sequences, as never to have for once obtained a nominal permanency in fact, or even in idea, in any country on the globe. Such ideas are too absurd to excite any alarm. If they should spring up, they require no other refutation than to leave mankind to the free influence of their own understanding. Before this tribunal they must quickly sink and disap

•pear.

The natural inequality that takes place among mankind, from that original diversity of talents with which they have been endowed, is still farther augmented by education and the habits man acquires in society, from the circumstances in which he may be accidentally placed. The influence of these extrinsic, or, as we usually call them, moral causes, are such as make a wonderful difference in the natural powers of man. It is to the influence of these moral causes that we are to attribute that species of uniformity which we so often observe among bodies of men; and which constitutes, what we call, national character. It is to the influence of the same principle that we must refer those local perversions of the human mind, which have at times led whole nations into the most extravagant absurdities of conduct. We now condemn our predecessors for the crusades and persecutions for conscience sake, which devastated the world for so many centuries: We are astonished at the weakness of our forefathers for humbling themselves before the pope of Rome, and submitting to his arbitrary decrees as to the voice of the Deity. We laugh at the weakness of whole nations, who at present bow with reverential adoration before an infant,

(the grand Lama.) In this respect we de well; but in looking back to the whole series of past ages, can we fix upon a single country, or a particular period of time, when the human mind was not, from education, imitation, or other circumstances, led astray from the truth, and.idolatrous of some favourite error? If we must admit that such a period cannot be found, we fhall be forced to own that human reason is a weak and fallible guide; and that, while we think we are following its dictates, we may, perhaps, be only adopting a fashionable phrenzy, which has been caught by infection from those around us. Since we see that others have gone into the most extravagant excefses from the influence of such kinds of phrenzy, ought we not to moderate our ideas, when we feel a contagious zeal taking possession of our soul, lest our posterity, in their turn, fhould find no other mode of palliating our crimes, but that of attributing them to a temporary insanity?

If “all mankind are born equal," a doctrine which in the sense of it above given, I wish to be universally admitted, we must then allow that national characters are merely the productions of chance; that contrary systems of religion, where revelation is out of the question, are to be ascribed to accident; that religious or political zeal, is error; that all mankind are brethren engaged in one common career;. that if they were capable of perceiving the truth, there would be an end to animosities and contentions. for ever; that therefore war and wrangling, are only the ebulitions of madnefs and folly; and that beneficence and philanthropy alone are true wisdom..

Since we never can be certain that we ourselves are free from the influence of prejudice, sound sense surely requires that we should treat with tenderness the opinions of those who differ from us, while we also have a just claim to a similar indulgence from them with regard to our own. What circumstance can be adduced as an infallible proof that the reasoning which is in vogue, in our own country, or during the age in which we live, is better than the reasoning adopted by another people, or at a former period? If “all mankind are born equal," have they not an equal right to claim pre-eminence as we have?

Since abstract reasoning, then, is so extremely fallacious, let us be exceedingly cautious how we rely upon it; let us rather be guided by facts in the judgements we are to form of man, and the circumstances that influence his conduct. By adhering to this rule we observe, from invariable experience, that power, with whomsoever it be intrusted, degenerates into insolence and oppression. But as, in matters of government, power must be intrusted somewhere, the the great question to be solved is, in whose hands may power be intrusted with the least chance of being abused? or to what modifications must it be subjected, so as to guard against the evils to which these abuses give rise?

In the present age, when the contagious phrenzy runs upon the "natural unalienable rights of men,' it is not impossible but some may ask if it be necessary to intrust power in the hands of any of the executive departments of government? Though this question ap

pears to be too absurd to require a serious answer, yet, when the phrenzy runs high, (even absurdities must be treated with respect. Where every person claims a right to decide, in every case, according to his own personal feelings at the time, there can surely be no power authorised to force his opinions in any case to bend to those of another person. If he had even given his consent to delegate another in his stead, he still must retain the "unalienable right" of annulling that consent, as soon as he fhall think he sees reason to believe it was improperly granted. Admitting therefore these claims of "the unalienable rights of man,” in their full extent, all government must cease, and universal anarchy must ensue.

All government must necefsarily be compulsive; and consequently, if it is to operate at all, it must tend to curtail these supposed "unalienable rights of man.” If a man is to be punished for theft, or any other crime, this punishment will not, most assuredly, take place with his own good will. He must be compelled to submit. But if the power to compel him cannot, with justice, be lodged any where, such punishment can only be deemed a tyrannical exertion of power, not a strict distribution of justice. Every punishment, every law even prescribing that punishment, must be deemed a tyrannical infraction of the

rights of man.' Had the individual even consented to the very law itself, the case would not be altered. He might only have given his consent to it at the time, because he believed it then to be just; but now, that he sees reason to think otherwise, it can with no consistency of reasoning, be forced upon him,

without depriving him of those "unalienable rights, which, from the very terms of the proposition, it is not even in his power to infringe. The doctrine of transubstanstiation has had its day. It is now past; and it may be freely ridiculed. Not more absurd it

was than that which now claims our animadversion, though it is at present too much in fashion to be turned into ridicule. I am only anxious to free from the imputation of such a doctrine the respectable society of which I have the honour to be a member. That individuals among us may embrace this doctrine, in all its extent, is not at all impofsible. With the

opinions of individuals I take no concern. I am only interested in freeing the society, as a body, from this malevolent imputation, which I think it never, in the slightest degree, did countenance.

Since then power must, in every effective government, be intrusted somewhere, we still recur to the old question, with whom may that power be most. safely intrusted? or under what modifications ought it to be put, so as to guard the most effectually against the abuses of it? This will furnish the subject of

another letter from.

London June 3. 1792.

TIMOLEON,

One of the Friends of the People.

THE highest felicity a man can enjoy, is that of being a husband and a father, and ending his days in the arms of his children.. Sacred ties !

connec

tions of the soul!" a double existence! without which man is desolate.-Alone, in the wide world, as in a desart dragging an useless life, and dying without regret.