que Roads important; and was persuaded that the public thought more highly of that noble lord since the court martial, than before it. He, for his part, would give thanks to Lord Gambier, not only for having destroyed the enemy's ships, but also for having withstood that advice which was calculated to hurry him into a course of conduct, the consequence of which must have been great loss to the fleet which he commanded.-The

Earl of Darnley had no objection to the vote of thanks, but at the same time he thought this one of the efforts now too commonly resorted to, by voting thanks to the officers employed, to throw a lustre on the government.

The question was then put and agreed to. Votes of thanks to the other officers, non-commissioned officers, sailors and marines, were also passed nem con.

CHAP.

In the House of Commons, Jan. 26, Lord Porchester called the attention of the house to the expedition to the Scheldt. When, at the close of a former night's debate, he gave notice of the motion which he should that night have the honour of submitting to the house, it was his intention, he said, to propose the appointment of a committee to inquire into the conduct of the whole campaign. On reflection, however, he was persuaded it would be much more conducive to the end he had in view, namely, to prove the incapacity and total want of system, that pervaded all the military measures of his majesty's ministers, to separate the different branches of the campaign, and institute a distinct inquiry into each; after which particular investigation, the several results might be more clearly sumined up, and a general conclusion drawn, with greater accuracy, justice, and truth. He

should, therefore, in what he had to address to the house, and the motion with which he meant to conclude, confine himself to the sole disastrous expedition to the Scheldt. The objections likely to be made to his motion, would, he supposed, relate to the time and the form in which it should be submitted. His object was, that the inquiry should be conducted by a committee of the whole house. He could not consent to delegate the right of inquiry, on this occasion, to any select or secret committee, by whom the course of investigation might be misdirected, or its bounds limited: before whom, possibly, garbled extracts, called documents, might be laid by ministers themselves, in order to produce a partial discussion. He would not expose the case to such a risk. It was in a committee of the whole house alone, that they could have a fair case, because, if necessary, they could examine oral evidence at the bar. As to the objection respecting time, that his motion ought not to be entertained until the papers promised by ministers should be laid before the house, it was a delusive and shallow subterfuge, as his view was simply to establish

the

the tribunal before he should open his case. The only end he had in view, was, to pledge the house to the institution of an inquiry. It was not his wish, at that time, to discuss the merits of the investigation. He did not desire to put ministers on their trial, before they had had full opportunity of preparing their evidence and their defence. Yet, could the country remain in doubt whether such ministers should be tried at all? If we examined any or all of the campaigns which had recently taken place, we should find, in fact, the same character of weakness and fatuity; the same features of tardiness of preparation, ignorance in conduct, imbecility in combination, and, of consequence, failure in result. In the expedition to which this motion referred, the calamities which attended it, were, in fact, to be equalled only by the magnitude of its extensive and expensive preparation. The truth of this position, his lordship procecded to illustrate. The strongest as well as most obvious objections to the designs and plan, as well as the management of this expedition, were stated, as we have seen, in the debates on the king's speech, in both houses of parliament. These, Lord Porchester urged in a clear and forcible manner, with the addition of farther observations, of which the following acute remark is a specimen: "We had been told, by the minister, that before the troops could be sent to Holland, it was necessary to wait for the arrival of transports from Lisbon. But why were those transports at Lisbon?

For the use of Sir Arthur Wellesley's army, in case it should be defeated, and obliged finally to retreat. So that our ministers combined their plan with such peculiar judgment and felicity of arrangement, that a defeat in Portugal would have prevented the expedition to Holland." But, Lord Porchester asked, why the minister had not a sufficiency of transports ready for any operation that might be deemed necessary? If ministers did not attend to their duty, it was not admissible in them to plead their neglect of duty as a reason for not sending out an expedition, which, if proper to have been sent out at all, ought to have been sent out in due time. He was speaking of the means they had provided for acting on their own plan: not that he approved this; but in order to shew the inefficacy of these means to their own ends. For if it was really meant to assist Austria, by making a diversion in her favour, why chuse a place for an expedition, where there was no possible point of communication with the power to be supported? In that situation we had it not in our power to advance a step without meeting with a fortress, which, when captured, we must reduce our force to garrison, before we advanced farther. But Lord Chatham found it impossible to advance at all. What was the main object of this expedition? The French fleet at Antwerp. Did they go at once to Antwerp? No. The expedition sailed for Walcheren on the 28th of July. It was accompanied by heavy cavalry, which in fact never

landed,

landed, and other descriptions of force, appropriate to service different from that entered on. On the 28th of August it was decided, by our commander, that Antwerp was not assailable, and that our troops must retreat. How was the long interval employed before it was thought adviseable to come to that decision? Instead of proceeding at once to Antwerp, and leaving some part of our shipping to blockade Flushing; which block ade would have rendered the force in that garrison and all Walcheren quite useless, Flushing was regularly besieged. Thus the force, which must have been kept as it were in a cage, was, by our lying down before Flushing, with double the number, rendered completely effective against us. But this was not all. Before Flushing was reduced, a formidable force was collected at Antwerp: and the fortress, according to the admirable plan, was to be taken by a coup de main, after a month's previous notice! It had been said, that Walcheren had been retained in consequence of a requisition from Austria, in the hope that Buonaparte might thereby be in fluenced in his negociations with that power. If, however, it was meant to retain Walcheren only as a feint, why proceed to fortify the works of Flushing? Why construct new works elsewhere in Walcheren, and expend a considerable sum on such fortifications? That the retention of Walcheren was a feint, no rational man could believe. The fallacy of the pretence was obvious from the conduct of ministers themselves, in being at the expence of fortifying it. But, supposing it to have been

indeed a feint, it was absurd to imagine that Buonaparte, in order to get possession of that island, or to avoid the delaying for two or three weeks his attack upon it, would be induced to lower his tone, or modify or moderate his terms with Austria.

Lord Porchester having gone through the principal points, as they occurred, and appeared to be to him connected with the policy or progress of this expedition, pro ceeded to consider the choice which ministers had thought proper to make of a commander to direct its operations. Although he was much more conversant with the gaieties of London, or the business of office, than with the annals of mili'tary experience or glory, yet he did not complain of the appointment of such an officer to the command of such an expedition. He was, in fact, the most appropriate person that could have been chosen. Abortive and impracticable as the plan was, he should have thought it a pity that the character of an intelligent and experienced officer should have becn exposed to sacrifice, by rendering him responsible for the success of a measure, which it would have been impossible for such a man to comprehend or execute. Such an expedition could, in fact, be understood by ministers alone, and one of themselves alone, was fitted to command it. Many other proofs of neglect and inattention, with regard to the conduct of the expedition, had been mentioned. to Lord Porchester. Among many others, he had been told that transports, with artificers, and ma terials for the construction or repair of fortifications, were actu

ally

ally sent out to Walcheren, even after the order for its evacuation had reached the island. He had also heard of the sick and wounded soldiers being most severely distressed for want of bedding, clothing, and even necessary provisions and medicines. All these things might not be true, but yet they rested on the statement of such authorities as to form an additional argument for inquiry. Indeed the arguments for inquiry were so numerous and irresistible, that unless the house acceded to them, they could not hope to have credit with the country for acting under the influence of reason or argument. Lord Porchester concluded with moving, "That a committee be appointed to inquire into the policy and the conduct of the late expedition to the Scheldt."

Mr. Windham Quin, in seconding the motion, reviewed the conduct of the expedition, which appeared to him to be remarkable only for ignorance, imbecility and mismanagement. He was particularly struck on a perusal of the papers on the table, with the defisiency of means to carry into effect the attack upon Cadsand, there having been provided no more boats than would be sufficient to land 600 troops, at a time when 2000 troops were drawn up on the beach. It appeared that there had been transports provided by the wise planners of the expedition, without boats, and soldiers sent without provisions. The consequence was, that though batteries had been opened on the 5th of August, the enemy had been

able, without molestation, to throw a body of three or 4000 men into Flushing, across the Scheldt, before the communication with Cadsand was cut off.

Mr. Croker, with regard to the delay of the expedition, observed, that his majesty had not incited Austria to hostilities-that he was even unwilling that Austria should precipitate herself into a war with France, and cautioned her against taking such a step, without rational grounds of hope for a successful issue. It would, therefore, have been imprudent and impolitic to have wasted our resources in preparations for supporting Aus→ tria, in the case of an event which it was hoped would not take place. Lord Porchester had complained of many circumstances besides delay, connected with the expedition. Might not those circumstances be satisfactorily explained by the papers which were yet to be produced? Mr. Quin had complained of a want of boats to land a

sufficient force on Cadsand. Mr. Croker had no hesitation in contradicting the honourable gentleman on that point. The statement of the honourable gentleman was unfounded in fact: and that single circumstance was sufficient to prove the propriety of waiting till all the documents should be produced. He had means of knowing more on the subject of the expedition than the honourable gentleman. Mr. Croker wished the house distinctly to understand that he did not oppose inquiry, but only wished to defer it till they should be in possession of those papers which alone could

enable