had authorised what had been done, and, therefore, it was legal. He defied the Attorney-general to prove that proposition. Lord Denman repudiated the doctrine. The house of commons took offence on that occasion, a discussion took place, and the resolutions were passed which he was happy he did not agree with. Another action was brought. The house had passed a resolution, that any court which should entertain an action was guilty of a breach of its privileges: but the very house that passed that resolution made an order that the Attorney-general should plead for Mr. Hansard to that fresh action. What was the form of the plea? It was not to the jurisdiction of the court; they came in and defended what they had done, and put themselves upon the judgment of the court; they in fact, told the court that it was not to decide against them. The court did decide against them. The court heard the argument, it gave judgment against them. How could a contempt be more complete? Why did they not send for the judges? No-they paid the money. Mr. Stockdale brought another action. They did not say then that they would oppose it, but they admitted in the record, that Mr. Hansard had, without an excuse, published a libel upon Stockdale. They did not say anything in answer to the action, and so they admitted the allegation to be true. When they had admitted this there was nothing left but an inquiry, into the extent of the injury which had been sustained by a libel which had been published without justification or excuse. Was there a single instance in which the house of commons had ordered a court not to proceed in an action? No.

Was there a single instance in which the house had successfully stopped an action? No. Would they be able to stop the present action? They might send to the sheriff and tell him not to pay the money, or they would send him to Newgate; they might send the sheriff to Newgate, but would they stop the action? The judges would tell him, if he did not pay the money they would send him to prison; so that he would be like the flying fish equally uusafe in the air or the water. On these grounds he resisted the present motion.

Sir Robert Peel after recapitulating the circumstances which had led to the present embarrassment, asked the house whether they should abandon their privileges? If they permitted the sheriffs to pay Stockdale the damages which the jury had awarded, what would be the next step? They could not prevent Stockdale from instituting another action, if they once admitted, that one of their officers was liable in any court of law to an action, civil or criminal, for performing his duty to them? Had they any privileges? Were they the judges of those privileges? Those were the questions. His noble friend (lord Mahon) admitted one certain privilege, the privilege of publishing for the use of the members of the house. Suppose they should proceed by resolution to declare, that the house had the privilege, and that they themselves were the exclusive judges of those privileges. There were no means of enforcing any privilege except by resolution. His noble Friend said, that they added the power of sale to their old privilege. He (sir R. Peel) was ready to admit,

that the use of the power of sale had raised some prejudice against them in the public mind. It might be a question of policy whether they should adhere to the sale, but it could be a question of policy only, and did not enter into the present discussion. What was the prescnt publication? It consisted of inquiries into the state of gaols. It was proposed to introduce some new regulation to cure the abuses existing in prisons. As an instance of these abuses it was stated, that the prisoners were in possession of publications which, pretending to be scientific, were calculated to injure the minds of the prisoners. If this were true, was it not a material fact? His noble Friend said, that they might make a publication of the fact for their own use. Had his noble Friend considered the difficulty of confining it to their own use? had he considered the difficulty of not communicating it to their constituents? If a member in possession of such papers, should in any manner communicate their contents to any other person, the question would immediately arise, if the Court of Queen's Bench should determine that the member had been a little too free in the use of his papers, even by communicating them to a constituent, the very question which they had now to consider would then arise. He firmly believed, that this privilege of publication was essential to the house in order to enable it to perform its duties. He did not conceive, that they could act as a house of commons, unless they had the power of publishing, not only for their own use, but for the information of the public what they considered necessary. How could they address the crown for the removal

of a judge for misconduct, without first satisfying the public mind that their decision upon such conduct was correct? Could it be possible for the house of commons to set aside the claims of a duke of York without convincing the public mind that danger existed if he ascended the throne? At the same time, he was quite aware of the imperfection of the power which they possessed. He was aware that their power was perfect only whilst parliament was sitting. Here was an instance of the imperfection. He would ask the house to suppose a case. Let them suppose that the Court of Queen's Bench should persevere in issuing a process in opposition to an injunction of the Court of Chancery. This would be a case of conflicting jurisdictions which the law could not foresee, and what would be the course to be pursued by the court of chancery? Would they commit the judges of the court of Queen's Bench? He thought, that they would not, but that they would direct their offensive proceedings against the officers of that court. Whatever might be the result of this case, he must express his firm belief, that the privilege of free publication was essential to the performance of their duties as a deliberative assembly, and as one of the branches of the constitution of the country.

Mr. Fitzroy Kelly who next rose to address the house, said, that whatever mode of dealing with the case might be adopted, he hoped, that the Messrs. Hansard having acted under the orders of the house, would be fully protected and indemnified. When the proper time came, he should propose an amendment to any resolution which might be laid before

the house to that effect- and he should further venture to suggest, that in any case which might hereafter arise, the hon. and learned attorney-general might be instructed to defend the action, and afterwards report upon the subject to the house. In conclusion, he begged to say, that if the hon. and learned attorney-general were sincere in saying, that the court of Queen's Bench had come to a wrong conclusion, let him bring a writ of error in order that the question might be fairly decided. He hoped that a writ of error would yet be brought, and that the privileges of that house might be sustained, as they had hitherto been, by the legal and constitutional tribunals of the country.

Lord John Russell said, that with regard to the privilege of printing and publishing the papers connected with the proceedings of that house, before the revolution of 1688 the votes of the house were printed and published by the authority of the Speaker, with the evident intention of appealing to the people as to the conduct of the house of commons, and the very first act after that, was the printing and publishing the Declaration of Rights, in which the house of commons of that day appealed to the people for their support in that extraordinary crisis. The house of commons subsequently continued to print their votes and papers, and for a considerable time during the last century, about 2401. a-year were regularly received by the Speaker in respect of the profit arising from their sale. The noble lord then proceeded to contend, that the practice of parliament-the determination of the house of commons since the period of the revo

lution-and the opinions expressed by the learned judges in conformity with that practice and that determination, had acknowledged the right of publication. As to the question whether they were to give way in this matter of privilege, he did not see, why, if the courts of law could interfere with the privilege of publication, they could not also interfere with that of freedom of speech and other privileges which had been alluded to.

With regard to the manner of asserting their privilege, he thought, that they should first assent to the measures which had already been adopted. An hon. and learned gentleman (Mr. F. Kelly) had contended, that the Messrs. Hansard ought to be reimbursed by that house, the amount lost by them in consequence of such damages having been given by the jury. Why, what would be the consequence of such a course being adopted? Continually increasing damages awarded by juries-and in fact, every man against whom any libellous matter might be published, however deserving of punishment, would, if such a principle were adopted, acquire a claim on the public treasury. A species of annuity of thousands a-year would be created and added to the expenses of the house of commons. Another suggestion was, to propose a conference on the subject with the house of lords. But what would be the answer of the house of lords? That they were quite able to maintain their own privilegesand that they therefore would leave it to the house of commons to consider if they also had not the means of vindicating their privileges. A power similar to that asserted by the house of commons

was exercised by the chancery court. The court of exchequer exercised a similar power. He had read that morning an elaborate judgment of chief baron Eyre on the subject. He felt in common with the right hon. gentleman opposite (sir Edward Sugden), that they were placed in a situation of great difficulty, being no longer assisted by the courts of law. He was aware, in fact, that obstacles might arise, not from the want of power on their part, but from the great extent of their powers. Under the resolution of 1837, he contended, that it was quite competent to the house to call the judges to the bar of that house, and there impugn their conduct on the judgment seat; but undoubtedly great public inconvenience must arise from it. For his own part, he must say, that if by stopping the inferior officers of the law, these proceedings could be brought to a close, it would be preferable to adopting the extreme course.

The house then divided, when there appeared:-Ayes 286; Noes 167 Majority 119.

On the resolution that the sheriffs be called to the bar,

Mr. F. Kelly moved an amendment, to the effect, that the sheriffs and under sheriffs be ordered to bring with them all writs, rules, and other authorities, under which they might have acted.

For this resolution so amended, there appeared on a division:Ayes 206; Noes 117: Majority 89. On the following day January 17th, the order of the day for taking into consideration the petiticn of Messrs. Hansard was read.

Lord John Russell moved, that John Joseph Stockdale be called to the bar. He was accordingly

Part

called in and placed at the barwhen the attorney-general interrogated him at some length as to the facts of the different actions against Messrs. Hansard in which he Stockdale was plaintiff. of the examination was directed to the point that the book published by him and alluded to in the report of the committee, which was the alleged libel and subject matter of the action, was in fact an obscene publication — and that Stockdale prevented as far as he could, the jury who assessed the damages from seeing either the book or the plates contained in it. Stockdale asserted, that the work in question was of a strictly professional nature-but would not deny, that he had refused to produce the book or plates before the sheriffs' jury who had to award the damages on the writ of inquiry.

He was then ordered to withdraw, when lord John Russell rose and moved, that Mr. Stockdale having brought an action against Messrs. Hansard for the publication of a report ordered by this house to be printed, has been guilty of a high contempt and breach of the privileges of this house. To this Mr. Law proposed as an amendment, that Mr. Stockdale be now discharged from his attendance at the bar. An animated debate then took place, in the course of which,

Sir R. Peel said, that as these proceedings would be left as matter of record, he submitted, that the resolution ought distinctly to recite the offence by which the breach of privilege in this case had been committed.

Lord John Russell in answer stated, that he was about, in the first instance, to move a resolution nearly in the terms sug

gested by the right hon. gentle man-but after the attorney-general had remarked (which he considered of very great import ance), that if they recited the particular grounds upon which they adjudged that Mr. Stockdale was guilty of a breach of the privileges of the house-and if this question came to be argued hereafter-seeing that these privileges were now so much in question-it might be said, that although the house had a right of inflicting punishment for any indefinite breach of its privileges, yet that an action and proceedings with regard to the publication of a libel, was not a matter that came within that privilege. To specify therefore the particular grounds of Mr. Stockdale's offence in this instance, might hereafter be made use of as an argument against the house. What appeared to him to be at present the proper course, was to exercise their right of adjudicating Stockdale to have been guilty of a high contempt and breach of privilege. They then might proceed to consider what ought to be the punishment to be inflicted on the offender.

Mr. Pemberton said, it was with sincere pain he offered any opposition to the course proposed to be taken in vindication of the privileges of the house. He earnestly trusted, that the house would not enter into a conflict which must have consequences most pernicious to the country, unless they were quite sure both that it was necessary, and that they were right. This very point in the same form had arisen in the great case of "Ashby v. White." Where the question which arose respected the exclusive jurisdiction of the house of commons, quite as much as any

that could possibly arise about the publication of papers. That case was an action brought by a person at Aylesbury against the returning officer for illegally rejecting his vote. his vote. The house of commons had declared, that the right of voting for a member of parliament was a question to be decided exclusively by the house of commons. He asked if there was any distinction between the present case and that of "Ashby v. White?" What then was the result of that case? The house of commons of that day, did what the house was now called upon to do-they committed the plaintiff in the action. Did the committal of the plaintiff' stop the action? It did not. Judgment passed against the defendant in the action, he refused to pay, as Messrs. Hansard refused to pay, the damages, and in the course of a regular process of law he was committed to prison. The house committed Ashby for a breach of privilege, and the Court of Queen's Bench committed the defendant for non-payment of damages. Did this proceeding strike terror into the delinquent? It occasioned no less than fourteen new actions. In every one of these actions the plaintiff was committed by the house of commons. Did that stop the prosecution of the damages, and the recovery of the damages? Not in any one action. The result of the present proceeding would inevitably be the same. Now what was the result of the case of "Ashby v. White," in which the very question now at issue was raised? The consequence of the conflict between the house of lords and the house of commons was this, that the house of commons committed, as the house was now about to do, the attornies and so