They made no objection; and in their subsequent letter, and in the search for the other codicil, they acted upon it as if it were a genuine instrument. It was not till some time afterwards that they altered their course, and treated it as a forgery. But, according to the rule of practice to which I have before adverted, the Ecclesiastical Court will not grant probate on the sole evidence of the handwriting of a testator, where that is disputed. There must be some confirmatory proof. This confirmatory proof must evidently vary with each particular case; and would require to be more or less stringent according to the weakness or strength of the evidence as to the handwriting. In some of the cases referred to in the arguments at the bar the confirmatory proof appears to have been very slight. We think, however, that there are in this case, in addition to the very strong evidence of handwriting, several circumstances leaving, in the result, no doubt on our minds that the codicil was the act of the testator. It is evident that he had it in contemplation to make a codicil or codicils to his will. This appears as well from the will itself, as from the question put by him to Chadborn at the time of executing it. It is not, indeed, probable that he would have left so very large a property to be enjoyed solely by his executors. There is nothing in the dispositions which it contains to lead us to doubt the genuineness of the instrument; and if it does not notice every person who might naturally have been an object of his bounty, this may be explained by the circumstance of there having been a previous codicil, to which this instrument refers. Several

facts insisted upon to show that the paper was a forgery, tend strongly, upon investigation, to prove that it is the act of the testator; as an instance, I refer to the incorrectness respecting the name of counsel. It is not probable that a person forging such an instrument would have misspelt it, particularly a person who must, from the nature of the dispositions, obviously have been well acquainted with the testator and his connexions. So as to the use of figures instead of words in stating the sums bequeathed to the legatees. A forger would have conformed to the usual practice of the testator. Again: stress was laid upon the peculiar manner in which the x was formed in the word "executors." It is a mere cross, whereas his usual practice was to make an s, and then to cross that letter. But on a careful search, instances have been found among the books and papers of the testator, and which were, as the learned judge observes, very reluctantly produced, of similar deviations from his usual practice, and also of the same inaccuracy in spelling the name of counsel. These are singular and striking coincidences, and there are others of a similar nature strongly confirmatory of the evidence of the handwriting. It is true that these are minute circumstances, but their very minuteness, we think, adds to their importance, and affords the strongest internal evidence of the genuineness of the instrument. It has been observed, and we think justly, that it is not at all probable that a person forging such an instrument would have referred to a former codicil, and thereby unnecessarily increased the means of detection. The very amount, too, of the legacies, and,

above all, the charges against the executors, would almost of necessity lead to opposition. Looking, too, at the different dispositions in the codicil, it is almost impossible to suppose that if the instrument had been a forgery it would not have been detected by some inaccuracy or exposed by some inconsistency. There are other circumstances of confirmation which are not immaterial. It is proved that the testator had by a former will bequeathed a sum of 20,000l. to the city of Gloucester. This was at a period when his circumstances were very different from what they were at the date of the codicil. He had in the interval received large accessions to his property; but unless the codicil be genuine, there is no bequest to the city. In a conversation with Hopkins, in February, 1836, after the date of the codicil, and in the presence of several persons whose names are given, the testator, in allusion to some suggestion made by the witness, stated that he had not forgotten "Old Gloucester," or " Poor old Gloucester." And this corresponds with the evidence of Elizabeth Whalley, who states that on a former occasion he had said "He would do great things for old Gloucester." It is stated, indeed, that he sometimes declared that the corporation should not be the better for him; but his declarations in favour of the city, and particularly that to Hopkins, made after the date of the codicil, agree with the documentary proof and confirm it. Again, in the codicil there is a bequest to a relation, Samuel Wood, of 14,000, and to his family of 6,000l. He had, in fact, six children; the 6,000l. and the 14,0007. make 20,000l. He had given the

sus

same sum (20,000l.) in each of the two preceding bequests to two other relations, Mrs. Goodlake and Thomas Wood. Now it appears, that in a conversation with Samuel Wood, the testator had asked him how many children he had, and the form of this bequest appears to be the result of that conversation, and corresponds with it. These circumstances, more or less weighty, and in particular the internal evidence to which I have referred, are in confirmation of the codicil, and, added to what we consider as the all but conclusive evidence as to the handwriting of this holograph instrument, satisfy us that the codicil was the act of the testator. But then it comes nobody knows whence or from whom. It was sent anonymously to one of the parties claiming under it. This is a circumstance justly calculated to create picion, and would, under ordinary circumstances, have been a most material and formidable objection. But the evidence in this case leads to the conclusion that the papers of the testator have been improperly dealt with. It is proved, as we think, satisfactorily that Chadborn, who had committed, or attempted a fraud, in the annexation of the papers A and B, was in the house of the testator at an early hour on the day after his death, while Osborn and Surman were still in bed. The explanation is insufficient, and at variance with the proof. It is admitted that papers were burnt, and one of them probably of a testamentary character. These circumstances appear to us greatly to weaken the force of the objection. Adverting here again to the charge against the executors, would a person forging such an instrument have

made such a charge? On what grounds? It was not known at the time when the codicil was produced that papers had been burnt; that there had been any thing irregular in the conduct of the parties. They were respectable in station and character. But the misconduct and burning are charged, and it turns out most unexpectedly to be true. The

person, therefore, who produced this paper must have had some knowledge of these transactionssome connexion with them; and this explains the possession of the codicil, and shows why it was not produced from the repositories of the testator. Then as to the alleged cancellation. We think, if this be a genuine instrument, that the onus to make out the fact of cancellation is on those who oppose the codicil. It seems that a corner has been burnt, the paper torn through, and in one place across the signature; but by whom, and under what circumstances, does not appear. There is nothing whatever to show that it was done by the testator, or, if so, with what intention it was done. If it be a genuine instrument it proves that there was also another codicil, and which is not forthcoming. It is obvious, we think, that it must have been improperly dealt with, for if it was defaced by the testator, he would either have entirely destroyed it, or it would have been found in this state among his papers. The circumstance of its being in other hands shows that a fraud has been practised, and that no safe conclusion can be drawn from its appearance that it was burnt or torn by the testator. But even if it had been found among the testator's papers at the time of his death, we in

REEVE v. KENT.-In this case their Lordships decided a question of considerable importance in the construction of the New Will Act. It was an appeal from the Prerogative Court of Canterbury, which, on the 13th of February, 1840 rejected an allegation propounding and praying probate of the will, as it originally stood, of Mr. William Brooke, who died on the 28th of June, 1839, the will bearing date the 15th of July, 1837, with a codicil dated the same year. By the will, the testator empowered each of the persons made tenants for life of his real estates thereby devised, to appoint to the use of any woman he might marry, for her life, as her jointure, 2001. a year, issuing out of the said estates. The will was duly executed under the old law; but on the 28th of June, 1838, he, with a knife, erased this amount of annual jointure, and altered the sum to 1001., writing under the clause of attestation, at the end of the will, a memorandum of what the alterations were, and signing the same; but they were not attested

agreeably to the new act, which came into operation on the 1st of January, 1838. The allegation pleaded these facts, and exhibited the draught of the will, containing the words as they originally stood. The judge in the court below held that, although nothing could be more clear than the intention of the testator namely, to reduce the annual charge upon his estates for jointure from 2007. to 100., yet the alteration not being executed in the presence of two wit nesses, was void under the 21st section of the act, "except so far as the words or effect of the will before such alteration was not apparent;" and the testator having erased the words so as to render the former sum not apparent, he could not pronounce for either, the Court not being at liberty to admit other evidence than appeared on the face of the will itself.

Dr. Lushington delivered the judgment of their Lordships. After considering the state of the law, as to wills of real and personal property prior to the statute, the object which the statute had in view, namely, to provide one uniform mode of executing all wills, and of altering and revoking the same, thereby to do away with the anomalies and distinctions respecting property of different kinds; and after stating the effect of va rious clauses of the act, and observing that the present question related to real property; the learned judge remarked, that the act required by the 20th section, that the revocation of a will," by the burning, tearing or otherwise destroying the same by the testator," should be "with the intention of revoking the same;" and that their Lordships were of opinion that the construction to be

given to the succeeding section (the 21st), as to alterations, was, that the same intention must accompany the acts; otherwise, absurd consequences would follow, since the burning or tearing of a will without intention to revoke would be ineffectual; whereas the alteration of a will without intention to revoke might render ineffectual the most important parts of it. In all cases, under the statute of frauds, as well as under the present act, the intention was indispensable. Under the former statute, burning, tearing, or cancelling sine animo revocandi, were ineffectual, and similar principles must be applied to the present statute, there being nothing in the statute to lead to a contrary interpretation. Then how was the intention of the testator to be ascertained? By precisely the same rules of evidence as whilst the statute of frauds was in force. In the present case, there was sufficient proof, that the testator did not intend to revoke the will ab. solutely, but only to substitute a different sum. The words substituted could not stand, as the alterations were not attested in conformity with the statute; the will must, therefore, stand in its original state.

Their Lordships consequently reversed the decree in the court below, retained the cause, admitted the allegation which had been rejected, and rejected the allegation given in in this court, and as there could be no doubt as to the facts, the counsel would agree to probate being granted at once.

This was assented to, and probate of the will was granted as it originally stood.

COURT OF CHANCERY.

RULES, ORDERS, AND REGULATIONS MADE BY THE LORD CHANCELLOR, WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS, RELATIVE TO THE FORMS AND MODE OF PROCEEDING IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY.

Order of Court, Aug. 26, 1841.

The Right Hon. Charles Christopher, Lord Cottenham, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, by and with the advice and assistance of the Right Hon. Henry, Lord Langdale, Master of the Rolls, doth hereby, in pursuance of an Act of Parliament passed in the fourth year of the reign of her present Majesty, entitled "An Act for facilitating the Administration of Justice in the Court of Chancery," and of an Act passed in the fourth and fifth years of the reign of her present Majesty, entitled "An Act to amend an Act of the fourth year of her present Majesty, entitled An Act for facilitating the Administration of Justice in the Court of Chancery,'" order and direct in manner following; that is to say

1. That there shall forthwith be prepared a proper alphabetical book for the purposes after-mentioned, and that such book shall be called the solicitors' book, and shall be publicly kept at the office of the Six Clerks, to be there inspected without fee or reward.

2. That every solicitor, before he practise in this court in his own name solely, and not by an agent, whose name shall be duly entered as after-mentioned, and every solicitor, before he practise as such agent, shall cause to be entered in

the solicitors' book, in alphabetical order, his name and place of business, or some other proper place, in London, Westminster, or the borough of Southwark, or within two miles of Lincoln's-inn-hall, where he may be served with writs, notices, orders, warrants, rules, and other documents, proceedings, and written communications, in causes and matters depending in this court; and as often as any such solicitor shall change his place of business, or the place where he may be served as aforesaid, he shall cause a like entry thereof to be made in the solicitors' book; and that the above-mentioned entries shall be made in such book by the said six clerks, who shall be entitled to a fee of 1s. for every such entry; and that the fund arising from such payment shall be applied, in the first instance, in paying the expenses of providing and keeping such book.

3. That all writs, notices, orders, warrants, rules, and other documents, proceedings, and written communications, which do not require personal service upon the party to be affected thereby, shall be deemed sufficiently served if such document, or a copy thereof, as the case may be, shall be left at the place lastly entered in the solicitors' book by the solicitor of such party; and if any solicitor shall neglect to cause such entry to be made in the solicitors' book as is required by the second order, then the fixing up a copy of any such writ, notice, order, warrant, rule, or other document, proceeding, or written communication, for such solicitor in the said Six Clerks' office shall be deemed a sufficient service on him, unless the Court shall, under special circumstances, think fit to direct otherwise.