received the sanction of the legislature. In its progress, it met with considerable opposition. The bill, said Mr. Canning, was obviously a breach of faith towards all who, since 1810, had devoted themselves to the public service, on condition of receiving the benefits which the act of that year held out. He would put an individual case—— that of a young man of the highest promise and of most respectable birth, but deprived of his father, who at a time when he was obtaining the honours of his college, and had every prospect of distinguished preferment in the church, was induced to accept a public situation under the crown on the conditions of the statute of 1810. On those conditions he had relied; but he was now to be told that they were not to be fulfilled-that a large part of his emoluments was to be taken from him. This bill would be to him a grievous injury. It was impossible to know how many individuals had quitted the law, the army, or the church, under the faith of the act of 1810. This bill might also be considered an invasion of the rights and powers of the crown. Besides, if

a man were removed from office, he would lose all he had contributed to this fund: it would really be nothing short of pillaging him to turn him out of his place without returning the money he had annually paid. He saw no remedy for this objection, but by defining in the bill for what faults a man should or should not be dismissed, and under what circumstances he should or should not be allowed to withdraw the sum he had contributed to this joint stock. The bill gave all the apparent accuracy of rule to that which could not be governed by rule. It pro

vided not for extraordinary merit; it recognized not services, the performance of which required superior talents. In the relations between the public and their executive servants, as in the relations of private life, many things must be taken into the account, when rewards were about to be granted, which were not susceptible of legislative interference. He would, therefore, in the first instance, place the extent of reward in the discretion of the crown, and next in the high official servants of the crown. He would not attempt to confine that discretion within legislative limits. It was a vain endeavour to define those shades of merit, which were almost too minute for human observation, and infinitely too nice for legislative enactment.

The ministers defended the measure, as being in itself consonant to strict justice, and as being rendered necessary by the general wish for reduction. Mr. Canning's argument, they said, amounted to a denial, that the country had any right to diminish the amount of remuneration, paid to any of its

servants.

During this session, the nation was gratified by the diminution of some of the public burthens. As soon as the reduction of the navy five per cents was determined upon by ministers, they announced their intention of repealing taxes to the amount of the annual saving of interest. The preference was given to the annual malt duty of one shilling per bushel, which produced nearly a million and a half per annum.

The repeal of this impost did not satisfy the public mind; greater relief was expected, and was loudly called for. The ministers, on the other hand,

declared, that no further relief eould be given, consistently with the safety of the public credit. Their adversaries, however, tried to force them to do that which they refused to do spontaneously. On the 28th of February, Mr. Calcraft brought forward a motion for the progressive repeal of the Salttax, by taking off one-third of the duty in each of the three succeeding He stated that the contribution of a labourer's family to this tax was from 20s. to 25s. a year, and that the relief would be greatly felt.

years.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer replied, that the reduction of the tax would diminish the sinking fund by 500,000l.; and that the tax was not so much felt as was represented; for the very small pittances, which were weekly appropriated to the purchase of salt, would make no difference in the labourer's wages, and were scarcely perceptible in his expenditure. Sir E. Knatchbull, sir T. Lethbridge, Messrs. Gooch, S. Wortley, Wodehouse, and other country gentlemen ranged themselves on this occasion against ministers; and though lord Londonderry protested that the deduction of 500,000l. from the Salt-tax would endanger the sinking fund, they still voted with Mr. Calcraft. The motion was lost by a majority of only four: 165 members voting for the repeal, and 169 against it.

So narrow an escape from the danger and disgrace of being left in a minority, made, no doubt, a considerable impression on the minds of the ministers: but the following day gave them a still more effectual lesson on the necessity of economy and reduction. This occurred in a discussion of

the expenses of the Admiraltyoffice.

ex

Sir J. Osborne, after a panegyric on the saving which had been effected in the contingent expenses of that department, concluded by moving a grant of 57,616l. 16s. 1d. to defray the current penses of the office during the year. To this an amendment was proposed by sir M. W. Ridley, who moved a reduction of 2,000l. in the vote, being the salary of the two junior, or, as they are technically termed, lay lords of the Admiralty. A long debate ensued, in which the advocates for the amendment asserted the utter inutility of these appointments, and ministers as vehemently contended for their importance; at the close, however, the numbers appeared to be, for the amendment, 182against it, 128-leaving ministers in a minority of 54! Those two useless offices were immediately abolished; though, to the very last, ministers (and more especially in the House of Lords, the earl of Liverpool and lord Melville), maintained, that they were absolutely necessary.

This was not the only defeat, which the government sustained. On the 13th of March, lord Normanby moved, "That it is the opinion of this House, that, without detriment to the public service, the duties of joint postmaster-general may be performed by one officer, and that the salary of the other may be saved." The argument which he used was, that the office of the second postmaster-general was a complete sinecure : that it was so, he proved from the nature of the employment, as well as from the fact, that lord Clancarty had filled it for some years,

during which he had been resident on the continent.

Mr. Robinson resisted the motion, because the effect of it would be, to diminish the influence of the crown. The experience of all mankind, in all times, had shown, he said, that there must be some influence attached to a government, to enable it to continue its functions for the benefit of the state. True it was, that the offices under the crown had numerically increased, as compared with former times; but, on the other hand, there had grown up an insurmountable counteracting power. Could any one deny the existence of that counteracting power, which rendered comparatively inefficient in the country the influence, direct or indirect, of the crown? When the extension of universal information through the country was considered, a degree of information which gave respectability to public opinion which it had never before possessed

an intelligence, which no man half a century ago could have expected-was not the balance to government interest apparent to every man? And was it under such circumstances, that the throne was to be deprived piece-meal of those means of gratifying individuals, or of rewarding services, without which a monarchy like ours could not exist?

Mr. Peel and lord Londonderry treated more cautiously the same topics on which Mr. Robinson had insisted, but dwelt principally on the antiquity of the office, the great increase of business in the department of the post-office, and the authority of Mr. Burke, who, in his comprehensive plans of economy, had left this appointment untouched.

Such great sinecures of state, it was replied by the opposition, were tolerated in past times; because they then constituted the only provision for retired servants of the crown. Pensions had now been substituted for the former mode of remuneration; but it would be too much to be loaded both with pensions and sinecures. The just influence of government was that which grew out of the legal authority of the crown. Such influence would exist as long as the monarchy existed. It arose from the collection and administration of the greatest revenue ever known, and the appointment to all civil and military offices. A revenue of 60,000,000l., an army of 70,000 men, a large navy, the patronage of India-these were the sources of just and legitimate influence. The question would have arisen, whether this influence was sufficient, if it had been attempted to reduce a necessary office. If it had been proposed, for instance, to abandon one of our 35 colonies, which formed so fertile a source of patronage, then indeed it might be argued that the just influence of the crown was attacked. But if this second post-master were to be retained, for the reason so boldly advanced by Mr. Robinson, then no office, however useless or expensive, could be touched; for all would be deemed necessary for maintaining the just influence of the crown. According to these notions, there was no sort of limit to be set to that influence. In truth, however, the just influence of the crown was merely that which belonged to it without the abolition of necessary offices, or a change in the manner and forms of government.

Creevey had laid no ground for his motion, except the assertion of his own inefficiency. Mr. Canning further assured the House, that the actual business of the board, in point of extent, delicacy, and difficulty, compared with what it was at the period, when the right hon. gentleman presided over it, partly from circumstances arising out of the renewal of the company's charter, partly from the political and military changes which had since taken place in India, had materially increased. The circumstances to which he had alluded, would, of themselves, in a great degree, account for the burthen of affairs now thrown upon the Board of Control, being much heavier than formerly. He could not, of course, speak as to the former period from his own knowledge; but, from the information he had obtained from others, he could state, that, if they compared the present state of the business at the India house and the Board of Control, with what it was in 1793, it would be found to have increased nearly a hundred fold. This he stated without fear of contradiction; and what was still more to the purpose, he could assure the House, that it had increased, within the last five or six years, in the ratio of 20 per cent. If then, two commissioners were found necessary in 1807, when the hon. mover, and his right hon. colleague were in office, it was surely not too much to say, that no reduction in these commissioners ought to take place at present.

The course of business, so far as related to dispatches sent out to India, was this. The dispatches were prepared by the court of directors and sent to the Board of Control for revision, correction, or approbation. No dispatch could

be sent out to India without the approval of the Board of Control, signified by the signature of three commissioners. He did not mean to say, that many dispatches were not forwarded in the form in which they were first prepared; but, in others, it was found necessary to make corrections, or additions, which were again sent back to the court of directors, assigning the reasons and adducing the motives which required such alterations. Now, such a course of proceeding afforded a guarantee for the diligent performance of the duties of the several parties concerned. If the president or the commissioners were even disposed to be idle, the House would evidently see, that, where they were obliged to give their reasons for any proposed alteration or omission, no man would risk his reputation in giving such reasons, unless he had previously made himself acquainted with the subject. Such was the legal course of proceeding prescribed by the act of parliament, and in no instance ever omitted. But custom had introduced another course, which, though it seemed to give additional trouble in the first instance, was calculated ultimately to save it. Previous to an important dispatch being made up at the India-house, its substance was usually, by courtesy, communicated to the president of the Board of Control; so that, if there was any fundamental objection to the principle on which it was framed, this could at once be stated confidentially, without committing the two authorities against each other; and the court of directors might be advised, that it would be better not to draw up their dispatch in such a shape. On this intimation being given, the plan of it was