could the parties suffering under it maintain an action for assault or false imprisonment? The authorities upon the subject clearly settled that they could not recover in such action. In confirmation of this view, the right hon. gentleman cited the cases of Jay v. Topham and Burdett v. Abbott. He took, therefore, he said, as settled, that that house had the power to commit, and that no authority could examine into that commitment; likewise that no man could maintain an action of assault or false imprisonment in consequence of that power having been duly exercised. He said, duly exercised, because the officers, if they exceeded the authority imposed upon them in the execution of the writ, were amenable at common law, and no power of that House would protect them from the recovery of damages. The great question, then, remained as to what were the rights of that house incidentally, if an action were brought for damages. The result of his investigation was, that a resolution of that house was of no avail in a court of justice. Upon an action brought upon a commitment, it was the duty of the court, the case being brought before it, to inquire into it and decide it. In the cases he had referred to, the courts heard and decided, but did not examine the validity of the commitment. The case of Ashby v. White to which he would not refer, would enable the house to understand the question more clearly. The plaintiff brought his action against the defendant, a returning officer, for refusing to take his vote. Chief Justice Holt, who was always against the privileges of the house, was of opinion, although there were eleven judges,

and the lord chancellor against him, that the action would lie. Upon an appeal, from the decision that the action would not lie, to the house of lords in its judicial capacity, the judgment of the court was reversed. That case involved the question of a breach of privilege of the house of commons; for it had voted that it was a breach of privilege to bring the action. The house of commons had never reversed that decision of the house of lords. How, then, did the case stand? The house of lords, as a court of justice, would not attend to their resolution. The house of lords had, in fact, already refused to attend to their privileges, and had decided as a court of law upon them. Let them, therefore, observe the situation in which they placed the court below. If it even decided for them, there might be. an appeal, and the house of lords might decide against them notwithstanding their resolution. He consequently found himself under the necessity of admitting that no resolution of the house of commons could bind a court of law in its decision of a question upon an action which involved the privileges of that house. The Banbury peerage case shewed that no resolution of the house of lords was binding upon a court of law. Many judges had held that the privileges of the house of commons coming incidentally before the courts must be examined. The exceptions were commitments and actions against them for false imprisonment. Lord Kenyon had said, that cases would arise which the court (of King'sbench) would be bound to investigate; and lord Ellenborough expressly declared, that cases might arise in which the court would be bound to examine into the ques

tion of privilege and decide against it. He (sir Edward Sugden) would now briefly call the attention of the house to its right of publishing papers which might prejudice other persons. The question might be narrowed to this: could the house print and publish papers generally, and which re flected prejudicially upon the character of others. The right hon, gentleman then, after quoting some other cases, said, that he would read to the house what lord Ellenborough in " Rex v. Creevy" had said in reference to lord Kenyon's observations in Rex Wright." His lordship said, that,

v.

"What was printed for the use of the members was certainly a privileged communication; but he was not prepared to say, that to circulate a copy of that which was intended for the use of members, if it contained matter of an injurious tendency to the character of an individual, was legitimate, and could not be made the ground of a prosecution. He would hesitate to pronounce it a proceeding in parliament in the terms given by some of the judges in that case (Rex v. Wright)."

In the case of "Rex v. Creevy," an action was brought against Creevy for the publication of his own speech, after it had been delivered in that house. In that case, as the speech contained matter injurious to an individual, it was held that Creevy was liable to indictment. That was a strong case. A member might make what statement he pleased in that house; but when he went out of that house and published his speeches delivered within its walls, he was liable to an indictment if he published what was injurious to individuals, but which he had an un

doubted right to state before the house. This brought him to that part of the question which had reference to the authority of the house. Now, his opinion was, that even in a court of common law the judges would have been bound to decide this case of Stockdale had it been brought before them. The right hon. gentleman then proceeded to ask what the house should then, under the circumstances do? Were they to bring the sheriffs to the bar? Could they commit the judges? No. He would distinctly say, that that House would disgrace itself for ever if it ventured to call the judges to the bar. Was the house prepared to commit the sheriffs? Why, in four days, if they did not pay the money when ordered, they would be committed by the court of Queen's-bench.

Let the house reflect, that their present position with regard to this matter, was the result of their own conduct, and was it therefore right or proper that they should now visit on the executive officers of justice, all the unfortunate consequences of their own delay? In the first action which had been brought, the house had allowed the proceedings to go on, and the judges were bound to decide on the question which was brought before them. In the next the House had refused to appear, and judgment had been allowed to go by default in consequence. In the first instance when the case was before a jury, it was pleaded that Stockdale was not the injured person he represented himself, and the jury had found that that was true and no damage had been given. In the next case the jury had given 1007. damages, and in the last case 600l., and from what he knew of

the spirit and independence of the juries of this country, he had no hesitation in saying that, if they went on, they would in the next case give 6,0007.

What course then were they to follow? He would suggest, that the house, before proceeding further, should have a conference with the lords. By so doing, this house would be submitting to no degradation. It would not be submitting the question of its privileges to the house of lords, but it would in a point of law, be taking the opinion of the highest tribunal which the country recognised. As he had before said, he was of opinion that the house had the right to publish this particular paper, but the evil had arisen from the resolution of the house ordering the sale of the papers printed for the use of the members. The house, in fact, were now acting in the character of booksellers; and although formerly the public could obtain copies of certain parts of their printed papers, yet they could not then, as in the case of Stockdale, purchase as many copies as any individual might choose. His opinion, therefore, was, that the house should, as a preventive measure, rescind the resolution authorising the sale of its papers. The right hon. gentleman concluded by saying, that he should oppose the motion for ordering the sheriffs to the bar of the house.

After a short speech from sir Robert Inglis, in which he stated that he should oppose the motion of the noble lord,

The Attorney-general rose and said, that he had not the slightest hesitation in declaring that he entirely approved of the motion of his noble friend; and that unless that motion were carried, in his opinion

the privileges of the house would be for ever lost. He thought that their usefulness would be at an end if they abandoned their privileges, and that if they succumbed on that occasion they would be guilty of treason to those who sent them there. He would ask would the house allow the damages awarded in the action to be levied upon the goods of Mr. Hansard? would the house allow the money to come out of Mr. Hansard's pocket? or would it say, that the sum should be included in the estimates for the year, to be paid out of the revenue of the country? If they did that, they would not only abandon the right of publishing that which they conceived to be necessary for the public goodbut would totally alter the position in which they had hitherto stood. They would in that case submit themselves not only to the judgment of the court of Queen's Bench, but to the judgment of every other inferior tribunal throughout the whole of this country. A similar action to that brought by Stockdale in the Court of Queen's Bench might be brought in a Court of Requests, in a borough court, or in any of the manor courts in any part of the country, and each of these courts would have an equal right with the Court of Queen's Bench to decide upon their privileges.

It was said, that the judges in the case of Stockdale v. Hansard, although they decided against that particular part of the privileges of the house which related to the publication of papers, were nevertheless disposed to respect its other privileges. But did they know how long they would continue to respect them? Lord Denman in that very case, cast a doubt upon

their power of commitment, and had reserved to himself the right of inquiry whether that power which might in some cases belong to them ought always to be exercised. The majority of the other judges, it was true, differed from lord Denman upon that point; but how did he know, that in the course of a few years a majority of them might not concur with him, and over-rule their power of commitment, just as they (the judges) had over-ruled their power of printing? The motion before the house was simply this-that Stockdale and the sheriffs be required to attend at the bar of the house. If the sheriffs were required to attend, it did not in the slightest degree follow that they were to be sent to Newgate. The sheriffs might justify themselves, but surely the house had a primá facie case for calling them to the bar. Under the circumstances he thought it was highly probable that the house might determine that the sheriffs should be committed to Newgate; and at present, he confessed he knew of no other course by which the privilege of the house could be vindicated. The hon. baronet, the member for the University of Oxford, said "Why not seize the judges?" So far as this case was concerned, the judges were not at all to be found fault with; because in this case it had never been judicially submitted to them, that the action was brought against Hansard for that which he had done in obedience to the orders of the house. The judges, therefore, were not to blame, but the sheriffs with full notice of the resolution of the house, had proceeded to levy an execution upon the goods of its servant. In order to shew that there were not want

ing precedents for such a step as that of summoning the sheriffs to the bar-the Attorney-general cited the case of "Bell v. Glass," which occurred in 1827. Bell the plaintiff brought an action in the Court of Requests against Glass, an officer of the house of lords, because Glass, in obedience to the orders of the house, took an umbrella from him. The Court of Requests heard the case, and awarded damages to Bell. What did the house of lords do? They immediately summoned Bell the plaintiff to the bar of their house, together with the clerk of the Court of Requests, and, as he thought, one of the judges. They declared that it was a high breach of the privileges of their house to have brought the action; and they warned Bell that he should not persist in levying the damage. Furthermore it was only on the assurance of Bell that he would abandon the judgment given in his favour, that he was not committed to Newgate. The officers of the Court of Requests declared that they were not aware, that the matter had arisen out of a breach of the privileges of the house, and that Glass had acted in obedience to their orders, and for that reason and that reason alone, the officers of the court were acquitted. The house of lords had acted in the same manner in many other cases. It was said, that to agree to the motion of his noble friend might bring them into collision with the house of lords. Undoubtedly it would. It could not be avoided, but the conflict was not of their seeking They had done everything in their power to avoid it. With very great deference to the character of the lord chief justice, for whom he had the highest reverence, he must say,

that the conflict might have been avoided. They had done their utmost to avoid the collision, but it now became inevitable. It must now be determined whether the house of commons, or the courts of law were to have the superiority. The house of commons were then to determine whether all its privileges were to be at the beck of every judge, high and low, and of every court of common law, civil or criminal. The sheriff still had the money in his hands-that court (for they, i. e. the house of commons, were a court) might order him to retain the money or to return it to Hansard. If the house should adopt that course, the sheriff would have it in his power to say to the court, that the house of commons in vindication of its privileges had ordered him to return the money to Mr. Hansard, because it was a violation of the privileges of the commons of England, that the execution should be levied. It might then be referred to the Court of Queen's Bench to say, whether that was not a sufficient excuse. He (the Attorney-gene. ral) apprehended, that according to every authority and every rule of law, the rule then depending (namely, that to shew cause why the sheriff should not pay over the money to Stockdale) ought to be discharged. He admitted, that upon all general matters a resolution of the house could not be held to be binding upon a court of law. But questions of privilege were distinct from all other matters, and as regarded them he maintained that a resolution of the house was binding upon a court of law, because the house was the sole judge of its own privileges. They came then to no resolution further than that the sheriff should

be summoned. Every thing else was open to discussion. No hon. member by voting for the present motion pledged himself to go one jot further. It would afterwards be open for consideration whether the sheriff should be committed or discharged, or whether as a middle course he should merely be ordered to retain the money or return it to Hansard. At all events whatever ulterior course the house might pursue-he trusted that it would adopt the motion then submitted to it by a large majority.

Lord Mahon opposed the motion at considerable length, saying that he felt bound to resist the attempt to erect the house of commons into a new and a worse court of starchamber, when he was followed by,

Mr. Cresswell who said, that if he rightly understood the grounds upon which the noble lord (Lord J. Russell) proceeded, then, in his opinion, if any person ought to he called before the house, it ought to be the judges who pronounced the judgment upon which the sheriff was acting. The hon. gentleman the Attorneygeneral, was mistaken when he said, that the judges had not had notice. The petition stated, that they had notice; that application had been made to them to prevent the return of the writ. The act of the jury was in execution of the writ of the judges, and therefore they had notice, they had proceeded after that notice, and they had adopted the proceedings of the other parties. The judges then were the real parties. He contended that lord Denman would have shrunk from his duty, if he had not given his opinion on the question involved in the cause brought before him. The Attorney-general had said, that the house of commons