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troops should occupy them the same day they retake possession of Hanover. On a little further conversa. tion, I had little doubt that were England to provide in any other manner for his Sicilian majesty, the king might add the Hans Towns and their territories, in full sovereignty to his German dominions.

The proposition about the Ilans Towns being entirely new, I promised to refer it without any comment to you for his majesty's consideration.

I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed)
Yarmouth.

No. XVIII. Extract from a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yar. mouth, dated Downing-street, July 5, 1806.

Downing-street, July 5, 1806.
MY LORD,

Your lordship's dispatches of the Ist instant, were received here early yesterday morning, and I lose no time in apprizing you of his majesty's commands upon the present state of the discussion with the French government.

The abandonment of Sicily is a point on which it is impossible for his majesty to concede. Your lord ship has already stated unanswerably to M. Talleyrand, that this demaud is inconsistent with his express declarations, and with the whole principle on which the negotiation rests. It is, besides, a proposal in itself quite inadmissible. The king's troops occupy Sicily for its defence, but with no right to cede it to France. It is not casy to contend, that the possession of Sicily can be necessary to that of Naples; nor, if it were so, could that be assigned as a reason for his majesty's

consenting to abandon that island, which he may justly hope his naval and military forces will be able to defend against all attacks. The Hans Towns could not, in the present circumstances, answer the purpose of an equivalent for Sicily, even if there were not other obvious objections to such a proposal. Nor would it be possible that any solid basis for the public tranquillity of Europe could be established on the idea thrown out to you by M. Talleyrand, of leaving Great Britain and France at liberty to prosecute the war against the allies of cach other; a state of things in which their respective fleets and armies would in fact be as much opposed to each other, as they are now, and the peace between them would be merely

nominal.

It is, therefore, to be hoped, that the French government will revert to its original proposals with which your lordship was charged by M. Talleyrand. To that basis of negotiation it must be your lordship's endeavour to recal him; and if, unfortunately, you should find this to be impracticable, nothing can remain but that you should state, in perfectly civil, but decided terms, that you are not at liberty to treat on any other ground, and must therefore desire your passports to return to England.

I have stated in my last letters the different ideas that had occurred here for combining our negotiation with that of Russia; providing, at the same time, for the safety of Sweden and Portugal.

Until we are informed what other proposal is made in this respect by M. Talleyrand, I can only desire that your lordship will keep this subject in view, so as not to admit

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I had the honour to receive your dispatch of the 5th instant early, yesterday morning, and as soon as possible after waited upon M. Talleyrand to communicate to him that the offer made by France was by no means admissible, and that I had no authority to listen to any proposals whatsoever for the restoration of peace till he should desist from all pretensions to the island of Sicily.

M. Talleyrand not being willing to make any such declaration, I asked him to give me a passport to return to London he desired me to wait one day, till he should again have taken the emperor's orders.

I accordingly returned this morning, when he desired me to propose Dalmatia, Albania, and Ragusa, as an indemnity for the loss of Sicily to his Sicilian majesty; to this I answered that as a messenger was returning I should communicate this proposition, but that it by no means authorized me to expect an answer, and therefore I must beg leave to return to England.

Had M. d'Oubril not been here I should immediately have insisted on passports.

I must now inform you that on Monday, M. Talleyrand took me aside and told me that the tele

graph announced the landing of Basilico, expressing at the same time. a wish that the dispatches he would bring might lead to peace. I answered that I could expect no such result whilst France demanded Sicily; and added, that if I might believe public report, the emperor, so far from shewing any pacific disposition,every day threw new obstacles in the way.

I then mentioned the changes in Germany. M. Talleyrand said that they were determined upon but should not be published if peace took place. He has since repeated this to M. d'Oubril and myself, saying if peace was made, Germany should remain in its present state.

M. d'Oubril writes both to you and to the comte de Strogonoff; his letters will probably contain more than mine, as I conversed very little with M. Talleyrand. I felt on very delicate ground. Had I entered sufficiently into the question of indemnities for the king of Sicily, to obtain a precise idea to what extent they could be carried, monsieur de Talleyrand might have formed an opinion that I had some instruction, and was prepared to abandon Sicily whenever I was assured of sufficient compensation.

No. XX.

Extract from a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth, dated Downing-Street, July 18, 1806.

Downing street, July 18, 1806..
MY LORD,

Your lordship's last dispatches have been received, and considered with all the attention which their importance naturally demanded.

It is unnecessary for me to recal to your lordship's recollection that

the demand of Sicily, in whatever shape it may be brought forward by France, is an express contradiction to the offers originally made to your lordship by M. Talleyrand. But it is material that this topic should never be lost sight of in the course of these discussions; and that your lordship should observe to M. Talleyrand that whatever difficulty now obstructs the conclusion of the negociation, arises solely from this unexpected departure from the basis originally established.

An exchange is now offered for Sicily, and it is in that view, and not in that of an absolute and uncompensated cession, that the question is to be considered. In this shape of the business it is obvious that the value of that exchange must be to be judged of, not only by this country and by Russia, but also by his Sicilian majesty. As the king, whose troops were admitted into Sicily for its defence and protection, naturally feels insuperable objections to any proposal for abandoning that island, unless with the free and full consent of its sovereign, and in consequence of such an arrangement as should provide for his interests by a compensation really satisfactory both in point of value and of security.

The plan of creating for him a new kingdom, to consist of Dalmatia, Ragusa, and Albania, does not appear likely to answer this description. Albania, which forms so large a part of this proposed sovereignty, is now a province of the Turkish empire; the dismemberment of which it is a principal object of the policy both of Great Britain and Russia to prevent. That province has indeed been frequently involved in the same sort of confusion which prevails in many other parts of that empire. But this

circumstance only increases the diffi. culty of giving any consistence to a state to be formed out of such materials. It does not lessen the other objections to such a plan.

There are in like manner many and strong objections to that part of the proposal which respects Ragusa, an independent state whose territory has never been ceded to France by any treaty, and of which she can consequently have no right to dis. pose, her, occupation of it being indeed of very recent date.

But even with Albania and Ragusa and much more without them, his majesty secs no hope that such a power could be formed in that quar. ter as would, either in extent of territory or in amount of revenue, afford the means of opposing any barrier for Austria, or Turkey, or even of maintaining its own independence.

What advantage then could be gained to the allies by creating a nominal kingdom, without any suf ficient power either to reduce the countries of which it would be composed under any uniform system of government, or to defend itself against the first attack which may be made upon it from without.

If there could, with the consent of his Sicilian majesty, be any question of an exchange for Sicily, by the creation of a new state in that quarter, it is obvious that this could no otherwise be done than by annexing to Dalmatia not only the whole of Istria, but also a very large propor. tion, if not the whole of the Venetian states, including, if possible, the city of Venice itself. In some such shape as this it is possible that the proposition might be rendered not wholly unacceptable to his Sicilian majesty. And although the inte

rests

rests of this country separately would be far less consulted by such a plan than by the continued occupation of Sicily, yet the sense which the Russian minister at Paris appears to entertain of the advantage which might result from it to Austria and to Russia from the recovery of Dalmatia, if it were well combined with future arrangements of defence, might induce his majesty to accede to proposals of this description; on the supposition above mentioned of a bona fide consent on the part of his Sicilian majesty.

There appears, however, so little probability of inducing France so to extend her offer, that any further discussion of it might scarcely have been worth pursuing, had not M. d'Oubril so strongly expressed his wish, that this court might rather seek to temporize than abruptly to break off a negotiation now brought to a state which affords so little promise of success. It is only in compliance with that desire that his majesty has been pleased to direct your lordship to continue the conferences with M. Talleyrand, so as to ascertain whether any more practical shape can be given to the proposal of an exchange for Sicily. If this cannot be done, your lordship's attention will then, of course, be directed to the object of recalling the French government to the basis on which the negotiation was originally placed by themselves, and on which his majesty is still ready to conclude it.

M. d'Oubril has stated to count Strogonoff the proposals which have been made to him for the conclusion of a separate peace, and the inducements which, he thinks, might lead his majesty to judge such an arrangement useful to the general

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interests of Europe. His majesty has undoubtedly been at all times ready to make great sacrifices for those interests; but very little expectation is entertained here, that Russia could, in such course, obtain any effectual security for them, at a time when so much new danger is to be apprehended, and in so many quarters, from the projects of France with respect to Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, the Porte, Spain, and Portugal.

In the present circumstances of Europe, the last hope of averting these dangers is to be found in the union of the only two powers on whom France has yet made no impression, Great Britain and Russia.

And although the mutual good dispositions and confidence of those two powers should in fact rcmain, (as his majesty trusts they would) unimpaired by the difference of the situation in which a separate peace would place them, yet it is obvious that the enemy would build the most extensive hopes on that foundation, and would be more encouraged by that, than by any other circumstance that could be stated, to proceed in the execution of the plans already announced to your lordship and to M. d'Oubril.

His majesty, therefore, directs that you should express to that minister how material it is in every case, that the two courts should continue to combine their measures both of peace and war, and that no expectation should be held out to the enemy of sucess in any endeavour to conclude a separate peace with either of the allies; a line to which, as your lordship will have informed M. d'Oubril, his majesty has, on his part, strictly adhered.

No. XXI.

No. XXI.

Extract from a Dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, July 19, 1806.-Received July 22.

I

Sir, Paris, July 19, 1806. On the 10th general Clarke was named plenipotentiary to treat with monsieur d'Oubril: they have since had daily conferences of many hours; yesterday of fourteen. bear every where that peace will be signed to-morrow between Russia and France. On the 17th M. d'Oubril admitted to me that he had produced his powers, and that if conditions, such as he should judge necessary to ensure the repose of the continent could be obtained, he should sign a truce of ten months; and this night, on pressing him, and remonstrating both upon his con. duct, and the impropriety of disguising his intention, I drew from him these words, which I wrote down in his presence. voyant le danger immédiat de l'Autriche si'l pouvoit la sauver il croiroit de son devoir de la faire, même par une paix particulière." All he now appears to claim is the return of troops from Germany; and if he is willing to make peace on re ceiving an assurance that orders to that effect should be sent, nobody can doubt but that it will be signed, and probably not a battalion make a retrograde movement of fifty miles.

66 * Que

M. Talleyrand says, that M. d'Oubril is willing to abandon Sicily and Dalmatia, and even to engage to solicit the junction of the former to Naples, &c.

I have used every argument to dissuade M. d'Oubril from so unadvised and unwise a measure, I hope, more than I believe, with success. Indeed, I feared from the first hour I met him, that he was come determined to make a peace, good or bad, with or without Great Britain. I may, perhaps, gain a day, which may be a great deal, if that day should produce dispatches from M. de Strogonoff.

On the 17th, at night, the new arrangements for Germany were finally determined upon. The princes and the ministers who signed were scarce allowed time to read the deed.

There is a considerable army forming at Bayonne: thirty thou sand men are there already. This army is ostensibly destined against Portugal, but will take Spain likewise. M. Herman, one of the secretarics of the foreign office, set off for Lisbon with a mission on the 13th.

All the officers of the army now in Germany, received yesterday orders to join their regiments instantly. The court say, this is to have troops to occupy the states seized by the new confederacy. The public ascribe this measure to a desire to frighten the emperor of Germany; and myself, to a wish to hurry M. d'Oubril, who has shewn so much anxiety for the evacuation of Germany.

M. d'Oubril and M. Talleyrand have, as I have learnt, fixed upon Majorca, Ivica, and Minorca, for his Sicilian majesty, if they can prevail upon us to evacuate Sicily.

I have the honour to be, sir, &c.
Yarmouth:

"That being aware of the immediate danger of Austria, if it was in his power to save it, he should think it his duty to do so, even by a separate peace."

No. XXI.

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