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held sufficient, and the plaintiff be held to have submitted thereto, unless the plaintiff shall, within three weeks from the expiration of the time allowed for filing such last-mentioned demurrer, cause the same to be set down for argument. 35. That where the defendant shall file a plea to the whole or part of a bill, the plea shall be held good to the same extent and for the same purposes as a plea allowed upon argument, unless the plaintiff shall, within three weeks from the expiration of the time allowed for filing such plea, cause the same to be set down for argument, and the plaintiff shall be held to have submitted thereto.

36. That no demurrer or plea shall be held bad and overruled upon argument, only because such demurrer or plea shall not cover so much of the bill as it might by law have extended to.

37. That no demurrer or plea shall be held bad and overruled upon argument, only because the answer of the defendant may extend to some part of the same matter as may be covered by such demurrer or plea.

38. That a defendant shall be at liberty by answer to decline answering any interrogatory or part of an interrogatory from answering which he might have protected himself by demurrer, and that he shall be at liberty so to decline, notwithstanding he shall answer other parts of the bill from which he might have protected himself by demurrer.

39. That where the defendant shall by his answer suggest that the bill is defective for want of parties, the plaintiff shall be at liberty, within fourteen days after answer filed, to set down the cause for argument upon that objection

only, and the purpose for which the same is so set down shall be notified by an entry to be made in the registrar's book in the form or to the effect following; that is to say, "Set down upon the defendant's objection for want of parties," and that where the plaintiff shall not so set down his cause, but shall proceed therewith to a hearing, notwithstanding an objection for want of parties taken by the answer, he shall not at the hearing of the cause, if the de fendant's objection shall then be allowed, be entitled as of course to an order for liberty to amend his bill by adding parties; but the Court, if it thinks fit, shall be at liberty to dismiss the bill.

40. That if a defendant shall, at the hearing of a cause, object that a suit is defective for want of parties, not having by plea or answer taken the objection, and therein specified by name or description the parties to whom the objection applies, the Court (if it shall think fit) shall be at liberty to make a decree saving the rights of the absent parties.

41. That where a defendant in equity files a cross-bill against the plaintiff in equity for discovery only, the costs of such bill, and of the answer thereto, shall be in the discretion of the Court, at the hearing of the original cause.

42. That where a defendant in equity files a cross-bill for discovery only against the plaintiff in equity, the answer to such cross-bill may be read and used by the party filing such cross-bill, in the same manner and under the same restrictions as the answer to a bill praying relief may now be read and used.

43. That in cases in which any exhibit may by the present prac

ce of the Court be proved vivá oce at the hearing of a cause, the me may be proved by the affiavit of the witness, who would e competent to prove the same iva voce at the hearing.

44. That where a defendant makes default at the hearing of a ause, the decree shall be absolute n the first instance, without givng the defendant a day to show cause; and such decree shall have the same force and effect as if the same had been a decree nisi in the first instance, and afterwards made absolute in default of cause shown by the defendant.

45. That every decree for an account of the personal estate of a testator or intestate shall contain a direction to the Master to inquire and state to the Court what parts (if any) of such personal estate are outstanding or undisposed of, unless the Court shall otherwise direct.

46. That a creditor whose debt does not carry interest, who shall come in and establish the same before the Master under a decree or order in a suit, shall be entitled to interest upon his debt at the rate of 41. per cent. from the date of the decree, out of any assets which may remain after satisfying the costs of the suit, the debts established, and the interest of such debts as by law carry interest.

47. That a creditor who has come in and established his debt before the Master under a decree or order in a suit shall be entitled to the costs of so establishing his debt, and the same shall be taxed by the Master, and added to the debt.

48. That in the reports made by the Masters of the Court, no part of any state of facts, charge, affidavit, deposition, examination, or

answer brought in or used before them shall be stated or recited; but such state of facts, charge, affidavit, deposition, examination, or answer shall be identified, specified, and referred to so as to inform the Court what state of facts, charge, affidavit, deposition, examination, or answer was so brought in or used.

49. That it shall not be necessary, in any bill of revivor or supplemental bill, to set forth any of the statements in the pleadings in the original suit, unless the circumstances of the case may require it.

50. That in any petition of rehearing of any decree or order made by any judge of the Court it shall not be necessary to state the proceedings anterior to the decree or order appealed from or sought to be re-heard.

51. That the foregoing orders shall take effect as to all suits, whether now depending or hereafter commenced, on the last day of Michaelmas Term, 1841.

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and with the advice and assistance of the Right Hon. Henry Lord Langdale, Master of the Rolls; the Right Hon. Sir Lancelot Shadwell, Vice-Chancellor of England; the Hon. the Vice-Chancellor James Lewis Knight Bruce, and the Hon. the Vice-Chancellor James Wigram; and in pursuance of an act passed in the 5th year of the reign of her present Majesty, entitled An Act to make further provisions for the Administration of Justice,' doth hereby order and direct in manner following, that is to say

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"1. That any person or persons claiming to be interested in any stock transferable at the Bank of England, standing in the name or names of any other person or persons, or body politic or corporate, in the books of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, may, by his or their solicitor, prepare a writ of distringas pursuant to the said act, in the form set out in the first schedule to the said act, and may present the same for sealing at the Subpoena-office. "2. That upon the presentment of such writ for sealing, and on leaving with the patentee of the Subpoena-office an affidavit duly sworn by the person, or one of the persons, applying for such writ, or his solicitor, before one of the Masters or Masters Extraordinary of this court, in the form set out at the foot of these orders, the same writ shall (in conformity with the orders of this court for issuing and sealing writs of subpoena) be forthwith sealed with the seal of the Subpoena-office; and such writ when sealed shall have the same force and validity as the writ of distringas heretofore issued out of the Court of Exchequer.

"3. That such writ of distringas and all process thereunder may at any time be discharged by the order of this Court to be obtained as of course upon the petition of the party on whose behalf the writ was issued, and to be obtained upon the application by motion, or notice, or by petition, duly served, of any other person claiming to be interested in the stock sought to be affected by such writ; and that upon or after such application, such costs thereof, and in relation thereto, and to the said writ, as to this Court shall seem just, may, if this Court shall think fit, be awarded, and ordered to be paid by the person or persons, who obtained such distringas, or upon an application by any other person, or persons, by such person or persons.

"4. That the Governor and Company of the Bank of England having been served with such writ of distringas, and a notice not to permit the transfer of the stock in such notice and in the said affidavit specified, or not to pay the dividends thereon, and having afterwards received a request from the party or parties in whose name or names such stock shall be standing, or some person on his or their behalf, or representing him or them, to allow such transfer, or to pay such dividends, shall not by force or in consequence of such distringas be authorised, without the order of this Court, to refuse to permit such transfer to be made, or to withhold payment of such dividends for more than eight days after the date of such request.

"5. That upon leaving such affidavit as aforesaid with the patentee of the Subpoena-office, there shall be paid to such patentee the sum of 1s. for filing such affidavit; and that within twenty-four hours

om the time when such affidavit all be so left, the said patentee all pay the said sum of ls. to the erk of the affidavits, and cause ich affidavit to be filed and regisered at the office of such clerk.

"6. That upon the sealing of ach writ of distringas the sum of s. 6d. shall be paid to the patenee of the Subpoena-office, and that ut of such sum the said patentee hall pay the sum of 4s. to the Accountant-General, to be by him laced to the credit of the account Entitled the Suitors' Fee Fund Account.'

7. That for and in respect of he preparation and service of such writ of distringas and the præcipe, and attendance in respect thereof, such costs shall be allowed as by the rules and practice of this court are allowed for the preparation and service and attendance in respect of a writ of subpœna to answer a bill."

FORM OF AFFIDAVIT.

(or to the interest of the said
C D, as ths case may be).
"LYNDHURST, C.

"LANGDALE, M. R.

"LANCELOT SHADWELL, V.C. "J. L. KNIGHT BRUCE, V.C. "JAMES WIGRAM, V. C.”

LORD CHANCELLOR'S
COURT.

Wednesday, Jan. 13. ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. FISHMONGERS' COMPANY.-The Lord Chancellor delivered judgment in this and the following case, which were argued some time since. The object of the information was to fix a charitable trust on property given to the Fishmongers' Company, by the will of Sir Thomas Kneseworth, in 1513. The testator devised certain lands for the purpose of supplying loans to poor members of the Company, and other objects, and also for prayers to be said for his own soul and those of his family. The surplus "Y Z (the name of the party on was given towards the repair of whose behalf the writ is sued premises belonging to the Comout) v. the Governor and Company, and other purposes beneficial to them. His Lordship said the pany of the Bank of England. provision for loans was a distinct "I, A B, of —, do solemnly one, and when the surplus was to swear, that according to the best be applied to a different object, of my knowledge, information, which failed, the former charity and belief, I am (or if the affidavit could not on that account be augis made by the solicitor, CD, of mented. Therefore, although the -, is) bona fide and beneficially prayers for the dead were a superinterested in the stock hereinafter stitious use, and the lands to supparticularly described, that is to port it of consequence forfeited to say (here specify the amount of the the Crown, the information failed stock to be affected by the writ, as to depriving the Fishmongers' and the name or names of the per- Company. The statute 1 Edward son or persons, or body politic or 6th, gave all obits and anniversacorporate, in whose name or names ries, and the property respecting the same shall be standing); and them, to the King, from whom that I have reason to believe, and the Company had repurchased it, do believe, that there is danger of and held it under letters patent such stock being dealt with in a of that monarch, confirmed by manner prejudicial to my interest those of James 1st. The lands in

question were within that statute, and the result was, that the Company obtained all belonging to the Crown by the grant.

Saturday, Jan. 23.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. IRONMONGERS' COMPANY.-The Lord Chancellor delivered judgment in this case, which arose upon a bequest in the will of Thomas Betton, who died in 1723, for the redemption of Christian slaves in Barbary and Turkey. Direct objects for the application of this charitable fund, of which the Company were appointed trustees, having failed, Lord Brougham, in 1833, directed the Master to report upon some mode of employing it cy-pres to the original intention of the donor. A report was subsequently made, and confirmed by the Master of the Rolls, applying it to the second object of the testator's bounty, which was in favour of charity schools, and also to a third, for the benefit of necessitated members of the Ironmongers' Company, as a compensation for the trouble in the trust. His Lordship now said it was a matter of uncertainty, where one charitable object failed, whether a subsequent one was or not cy-pres to the first. In this case the third object was a very narrow one, and no guide to the testator's general intentions. He should therefore exclude the third gift, and reverse the decree of the Master of the Rolls, except as far as it declared the object of the first bequest had failed. In place of what was struck out, an order must be substituted, directing the accumulation to be applied for the benefit of charity schools in England and Wales, provided that, according to the expressed wishes of the test

ator, they were in conformity with the Church of England, and that no one school should receive more than 201. a year. The relations, and the parties to the information, were entitled to their costs, but not the crowd of charities which had intervened for the purpose of preferring their claims to a participation of the testator's bounty. His Lordship in conclusion said, that with regard to the Mico Charity, as the trustees had been invited to take part in the discussion, he should not impose costs upon them.

VICE-CHANCELLOR'S
COURT.

Wednesday, May 5.

WALDO v. WALDO.-This was a petition by an equitable tenant for life of certain estates at Heaver, in Kent, without impeachment of waste, who had lately come into possession on the death of a preceding tenant, who had power to cut down only such timber as was necessary for repairs, praying that a sum of 2,6371. 3 per cent. Consols, the produce of a quantity of timber which had been cut down by the trustees, with the consent of the tenant for life, to prevent its falling into decay, might be paid to him.

The Court had sanctioned the act of the trustees, and the dividends had been paid to Mrs. Waldo, the late tenant for life, up to the date of her death. The present petition, therefore raised a question on which no precedent could be found, whether the corpus of the fund on the death of the first tenant for life belonged to the next tenant, unimpeachable for waste, or whether it fell into the inhe ritance.

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