fundamental principles, the three eftablished religious of the empire, being the Roman Catholic, the Lutheran, and the Calvinift. Though this laft claufe, which went to the protection of the two reformed religions as well as the catholic, might feem virtually to include a toleration to the proteftants within the emperor's own particular dominions, yet the decree for that purpose did not appear until about the clofe of the year. The Jewith nation or people, who through a long courfe of centuries had fo often been doomed to lament the caprices or rapacity of monarchs, and to become victims to the revolutions of ftates, were now among the firft to experience the benefit of living under a government, where the prince has fufficient comprehenfion to difcover that his own interefts are, in a lefs or greater degree, infeparably connected with the fecurity and profperity of every clafs and order of his fubjects. Among other immunities and privileges now granted by the emperor to that people, they were particularly admitted to the right of exercising all kinds of arts and trades, of applying themfelves to agriculture, and to the invaluable privilege of freely pursuing their ftudies in the univerfities, without any impediment whatever on the fcore of re ligion: fo that, upon the whole, they feem now to poffefs in general the fame advantages with other citizens. This decree in favour of the Jews, was foon followed by two unexpected ordinances, which ftriking directly at the power and authority of the court of Rome, af forded a moft alarming prefage of what it had farther to apprehend. By the first of thefe, all the religious orders within the royal and Imperial dominions (but confined, we apprehend, to Germany and Hungary) were ftrictly prohibited from holding any correfpondence, on fpiritual or temporal fubjects, with their refpective chiefs, while these were refident in any foreign parts; and farther prefcribing, that under fuch circumftances, they fhould be governed entirely by their provincial fuperiors; who were however, to be at all times fubject to the controul and authority of the epifcopal power in the refpective diocefes, and even to the temporal governors of provinces. By the other ordinance it was enacted, that no bull, brief, or other inftrument, iffued by the apoftolic fee, fhould be received, or have any effect whatever within the imperial dominions, until it was rendered valid by the fanction of the fovereign. Thefe decrees were iffued at Vienna, in the latter end of March, 1781; and it may be easily seen, that the court of Rome could fcarcely have received a greater fhock. For the refidence of the generals or chiefs of the principal religious orders at Rome, was the link, which immediately united their respective communities, however widely difperfed, to the papal chair, and which afforded the means of maintaining a fubordination and difcipline unexampled in its nature and extent; while that edict, by cutting off the intercourse, muft, in its effect, if not entirely diffolve the connection, at leaft render it useless with refpe& to its destined purposes. [4] 3 Other 1 Other great political objects, together with a long journey, in confequence of them, which the emperor was then upon the point of undertaking, and in the courfe of which he visited the Low Countries, Holland, and France, ferved to draw off his farther immediate . attention to ecclefiaftical affairs, and afforded time for the court of Rome to recover from its first aftonishment and to deliberate upon and pursue such measures as might poflibly mitigate the effects of the late unexpected blow, or at leaft ward off fuch evils as were farther to be apprehended. He had fufficient oftenfible motives, if any fuch were wanting, for undertaking this journey. He had to take perfonal poffeffion of the Auftrian Netherlands; to be inftalled in his dukedom of Brabant; to regulate the public affairs at Bruffels, preparatory to the arrival of his fifter the archduchefs, and her husband, the duke Albert, of Saxe-Teichen, on whom the government of thefe provinces was bestowed on the death of prince Charles, of Lorraine, and who were now far advanced in their way thither; to all which may be added, the natural defire of withing to fee his new fubjects, and being feen by them; befides the opportunity which this tour would prefent, of vifiting his fifter the queen of France, and of feeing parts of that country on his return, which he had not hitherto had au opportunity of obferving. But there were other matters, of much greater political moment, which operated upon this prince in undertaking the journey. The ruinous and unfortunate war, into which the prevalence of the French and republican faction in Holland had precipitated that country with its old and natural ally, among its other irreparable ill confequences, was the means of unveiling the nakedness of the republic, and to the aftonishment of all Europe, prefented fuch a view of diforder and imbecility in the government, and of radical weaknefs in the state, as had not before been fufpected, even by its nearest and keeneft-eyed neighbours. The impreffions made by this discovery were continually increafing, as almoft every day of the war was marked with fome new circumftance of misfortune or difgrace. While they were thus expofed to danger from with out, the ftate and the public were convulfed and torn to pieces by inteftine diffenfions, the feeds of which were fo numerous, and fo deeply laid, as fcarcely admitted the hope of any effective remedy. The differences between the prince ftadtholder and the states were multiplying fo fast, and increafing fo much in degree and virulence,as to indicate a speedy and moft alarming crifis; while the violence and animofity of the French and Orange factions, which included between them the whole body of the people, and all the departments of government, whether civil or military, by sea or by land, feemed deftined to harrow and tear up the very foundations of the republic. Upon the whole, it feemed clear to all obfervers, that the reftoration of the republic, in any degree, to its former power and fplendor, was a circumftance which would not admit of a moment's fpeculation; and that fome confiderable revolution was neceffary, to preferve the union of its parts. It could not be expected, upon any 1 any foundation of political knowledge and experience, that the unexpected difclofure of fuch a fcene, with the magnitude of the objects which it exhibited, and the profpects of advantage is held out, fhould not attract the views, and excite the ambition, of a powerful, active, and neighbouring fovereign, whofe enterpriting difpotition, tho' hitherto a good deal refrained, had however been apparent in other inftances. The refumption of the Dutch barrier was among the firft advantages he propofed to draw from the prefent forlorn ftate of their affairs. Few are ignorant that the principal fortreffes of the Auftrian Nether. lands, including feveral of their moft confiderable cities, had, ever fince the conclufion of the fucceffion war, been depofited in the hands of the Dutch, for the mutual benefit and fecurity of the court of Vienna and themtelves; for, at the fame time that they formed a powerful barrier to cover the territorics of the flates, they were to be garrifoned and defended by them; and thus ferved to obviate the dangers apprehended by both from the power and ambition of France. During the long fucceeding depreffion of the house of Auftria, the advantages of this arrangement were repeatedly and fully experienced; and occafions offered which made it evident, that nothing less could have prevented the Netherlands from being long fince wrefted out of their hands. But in the extraordinary degree of power and greatness to which that houfe has, within the memory of man, rifen, and in the ufual viciflitude of things, what had before been underflood and felt as a fubftantial benefit, 2 came at length to be confidered as a figma, and a grievance. The prefeat emperor felt his own power to be fully competent to the protection and defence of his dominions. With the great armies he poffeffed, he could not conceive that he wanted the cover of fortreffs to prevent the progrefs of an enemy. He confidered, that it was exceedingly expenfive to keep them in repair; that being accordingly neglected in feafons of peace and fecurity, they generally fell, with little trouble, into the hands of an invader at the commencement of hottilities; when, befides the lofs of their garrifons, and the great prefent advantages which they afforded to the enemy, their recovery frequently became among the most difficult and arduous tatks of the war. He, befide, thought it derogatory to his own honour, as well as to the diguity and power of the empire, that a number of his principal cities and fortreffes fhould be garrifoned, and at his own expence too, by foreigners. He confidered it as no less than paying a thameful and ignominious tribute for protection and defence; and that it would be in the laft degree perfonally fhameful and degrading to himself, if now, when the occafion fo opportunely offered, he should suffer fuch a ftanding monument of paft weaknefs, dependence, or even obligation, any longer to continue Nor were feveral colourable arguments wanting, to juftify to the Dutch, and to the world at large, the intended measure of taking the barrier into his own hands, and of difmantling the fortreffes It was fiated, that the revenues drawn from thefe cities and their districts were mifapplied; that the fortifi[4] 4 cations ANNUAL REGISTER, 1784-5. cations were falling to decay, and the garrisons defective; and that the thameful manner in which they were loft by the Dutch, in the war of 1741, was a fufficient evidence of their incapacity to maintain and defend the barrier. But that, independent of all complaints with reIpect to the discharge of their truft, the circumftances of things, and the ftate of affairs on all fides, were now fo entirely altered, that none of the caufes or motives, which originally operated to the establishment of the barrier, were any longer in existence. That France, inftead of being the common enemy, as then, was now the common friend of both parties; that her ambition was no longer dangerous, and if it were, was directed to other objects; that the emperor and the were mutually bound, in the ftrictest and deareft ties of alliance, friendship, and blood; and, even admitting the poffibility of any change in this ftate of connections, his territories would at all times be an effectual barrier to Holland, and would afford much greater fecurity to them by being in his hands than in their own. Much was, however, to be faid on the other fide. The immenfe expence, in blood and in treasure, which Holland, through a long courfe of facceffive wars, had endured, for the attainment, the eftablishment, and the prefervation of this very barrier, was known to all the world. Nor was it to be for gotten, that the emperor owed to the extraordinary exertions of Great Britain and Holland his now holding any territory or poffeffion whatever in the Low Countries. That they had the principal thare through a long war, and a series of the moft glorious fucceffes, in wrefting by That as they piece-meal from the boufe of Bour faid; but arguments are of little to emperor had, in the beginning of As an opening to this defign, the the year 1781, and fone months before he fet out on his tour, peremptorily de anded from theStates General precife accounts of the 1 revenues revenues which they had drawn from the barrier, and of the fums which they had expended in the repair or improvement of their fortreffes. This fudden and captious demand, of coming to a fettlement upon fuch old, intricate, and longneglected accounts, and made at fo very peculiar a feafon, feemed to augur very different difpofitions from thofe of friendship or good will to the ftat s; and probably infpired them with other apprehenfions befides thofe which related to the barrier. Circumftanced, indeed, as they were, it may well be fuppofed, that this demand contributed not a little to facilitate their fubfequent compliance with the ceffion of an object, fo long held dear by them, and which involved in it the immediate fecurity of the'r country. However that was, the business was foon decided; and it feems probable that many words were not used in its procefs, for the negociation was fcarcely heard of, when, towards the clofe of the year, the Dutch garrifons and artillery were almoft lently withdrawn from the barrier, and the emperor's or der for difmantling the fortreffes, and felling the materials, feems to have been the first public annunciation of the event. Never was a measure of fo much importance, and on which fo much depended, carried into effect more fmoothly; but notwithstanding this facility, it was eafily feen, that the fiates were fully aware of its dan gerous tendency, although the unfortunate fituation in which they were involved, compelled them to an easy fubmiffion. In fact, a general alarm was fpread through the United Provinces; and the great number of hands that were directly employed, and the corresponding meafures adopted, for putting their own fortreifes on the frontier, particularly thofe along the Schelde, in an immediate state of defence, fufficiently thewed that government was no lefs affected than the public upon this occasion. Thus was Holland ftripped of its hard-earned and dearly-purchafed barrier, and by the revolution of politics laid open to the views of a not lefs ambitious, and more dangerous, as being a nearer neigh' our, than France. The business of the barrier was not, however, the only confiderable object which the emperor had at this time in view, and which drew his attention fo much to the affairs of the Netherlands. The rupture between the maritime powers had been the means of transferring from Holland to the Auftrian Netherlands, the courfe of that vaft commerce, which, through the medium of the canals, and great German rivers. England carried on with that and other Eaftern and Northern continental countries. The benefits which the Netherlands derived from this tranfit of fo great a commerce, were ftill farther increafed by the peculiar circumftances of the naval war in which Great Britain was involved. Attacked, at once, in every part of the world, and nearly overwhelmed by the multitude of her enemies, fhe was under the neceflity of abandoning, in a great measure, the protection of her home commerce, and even, at times, the fovereignty of her own feas, in order that her foreign fleets might be fufficiently powerful to cover her very numerous diftant poffeflions. This new and untoward state of things, reduced the English merchants o difficulties and diftrefles, with re fpect |