all who had voted three times in favour of popular measures, even though they were in general supporters of ministers. From the members of the boroughs under 500 inhabitants, there was one member in favour of reduction, and 19 against it. From the members of the boroughs contain ing from 500 to 1,000 inhabitants, there were 12 for, and 33 against reduction. From the members of the boroughs containing more than 1,000, and less than 2,000 inhabitants, 17 were for, and 44 against reduction. From the members of the boroughs containing more than 2,000, and less than 3,000 inhabitants, 19 were for, and 46 against reduction. From the members of the boroughs containing 5,000 inhabitants, there were 25 for, and 44 against reduction; and from those of the boroughs containing more than 5,000 inhabitants, there were 66 for, and only 47 against reduction. Thus, it was evident, that the proportion in favour of ministers diminished, as the size of the places increased; for the proportion was in the first class as 19 to 1 in their favour; in the second, as 3 to 1; in the third, as 2 to 1; in the fourth, as 4 to 3; in the fifth, as 3 to 5. These were facts which ought to convince the most incredulous, that the small towns did not represent the interests of the people so well as the large towns.

"But besides these facts," said the noble lord, "others have occurred during this session of parliament, which afford results equally striking. I shall take two questions which have been discussed in it, and which are undoubtedly of great public interest and importance: the one relates to the salttax, the other to the office of post

master-general. Upon the salttax the numbers were 169 in favour of its continuance, and 165 in support of its abolition. Out of these 165 members, there were 42 representatives of English and Welsh counties, and 55 of large towns; of which towns there are altogether not more than 56; so that in this small number of 165, less than a third of the English members, we have nearly a majority of the whole number of English members for counties and large towns. Now out of the 169 members, who formed the majority on that occasion, I cannot make out more than 14 county members, though I can make out 61 placemen, of whom only 10 can be in any respect considered as nominees of counties or large, towns.

"The division on the office of post-master-general was still more decisively in favour of the proposition which I wish to establish. There were 159 members for the abolition, and 184 for the continuance of that useless office; so that there was a majority of 25 in favour of the office and of ministers. Of these 159, 29 were the representatives of English and Welsh counties, and 40 the representatives of large towns, making together a total of 69. On the other side, I cannot make out more than 11 county members, and 23 members for large towns, making a total of 34: that is to say, that out of those members who were really elected by the people, there were 69 for abolishing, and only 34 for continuing the office."

Having thus established, as he conceived, the necessity of an alteration, Lord John Russell proceeded to consider what the alteration ought to be. In doing this,

he said, he had naturally directed his attention to the remedial measures, which had been heretofore suggested by persons of great weight and authority. The proposition of lord Chatham was, to add 100 members to the number of persons composing the House of Commons. Mr. Pitt proposed an addition of 100 knights to be elected by the counties. Mr. Flood, in the year 1790, proposed the same numerical accession of strength to the representation, to be elected by householders throughout the country; and Mr. Fox at the time, remarked that the plan of Mr. Flood was the best he had ever seen submitted to the consideration of parliament. Feeling, therefore, the weight and influence of such great authorities, he should adopt their number in his present proposition. His plan then would be, that an addition of a hundred names should be made to the roll of that House; and the leaning of his mind was, that 60 of these should be added for the counties, and the remaining 40 for the towns and commercial interests of the country.

How

ever, as to the manner of distribution and the mode of election, that was a matter which ought to be reserved for consideration at a future period. It might, however, be said, that since the time when Chatham, Pitt, Fox, and Flood had called for an addition to the number of members in that House, the proposed number of 100 had,. in point of fact, been added by the Irish Union. In order to get out of this difficulty, he should say, that a number to the same amount as that for the representation of Ireland might be struck out of their present list, without interfering with his remedial plan; for

instance, let the hundred be taken away from the hundred smallest boroughs which returned each two members to sit in parliament; and let these boroughs retain but one member each.

Mr. Horace Twiss, lord Folkestone, Mr. C. Wynne, and Mr. Robinson, spoke after lord John Russell; but the House waited impatiently for the rising of Mr. Canning, whose speeches at Liverpool on the subject of parliamentary reform had been, in the course of the debate, vehemently reprobated by lord Folkestone, The harangue of Mr. Canning on this occasion, was in his most elaborate and discursive style. "The plan of reform," said he, "now proposed is, to make an addition of 100 members to this House, to be returned by the counties and larger towns; and to open the way for this augmentation, by depriving each of the smaller boroughs of one half of the elective franchise which they now enjoy. This plan the noble lord has introduced and recommended with an enumeration of names, whose authority he assumes to be in favour of it. Amongst those names is that of Mr. Pitt. But the House must surely be aware, that the plan brought forward by Mr. Pitt differed widely, not only in detail, but in principle, from that propounded on this occasion by the noble lord. True it is, that the object of Mr. Pitt's plan was, like that of the noble lord's, to add 100 members to this House; but this object was to be attained without the forcible abolition of any existing right of election. Mr. Pitt proposed to establish a fund of 1,000,000l., to be applied to the purchase of franchises from such decayed boroughs as should be

willing to sell them. This fund was to accumulate at compound interest, till an adequate induce ment was provided for the voluntary surrender, by the proprietors, of such elective franchises as it might be thought expedient to abolish. There was throughout the whole of Mr. Pitt's plan a studious avoidance of coercion; a careful preservation of vested interests; and a fixed determination not to violate existing rights in accomplishing its object. It was hoped, that by these means every sense of injury or danger would be excluded, and that the change in view would be brought about by a gradual process, resembling the silent and insensible operation of time. Here then, I repeat it, is a difference of the most essential kind between the two propositions of Mr. Pitt and of the noble lord; a difference, not superficial, but fundamental; as complete, indeed, as the difference between concession and force, or between respect for property and spoliation.

The plan now brought forward, dangerous and violent as it was, would never satisfy the genuine reformers. "If," said Mr. Canning, "the House looks only to the various plans of reform, which have at different times been laid upon its table, not by visionary speculatists, but by able and enlightened men, some of the ornaments of this and the other House of Parliament, how faint and flat is the noble mover's present plan in comparison with them? Let us take for example that one of the plans, which had the greatest concurrence of opinions, and the greatest weight of authority in its favour. A petition was presented to this House in 1793, which may perhaps be considered as the most advised and

authentic exposition of the principles of parliamentary reform that ever has been submitted to the consideration of this House or of the public. Those principles are developed by the petitioners, with singular clearness and force, and expressed in admirable language. It was presented in 1793, by a noble person, now one of the chief lights of the other House of Parliament, as the petition of the "Friends of the People, associated for the purpose of obtaining a Reform in Parliament." In that petition, certain distinct propositions are laid down as the basis of a reform, which, to my recollection, have never yet been disclaimed, either on the part of the petitioners, or of those who have succeeded them in the same pursuit. The petitioners complain, in the first place, that there is not an uniform right of voting;-secondly, that the right of voting is in too small bodies;-thirdly, that many great bodies are excluded from voting;-and, fourthly, they complain of the protracted duration of parliaments. Does the noble lord believe that all these notions are forgotten? that no persons still cherish them as the only means of effecting the salvation of the country?-or, does he subscribe to them all, although he may not think this the time for pressing them upon the House?

"For my part, Sir, I value the system of parliamentary representation, for that very want of uniformity which is complained of in this petition; for the variety of rights of election. I conceive, that to establish one uniform right would inevitably be, to exclude

See Parl. Hist. v. 30, p. 789.

some important interests from the advantage of being represented in this House. At all events, the noble lord's plan does not cure this objection. The rights of voting would remain as various after the adoption of his plan, as before; and a new variety would be added to them. Even of burgage tenures, the most obnoxious right of all, and the most indignantly reprobated by the petition of 1793, the noble lord would carefully preserve the principle-only curtailing, by one-half, its operation.

"A change in the constitution of the House of Commons," continued Mr. Canning, "is the object of the present motion. That such a change is necessary, the noble lord asserts and I deny. I deny altogether the existence of any such practical defect in the present constitution of this House, as requires the adoption of so fearful an experiment. The noble lord has attempted to show the necessity of such a change by enumerating certain questions, on which this House has, on sundry occasions, decided against the noble mover's opinion, and against the politics and interests of that party in the state, of which the noble mover is so conspicuous an ornament. But if such considerations be sufficient to unsettle an ancient and established form of political constitution, how could any constitution-any free constitution-exist for six months? While human nature continues the same-the like divisions will arise in every free state; the like conflict of interests and opinions; the like rivalry for office; the like contention for power. A popular assembly always has been and always will be exposed to the operation of a party-feeling, arraying its elements and influencing its decisions;

in modern as in ancient times; in Great Britain, in this our day, as heretofore in Athens or in Rome. No imaginable alteration in the mode of election can eradicate this vice-if it be å viceor can extinguish that feeling, be it good or bad, which mixes itself largely in every debate upon the public affairs of a nation-the feeling of affection or disfavour towards the persons in whose hands is the conduct of those affairs. I am not saying, that this is a proper and laudable feeling: I am not contending, that partiality ought to influence judgment; still less, that when judgment and partiality are at variance, the latter ought, in strict duty, to preponderate. I am not affirming that in the discussion of the question-" What has been done?"-the question -"Who did it?"-ought silently to dictate or even to modify, the answer;-that the case should be nothing, and the men every thing. I say no such thing. But I do say, that while men are men, popular assemblies, get them together how you will, will be liable to such influence. I say, that in discussing the particular acts of a government, in a popular assembly, the consideration of the general character of that government, and the conflicting partialities which lead some men to favour it, and others to aim at its subversion, will, sometimes openly and avowedly, at other times insensibly even to the disputants themselves, control opinions and votes, and correct, or pervert (as it may be) the specific decision. I say that, for instance, in the discussion upon the Walcheren expedition, which has been more than once selected as an example of undue influence and partiality, there was notori

ously another point at issue, beside the specific merits of the case; and that point was whether the then administration should or should not be dismissed from the service of their country? Never, perhaps, was the struggle pushed farther than on that occasion; and that vote substantially decided the question"in what hands should be placed the administration of affairs." I am not saying, that this was right in the particular instance I am not saying that it is right in principle. But right or wrong, such a mode of thinking and acting, is, I am afraid, essentially in the very nature of all popular governments; and most particularly so in that of the most free.

"The noble lord has himself stated, that, in the instance of the Revolution, the parliament did wisely in setting at nought the immediate feelings of its constituents. There cannot indeed be the slightest doubt, that, had the nation been polled in 1688, the majority would have been found adverse to the change that was then effected in the government; but parliament, acting in its higher and larger capacity, decided for the people's interests against their prejudices. It is not true, therefore, that the House of Commons is necessarily defective, because it may not instantly respond to every impression of the people.

"In the year 1811, I myself divided in a minority of about forty against an overwhelming majority, on the question relating to the depreciation of the currency. It would be idle to deny, that the majority, which sturdily denied the fact of that depreciation, then spoke the sentiments of the country at large; they certainly did

In

so; but who will now affirm that it would have been a misfortune, if the then prevailing sense of the country had been less faithfully represented in the votes of this House? What a world of error and inconvenience should we have avoided, by a salutary discrepancy, at that time, between the constituent and the representative! Eight years afterwards, but unluckily after eight years' additional growth of embarrassment — in 1819, the principles which had found but about forty supporters in 1811, were adopted unanimously, first by a committee of this House, and then by this House itself. But the country was much slower in coming back from the erroneous opinions, which the decision of this House in 1811 had adopted and confirmed. 1819, as in 1811, if London and the other principal towns of the kingdom had been canvassed for an opinion, the prevailing opinion would still have been found nearly what it was in 1811. Yet is it necessary to argue, that the decision of the House in 1819 against the cpinion of the country, was a sounder and wiser decision, than that of 1811 in conformity to it? Never then can I consider it as a true proposition, that the state of the representation is deficient, because it does not immediately speak the apparent sense of the people-because it sometimes contradicts, and sometimes goes before it. The House, as well as the people, are liable to err; but that the House may happen to differ in opinion from the people, is no infallible mark of error. And it would, in my opinion, be a base and cowardly House of Commons, unworthy of the large and liberal confidence, without which it must