A suspension of arms was accordingly agreed upon the seventh of April, the duration of which was limited to ten days. This, by the French commander, was deemed a space sufficient to come to a final determination, whether to acceptor to refuse those terms which had been proffered to the Imperial courts, and from which it was now determined, by the French, not to recede.

In accepting the offer of an armistice, for the purpose of pacification, Buonaparte displayed equal moderation and judgement.Though the rapid career of his victories had met with little interruption, he could not but be sensible of the extreme difficulties, if not imminent dangers to which he was now exposed.

His rapid marches, across ravines and precipices, and over mountains, where no traces of roads existed, had compelled him to leave behind the greater part of his heavy artillery; while his army, from the rigours of the season, and the constant state of action in which they had been kept, had very sensibly diminished; and though the remainder preserved, to the last, the same courage and ardour, yet they were insufficient to preserve the vast extent of country which they had conquered; and the positions which he had taken, though highly favourable for farther conquest, had he been sufficiently reinforced, were no less fitted for the operations of the enemy, which he conceived he had left behind him in the states of Venice.

To reach Vienna by the speediest direction, the French army had to pass the mountains of Stiria, which rise for a long extent from the VOL. XXXIX.

Murh, almost within sight of this seat of empire. These mountains, easily defended by the retreating army, and the succours which were pouring in from all quarters, would have rendered the remainder of his march extremely difficult. These difficulties might have been ob viated, by his taking a direction towards the Danube, by crossing over from the Murh to the Ems, along the banks of which his army would have found an easier mode of arriving at the end of their expedi tion; but the circuit was too long, and the army too much diminished, to suffer such a dismemberment of it as would be necessary to keep up its communication with Italy. The dangers arising from the enemy before him, had been well weighed by Buonaparte. By daring courage, and the boldest efforts, he had, in the space of a month, led his army to conquests, which the most ardent imagination had scarce ventured to contemplate; but he had made no calculations on the outset of his expedition,for other enemies than those with whom he was in open hostility, and therefore had not provided resources against them.

The best judges of military affairs expressed a degree of wonder, not that Buonaparte should accept the offer of an armistice, but that the Imperialists should make it. Had he advanced without a proper train of battering cannon against the works of Vienna, which might still have been defended, even after the loss of a battle in the field, the Hungarians and Austrians, collected in over-powering numbers, would have probably cut off his retreat, and his ruin would have been certain. It was not, therefore, it has been said, on very probable grounds, the ter◄ [Dj

ror

ror of Buonaparte's arms, tremendous as he was, that moved the emperor to sue for peace; but a terror of another kind, on the one hand, and an allurement held out, on the other by the French commander, in the preliminaries for peace. The greater portion by far of his Imperial majesty's subjects, even a great many officers in his armies, were averse to a war with France. The conduct of Buonaparte had not, on the whole, been such as to discredit his professions of a respect for private property, public credit, and the rights of men, as well as nations. The shew he had made of generosity and justice, in some instances, veiled, in a great measure, from the public eye, those contributions which he levied in others. No general, no politician of the present day, appears to be more profoundly skilled than that leader in the management of the two great springs that move the whole ma chinery of public affairs, the passions and finance. His conquests took property and cultivation, and the free exercise of religion under their protection; and in directing the new governments to be responsible for the debts of the old, he touched on a deep system of policy and revolution. The governments that had fallen before him seemed to have fallen of themselves, and without convulsion. Had the coalition, on entering France, issued a proclamation in favour of the government de facto, the road to Paris would have been found more practicable. The effects of Buonaparte's proclamation in Stiria, on the inhabitants of Vienna, and other cities, were dreaded, it was believed, in the Imperial palace.

In order to accelerate the nego

ciation, Buonaparte had previously taken care that the conditions of the armistice should be entirely to the advantage of the French. The posts occupied by them, in the provinces of Carniola, Carinthia, Stiria, and the Tyrol, were to remain in their possession till a paci fication had taken place. To these posts others were added of great consequence: one of them was Gratz, the capital of Stiria, a city of the first importance in the em peror's dominions, and where a numerous garrison was placed by Buonaparte.

unre.

While this fortunate commander was obtaining so many triumphs for France, the directory was mittingly attentive in bestowing those praises upon him and his ge nerals, which they were conscious would prove peculiarly satisfactory to the patriotic disposition, and warmth for the glory of their coun try, that had so remarkably charac terised the French officers, since the commencement of this wa.

In order to convince them how circumstantially they attended to the gallant actions they performed, the directory wrote, in its official ca pacity, letters of thanks to every officer deserving of such a mark of distinction. Herein they carefully specified the particular instances of his valour and conduct that had induced them to reward his merit with so honourable a notice. The publicity of the encomiums bestowed upon them excited, in a wonderful manner, the emulation of the French military. To obtain a remuneration of this kind was held the highest degree of honour and credit to which the profession could attain, as it seldom failed to be accompanied, at the same time, by promotions,

and

and other substantial encourage.

ments.

The principal officers to whom the directory addressed letters of such a tenour at this time, were generals Joubert, Berthier, Bernardotte, Massena, Guieux, and KelJerman. They were all men of tried valour and abilities, and had proved of essential utility to Buonaparte, in his expedition to Italy and Austria. There were others also no less deserving, such as Augereau, who was styled his right hand. To these the like honours were paid verbally by the directory, and similar tokens of regard conferred upon them, on their being sent to Paris, by Buonaparte, with the standards and military trophies taken from the enemy.

It was with great reason that the French government testified somuch respect for the army of Italy. It had, in the preceding and present campaign, been the principal agent and support of the republic. While its armies in Germany were compelled to retreat, this one continued to advance, and to strike terror into the councils of Vienna. Had not Buonaparte balanced, by his successes, the expulsion of the Freuch from the empire, they would probably have been followed by the victorious Imperialists into the heart of France. It was the necessity of making head against him, that with held five armies successively, for the preservation of Austria. Had not this immense force been necessary to prevent its total destruction, and could it have been employed in carrying the war into France, it was the opinion of Europe, that an ef. fectual impression must have been made on the republic; and that the conditions of peace proposed by the

British ambassador at Paris, must have been accepted by the directory.

To the extraordinary talents of Buonaparte, and to the valour of his troops, was owing therefore the superiority that France still retained over its enemies. Never had the exploits of this celebrated warrior, and of his companions in arms, been exceeded. In the course of less than a twelvemonth they had been victorious in no less than eighty-four engagements, fourteen of which were pitched battles. Exclusive of the slain, they had taken one hundred thousand prisoners, and between two and three thousand pieces of artillery. They had compelled five sovereign princes, two of them kings, to submit to their own terms, and had chased five Imperial armies out of Italy. They had given a new aspect to this part of Europe. They had changed the forms of its ancient republics, and had founded two new ones on the plan of their own. All this they bad effected at the expence of their enemies. Instead of draining the treasures of France, by these conquests and acquisitions, they had enriched them with the surplus of what they had levied and expended for their own support.

But what the philosophical world will probably deem the most ma terial circumstance, they carried with them the principles of that revolutionizing disposition, which had effected such changes in their own country. They propagated them widely in Italy. Whatever may be its future destiny, the seeds of that freedom of thinking, which the French planted among the peo ple, will fructify in spite of all en[D 2]

deavours

deavours to stifle them. The temporal and spiritual power of the clergy have both received such a blow, that neither, in all likelihood, will ever recover its former import ance. The minds of a large proportion of the people are in fact so completely revolutionized, that although they may be necessitated, for their own safety, to submit for a while to the coercive law of the sword, they will embrace every opportunity of shaking off the yoke of foreign rulers, and will reiterate those attempts so frequently, that it is probable they will succeed at last, especially if the French republic should remain unshaken: as in that case they will always depend on its intervention in their favour; they will, from that motive, be ready to act with the more spirit and energy against those whom they will henceforth consider much more as their ty ants than their sovereigns.

These appear to be the current ideas of the majority of politicians. In France, and in those countries that are not averse to the interests and principles of the republican par ty, no doubt is entertained that if it stands its ground, Italy will soon or late assume those forms of government which Buonaparte was so anxious to establish.

All these considerations operated strongly at the period of the ne gociations, to which the court of Vienna was compelled to accede. The Imperial ministry, discouraged by the repeated inefficacy of the extraordinary exertions that had been made to resist the victorious armies of France, yielded to necessity, and subscribed to the conditions dic tated by the conqueror, in hopes, however, that fortune might, at a more auspicious crisis, atone for the calamities now become un avoidable.

!

HE armistice, granted by Buo

Tnaparte, left the Austrian ministers no longer time, than was absolutely necessary, to make a speedy option, whether to embrace his of fers, or to renew hostilities. He was so completely prepared for these, that a renewal of them was too much dreaded by the court of Vienna, to decline any longer, to accede to his proposals.

The preliminary articles of a peace, between France and Austria, were accordingly agreed to, and signed, by both parties, on the eighteenth of April. By these preliminaries the French remained sovereign possessors of the Austrian low countries, and the establishment of the republic of Lombardy was confirmed. These were the ostensible articles, but it was universally conjectured, that the court of Vienna would not so readily have assented to concessions so advantageous to France, and detrimental to itself, without previously obtaining the promise of some indemnifica tions.

During these transactions, on the

borders of Austria, and while Bube naparte was preparing to march into that province, the French ar mies on the Rhine had been put into motion, and obtained some signal successes. The necessity of procuring a new army, to enable the archduke to oppose Buonaparte, had obliged the court of Vienna, to recall a large proportion of its forces from the defence of that river. Little less than thirty thousand of its best veterans being thus withdrawn, the French resolved to attempt a passage. On the nineteenth of April, general Moreau effected it, after an obstinate dispute, and proceeded immediately to Kehl, of which he took possession, notwithstanding the resolute defence of the Austrian troops that occupied this advantageous post. The loss, on both sides, was very great; five French generals were wounded, and numbers of their soldiers fell; but the slain and wounded among the Austrians were much more numerous. Between [D 3] three