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charges connected with the civillist. There were 30,000l. for foreign ministers, and various charges of a miscellaneous nature. He did not mean to say that these were improper. They might be But let any very necessary. individual look over the accounts, and he would at once perceive, that the whole of these items would be as soon paid, if an estimate of them were laid on the table of this House, unless they were manifestly improper, as they were under the existing system. Why could not these demands be submitted to the House, in the same way as the army extraordinaries were laid before them? Why could they not be introduced by estimate and proposal? Why should not questions be asked, and explanations be given, within the walls of that house? that was the only course that could satisfy the publicthat could enforce economy-that could prevent abuse.

Mr. Brougham then mentioned some instances of the manner in which the sums that formed the droits of the crown, accrued to it. In 1817, the sum of 130,000l., fell to the crown, in consequence of the demise of a rich lunatic. In 1807, an individual, who had no heirs, died intestate; his property, to the amount of 47,0001., went to the crown. In 1816, the crown got possession of 62,0007. in the same way. In 1804, prize-money to the amount of 105,000l., was received on one occasion. In the same year there was another sum of 40,000l., and a third of 55,000l. In 1806, those droits were augmented by 155,000l.; and at one period there came in nearly the whole proceeds of the Dutch prizes, amounting to 1,657,000l. From the Spa

nish condemnations the sum of 2,200,000l. was derived. So that large sums were not wanting in the list, more than small ones.

There was another source, too, of great importance, though not so productive as those to which he had alluded. He meant the revenue derivable from the Leeward Islands, from Gibraltar, from Scotland, &c. which amounted to a very large sum. How was it disposed of? in pensions. It was not under the control of parliament, and might be expended as the reward of good services or bad services, or as the meed of favouritism for no services at all. So that the property of those dying intestate, and without heirs or next of kin, the proceeds of certain captured vessels, and the other sources of revenue which he had mentioned, might all be employed in the furtherance of corrupt practices or of special jobs. He would not contend, that such a use had been made of those funds. He merely alluded to the possibility of their abuse; and he conceived, that pensions derived from those occasionally-accumulating funds, were not so pleasing to the public, as those which came through the more regular and steady channel of the legislature. If these droits were suspicious in their application, in their origin they were ten thousand times worse. As every prize made before declaration of war formed part of them, they were, in fact, premiums for going to war without the usual proclamation; and on these funds ought to be written, in indelible characters, "The purchase money of the honour, the good faith, the pure and unsullied good name of England." If he wanted a proof

that they were so, he had only to refer to the Dutch war, in the time of Charles II.: that war was undertaken for the purpose of seizing the Smyrna fleet-for which perfidious action Providence punished that monarch, by overwhelming him and his ministers in discomfiture and disgrace. But, to come to later times, what did they think of the Dutchwhat of the Spanish prizes? 2,200,000l. were acquired by attacking unarmed, defenceless men-men who knew no reason for such a proceeding, except that they had dollars on board their ships. His advice, there fore, was, that the crown should be requested to resign these funds, receiving in their stead an ample remuneration, and that the royal dignity should henceforth be wholly maintained out of the · consolidated fund. It was now a new reign; and if, in opposition to the clear law of the question, in opposition to the constitutional view of its principle, in the face of numerous precedents of mischievous abuse derived from history -if the House neglected to wipe away a foul blot on the honour of the country, by giving up a vile relic of feudal barbarism, useless for any national purposes, and serving only as an occasion of calumny to our carping rivals and bitter enemies-if now, when this mischief could be done away, without injury to the crown and with benefit to the people, the House should suffer the opportunity to be lost, it would, in fact, go the length of saying, that these droits ought to remain for ever a lasting anomaly in the law and constitution, a perennial source of abuses, and a perpetual stigma on the character of the country. VOL. LXII.

As soon as Mr. Brougham sat down, Mr. Canning rose, and declared, that he and his colleagues would reject with disdain any boon, which was offered as an inducement to barter away the royal prerogatives. "The honourable mover, said" Mr. Canning, "wishes that the regal department of the state may be re-cast anew, and every vestige of ancient feudal monarchy abolished. That we could erect something new that would merit great praise, I am not prepared to deny. The new fabric might be clean and neat as the American government, and intelligible as the president of the United States; but I am unwilling that every trace of antiquity should be done away in the British constitution. Nothing is so easy as to frame a system that will look neater on papera system that, by stripping the king of all exclusive and princely ornaments, would render the monarch and his ministers, in dignity and form, what they are in reality, but in a more suitable and efficient character-the mere functionaries of the people. There is but one step further to complete the improvement: it is, as the king is paid a fixed and calculated salary, so let ministers be removed in form as they are in substance, as well as new ministers appointed, by this House. The monarch would then be separated from all the darkness of ancient times. The honourable gentleman (continued he) has expatiated on the danger of leaving the crown in possession of a power of conferring pensions charged on funds, not within the control of parliament. But, for my own part, I think it better that the patronage of the Crown

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should reward public services by property under its peculiar protection, than that a democratic assembly should dole out largesses and favours according to the impulse and force of passion, party, or canvass. We have had instances enough, in our own memory, of what canvass can do. Setting on the one side the chances of favour, canvass, party, and inadvertency-on the other, the chances of extravagance-I do think the crown the better trustee. And I am sure that the hon. and learned gentleman is too well read in the principles and practices of popular assemblies, to be ignorant of the change that would take place to the prejudice of the people and of public men, if the task of giving pensions for political services were abandoned by the crown, and should fall into the management of this House.

After entering into some details on the origin of the 4 per cent fund, and stating that its amount and application should, for the future, be laid annually before parliament as a matter of course, Mr. Canning proceeded to the consideration of the Admiralty-droits, which he said, in the course of the late reign, had amounted to about 9,700,0001. Out of this there had been paid to captors, and for various law expenses, 5,372,000/. There remained, therefore, something more than 4,000,000l. to be accounted for. Out of that sum 2,600,000/. had been contributed for the public service: and two several sums had been givenone in aid of the civil-list, the other of the 4 per cent fund: the first of these contributions was 1,300,000, the second

40,000l.: there remained, there fore, about 380,0001, to be accounted for. This sum had been paid partly in donations to different branches of the royal family, and partly in entertainments to foreign sovereigns. The expenditure, however, of the whole, had been communicated to parliament. It was true, that the account had not been laid before the House as a matter of course, but in consequence of motion and discussion. But it

was part of the new arrangement, that an account of every grant out of this fund should, as a matter of course, and without address, be laid before the House in every session, immediately after such graut. So that the only question now was, whether the grant should be discussed in the House in the first instance, and be conferred in consequence of a parliamentary vote; or whether it should first proceed from the crown, and then be submitted to the cognizance of parliament. He did not say that this distinction was a trifling one, or one that did not deserve the most serious examination, All he meant to affirm was, that the ministers of the crown were not prepared to propose, that a long and almost immemorial usage should be abolished without the most striking proof that such usage, though co-existent with the practice, was incompatible with the spirit of the constitution.

Mr. Canning added, that, by vesting in the crown the absolute disposal of prizes taken before the formal declaration of hostilities, great facilities were given for ultimately avoiding war, even after disputes with our neighbours had assumed a very threat

ening aspect. But if the droits, instead of being committed to the crown through the proper courts of law, were submitted to parliamentary control, the difficulties of amicable adjudication would be increased tenfold. The desire to hold the balance equal -and, if wrong was done on one side or the other, to make amicable reparation-would be counteracted by national heat, high and romantic honour, and other feelings, which would naturally prevail in an assembly like the House of Commons. For the very purpose, therefore, of avoiding rash and unnecessary war, it is requisite to exclude such questions from the official knowledge of parliament, till every claim has been heard, and a final adjudication made. If any private wrong should have been committed, if any inadvertent measure should have -been adopted, not only the difficulty, but the inconvenience, of retracing the first step, or of persevering in the course once hastily taken, would be increased by the change. If it were necessary to come down at once to parliament, and state that so many ships had been captured, and were at the control of parliament; the question would arise, was the capture just or unjust? If it should be judged unjust, the administration would be condemned; but, what has this to do in repairing the wrongs of a nation? If it were thought just, war must be entered into, although policy might dissuade strongly from war. No reason, then, can be found in the usage, in any constitutional defect, or in the application of the droits, for the change proposed. Every reason and every argu

ment, arising from the first nucleus of their formation to the expenditure of the last farthing, distinctly shows, that we should be wrong in changing the control of the droits in question. In the hands of the crown, then, they are best placed, to be exercised as every prerogative of the crown ought to be-for the benefit of the people, for whom the royal prerogatives exist.

The motion was supported by Sir James Mackintosh, Mr. Macdonald, Mr. Marryat, Sir Robert Wilson, Sir Joseph Yorke, and Mr. Tierney. The Chancellor of the Exchequer and Mr. Bragge Bathurst opposed it. After a very eloquent and powerfully sarcastic reply from Mr. Brougham, the question was put; when 145 voted for it, and 273 against it.

The same question came again into discussion upon the third reading of the Civil-list bill, in the House of Lords (May 30th). That bill, in conformity to the assurance which the ministers had given in the debate on Mr. Brougham's motion, contained a clause, which provided, that an account of the sums received for the droits of the admiralty or the crown, and the surplus of the 4 per cent duties, should be returned annually to parliament, together with their application. Lord Dacre proposed to amend this clause, by enacting, that no part of these droits should be applied to purposes already provided for in the grant for the civil-list. The amendment was supported by lord Ellenborough; but, being opposed by lord Liverpool, was rejected by a majority of 60.

The principal discussion on the arrangements of the civil-list, took

place on the 8th of May, when the chancellor of the exchequer moved the second reading of the resolutions relative to the civillist, by which 850,000l. out of the English revenue, and 207,000/. out of the Irish, were to be granted to the king for life, to commence from the demise of his late majesty. The civil-list had been last settled in 1816; and the scheme now proposed was, in every respect, the same as that which was then adopted, except that in the latter a sum of 298,000l. was allowed for the Windsor establishment, the privy purse of his majesty, the allowance to the deceased queen, and the privy purse of the prince regent. Of these heads of expenditure, the annual sum of 60,000l. for the royal privy purse, was the only one which remained in the present estimates so that there was here a saving of 238,000l., subject to such provision as it might be thought expedient to make for the servants of his late majesty. Lord John Russell, to give time for inquiry, moved, that the consideration of the report should be deferred for a week. His arguments were, that there were many useless offices comprised in the civillist, which ought to be abolished, and that the establishment of 1816, when, in fact, two courts were to be maintained, and the value of money was much lower than it now was, ought not to be implicitly adopted in the present circumstances of the country. Mr. Tierney argued for inquiry at great length. He stated, that he had originally disapproved of the establishment of 1816, because the estimates had not been sifted by public inquiry; and, surely, that which was originallydefective,

could not have been made perfect by the lapse of time. Even if that establishment had been sufficiently economical, still there was reason to suppose, that considerable retrenchments might now be made, because several causes of expenditure which existed then, no longer operated. He would beg the House to consider, that his late majesty was liable to very heavy demands, by reason of his large family. He would beg them to consider the charges of the Board of Works, and what had been the cost, not for repairs, but for the improvements of that stupendous pile, Windsor - castle; next, for the decoration, furnishing, &c., of apartments in the palaces for the princesses, and of the apartments in Kensingtonpalace for the princess of Wales. He would beg them to consider the heavy expenses of removing the princesses to and from Windsor, stated at 20,000%.; and further, the removals of the royal family to Weymouth; and, putting all these very heavy costs together, were they to be told, that the last seven years were the proper criterion, upon which the estimate for the expenses of the civillist at the present day were to be framed? There are (said Mr. Tierney, towards the conclusion of his speech) many rumours abroad, which may or may not be well founded; and if I listened to them, I should think it a very bad time, indeed, for any gentleman on this side of the House to do any thing that might possibly wound the feelings of his majesty. What may be the consequences of the part I have taken, I neither know nor care; but this I know, that if public confidence be of any value, no man ought to hope

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