with the new republic. From that era to the period of which we treat, the policy of Prussia, pursued with equal assiduity and success, had been to maintain peace with all her neighbours, to cultivate her alliancé with France, and to extend her influence and dominions in Germany. Her acquisitions of territory in that country were not, indeed, of much importance, when compared with her share of the spoils of Poland, which she had gained by her alliance with the opposite party; but her weight and influence in the empire were greatly increased during her connexion with republican France. One half of the states of the empire were detached from their lawful obedience to her rival, and united in a formal confederation under her protection. Her influence in the electoral college was so much greater than that of Austria, that she might reasonably aspire, on the first vacancy of the empire, to place her sovereign on the throne of the Cæsars. Her dominions were rich and prosperous, and had flourished in peace, while other states were exposed to the desolations or exhausted by the burthens of war.

But, notwithstanding these advantages, which Prussia had derived from her pacific system, it may be questioned, whether she had acted upon it in a manner conducive to her reputation and permanent advantage, or with due regard to the peculiar circumstances of her situation, To a military power, like Prussia, whose consequence and even existence depended on her army, the long continuance of peace, while her neigh bours were engaged in hostilities, could got but in the end be dangerous if not destructive. The numbers and outward show of her army

might be maintained in peace, but its strength and spirit could be preserved only in actual service. When accordingly the unfortunate day arrived for making trial of the Prussian army against the veterans, who had fought and conquered Austria, it was found, that the Prussian soldiers were unprepared for the dangers and fatigues of war, their offi cers were without experience, and their generals, enfeebled by age, were confounded by the tactics familiar to their opponents.

It was not, however, in the decline of her military system alone, a decline the more dangerous because the less suspected, that Prussia had prepared in peace the causes of her sudden eclipse in war. Her admi nistration at home and consideration abroad had been equally impaired during this interval. Her sovereign, with excellent intentions, and with no bad passions to mislead him, was diffident of his own abilities, incapable of acting from himself, and surrounded by ministers, unworthy of his confidence, and unfit for the high situations to which they were raised. The greater part of them had been clerks of office under the Great Frederick, and were not only incapable of advising any generous, bold, or magnanimous resolution, but destitute of capacity, vigour and decision for the most ordinary business, to a degree hardly credible. To such counsellors it was owing, that the weight and consideration, which Prussia had gained as a state of the empire, she had lost throughout Europe that her policy had been narrow, crooked, and ambiguous; that her ambition had appeared mean and sordid, restrained by fear, but never under the control of principle; that she had obliged

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no party, and offended all, the French by the coldness of her friendship, the allies by her desertion of their cause; that she was at last compelled to go to war, without an urgent motive, or attainable object or adequate preparation, by the universal hatred and contempt into which she had fallen; and, that when ruined by the contest so foolishly begun, the spectacle of her overthrow softened the regrets of those, who most lamented the success, and feared the progress of her conquerors.

The ill-advised and disastrous coalition of 1805 was the touchstone to try the capacity, conduct, and decision of the Prussian cabinet. It was clearly the interest of Prussia to have preserved, if possible, the peace of the continent; and such was the respect entertained for her military power, that an early and unequivocal declaration from her might have prevented the revival of hostilities. But, that opportunity being neglected, when the intentions of Austria and Russia to risk their last stake against France could no longer be doubted, it became a matter of serious import to Prussia to adopt some determinate system in the approaching war, and to adhere to it steadily. It suited the indecision of her sovereign and the incapacity of his ministers, to prefer a system of neutrality, because it led to procrastination and called for no immediate exertions, while it sufficiently gratified their self importance, to emit threats and declarations against any power, that should dare to violate the integrity of the Prussian territory. It may be questioned, whether, supposing it possible for Prussia to have maintained her neutrality, it was her interest to remain neutral, when so great a con.

test was impending, the event of which must determine, who were to be in future the masters of the continent, the French or the allies. For, whichever party prevailed, it was easy to foresee, that Prussia would be soon reduced to the necessity of fighting with, or receiving laws from the conqueror. If France was near attaining universal empire, was it not the interest of Prussia to have taken part against her, in the last effort of the powers of Europe, to set bounds to her ambition, though she might disapprove of the attempt as premature, and doubt of its success? or, if she thought the enterprize utterly hopeless and desperate, was it not a preferable policy, with a view to her own interest and selfish politics, to join with France in the war, approve herself an active and efficient ally, merit the consideration and respect of her associate, and share in her conquests? But, having determined on neutrality, the greatest error that Prussia could afterwards commit, was to be diverted from her resolution. If it was impolitic to quarrel with France before the violation of Anspach, it was more impolitic still to quarrel with her after the surrender of Ulm. Yet, such was the fantastic importance annexed to the court of Berlin, to the inviolability of its territory, that Prussia, which, some weeks before, had been arming to oppose the passage of the Russian troops through her dominions in Poland, was induced to enter into negociations and take measures for a war with France, because a body of French troops, by passing through the Prussian territory of Anspach, had surrounded the Austrian army at Ulm, and compelled it to capitulate. As far as ber honour was concerned in exacting reparation

reparation for the violation of her territory, ample atonement was spontaneously offered by the French. The question for her consideration was, therefore, a point of interest and policy, not of honour and character; but on prudential grounds, it is clear, that, whatever were her motives for not taking part originally with the allies, they must have been strengthened and confirmed by the disasters at Ulm.

The violation of the Prussian territory of Anspach by the French troops under Bernadotte tock place on the 3d of October; on the 17th of the same month Ulm capitulated; and on the 3d of November, a con. vention was signed at Potzdam, by which the king of Prussia agreed to offer his mediation between France and the allies, for the restoration of a general peace on a permanent footing ;" and in case his propositions were rejected, he engaged after receiving a promise of subsidies from England to declare war against France. In this interval various events had marked the displeasure of the court of Berlin at the violation of its territory, and shewn how materially that affair had changed its politics, and given them a turn hostile to France and favourable to the allies. A proclamation had assured the subjects of Prussia in Franconia, that their sovereign was taking measures to obtain satisfaction and security for the unexpected and forcible violation of his neutrality and an angry note had been delivered by baron Hardenberg to the French mission at Berlin, in

answer to their justification of that transaction; expressing the surprise and indignation of his Prussian majesty at such an outrage having been committed in his territories, after the exemplary fidelity, with which he had kept his engagements to France, and the advantages which she had derived from his firmness; declaring, that he now considered himself absolved by her conduct from all past engagements, and that he would henceforward direct his efforts to the reestablishment of peace on a solid basis; and concluding with an intimation, that in the mean time he found himself compelled to order his armies to occupy positions necessary for the protection of his states. In addition to this menacing language, the Prussian army was put in motion; the permission of marching through the Prussian territories, which had been so long withheld from the Russians, was no longer denied; the emperor Alexander was received at Potzdam with every demonstra tion of confidence and cordiality; and the French ambassador, marshal Duroc, who had been sent to make reparation for the affair of Anspach, was suffered to depart from Berlin without accomplishing the object of his mission.

We presume not to give an opinion of the wisdom of the court of Berlin in thus departing from the policy, which had hitherto directed its conduct; but, we are confident, that having manifested so unequivo. cally its inclination to favour the allies, it ought not, in the present

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critical situation of their affairs, to have delayed an instant longer than was necessary for collecting its forces, to commence hostilities against the French. Instead of such prompt and vigorous measures, with that irresolution and indecision of character, which is the surest mark of incapacity for great affairs, the advisers of his Prussian majesty negociated, when they should have acted, and chese for their negociator a man without firmness, capacity or resources, slow and dilatory in business, Barrowand perplexed in his understanding, of a character at once liable to the impressions of fear, and open to the insinuations of flattery, and of opinions diametrically opposite to the system, which he was now sent to enforce. Hangwitz repaired to the head quarters of the French army, and had an audience of Bonaparte on the 28th of November, at which the latter manifested a disposition to accept the Prussian mediation, but annexed conditions to his assent, which the king of Prussia could not admit. While the negociation was thas protracted, the battle of Austerlitz was fought, the armistice concluded, and the coalition dissolved.

The Prussian troops had taken the field and begun their march to the scene of action, when the news of the armistice stopped their progress. Unwilling to embark alone in a contest with a victorious army, elated with its double triumph over the soldiers of Austria and Russia,

the court of Berlin had again recourse to negociation. Majorgeneral von Pfuhl was dispatched to the French head quarters, with instructions to signify, that Prussia was now ready to accept the propositions which she had formerly rejected, and with orders to add, "that his Prussian majesty would consider the occupation of Hanover by French troops, as an act of hostility."* But, previously to the arrival of von Pfuhl at the place of his destination, Haugwitz had signed a definitive treaty at Vienna, † by which Prussia, from being the friend and ally of the coalesced powers, and almost the open and declared enemy of France, became the ally of the latter, the guarantee of her conquests in Germany, and her associate in the spoils of the van. quished and baffled coalition. How this extraordinary change was brought about, is yet unexplained. We have yet to learn, whether Haugwitz was gained by flattery, or terrified by threats into so scandalous an abandonment of the trust reposed in him. We have been merely told, that "the French emperor proposed to him a treaty in which was stipulated, on the one side, a mutual guarantee of possessions, the inviolability of the Turkish territory, and the ratifica tion of whatever should be concluded at Presburg; and, on the other, the annexation of Hanover to Prussia, in return for the cession of three provinces ;" and that a treaty to that effect was signed by

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