true that we felt triumph at the supposed humiliation of France. Though she had been called our natural enemy, and we had been long and warmly engaged in conflict with her, he did not believe, that there was any wish on the part of this community to see her power or authority curtailed, or that there would be any rejoicing here at any reverses which might befal her. At the same time he was not prepared to say, that the policy which had been pursued, of attempting the settling of the eastern question was not justified by necessity. We could not disguise from ourselves the peculiar relative position of the Russian empire and of Constantinople. Now, if in the present instance we had refused to interfere, and if Russia really entertained the ambitious designs imputed to her, where was the security against her taking upon herself the exclusive protection of the Turkish empire? If, in consequence of this, she should gain possession of Constantinople, would the honourable member for London look on such an event with complacency? He would advocate, in that event, our dispossessing her by force; but was it not wise to adopt that policy which would prevent Russia from getting there, and prevent our being compelled to go to war with Russia on ground where she must have a great advantage over us? It might be no easy matter to make the evacuation of Constantinople by Russia one condition of peace with us. The cooperation of France in the settlement of this question would undoubtedly have been of inestimable value; but if four great powers of Europe, acting, as he might assume, with perfect integrity, were convinced that the geVOL. LXXXIII,

neral interests of Europe required active intervention, he was not prepared to say, that the refusal of one power to co-operate with them made it necessary for them to desist, otherwise that single power might acquire an undue preponderance in the affairs of Europe, and might be tempted to extend its influence beyond the due range. He would, therefore, suspend his opinion with respect to the convention, till the house received such further information as the ministers had to give; in the meantime it would be injustice to join in the censure pronounced by the amendment on the parties to that treaty. He could make every allowance for the sensitive and susceptible feeling with which the French people might naturally regard a revival of the alliance of 1814, though there was really no analogy in principle between the two treaties. The circumstances of the past history of France rendered it especially necessary that there should have been no want of courtesy shown her in the late negotiation. Now, there was one part of the proceedings which had given him great concern. It appeared, that up to the 14th July, the day before the treaty was signed, M. Guizot was kept in ignorance of what was going on. He thought, considering the character of M. Guizot, and his friendly disposition towards England, it would have been well to have apprised him, in the most temperate and conciliatory way, of what was about to be done. Such a course would have given much less offence than that which had been adopted, of first signing the treaty, and then communicating the fact. The right honourable baronet then protested against parliament having been allowed to [C]

separate last year without information having been given to it of the events then in progress. If such conduct were to become a precedent, it would undermine the authority of parliament. He agreed with those who had expressed regret at the omission of all mention of France in the speech. Such an expression would have involved no concession, and could not have been ascribed to any but the real cause. He sincerely hoped that the clouds which now overhung Europe would soon disperse. He deprecated war as the most mischievous of all caJamities; it would be attended by the addition of taxation, the waste of capital, the revival of bad passions, and other most disastrous consequences. It was said that the eastern question was settled, but he considered that a thousand questions might yet arise and create difficulties, and that no settlement could be efficacious unless they could still prevail upon France to become a party to it. He thought that there was nothing to prevent our now taking fresh steps, and inviting the interference of France. Their recent success afforded a favourable opportunity, without involving any derogatory concessions, for again appealing to France to join with us, and enter into our plans for the interests of the Porte, and for the peace of Europe. Sir Robert Peel then referred to a letter written by marshal Soult on 17th July, 1839, in which he laid great stress upon the importance of preserving the integrity of the Ottoman empire as an essential element of the balance of power; and concluded by saying, that he was convinced that if there were any two men who would desire to shun an unnecessary conflict with England, they were marshal Soult and M.

Guizot. He ran some risk of doing them an injury by the compliment he was now paying them; but he could not refrain from expressing his hope that these two distinguished men might be successful in maintaining peace, and rescuing both France and England from the calamity of renewed hostilities.

Viscount Palmerston said, that in the concluding part of sir Robert Peel's speech he fully concurred; indeed, he had gone further than the right honourable baronet on this question, and had had, on former occasions, to stand up and justify himself against the charge of attaching too much importance to the connection. He was persuaded, when the French people came to regard this subject with cooler temper and more deliberate reflection, that they would see there had been no disposition to treat them with unfairness, and that they would come round to that better frame of feeling towards England which was so ardently to be desired. He was ready to admit and to declare, that France, possessed as she was of vast naval and military power, and placed as she was geographically in the centre of Europe, could not be excluded from the great affairs of Europe, and that no transaction could be completely or securely settled unless she were in one way or other a party to it. With respect to the allegation of sir Robert Peel, that sufficient court had not been paid to France, in consequence of the omission to apprise her minister that the treaty was about to be completed, the noble lord contended that there was no ground for such a charge-that every endeavour had been made to obtain the co-operation of France

that concessions had been offered, and that, after the repeated refusals

which she had given to be a party to the arrangement, it would have been a mere mockery to have again called upon her to revoke her refusal that it would have implied that our former answer to her was not sincere, and would have been, in fact, an act of incivility instead of a measure of conciliation. Moreover, it must be obvious to all who had read the French debates, that if such a course had been pursued, it would have defeated the success of the measures. The avowed object of the French government was to gain time by means of negotiation; and if the four powers had acted in the manner suggested, and lost time by submitting the treaty for the consent of France, her object of procrastination would have been answered, and all operations for that year effectually prevented. The right honourable baronet had said that Parliament ought not to have been allowed to separate last year without having had the engage ments laid before it into which the country was about to enter. To have laid the treaty itself before parliament, before its ratification by the contracting parties, was im possible; but as to the general nature of the treaty, it had become matter of public notoriety before parliament separated, and had been twice the subject of discussion in that house. Any member, therefore, had it in his power to pass an opinion either of censure or approval upon these arrangements. It would be the duty of the government hereafter to lay before the house such facts as would enable it to form a deliberate conclusion upon these matters. His noble friend lord John Russell had stated, in so able and impressive a manner, the general outline of the grounds on which their policy had rested,

that it was only necessary to refer to his speech for its justification. The object of that policy was to avert events which would have involved the great powers in the most serious difficulties; its success was more rapid and complete than those who were best informed on such matters could have ventured to expect. With respect to the omission of all mention of France in the address, it was not because the government did not feel sincere regret at her not being a party to the treaty, but because it would have been unusual, and inconsistent with the ordinary principle on which speeches from the throne were framed, to have expressed regret at the interruption of a good understanding which had not been marked by any diplomatic event. If either country had withdrawn its minister, or taken any distinct step interrupting the diplomatic relations of the two countries, that would have been a public act of which the crown might have taken notice; but to have noticed the mere existence of an irritation which had been manifested in various ways, would have been inconsistent with the usual rules on which such documents were framed. The debate here terminated, Mr. Hume withdrew his amendment, and the address was agreed to, and referred to a committee.

It has probably rarely happened of late years that the debate on the opening of parliament has been marked by so complete an omission of all topics of domestic concern, as on this occasion. Foreign politics engrossed the entire attention of both houses, and the ministers completely succeeded in what we think was obviously their design in framing the royal speech-that

of avoiding any issue which might have involved a trial of strength with the opposite benches, and choosing for their battle-field a question on which little hazard of a conflict could be anticipated. Desiring to secure a favourable and auspicious opening for the new campaign, they prudently took their stand upon that branch of their policy of which the present results at least had been confessedly brilliant and decisive. The consciousness of numerical weakness prompted them, on the other hand, to observe a cautious silence in the speech upon topics nearer home, a discussion upon which might have led to a less favourable result, and might have weakened the precarious tenure on which they held their power. With respect to that question which thus formed the almost exclusive subject of debate the treaty of July, and the operations which followedwe think it will be generally agreed, upon a candid review of the arguments by which lord Brougham and Mr. Grote on the one side attacked, and viscounts Melbourne, and Palmerston, and lord John Russell on the other defended, the ministerial policy, that the justification of the measures of the government was on the whole satisfactory and complete. It was clearly shown, we think, that while no exclusive advantages for England were aimed at by the measures pursued, her interest, as identified with those of the great commonwealth of European powers, had been wisely consulted, and that her interference had been imperatively required to preserve the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire, an object which, by the common consent of the great powers of Europe, and in the opinion of the wisest

statesmen, was an essential element to the balance of European power, under the peculiar circumstances in which Turkey and Russia were relatively situated. Nothing was established which could justly impeach the sincerity and good faith of the latter power in these transactions, and though it was objected, with some show of plausibility, that it was absurd to suppose that any additional security against the designs of Russia could be gained by operations in which Russia herself was a leading agent, yet, on the other hand, there is irresistible force in the reasonings by which lord John Russell and sir Robert Peel demonstrated the formidable consequences which might have resulted to the other powers of Europe if, while they remained passive, the sultan had been driven by the terror of his encroaching vassal to throw himself upon the exclusive support of Russia, which would have led to the establishment of that power in the exclusive protectorate of the Turkish empire. We think it will be equally clear, in the judgment of those who may hereafter peruse the history of these transactions, that France had really no just cause for complaint or angry feeling on account of her exclusion from a share in the arrangements of the other powers. That exclusion was entirely her own act, and her conduct from first to last, in these transactions, only deserves to be characterised as petulant, selfish, and inconsistent; while the attempt to excite the sensitive feeling of nationality among her people against England, as having wounded her honour and thrown slight upon her dignity, was justly condemned by some of the speakers in this debate, as in the highest degree unworthy of her govern,

ment. The objection suggested by sir Robert Peel, that more regard might have been shown to the situation and personal feelings of M. Guizot, by apprising him beforehand of the intended completion of the treaty, seems to us, if not entirely cleared up by the explanation of viscount Palmerston, yet not materially to alter the merits of the case, far less to vindicate the spirit with which these transactions were resented by the French nation. But in whatever light the conduct of France may be viewed, we cannot but regard the language used with reference to her, by the leading speakers in both houses, as both admirably prudent and welltimed in their pacific effect, and as exhibiting a spirit of forbearance and magnanimity truly worthy of British statesmen. The anxious regard for the honour and true interests of our ancient rival manifested by such men as the duke of Wellington and sir Robert Peel, could not but produce a most tranquillising and beneficial result on the public mind on both sides of the channel, while the earnest desire which they expressed for her restoration to her rightful share in the counsels and operations of the powers of Europe, was peculiarly dignified and becoming, both as uttered in the flush of a success achieved without her assistance, and as a striking contrast to the petulant and irritable spirit which a large portion of the French nation had so recently displayed towards Great Britain. Practically such expressions as these made ample amends for the omission, so much commented on, of all aliusion to France in the royal speech, for which the very unsubstantial technicality pleaded by viscount Palmerston will probably be scarcely deemed

a valid apology, as indeed there can be little doubt that it was not the operative reason. To soothe the wounded feelings of our neighbour was, therefore, a task which devolved upon, and was certainly most adequately discharged by, the statesmen in opposition to the government.

Another omission in the royal speech was afterwards made the subject of observation. On the bringing up of the report on the address, sir R. H. Inglis called the attention of the government to the recent alarming agitation of the repeal question in Ireland, and to the inflammatory language held by Mr. O'Connell on that subject. Large meetings had been held in some of the principal towns of Ireland, at which hundreds of thousands had been present. The Irish government had thought it necessary to move troops to the support of the civil power, in consequence of these proceedings. Mr. O'Connell had recently said, that the repeal of the union was now become a vital question, and that every man henceforth must take his stand as a conservative or a repealer. He wished to know if the noble lord (lord John Russell) was prepared to adopt this alternative; if so, to which division he meant to attach himself.

Lord John Russell answered, that though, in his opinion, a notice of subjects of this kind was in some cases called for in the royal speech, there were others in which such mention served only to give additional weight and importance to the agitators of popular feeling, and was consequently better avoided. His noble friend the lordlieutenant of Ireland had recently spoken out in very plain terms on this subject, and that might be