If you can find a man of abilities who is above the influence of party, and free from prejudice, it might be made a valuable treatise indeed. Should that be once done, and were it revised by men of cool heads and sound judgement, so as to receive their approbation, I would, in that case, give the king's printer a little allowance to add one of them to every copy of the Bible, New Testament, and Prayer Book, under the title of the Political Bible of a free born Briton. The children thould learn the use of king, lords, and commons, by heart; then a chapter of the king's duty; the duty of the noblility; the duty of the people; then of law, how it preserves life, character, property, and so on. But I have said enough to give you an idea of what I mean, and that is all I intend at present *.

THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY THE ABOVE.

THE Editor would not presume to disfigure the above performance by any additions or interpolations of his. own; but he could not resist the temptation of subjoining a few thoughts that the perusal of the above suggested to his mind;-not as a continuation of the chapter, though the verses are so numbered; but as an amplification of it in some degree, which he hopes will not be deemed misplaced at the present time; but which, being

*No person can be so well qualified to execute this task as the ingenious proposer himself; and if he will go on to complete it on the model here so happily begun, he will confer an important service on the community; and if he will favour the Editor with a chapter from time to time, as Mahomet did of the Koran, it fhall be regularly inserted in the Bee, till the whole be completed; af er which it might be transplanted into the place allotted for it by him, if judged expedient. Edit

carefully distinguished from the text, may be omitted when the work is completed.

10. That government only is free, in which laws that have been deliberately enacted, are so inforced, as that no individual in the state can injure the person, or attach the property of another, with impunity.

II.

11. Freedom may be impaired by despotism on the one hand, or anarchy on the other; but every germ of freedom is totally annihilated where both despotism and anarchy prevail at the same time.

12. A despotic government is that in which any single undivided power is enabled to make, and to repeal laws, at pleasure, and to cause them be inforced in the way it chooses to dictate.

13, Despotic authority may be vested either in one person, as in Turkey, Russia, and some other kingdoms; or in an assembly consisting of many persons, as in France at the present moment.

14. Anarchy prevails wherever the authority of government is so feeble as that other powers arise within the state which overawe it, and prevent the execution of the laws; or where several powers contend for predominance, so as to render the peaceable subject unable to determine clearly what he should do.

15. When despotic authority is vested in one single person, the orders of that person will be prompt; and the execution of these orders so vigorous, as to make them be inforced without struggle or dispute. And although neither industry can be here vigorously exerted, nor wealth be accumulated to a high degree, nor the mental faculties of man be carried to perfection; yet if human beings are content to enjoy domestic tranquillity, without aspiring at affluence or distinction, they may be there of

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ten suffered to vegetate at least, in quiet. In this situàtion pure despotism prevails.

16. But where the despotic authority is vested in many, no man can enjoy even this kind of quiet. The will of no individual of that body constitutes the executive power; so that transgrefsions of t despotic will cannot be punished with promptitude ;-what was decreed to-day, by the prevalence of one party, may be annulled to-morrow by the prevalence of another. The decrees are thus not only more variable than they could be under any one man, but they are often altogether contradictory. From the general ignorance that must for ever in that state prevail, as to the knowledge of th decrees in force, the persons employed to inforce the law thus become a set of petty despots, who, from the unsteadinefs of those above them, must be perpetually tempted to engage in acts of plunder and opprefsion: and as these petty despots must be at times discovered and punished by a party which is inimical to their friends, acquiring power for the day, the people will be always on the catch to dispute their authority; a constant succefsion of struggles for power must be the consequence through all the land; and the strongest for the time must ever predominate over the others; so that peace or quiet are altogether unattainable in any station of life. In this situation despotism and anarchy equally prevail, and freedom is entirely annihilated. This may be called anarchical despotism.

17. Of all the kinds of government that can be conceived, that of anarchical despotism must not only be the most unstable and opprefsive, but also the least economical. In a pure despotism, the rapacity of one despot may be satiated; and there is at least a chance that generosity of sentiment may sometimes animate his bosom. But in a state of anarchical despotism, the rapacity of the

55 many must be insatiable; and by throwing the load from each individual on the whole body, even shame is annihilated; and if these despots are to enjoy power but for a fhort time, their appetite for plunder will be whetted by the consideration that they ought to lose no time in acquiring it. From the dread of detection, each will be disposed to wave severe scrutinising. This will produce à general and tacit connivance at the enormities of each; so that all attempts at inquiry will be quafhed by a vote of the majority, a the most fhameful peculations must thus escape with impunity. Could it have been possible, under any other form of government, to have screened the robbers of the Garde Meuble in France from detection?

18. To insure freedom to a people, and to guard against despotism, it is necessary that no single undivided power whatever fhould be intrusted with the sole privi lege of enacting laws; but that the concurrence of several distinct powers, which may have different views and inclinations, fhould be required, before any law can be binding on the nation: and the executive power ought ever to be separated from the deliberative voice.

19. To guard against anarchy, on the other hand, the árm that is intrusted with the execution of the law, ought to be strong and irresistible, so as to be able, without danger of successful resistance, to seize and bring to due punishment, by a clear and direct trial, every person, whoever he be, who shall dare to infringe the laws.

20. Whatever tends to weaken the executive arm, tends to remove the only shield that ever can be interposed to protect the weak, against the opprefsive grasp of the powerful.

21. To prevent the laws from being oppressive, they ought to be enacted with a proper regard to the circumstances of the people; and care be taken, that no law can be

March 13. enacted, but with due deliberation in several sittings of each department of the legislative council, that time may be given for reflection, and opportunities afforded, before passing the law, for parties who may think they will be aggrieved by any proposed law, to state their objections to it before the legislative council, thus to prevent these legislators from being betrayed into the enacting iniquitous laws through ignorance.

22. When a law is once enacted, provision fhould be made against a pofsibility of repealing it on a sudden that thus the many evils which must ever originate from a great mutation, and consequently a general ignora:.ce of the existing laws, may be avoided.

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23. The legislative department of government, fhould case have fhare in the executive power; because this tends directly to establish an uncontrouled despotic authority: but it ought to pofsefs a power of calling the tools of the executive power to account, wherever they had exceeded the powers intrusted to them by law; and of punishing them without appeal, where they fhould be fairly convicted of a crime.

24. The judicial power fhould be totally different from, and independent of both the executive and legislative departments of government, unless where the judges. fhall be convicted of having exceeded the powers intrusted to them by the law; that thus the persons who made the laws, may not have it in their power to stretch them, on particular occasions, beyond the limits for which they had been originally intended; and thus, by their preeminent power, be enabled to evade punishment when acting unjustly. It was by thus stretching the law at their pleasure, that the unfortunate Louis was condemned by the mere will of a junto, without a fhadow of law.

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