The earl of Carlisle did not think that the selected documents on the table could communicate the satisfaction which was required. He lamented that ministers had not come forward with them sooner, and offer their explanations when it might have been possible to collect information from other sources, and especially when they had an opportunity of hearing what the noble lord who commanded the fleet knew on the subject. He wished to have it satisfactorily explained, why ministers, when they had information of the preparations made by the enemy and the sailing of the Brest fleet, had not provided a force, under lord Bridport, sufficiently strong to have been superior to the consequences of two ships (the Prince and the Sanspareil) running foul of one another, and which would have guarded against the delay which such accidents had occasioned. He wished likewise to know why it was four days before the fleet was ready to sail, after the news of the French fleet being at sea bad arrived? Why, too,ministers had not given admiral Colpoys specific orders to make Ireland the chief object of his regard? It was the duty of ministers to watch over the safety of Ireland with the same care which was demanded for the safety of Great Britain. When they knew the designs of the enemy to be pointed against that country, why was not admiral Colpoys sent directly for its defence? Had they given such a positive order to admiral Colpoys, there would have been no occasion for any delay in lord Bridport's sailing; be ause, in proceeding directly to Ireland with the force he could muster, he must have fallen in with some of admiral Colpoys's squadron, which would have en

abled him to face the French with complete success. Even after admiraColpoys's return, why were not such ships as were fit for service again sent out to re-inforce lord Bridport? The marquis of Abercorn, after severely arraigning the total negligence of ministers to take any measures for the defence of Ireland, said, that, in order to establish the justification of ministers, the papers on their lordships' table ought to have proved four points: that this country had a sufficient fleet, ready for sea; that admiral Colpoys's fleet was sufficiently strong to keep the sea; that admiral Colpoys was sufficiently provided with stores and provisions; and that he had received particular orders to turn his attention to Ireland, and to proceed to that island, as soon as he should have re ceived intelligence that the French fleet had sailed. None of these points, however, appeared from the papers. On the contrary, it was proved, that admiral Colpoys's fleet had been too-long at sea; that it was not sufficiently provided with stores and provisions; and, above all, that no particular attention had been paid to Ireland, nor any positive orders given to admiral Colpoys to make its safety his principal object. Under such circumstances, the marquis could have no hesitation to vote for the inquiry.

The earl Spencer, with respect to admiral Colpoys, would only say, that if his fleet, together with that of lord Bridport, had gone to Ireland, the channel would have been left open to the Dutch fleet. One of the causes of lord Bridport's fleet not having been ready in time was, the damage which several ships sustained in a hard gale of wind in the channel.

The

The earl of Moira considered the real point in question to be, why admiral Colpoys had not received orders to proceed to Ireland, as soon as he received information that the French fleet had sailed. A noble earl (Spencer) had contended that, from the mass of intelligence which ministers received, it was impossible to decide on the real object of the enemy's expedition. But did not the noble earl know, that it was the province of talents and ability to deduce causes and consequences from the materials with which they might be furnished, and that on such occasions only true sagacity was to be discovered? He had been at Dublin when the preparations of the enemy were going on, and the arms, stores, and other articles with which they were provided, demonstrated the real point of their destination. That their design was to furnish the discontented in Ireland with arms was evident. But if the best means of securing Ireland had not been taken, this did not affect the admiralty exclusively, but the administration in general. He should vote for the enquiry in the hope that the house would proceed farther, shew to whom the disasters of the war were to be attributed, and why ministers did not seize and improve the favourable opportunities which were presented.

The earl of Liverpool maintained that a channel fleet, equal to that of the enemy, had always been deemed sufficient for our defence. Such was the understanding in the last and all our former wars. That the fleet under admiral Colpoys was fitted to - face the enemy's was a point that did not seem to be much disputed. As to the place to which he was to direct his force, he begged leave to

say, that it was not intended for the defence of Ireland exclusively, but for every part of his majesty's European dominions. With regard to the question, where the fleet could be best stationed for general defence, he maintained that it had actually been stationed in a place and situation where it could operate to the best advantage for the defence of this nation, and was in readiness to come to the defence of Ireland, as soon as that of any other part. Admiral Colpoys had orders to intercept the enemy's fleet going to any part of the world, and although it appeared doubtful, at that time, whether they were intended for Ireland or Portugal, was it possible to imagine, that if admiral Colpoys thought they were going to Ireland, he had such orders as did not leave him at liberty to follow them to Ireland? The admiral, viewing all circumstances, formed the resolution of remaining on his station. From all the information he had, the admiral was right in so doing: and all that bappened to disappoint his hopes and expectations was owing to the wind.

The duke of Bedford confessed that he was but little satisfied with the consolation held out by the noble earl, who spoke last, that it was always held sufficient in former wars for us to equal the enemy with a channel fleet; thereby insinuating that it would be sufficient for us to do so in this. Such doctrine appeared to him to be but frigid consolation, after the repeated assertions which had been made, that we had almost annihilated the maritime power of France. It had been said that at the time the armament was preparing at Brest, it was uncertain whether it was intended for Ireland

or for Portugal, and that the chance was equal. Now he would ask, whether, supposing the chance to be equal, there was a man in this world who thought it would be wise in us to put Portugal in the scale against Ireland? Whether there was a man upon earth rash enough to put these two chances upon an equality? With regard to the interest of this country in thwarting the expedition, admiral Colpoys, he had no doubt, acted well, according to the information and instructions he received; but he must contend, that from the information which ministers received, he ought to have had positive orders to sail to Ireland: and here it was notorious, from the documents which ministers themselves had laid upon the table, that this fleet ought to have been in Ireland when the French were there; for ministers had early information of the Brest fleet being to sail, and probably, at least, that they were destined for Ireland; indeed they could not even deny that they had information, or that they ought to have had it, considering the vast sums of money that they were allowed for obtaining intelligence. They might have judged, they ought, indeed, to have known, from the arms that were on board, and from the nature of the equipment, that it was destined for Ireland.

Lord Hood expressed his conviction, that the motion, if adopted by their lordships, could be of no service, but, would do mischief. He was convinced that every possible measure had been adopted, during the course of the war, by the naval department, for the good of the nation. He said that, while his mental faculties, such as they were, continued, he should have been glad

to serve in the present just and necessary war, if he had been permitted to do so.

Lord Auckland could see no reason for considering what had happened on the coast of Ireland, as a miscarriage on our part. The advantage was all on our side. The enemy had failed in their expedition, and lost one-fourth of their ships and nearly five thousand of their men.

The earl of Guildford observed, that some sort of enquiry had been judged to be necessary even by administration: for no sooner had the subject been mentioned in the house, than the noble lord, at the head of the admiralty, was ready to produce the papers that had been laid on the table. That these had been garbled, he would not say: but he would at least contend that, for the purpose of conveying information, they had been very badly selected. He could not find, in those papers, any good reason for admiral Colpoys being kept so long at sea. With respect to the real destination of the Brest fleet, the ministers were, he believed, the only persons who entertained any doubt. He concluded with observing, that. unless their lordships felt the propriety of the inquiry proposed themselves, from the papers themselves, and the speech of the noble earl at the head of the admiralty, nothing that could be said on the subject, could have any effect on their lordships' minds.

Lord Grenville, after declaring the harmony and concert that so happily reigned among the ministry, and the share he himself had taken in the transaction in question, and his readiness to take also his share of responsibility attached to it, complained, that whenever any expe

dition

dition failed, the whole blame was thrown upon ministers, without stopping to ascertain, whether they were, in fact, guilty. It was supposed, that they could, at pleasure, command the winds and waves, and send a fleet up or down the channel at a moment's warning. It had been represented, though without loss on our part, as a national disgrace: yet whatever failure there was, it was on the side of the enemy; who had lost, in all, he believed, eleven armed vessels. It might have been supposed, from the manner in which some noble lords had spoken, that this was a complete triumph of the French fleet overours: whereas, in fact, their only boast was, that they had succeeded in escaping from our fleet. When, before the administration of the present ministry, would the French have condescended to make such a boast? When, before the existence of the present ministry, would they not have considered it as a disgrace? Noble lords had complimented ministry justly, though unintentionally. "You have not, said he, been able to catch this miserable wreck of a French fleet." Who, exclaimed lord Grenville, made it a wreck? The present government. In no former administration, he observed, had this country ever been able to keep two fleets in the channel; each of them equal to that of the French; the one ready for sailing, the other blocking up Brest. But if noble lords supposed, that because our fleet was superior, the enemy, if the administration had directed it properly, could not have got to the coast of Ireland, he would refer them to two instances-one in 1689, in which year the French

landed in Ireland, notwithstanding that lord Torrington was at sea with a formidable fleet: and one in the succeeding year, when the same attempt was made with success, although admiral Russel did every thing in his power to prevent it. As to Ireland, lord Grenville was ready to allow, that its defence, as well as that of England, depended on the fleet: but the internal state of Ireland, notwithstanding all that had been alleged, he had the satisfaction to assure their lordships, was by no means such as to render such an invasion at all alarming. The French affected to have some hopes of being joined in Ireland; but the event shewed how much they were mistaken. This was a convincing argument in answer to those who declaimed on the discontents in Ireland, and would, he hoped, prevent or be recollected in all future discussions on that subject. He begged leave, in justice to his majesty's ministers, to bring to their lordships' recollection, the different instances in which the naval undertakings of the French had, in the course of the present war, been defeated. The shameful and cowardly conduct of Richery, after he left Toulon, and the manner in which he avoided the British squadron till he was strengthened by the accession of a British fleet; the event of the first of June, one of the most memorable in the history of nautical affairs; and the late decisive victory, were evidence on which the defence of the country particularly depended. Whatever we might feel for the miscarriage of the undertakings of our allies on the continent, in our naval undertakings there was nothing but tri

umph

umph. In the continental miscarriage we had, indeed, suffered some pecuniary loss, which could be easily repaired: and he was so far from regretting what had been thus expended, that were it possible to recall what was passed, he would vote for the assistance that had been actually given over again.

The marquis of Lansdowne said, that in Ireland it had been a prejudice to represent the government of this country, as careless of the sister kingdom. At present a new discontent had arisen, and gentlemen who were in the habit of corresponding with Ireland, knew very well that they who had formerly taken the part of the government, were now forced to acknowledge, that Ireland had been neglected. Applications had been made from thence for protection; and it must be confessed that country had been abandoned by England.Ministers had pledged to keep up a great land force in Ireland, which they had withdrawn, In the last war, a pledge had been made, that a naval force should, in all future wars, be kept off the Irish coast; and were he minister now, he should think it necessary to station a fleet in the Cove of Cork immediately. An inquiry could not but be satisfactory in every point of view; satisfactory to admiral Colpoys, to lord Bridport, and to the profession at large. There were, besides, other persons concerned in the inquiry; the admiralty, the commissioners of accounts, and other inferior boards. It would not impede. but accelerate operations. Ministers, indeed, had shewn some consciousness of the necessity of a mock inquiry at least, by their producing papers; and the first thing to be remarked on these papers

was the notorious want of intelligence. The noble earl had said, that he would resign when he could find a person daring enough to con tend against the winds. What the public wanted was, not a man who could govern against the winds and waves, but one who would govern with them this was the case in the present instance. The wind had been favourable; and all that had been wanting, was an admiralty capable of making use of it. On the 16th of December, admiral Colpoys receiv ed intelligence of the French having sailed, the wind continued fair, and if he had proper orders, he would have been off the Irish coast. Had the ships under lord Bridport been ready, the wind would still have been fair. The noble earl had talked of long nights; was it so great a reach of foresight to know that there were long nights in December? But the French fleet, it seemed, might have gone up the channel. In the first place, the wind was against them; but if they had, what would have been the case? They would have been under lock and key. The remainder of the subject lay in a very small compass; it turned upon two points. Why were not orders given to admiral Colpoys to go off Cape Clear? And why were not more ships kept ready at Portsmouth?

The earl Fitzwilliam said, that where there had been blame, there ought to be inquiry. Some expressions that had been thrown out of "greater care being required for England than Ireland," would make a deep impression on the minds of the people of that country; and he was sorry to have heard them.

Lord Grenville assured their lordships, that they might set their minds at rest on the subject of Ireland;