would have mischievously complicated the affairs of this country. This measure has given

force and courage to the grand vizier to resist the pasha, and to maintain the rights and interests of the sultan. It will also, I think, insure the tranquillity of the capital, and the security, therefore, of the foreign and Christian populations and inhabitants. It opens the road for all that may be considered right to be done by her majesty's government. It has placed her majesty's government in a position that enables it to secure the future integrity and independence of Turkey.

I fear the state of Asia Minor is very unsatisfactory, but it is natural that it should be so after the late events. It is not to be imagined that Mehemet Ali will neglect any means in his power to augment disorder everywhere, but he is himself the source of all the dangers and difficulties, and if he be forced to desist from pursuit of his ambitious plans, order will be easily restored. If her majesty's government will secure Constantinople against all attack, there will be no just cause for alarm from anything that can be done to disturb the peace or alter the balance