lord Yarmomth, but really it was not fitting that he should have been sent to treat with such a man as Talleyrand. As to the basis of the uti possidetis, the whole controversy on that point lay between the assertions of that noble lord and Talleyrand. A written note would have made the matter clear, and it was very inconsiderate in government not to have insisted on this. But, the fact was, that Mr. Fox did not like to put the question suddenly. He was afraid he might lose his favourite object; following the policy of a man with a woman, he did not ask her the question broadly at once, lest she would have slapped the door in his face. As to the other noble lord entrusted with the negotiation, from his intimacy with the Brissotines who had since put their king to death, and the patience with which he listened within the walls of the national as. sembly, to the projects for the de. struction of England, he could not think him a fit person to be charged with the interests of his country in this negotiation. He blamed the dalliance in which our two plenipotentiaries had been kept. Their situation was no better than that of prisoners. Why did not lord Lau. derdale demand a categorical answer at once? He had only to say, "This is the basis on which we shall treat," and then he would have had a plain answer, Aye or No. In short, our ministers had been bam. boozled from beginning to end. He had no doubt but lord Lauderdale had done his duty, though, having sat quietly in the Cyclops' cave, while the thunderbolts of war were forging against his country, he could not appear to him to have been a proper person to be entrusted with the negotiation. Mr. Montague joined heartily in that part of the address which pledged every heart and hand to the defence of the country. Let ministers,he said, be vigilant and attentive, and they should have his support: not uniform and unqualified support, for he thought it might be right to keep them alert by admonition and castigation, but qualified and rational support according as they should be found to deserve it. Mr. Whitbread, in a very long and elaborate speech, expressed his full conviction that the chief of the French government was desirous, and the ministers of France sincere in their wishes for peace; that an opportunity had been lost of making peace on terms both honourable and advantageous; that the negotiation had been broken off by the govern ment of this country prematurely and unnecessarily; and that with greater prudence and candour, and a little more patience, skill and address on our part, we should have found France ready to grant such terms as his majesty's ministers ought to have accepted. In reply to the strictures that had been made by Mr. Montague, on the choice of the earl of Lauderdale as a negotiator from this country to France, he observed that the leaders of the different re volutionary factions there had expiated their crimes by their blood. But if, to the various qualifications for such a situation possessed by his noble friend, his extensive informa tion, his indefatigable industry, his acknowledged talents, and inflexible integrity, could be added an actual acquaintance with the persons and characters of some of those with whom whom he might have to transact business of such importance; surely, in the eyes of any reasonable man, this circumstance decided the preference in his favour. It was not any disposition to ogle for peace, as Mr. M. had called it, that had induced Mr. Fox to give information of the circumstance which gave rise to his first letter to M. Talleyrand. It was the spontaDeous act of his noble and generous heart,influenced by no motive but that of the pure and exalted benevolence with which it at all times overflowed. Had he then thought peace as impossible as it was now represented to be, nay, had the incident occurred at a much earlier period, and he could have foreseen and been sure, that the battles of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena would have been prevented by the perpetration of a deed so foul, he not only would have neglected it with indignation, but made the communication that might counteract it*. Mr. Whitbread having given a brief account of the negotiation up to the 2d of June, when the point of joint or separate negotiation between France and the two allies was adjusted; he asked his noble friend (lord H.) whether up to that moment, there was any other sine qua on, than that of joint negotiatiou? who at the same time, gave full assurances of the disposition of France to make specific concessions to England of the highest national importance. True it was that Mr. Fox desired lord Yarmouth to recall the French minister to his own original propositions, when on his return to Paris, he found him receding from them. But he emphatically adds, "Sicily is the sine qua non." And although he argues with great warmth on the conduct of the French government, and even says it was on the faith of the uti possidetis, that lord Yarmouth was then at Paris, he does not direct him to break off the negotiation until that basis be again recognized. He sums up the whole of his reasoning in one remarkable paragraph: "The result of what I have stated to your lordship is this: 1st, That Sicily is a sine qua non, on which subject, if the French minister recede from his farther answer, it is in vain that any former discussion should take place. should take place. It is clearly within his first opinion delivered to your lordship. It is clearly within his last description of places which are reciprocally possessed by the two countries, and which cannot be recovered by war." There was not any other ground in any part of Mr. Fox's dispatch, on which the discus The unhappy term of uti possidetis, sions were to be finally and peremphad neither been introduced nor torily closed. Mr. W. further obthought of. And most unlucky it served, that it was not the intention bad been that it ever was in- of either government to insist on the troduced, for it had proved the absolute recognition of the abstract tane of the negotiation. This basis lord Yarmouth had told them, was irst proposed by M. Talleyrand, basis of the uti possidetis, as preliminary to negotiation, or even to negotiate strictly upon that basis. This is a case of conscience, on which divines and moral philosophers might, perhaps, entertain different sentiments. But most people, we presume, would be apt to think, that if the life of so great a scourge to mankind, could have proved a ransom for so many, it would have been well disposed of.The world could have spared him. the The state of actual possession must have been intended on both sides, if on either. And yet we find, that in the very first conversation held by the English plenipotentiary on his return to Paris, wherein he urges upon that minister the correctness of the message he took to England, he gives Mr. Fox to understand, that he had asked for the cession of Naples, Venice, Istria, and Dalmatia, as well as an alienation of some parts of the French emperor's Italian states, to form a provision for the king of Sardinia. Where then was this basis of the uti possidetis to be found, as indispensable necessary to further proceeding? Not in any part of the papers, which he had so carefully searched; not in the narrative of ford Yarmouth, which he had so candidly given to the house; not in the eloquent speech of his noble friend lord Howick. After all he had read, and all he had heard, he was bound to say, he did not find the uti possidetis was the sine qua non of negotiation, up to the 2d of June, when the correspondence on the subject was renewed by M. Talleyrand, in his letter to Mr. Fox of that date. Mr. Whitbread begged the favour of lord H. and the house to peruse with attention a paragraph of a note, dated the 11th of August, signed by MM. Champagny and Clarke: "In laying down the principle of uti possidetis, have the English plenipotentiaries had it in view to propose a means of exchange and accommodation ? If this be their meaning, the emperor adopts it be. cause it appears to him conformable to the principles already agreed on by both parties." He requested the house to compare this with a paragraph contained in a note delivered by lord Lauderdale, to general Clarke on the 7th August: " He cannot consent to treat on any other principle, than that of the uti possidetis, as originally proposed to his sovereign by the court of France. At the same time, he desires it should be well understood, that the adoption of this principle will not prevent him either from listening to any just and adequate compensation to his Sicilian majesty for the cession of Sicily, or from accepting any proposition for the exchange of territory between the two contracting parties, upon just and equal principles, such as may tend to the reciprocal advantage of the two countries." Between these declarations was there any substantial, nay, whether there was any formal difference between them? Why then did not the negotiation proceed? The obstacle was removed, why was it revived? In Mr. Whitbread's opi nion, a golden opportunity was lost, he did not say of making peace, for he did not know what would have been the issue of the negotiation, but of ascertaining whether peace could be made. And, as this op. portunity, among others, was lost, it was impossible for him to say that the continuation of hostilities was entirely owing to "the injustice and ambition of France." Mr. Whitbread having taken a review of most of the papers submitted to the consideration of the house by his ma Declaration of the King of Great Britain, October 21, 1806. Vide State Papers. Vol, XLVII. of this work, page 793. jesty, jesty, proceeded to take some notice of the terms which were offered at last, by France to this country and to her ally-Malta was ours The Cape of Good Hope, the cession of which by England in the treaty of Amiens had been so much censured, was ours-Every point of conse. quence in the East was yielded.And Tobago, perhaps of little con sequence in itself, but which ha ving originally been an English colony, was on that account an honourable acquisition to this country, was also given up. What was there remaining for England, as England, to ask? As to Sicily, an indemnity for Sicily had been admitted by the king's servants as possible, and if, for the consideration of the question, that time had been given which was wasted in useless discussion, such an indemnity, he thought, might possibly have been found. With regard to Dalmatia, the peace of Presburgh, made when Austria lay prostrate at the feet of the French emperor, her capital in his possession, and her condition ten times more abject than ever, gave Dalmatia to France. Was it probable then, that France would cede Dalmatia within a few months after she had so acquired it? Had the success of the war in Russia been sach, as to entitle her to make large demands on France? or to make it reasonable to expect that France Would listen to great pretensions on her part? It had been stated, that Dalmatia was not necessary to France, either for the integrity of her dominions, or for her defence. Was Dalmatia necessary, for either of these purposes, to Russia? But France, it was alledged, had been desirous of possessing Dalmatia, as a point of offence in war both to VOL. XLIX. Austria and Turkey. After the one power had been so repeatedly and signally defeated, could it well appear surprizing if the other, after such a career of victory, when almost every thing was in her power, should select such possessions as would most effectually disable Austria from making any attempts against France in future? And if Austria, Russia, and England conjoined, could not prevent the peace of Presburgh, which gave Dalmatia to France, could it be hoped that England, for the sake of Russia, would do that for Austria, which Austria, with the assistance of Russia, could not obtain for herself? But then Dalmatia was a point from which the independence of the Ottoman empire might be attacked. If, however, Russia was jealous of French influence in Tur. key, was not France equally jealous of the influence of Russia? And in the hands of either of those powers, would not Dalmatia be equally a point of offence in war, and intrigue in peace against that empire? It had been insinuated, if not stated, that the object of the war, was not to ob tain Dalmatia for Russia, but only its evacuation by France. But surely no one would be brought to believe, that if France could have been persuaded to march out, Russia would not have stepped in. Even the terms held out in the last communication between lord. Lauderdale and M. Champagny, could not fairly be stated to be the ultimate terms of France. To the last hour M. Champagny, with an earnestness which, to Mr. Whitbread evinced sincerity, pressed for farther com. munication, and hoped for fresh instructions. And the emperor had said, that he would leave every thing to his plenipotentiaries. All F tended tended to shew, that if the time which had elapsed since the commencement of the negotiation had been duly improved, it might have been known what the ultimate terms of France were, and then only could they have said with truth to the world, that it was solely owing to the injustice and ambition of France, that peace between the two countries had not been concluded. What motive could France have had to desire negotiation with England, but that it should terminate in peace? His noble friend lord H. had been accused of having delayed expeditions, and withheld armaments in conse quence of lord Lauderdale's procrastinated stay at Paris. The justice of this charge he denied. We lost nothing by the delay, and France gained nothing by it If no correspondence had ever been entered into, would not every accession of power to France have been made, as it now had been made? Would not the Rhenish confederation have taken place? Could we by any means in our power have delayed, much less have prevented it? In the last note from the French minister, dated from Mentz, October 1, 1806*, wherein Great Britain is forcibly reminded of the elevation to which France had been raised by the combinations to destroy her power, and the successes of the new contest are predicted; we are told, "that amidst all the chances of war, the emperor of France will renew the negotiations upon the basis laid in concert with the illustrious minister whom England has lost." Russia, in her manifesto, published after she had refused to ratify the treaty signed by D'Oubril, declares her readiness to enter into immediate negotiation. Why should Great Britain alone, refuse to open her ear to any overture? Why should she alone reject all hope? Mr. Whitbread was aware that his opinions were peculiar, but he desired that it might be recorded on the journals of parliament, that there were some, however few, who thought it unwise in policy, and false in principle, to assert, that peace with France was, under any circumstances, impossible. And he could not refuse himself the satisfaction of putting into the hands of the speaker, a paper which contained the amend ment moved by his noble friend (Howick) on the rupture of the treaty of Amiens, the words of which he had made use of, as the most ex. pressive of his sentiments and feelings on the present occasion. He moved to leave out all the words of the address proposed by lord Howick after the word end in the third paragraph, for the purpose of inserting the amendment, "To assure his ma. jesty of our firm determination to co-operate with his majesty, in call. ing forth the resources of the united kingdom, for the vigorous prosecu. tion of the war in which we are in. volved, and to pray his majesty that he will, in his paternal goodness, afford, as far as is consistent with his own honour, and the interests of his people, every facility to any just arrangement by which the blessings of peace may be restored to his loyal subjects."-This motion was se. conded by Mr. Johnstone. main question upon the address being put, none of the ministers shewing any disposition to speak; * See Papers relative to the Negotiation with France. No. 55. Enclosure B. The Mr. |